

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT

NO. 39 MAP 2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellee

VS.

WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, JR.,
Appellant

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered on December 10, 2019 at Docket No. 3314 EDA 2018, affirming the Judgment of Sentence entered on September 25, 2018, as made final by the denial of post-sentence motions on October 23, 2018, by the Honorable Steven T. O'Neill, Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County at CP-46-CR-3932-2016

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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §724(a) of the Judicial Code, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, §2, (42 Pa.C.S. §742), as it granted Appellant's Petition for Allowance of Appeal via Order dated June 23, 2020.

II.

ORDER OR OTHER DETERMINATION IN QUESTION

A. The text of the order and determination of the Superior Court (the “Panel”) at issue:

Judgment of sentence *affirmed*.

Judgment Entered.

/s/ Joseph D. Seletyn

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/10/19

Commonwealth v. Cosby, J-M07001-19, 2019 Pa. Super. 354, Slip Op. pp. 93-94.

B. The text of the orders and determinations of the trial court at issue:

Order dated February 4, 2016

AND NOW, this 4 day of February, 2016, it is hereby **ORDERED** as follows: based upon review of all the pleadings and filings, the exhibits admitted at this hearing, and all testimony of witnesses, with a credibility determination being an inherent part of this Court’s ruling, the Court finds that there is no basis to grant the relief requested in paragraph 3b of the Defendant’s Petition for a Writ Habeas Corpus [sic] and, therefore, the Habeas Corpus Petition seeking dismissal of the charges is hereby **DENIED**.

BY THE COURT

[R.1048a]

Order dated December 5, 2016

* * *

AND NOW, this 5th day of December 2016, upon consideration of the “Defendant’s Motion to Suppress The Contents Of His Deposition Testimony and Any Evidence Derived Therefrom on the Basis that the District Attorney’s Promise Not to Prosecute Him Induced Him to Waive His Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination,” filed August 12, 2016, the Commonwealth’s Response thereto, filed September 2, 2016, and after hearing before the undersigned on November 1, 2016, based upon the arguments of counsel and the evidence adduced, the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is hereby **DENIED** in its entirety.

BY THE COURT

[R. 1192a-1197a].

Order dated March 15, 2018

AND NOW, this 15th day of March, 2018, upon consideration of the Commonwealth’s “Motion to Introduce Evidence of 19 Prior Bad Acts of the Defendant,” the Defendant’s response thereto, the Commonwealth’s offers of proof, argument of Counsel on March 5 and 6, 2018, the post hearing briefs submitted by Counsel, and this Court’s comprehensive review of Pa.R.E. 404(b), reported appellate authority, an analysis of the proposed evidence under the “common plan, scheme and design” and “absence of mistake” exceptions, and a balancing of the probative value of the other acts evidence versus the risk of unfair prejudice to the Defendant, it is hereby **ORDERED** and **DECREED** that the Commonwealth’s Motion is **GRANTED** in

part and **DENIED**, in part, subject to further examination and evidentiary rulings in the context of trial.

The Commonwealth shall be permitted to present evidence, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b), regarding **five** prior bad acts of its choosing from CPBA 2-12 through CPBA 2-19. . . .

BY THE COURT

[R. 1672a-1673a].

Order dated April 17, 2018

AND NOW, this 17th day of April, 2018, upon consideration of the Commonwealth's "Motion to Introduce Admissions of the Defendant," the Defendant's response thereto, argument on March 30, 2018, the Commonwealth's Supplemental Memorandum of Law, and the Defendant's Response to the Supplemental Memorandum of Law, and supplemental argument on April 17, 2018, is hereby **ORDERED** and **DECREED** that the Commonwealth's Motion is **GRANTED**.

BY THE COURT

[R. 6224a].

III.

STATEMENT OF SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The first issue involves the admission of: (a) testimony concerning remote, uncharged allegations that Appellant, William H. Cosby, Jr. (“Cosby”) sexually assaulted women; and (b) excerpts of Cosby’s civil deposition. The decision “...to admit evidence is subject to review for an abuse of discretion.” *Commonwealth v. Hairston*, 84 A.3d 657, 664 (Pa. 2014). ““An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.”” *Id.* at 664-665 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

The second issue challenges the: (a) refusal to dismiss charges based on a commitment by the Montgomery County District Attorney’s (“MCDA”) Office to not prosecute Cosby; and (b) denial of Cosby’s motion to suppress deposition testimony that he provided in reliance on that promise. As to the former, “[o]rdinarily, an appellate court will review the grant or denial of a petition for a writ of *habeas corpus* for an abuse of discretion...”” *Commonwealth v. McClelland*, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 4092109, *10 (Pa. 2020)(citation and footnote omitted).

Whether an enforceable agreement not to prosecute existed is a question of law. *Konyk v. Pennsylvania State Police*, 183 A.3d 981, 988, n.6 (Pa. 2018) (“...whether an implied contract can be derived from a set of underlying facts represents a question of law.”). Where the existence of an agreement is disputed, “...what was said and done by the parties as well as what was intended by what was said and done by them are questions of fact.” *GMH Assocs., Inc. v. Prudential Realty Group*, 752 A.2d 889, 898 (Pa. Super. 2000)

Regarding the denial of a motion to suppress, courts consider: “...only the Commonwealth's evidence and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.” *Commonwealth v. Livingstone*, 174 A.3d 609, 618-619 (Pa. 2017).

Additionally, “...this Court is bound by the trial court’s findings of fact, unless those findings are not based on competent evidence.” *Thatcher’s Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc.*, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (Pa. 1994). Furthermore, “...absent an abuse of discretion, this Court is bound by the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the parties.” *Id.* (citations omitted)

As to questions of law, lower courts’ conclusions are not binding on this Court, “...whose duty it is to determine whether there was a proper application of

law to the facts...” *Id.* The “...standard of review is *de novo* and [the] scope of review is plenary.” *Livingstone*, 174 A.3d at 619.

IV.

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- A. Where allegations of uncharged misconduct involving sexual contact with five women (and a *de facto* sixth) and the use of Quaaludes were admitted at trial through the women's live testimony and Appellant's civil deposition testimony despite: (a) being unduly remote in time in that the allegations were more than fifteen years old and, in some instances, dated back to the 1970s; (b) lacking any striking similarities or close factual nexus to the conduct for which Appellant was on trial; (c) being unduly prejudicial; (d) being not actually probative of the crimes for which Appellant was on trial; and (e) constituting nothing but improper propensity evidence, did the Panel err in affirming the admission of this evidence?

The Panel concluded that the trial court did not err.

- B. Where: (a) the Montgomery County District Attorney ("MCDA") agreed that Appellant would not be prosecuted in order to force Appellant's testimony at a deposition in Complainant's civil action; (b) the MCDA's Office issued a formal public statement reflecting that agreement; and (c) Appellant reasonably relied upon those oral and written statements by providing deposition testimony in the civil action, thus forfeiting his constitutional right against self-incrimination, did the Panel err in affirming the trial court's decision to allow not only the prosecution of Appellant but the admission of Appellant's civil deposition testimony?

The Panel concluded that the trial court did not err.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Form of action and procedural history

On December 30, 2015, Cosby was charged with three counts of aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §3125 (a)(1), (4) and (5). [R.1a]. Andrea Constand (“Complainant”) alleged that Cosby sexually assaulted her in 2004. [R. 3759a; 3781a].

On January 11, 2016, Cosby filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the “Habeas Petition”), arguing that the charges should be dismissed based on a commitment made in February 2005 by then-MCDA Bruce Castor (“Castor”), that Cosby would not be prosecuted. [R. 389a-411a]. Hearings were held on February 2 and 3, 2016. [R.412a-1017a]. The Habeas Petition was denied on February 4, 2016. [R. 1048a].

A preliminary hearing was held on May 24, 2016, after which all charges were held for trial. [R.3a]. A criminal information was filed July 13, 2016. [R.8a].

On August 12, 2016, Cosby filed a motion to suppress his deposition testimony based on Castor’s non-prosecution commitment which compelled him to waive his Fifth Amendment rights (“Motion to Suppress”). [R.6271a-6290a]. At a hearing on November 1, 2016, the trial court admitted the notes of testimony from the Habeas hearing and several stipulations relating to emails, dated September 23

and 25, 2015, between Castor and Risa Ferman (“Ferman”). [R. 1056a-1058a].¹ No further testimony was taken. On December 5, 2016, the lower court denied the Motion to Suppress. [R.1197a]. It issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Sur Motion to Suppress Evidence Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I) on December 5, 2016. [R.1192a-1197a].

On September 6, 2016, the prosecution filed a Motion to Introduce Evidence of Other Bad Acts of Defendant. [R.11a]. Cosby filed an answer in opposition. [R.14a]. Hearings were held on December 13 and 14, 2016. [R.1198a]. On February 24, 2017, the trial court granted the motion in part, allowing the testimony of one woman. *Id.* It denied the motion as related to 12 other women. *Id.*

Trial commenced on June 5, 2017 and on June 17, 2017, a mistrial was declared, as the jury deadlocked. [R.37a].

Prior to the second trial, on January 18, 2018, the prosecution filed another motion to introduce testimony regarding the alleged prior bad acts (“PBA”) of Cosby—this time from 19 PBA witnesses. [R. 1200a-1308a]. On February 5, 2018, Cosby filed an answer in opposition. [R.51a]. At a March 5 and 6, 2018, hearing [R. 1309a-1671a], the prosecution submitted written, unsworn statements from 19 women; no testimony was presented. [R.1311a-1312a]. On March 15, 2018, the

¹ Ferman was in the MCDA’s Office in 2005 when Castor determined that Cosby would not be prosecuted. [R. 479a]. Ferman later was elected as the MCDA. [R. 501a].

trial court allowed the prosecution to choose five of the 19 women to testify. [R. 1672a-1673a].

The trial court granted both parties' requests to incorporate all prior pretrial motions and oppositions thereto. [R. 1317a; 48a; 50a].

On March 29, 2018, the prosecution filed a motion to introduce excerpts from Cosby's deposition. [R.62a]. On March 30, 2018, Cosby filed an answer in opposition. *Id.* On April 17, 2018, the trial court granted the motion. [R.6224a].

Cosby's retrial commenced on April 2, 2018. [R.1768a]. On April 26, 2018, the jury found Cosby guilty. [R. 5813a-5816a]. Sentencing occurred on September 24 and 25, 2018. [R. 5895a-6212a]. A timely post-sentence motion was filed on October 5, 2018 [R.94a] and denied on October 23, 2018. [R.97a].

A Notice of Appeal was filed on November 19, 2018 [R.98a] and Cosby's Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) Statement was filed on December 11, 2018. [R.100a]. The trial court issued its Opinion on May 14, 2019. [R.105a; see also App'x "B"]. On December 10, 2019, the Panel affirmed. *Commonwealth v. Cosby*, 224 A.3d 372, 431 (Pa. Super. 2019). On January 9, 2020, Cosby filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal. On June 23, 2020, this Court granted the Petition, limited to the issues herein.

B. Statement of Prior Determinations

The Opinion and Order of the Panel affirming Cosby's judgment of sentence is published at *Commonwealth v. Cosby*, 224 A.3d 372 (Pa. Super. 2019). See Appendix "A." The text of the Order is included in Section II.

The relevant determinations of the trial court are those: (1) denying Cosby's Habeas Petition [R.1048a]; (2) denying Cosby's Motion to Suppress [R.1197a]; (3) granting the motion to introduce evidence of alleged PBAs [R.1672a-1673a]; and (4) granting the motion to introduce excerpts from Cosby's deposition. [R.6224a]. The trial court's decision is not published. Its Opinion is attached at Appendix "B."

C. Judges whose determinations are to be reviewed

The Panel judges were the Honorable John T. Bender, P.J.E., the Honorable Susan Peikes Gantman, P.J.E. and the Honorable Carolyn H. Nichols.

The trial judge was the Honorable Steven T. O'Neill.

D. Statement of facts

1. The relationship between Complainant and Cosby.

Complainant met Cosby at a basketball game in the fall of 2002 [R.3726a-3727a], when she was approximately 30 years old. [R. 3878a]. Approximately one month later, they had an "introductory conversation..." [R. 3728a]. Additional phone conversations followed, where they discussed Temple University ("Temple") and "some personal questions" about Complainant. [R. 3729a-3730a].

Cosby eventually invited Complainant to his home for dinner. [R. 3731a-3732a]. Although Cosby did not eat with Complainant, he joined her as she ate and drank her wine. [R.3733a]. Cosby put his hand on her inner thigh; Complainant thought it was an “affectionate gesture” and was not threatened or offended by it. [R. 3733a-3734a].²

Thereafter, they continued to speak via phone, discussing primarily Temple sports. [R. 3737a-3738a].

Cosby again invited Complainant to his home for dinner, this time with several people. [R. 3736a]. Complainant stated she had been in the community for less than a year and it was nice to meet people outside of basketball. [R. 3737a]. Another dinner at Cosby’s home followed, where individuals from different universities were present. [R. 3738a-3739a].

The relationship between them evolved, and they discussed more personal issues, including why Complainant had not pursued a career in broadcasting or television. [R. 3739a]. Cosby eventually invited Complainant to a dinner in New York to meet with someone in the entertainment field. Complainant took the train to New York and had dinner with six or eight people. [R. 3740a-3741a]. Cosby offered to reimburse her for the train fare. [R. 3741a]. Later, Cosby invited

² On cross, Complainant acknowledged that she previously stated that Cosby touched her pants, her inner thigh, her clothes and her waist. [R. 3846a].

Complainant to a concert in New York and to meet other women who shared her interests. [R. 3741a-3742a]. She and Cosby talked about health food, homeopathic remedies, and her life philosophy. [R. 3742a].

Several months later, Cosby again invited her to his home for dinner. [R. 3744a-3745a]. Cosby wanted to discuss getting head shots, attending acting lessons and taking steps to help Complainant's broadcasting career. [R. 3744a-3745a]. Complainant accepted the invitation. [R.3745a]. After arriving, Cosby eventually joined her. [R. 3745a]. Complainant drank wine with dinner and sipped brandy after her meal. [R. 3747a]. Complainant stated that she and Cosby talked; at some point, he reached to try to unbutton her pants. [R. 3747a]. She gestured she was not interested, and he stopped. [R. 3747a]. Nothing was ever said about it. [R. 3747a].

Complainant continued to speak with Cosby on the phone. [R. 3748a]. In 2003, Cosby invited her to the Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut. [R. 3749a; 3752a]. Cosby convinced her to come "and let [her] hair out." [R. 3749a]. They had dinner with a casino employee [R. 3750a] in Cosby's hotel room. [R. 3968a]. Complainant was affectionate with Cosby. When he invited Complainant to dinner, she hugged and kissed him "cheek to cheek." [R. 3851a]. After dinner, Complainant hugged Cosby and thanked him. [R. 3851a].

At approximately 10:30-11:00 p.m. that night, Cosby called Complainant, asking her to return to his room for baked goods. [R. 3751a; 3969a]. Complainant went to the room; he talked about sports, broadcasting and Temple. [R. 3751a]. At some point, he motioned her to the bedroom portion of his room and she complied. [R.3970a].

Complainant sat on the edge of the bed. [R.3751a]. Cosby laid down on the bed and then Complainant laid down. [R.3751a; 3971a]. Cosby laid there with his eyes closed. [R. 3752a]. According to Complainant, she sat there and watched him sleep for 10 minutes and then returned to her room. [R.3752a].

During their relationship, Complainant gave Cosby gifts, including Temple apparel and incense. [R.3753a-3754a; 3845a]. Cosby gave Complainant perfume and three cashmere sweaters. [R.3830a-3831a].

In January 2004, Complainant planned to resign from Temple to pursue a career in massage therapy and was nervous. [R.3759a-3760a]. Cosby invited her to his home to discuss her concerns. [R.3760a].

Complainant and Cosby talked at the kitchen table. [R.3760a]. Complainant drank water and had a sip of wine. [R.3761a-3762a]. When Complainant excused herself to go to the bathroom, Cosby went upstairs. [R.3762a]. They arrived back to the kitchen simultaneously. Cosby offered three blue pills and purportedly said, "These are your friends. They'll help take the edge off." [R.3762a-3763a].

Complainant took the pills. [R.3763a]. According to Complainant, she thought the pills were a “natural remedy” and would help her relax. They sat down and continued to talk. [R.3764a].

Complainant testified that she started to have double vision; “cottony” mouth; and slurred speech. [R.3764a]. Complainant indicated that her legs shook when she stood up; Cosby helped her. [R.3765a]. Cosby walked her to a sofa, put a pillow under her head and told her to relax. [R.3765a]. According to Complainant, she became weak, and then recalled feeling Cosby on the couch behind and beside her. [R.3765a-3766a]. Complainant stated that Cosby penetrated her vagina with his fingers, touched her breasts and placed her hand on his penis. [R.3766a]. Complainant claimed she could not tell him to stop or move him away. [R.3766a-3767a].

Her next memory was getting up between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m. with her bra around her neck and her pants “kind of half unzipped.” [R.3768a]. When Complainant walked toward the door, Cosby was in the doorway with a muffin and tea for her. [R.3768a-3769a]. Complainant took a couple of sips of tea, grabbed the muffin and left. [R. 3769a].

After that evening, Complainant and Cosby continued to have phone contact. [R. 3772a]. Cosby called her to check in about sports; nothing personal was discussed during these conversations. [R.3772a-3773a].

A few months later, Cosby invited Complainant to dinner at a Philadelphia restaurant with others. [R. 3770a]. She accepted the invitation because she purportedly wanted to discuss what happened. [R. 3770a]. During dinner she told him that she wanted to talk to him; Cosby asked her to go to his house to talk. [R. 3770a]. Complainant stated that it was a short visit, claiming that Cosby was evasive. [R. 3770a- 3771a].

As planned, Complainant left Temple and moved to Canada at the end of March 2004. [R. 3773a]. They continued to have contact after she moved. [R. 3776a]. Complainant and her family accepted Cosby's invitation to his performance in Toronto. [R. 3776a-3777a]. Complainant admitted there were "a lot" of calls, possibly numbering 70, between Cosby and herself after the sexual contact. [R. 4013a].

In January 2005, Complainant told her mother that Cosby sexually violated her. [R. 3779a-3780a].

On cross-examination, Complainant confirmed that: she never accused Cosby of having intercourse with her; she became friends with Cosby and viewed him as "somewhat" of a mentor; and she told the police that she exchanged "minor flirtatious comments" with Cosby on a few occasions. [R. 3822a-3823a; 3830a]. At trial, Complainant admitted that, in her deposition, she testified that she and Cosby had physical contact "of an intimate nature" before the alleged incident. [R. 3860a-

3861a]. In fact, during her civil deposition, Complainant admitted that, prior to the alleged incident, “on two other occasions” there “was some type of exchange” of “suggestive contact.” [R. 6329a].

2. The investigation.

In January 2005, Complainant reported to police that she was sexually assaulted by Cosby one year prior. [R. 3759a; 3779a; 3781a]. The allegation was investigated by the Cheltenham Police Department and the Montgomery County Detective Bureau. [R. 3784a]. Following the investigation, MCDA Castor determined that Cosby would not be prosecuted. On February 17, 2005, Castor issued a signed press release indicating that, after reviewing the statements of Cosby, Complainant, witnesses and consulting with the Cheltenham Police Department and Montgomery County Detective Bureau, “insufficient, credible and admissible evidence exists upon which any charge against Cosby could be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt.” [R. 127a-128a]. As the elected MCDA, Castor declined to file charges. [R. 127a-128a].

Castor contacted Cosby’s criminal defense attorney, Walter Phillips³ (“Phillips”), and advised him that the press release acted as a non-prosecution agreement compelling Cosby to testify in a civil deposition since, without an

³ Phillips passed away in 2015. [R.511a].

impending criminal charge, Cosby could not assert his Fifth Amendment rights. [R. 703a].

As expected, nineteen days later, on March 8, 2005, Complainant filed a civil suit against Cosby. [R. 3807a]. Cosby sat for four days of deposition. [R.728a]. During that testimony, and in reliance on the promise not to prosecute, Cosby did not assert his Fifth Amendment rights. [R. 750a-751a]. On November 8, 2006, the lawsuit was settled for \$3.38 million dollars [R. 3809a; 3811a] and included a confidentiality agreement. [R. 3993a].

In September 2015, almost ten years after the settlement, and following the public release of Cosby's deposition testimony, then-MCDA Ferman decided to reopen the 2005 investigation. Upon learning of the investigation, Castor sent emails to Ferman reminding her of the non-prosecution agreement made with Cosby in 2005. [R. 384a-388a].

Regarding the non-prosecution agreement, Castor testified at the Habeas hearing, "it was better for justice to make a determination that Mr. Cosby would never be arrested." [R. 474a]. According to Castor, he "...made the decision as the sovereign that Mr. Cosby would not be prosecuted no matter what. As a matter of law, that then made it so that he could not take the Fifth Amendment ever as a matter of law." [R. 475a].

Cosby's civil attorney, John P. Schmitt, testified that he retained Phillips as criminal counsel for Cosby during the 2005 investigation. [R. 700a-701a]. Phillips informed Schmitt that, "although the District Attorney had determined there wasn't sufficient evidence to charge Mr. Cosby, that he did anticipate that there would be a civil litigation. And...it was an irrevocable commitment to us that he was not going to prosecute." [R. 703a]. Schmitt believed the criminal investigation was closed and counseled Cosby to sit for the deposition because Schmitt "had the assurances given to our criminal counsel." [R.760a-762a]. Schmitt relied on the signed press release of Castor and his conversation with Phillips when counseling Cosby to testify. [R. 732a].

Statements made by Cosby during that deposition concerning the use of Quaaludes in the 1970s, and his contact with women during that period, were an integral component of the prosecution's case.

3. The trial testimony concerning allegations of PBAs.

The trial court permitted testimony from five women who accused Cosby of giving them some type of intoxicant and then having some type of physical contact with them; this alleged contact purportedly occurred in the 1980s. According to the women, the sexual contact was without their consent. The trial court also allowed excerpts from Cosby's deposition where he admitted to partying with women in the 1970's and providing Quaaludes to some. This testimony included that Cosby

provided Quaaludes to “other women” and suggested that he had sexual contact with some of these women, one of whom “came forward” and “complained” about that contact. The allegations and deposition testimony are summarized below.⁴

a. Heidi Thomas

In April 1984, Thomas, a 24-year-old aspiring actress and model, was sent to Reno, Nevada by her talent agency to meet Cosby. [R. 5851a-5852a; 2941a].

Thomas met Cosby at a house (which he did not own) and began to rehearse. [R. 5852a; 2945a-2953a]. Performing a “cold read” and playing the part of an intoxicated person, Thomas accepted Cosby’s suggestion to sip wine as a prop. [R. 5852a; 2955a-2956a].

Thereafter, Thomas purportedly was “in a fog” but remembered Cosby’s voice and “snapshots” in her head. [R. 5852a-5853a; 2956a-2957a]. Thomas claimed she remembered waking up in bed while Cosby was forcing her to perform oral sex. [R. 5853a; 2558a-2959a]. She remained in Reno for the remainder of her trip, but only recalled “snapshots” of it. [R. 5853a].

b. Chelan Lasha.

⁴ At the hearing in support of the PBA motion, the prosecution proffered statements of 19 women. [R. 5834a-5868a]. Although the issue was argued [R. 1309a-1524a], no testimony was presented. The only factual information presented was the women’s unsworn statements. Accordingly, the summary is based primarily on those statements. Relevant portions of their trial testimony are also cited.

In 1986, Lasha was 17 when she met Cosby. [R. 5857a; 5859a; 5862a]. Her father's ex-wife worked for a production company with which Cosby was affiliated, and her family sent her information to Cosby "hoping to jump start a career in modeling and acting." [R. 5862a; 3241a-3242a].

Lasha claimed that, in October, she was invited to meet Cosby at the Las Vegas Hilton, where he was going to introduce her to a representative of a modeling agency. [R.3247a-3248a; 5862a]. Lasha suffered from a cold and repeatedly blew her nose; Cosby offered her an antihistamine and a double shot of Amaretto, telling her it would help break it up. [R. 5863a; 3251a]. Cosby told her to change into a robe, wet her hair and someone was on the way to take pictures. [R. 5863a; 3250a]. A representative came to the room, took pictures, told her to lose ten pounds and left. [R. 5863a; 3250a].

According to Lasha, Cosby walked her to the bedroom and told her to lie down to help with her cold. [R. 5863a; 3251a]. Thereafter, Cosby allegedly pinched her nipple and humped her leg. [R. 5863a; 3252a]. Lasha indicated that she felt "something warm" on her leg. [R. 5863a; 3252a]. Lasha stated that Cosby woke her by clapping his hands, telling her that she had to leave [R. 5862a; 5859a; 3252a].

c. Janice Baker-Kinney

In 1982, Baker-Kinney was 24 and working at Harrah's casino in Reno. [R.5836a; 3349a-3350a]. A friend told her that Cosby was having a pizza party at Mr. Harrah's house and asked whether she wanted to go; Baker-Kinney accepted. [R. 5836a; 3352a].

Baker-Kinney indicated that only she, her friend and Cosby were there. [R. 5836a; 3354a]. Cosby offered her a beer and a pill. [R. 5837a; 3355a]. She thought he told her that it was a Quaalude. [R. 5837a; 3355a]. Baker-Kinney indicated that she had taken a Quaalude once before, and voluntarily took the pill. [R. 3355a-3356a].

According to Baker-Kinney, she became dizzy; everything went blurry; her head was spinning; and she blacked out. [R. 5837a; 3358a-3359a]. She recalled lying on a couch and heard her friend say goodbye and leave. [R. 5837a; 3360a]. Baker-Kinney stated her shirt was unbuttoned and her pants were unzipped. [R. 5837a; 3360a]. Cosby propped her up onto him, placed his arm on her breast and then moved toward the top of her pants. [R. 5838a; 3360a-3361a]. Cosby then took her to a bedroom. [R. 5838a; 3361a].

She woke the following morning in bed with Cosby; they were naked. [R. 5838a; 3362a]. Baker-Kinney thought that they had sex because she "was wet down there." [R. 5839a; 3363a].

d. Janice Dickinson

In 1982, Dickinson was a 27-year-old model who met Cosby at his townhouse in New York, where they discussed her singing and acting career. [R.5841a; 5844a; 3611a; 3613a]. That same year Dickinson was in Bali when Cosby called and invited her to Lake Tahoe; she accepted. [R. 5844a; 3614a-3616a].

Upon arrival, Dickinson attended Cosby's show with his music director and they had dinner with Cosby. [R. 5845a; 3619a]. While at dinner she mentioned having menstrual cramps and Cosby gave her a blue pill for it. [R. 5845a; 3620a].

After dinner, Dickinson went to Cosby's room purportedly "to continue our discussion about my career." [R. 5845a; 3621a]. Dickinson stated that she was sitting by the edge of his bed and took photos of Cosby while he was on the phone. [R. 5845a; 3622a]. According to Dickinson, she did not remember how long after taking the pill that it took her to begin to feel its effects. [R. 5845a]. Dickinson stated that she could "barely move" and that her "arms or legs felt immobilized." [R. 5845a; 3625a]. Dickinson stated that she "went to sleep fast after feeling the pain." [R. 5845a; 3626a]. She indicated that she felt sharp pain "in my butt area. Then I blacked out." [R. 5845a]. According to Dickinson, she woke up with semen between her legs; she stated that it "felt like he had penetrated me anally as well." [R. 5846a; 3627a].

e. Maud Lise-Lotte Lublin

Lublin, an aspiring model, met Cosby in 1989 when she was 23 and her booking agent notified her that Cosby wanted to meet her. [R. 5865a]. The second time she met Cosby was at his suite at the Las Vegas Hilton. [R. 5866a; 3513a-3514a]. Lublin indicated that he wanted to talk to her about improvisation; he gave her two dark brown drinks to help her relax. After the second drink, “Cosby sat next to me and was stroking my hair.” [R. 5866a]. According to Lublin, she woke up in her bed at home; she thought she had a bad reaction to the alcohol or some substance. [R. 5866a- 5867a]. Lublin never alleged any sexual contact between she and Cosby. [R. 5867a]. Lublin continued to have contact with Cosby for two years. [R. 5865a].

f. “Jane Doe 1,” the “other women” in the 1970s and Quaaludes

Through excerpts of Cosby’s deposition, the trial court allowed innuendo that Cosby engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with women in the 1970s, and admissions by Cosby that, in the 1970s, he gave Quaaludes to women with whom he was interested in having sex. [R. 4781a-4799a]. Cosby was questioned concerning a woman identified as “Jane Doe 1.” [R. 4784a]. Cosby met her at the Las Vegas Hilton and shared Quaaludes with her. [R. 4784a]. They discussed the effects the Quaaludes had on her. [R. 4785a-4786a]. Cosby indicated it looked like she had too much to drink; she was unsteady; he did not think that her speech was slurred; he thought she was relaxed; and she was able to move her arms and legs.

[R. 4785a-4786a]. The discussion also involved Cosby's possession of Quaaludes in the 1970s. [R. 4788a-4789a]. As of November 2002, Cosby did not have Quaaludes in his possession or in any of his residences. [R. 4788a].

The prosecution introduced testimony from Cosby's deposition regarding giving Quaaludes to other women with whom he wanted to have sex. [R. 4795a-4797a]. These women knowingly and voluntarily took the Quaaludes. [R. 4797a]. Nothing presented reflects whether Cosby actually had sex with those other women and, if so, whether they ever claimed that the sexual contact was not consensual. Moreover, if Cosby had sex with the women "from the 1970s," including "Jane Doe 1," nothing reflects the nature of that sexual contact.

E. Statement of the Order or Other Determination Under Review.

Cosby incorporates Section II and Section V. B. and C.

F. Statement of Preservation of Issues.

The issues raised in Question A were preserved via: Cosby's Opposition to Commonwealth's Motion to Introduce Evidence of Alleged Prior Bad Acts of Defendant [R. 6225a-6270a] and Cosby's Opposition to Commonwealth's Motion to Introduce Admissions by Defendant. [R.6570a-6587a]. They were also preserved for appeal in Cosby's 1925(b) Statement.

The issues raised in Question B were preserved via: Cosby's Habeas Petition [R. 389a-411a] and Cosby's Motion to Suppress [R. 6271a-6290a]. They were also preserved for appeal in Cosby's 1925(b) Statement.

VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The American criminal justice system was designed to convict defendants based upon their conduct – not on their general character. The fervor of the #MeToo movement rendered this cherished Constitutional tenet obsolete at Cosby’s trial where the court admitted copious propensity evidence, consisting of decades-old, uncharged allegations of five women and cherry-picked testimony from Cosby’s civil deposition regarding his use of Quaaludes and sexual behaviors in the 1970s.

Although this excessively remote PBA evidence was profoundly dissimilar to the charged offenses, and therefore inadmissible under the common plan exception, the Panel erred when it abandoned the time-honored test that PBA evidence be “nearly identical” to the charged offense, finding instead that its admission was justified because it followed a rough “playbook of criminal tactics.” Where drug-facilitated sexual assault accounts for roughly half of all sexual assaults, Cosby’s alleged use of an intoxicant in connection with some type of sexual misconduct did not amount to a *de facto* signature-like crime that sanctioned the admission of antiquated PBA evidence. Furthermore, because Cosby did not deny the *actus reus* of the charged offense, but rather challenged the question of Complainant’s consent, the PBA evidence was inadmissible under both the absence-of-mistake/accident exception and the doctrine of chances.

But even *if* the prosecution had successfully demonstrated a legitimate non-character basis for the admission of the PBA evidence, its probative value was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice and should have been barred. Indeed, the prosecution's closing argument revealed its true purpose in admitting an overabundance of PBA evidence which was to strip Cosby of the presumption of innocence, distract the jury from *bona fide* weaknesses in the evidence on the charged offense and breed contempt for Cosby. A new trial is warranted.

Turning to the second issue, the Panel erred in concluding that the Witness Immunity Statute is the only means of providing immunity for a witness' testimony. The Statute had no application to this matter, as there was no "proceeding" involved, as required by its express terms. The Panel's conclusion inappropriately constricts the tremendous power of a prosecutor by conflating her authority to compel testimony via the Witness Immunity Statute with her power to determine whether to *ever* prosecute the accused.

The Panel also overlooked the impact that a non-prosecution commitment has on an accused's ability to thereafter invoke the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, "where the potential exposure to criminal punishment no longer exists," *Commonwealth v. Taylor*, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 253223, *11 (Pa. 2020), the individual no longer can invoke his right against self-incrimination. Such is precisely what happened here. With Castor committing to never prosecute Cosby,

issuing a signed press release concerning that commitment and coming to an agreement with Cosby's counsel on the impact of that commitment on Cosby's Fifth Amendment rights, Cosby sat for four days of deposition in Complainant's civil action and could not, and did not, invoke the Fifth Amendment.

The Panel never addressed whether Castor made a binding non-prosecution commitment. The lower court concluded, however, that he did not. The Record demonstrates otherwise, and the law compels a contrary conclusion. At the time that Castor determined never to prosecute Cosby, he memorialized it in a signed press release and conveyed and discussed that decision with Cosby's counsel. Thereafter, Cosby was deposed without invoking the Fifth Amendment. Ten years later, upon learning that the investigation was going to be reopened, Castor sent emails to the then-MCDA reminding her of the non-prosecution commitment. At the Habeas hearing, Castor testified, at length, concerning his intent, the scope of the commitment and his reasoning. Moreover, Cosby's civil attorney, Schmitt, testified concerning his understanding that Cosby would never be prosecuted for Complainant's allegations; in reliance on that commitment, he permitted Cosby to testify during a contentious deposition without invoking the Fifth Amendment. As a matter of fact, and law, a commitment never to prosecute Cosby was made by the MCDA.

That commitment was binding on Castor's successor. Although there is no Pennsylvania authority directly on-point, decisions from other jurisdictions, as well as principles of Due Process and fundamental fairness, support the conclusion that when an elected prosecutor makes a non-prosecution commitment, that prosecutor binds the office of prosecutor, including any successor in office. A conclusion to the contrary undermines the integrity of the justice system and the office of prosecutor, and is wholly at odds with the "community's sense of fair play and decency." See *Commonwealth v. Kratsas*, 764 A.2d 20, 27 (Pa. 2001).

If this Court finds that Castor's non-prosecution commitment was defective, then principles of promissory estoppel nevertheless bind the MCDA. Castor, as the elected MCDA, made a commitment that reasonably would induce action or forbearance by Cosby. Schmitt unequivocally testified that he relied on that commitment, which was evidenced by the signed press release and conversations between Castor and Cosby's criminal defense attorney, when he permitted Cosby to be deposed. An injustice can only be avoided by enforcing Castor's non-prosecution commitment. Cosby's conviction should be vacated.

Alternatively, Cosby's deposition testimony should have been suppressed. This Court's decision in *Commonwealth v. Stipetich*, 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1995) is controlling. If Castor's non-prosecution commitment was invalid, such does not change the fact that Cosby provided testimony as a result of the commitment by

the elected MCDA. It was “fundamentally unfair” for Cosby’s deposition to be used against him, as he disclosed information based on the non-prosecution commitment which otherwise would have been subject to Fifth Amendment protections. It was an error of law not to suppress this testimony. Cosby’s deposition testimony should be suppressed, and a new trial ordered.

VII.

ARGUMENT

- A. COSBY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE TRIAL COURT STRIPPED HIM OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND RELIEVED THE PROSECUTION OF ITS BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN IT ALLOWED THE JURY TO HEAR DECADES-OLD, EXCESSIVE UNCHARGED BAD ACT EVIDENCE ABSENT A LEGITIMATE NON-PROPENSITY PURPOSE INCLUDING: (1) TESTIMONY FROM FIVE WOMEN WHO OFFERED VARYING ACCOUNTS OF COSBY'S ALLEGED SEXUAL MISCONDUCT STEMMING BACK TO THE 1980s; AND (2) COSBY'S HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL, DEPOSITION TESTIMONY ABOUT HIS SEXUAL BEHAVIORS IN THE 1970s THAT INVOLVED OFFERING QUAALUDES TO WOMEN HE WAS SEXUALLY INTERESTED IN, INCLUDING "JANE DOE NUMBER 1."**

The time-honored prohibition on bad act character evidence was effectively dismantled at Cosby's trial when the trial court admitted inadmissible propensity evidence involving decades-old, uncharged allegations of sexual misconduct. Although the evidence was purportedly allowed for a limited purpose, the prosecution's closing argument shows that the jury was urged to return a verdict against Cosby based on a depiction of him, unsupported by actual evidence, as a predator who drugged and raped women for decades. Forced to defend a half-dozen mini-trials involving antiquated claims of sexual misconduct, along with the general narrative that he took advantage of countless "young women" in the 1970s after giving them Quaaludes, Cosby was stripped of the presumption of innocence. The incalculably prejudicial evidence had no proper evidentiary purpose and

served only to distract the jury from legitimate weaknesses in the prosecution's case on the charged offenses. Cosby was tried and convicted for alleged misdeeds dating back to the 1970s and 1980s, that shed no light on the only question in dispute, that is, whether Complainant consented to the sexual contact that occurred in January 2004.

1. Testimony from five women regarding purported sexual misconduct allegedly committed by Cosby in the 1980s constituted rank propensity evidence inadmissible under the Common Plan and Absence of Mistake Exceptions to Rule 404(b).

After failing to secure a conviction at Cosby's first trial, where one PBA witness testified, the prosecution was permitted to introduce testimony at retrial from five women (the "404(b) witnesses"), alleging that Cosby engaged in varying forms of sexual misconduct toward them in the 1980s, all involving the use of some type of intoxicant. Despite an excessive 15-year gap between the last alleged PBA and the offense for which Cosby was on trial, the trial court ruled that the 404(b) testimony was admissible "under both the common plan, scheme, design exception and the lack of accident or mistake exception." [Appx. "B," p. 102]. The court further justified the admission of the evidence under the doctrine of chances. *Id.*

The Panel affirmed, finding that the common plan and absence of mistake exceptions warranted the admission of the 404(b) witnesses' testimony, and declined to examine admissibility under the "doctrine of chances." *Cosby*, 224

A.3d at 406. Troublingly, the Panel embraced an unprecedented evidentiary standard sanctioning the admission of PBA evidence under the common plan exception when the prior alleged misconduct follows a rough “playbook of criminal tactics.” *Id.* at 402. In so doing, the Panel diluted the rigorous standard for admission of otherwise prohibited character evidence. The Panel’s “playbook” approach created an exception that swallows the general character prohibition rule and must be rejected.

a. The PBA Testimony did not satisfy the Common Plan Exception.

In admitting the testimony of five women who alleged that Cosby sexually assaulted them in a number of different ways with the aid of some type of intoxicant, the trial court departed from the general rule that only “signature-like” similarities or a true logical connection to the charged crime satisfies the common plan exception to the general prohibition of the admission of PBA evidence. Generally, evidence of PBAs or unrelated criminal activity “...is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1); *Commonwealth v. Sherwood*, 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009). In other words, PBA evidence is inadmissible to show criminal propensity.

However, evidence of PBAs may be admissible when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity and absence of mistake or accident. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). In determining whether evidence of PBAs is admissible, the trial court must balance its probative value against its prejudicial impact. *Commonwealth v. Powell*, 956 A.2d 406, 419 (Pa. 2008); *see also*, Pa.R.E.404(b)(2).

Under Pennsylvania law, evidence of PBAs is admissible to prove a “common scheme, plan or design where the crimes are so related that proof of one tends to prove the others.” *Commonwealth v. Elliott*, 700 A. 2d 1243, 1249 (Pa. 1997). However, to preserve the purpose of Rule 404(b)(1), a close factual nexus must exist to demonstrate the connective relevance of the PBAs to the charged crime. *See Commonwealth v. Ross*, 57 A. 3d 85, 104 (Pa. Super. 2012). Long ago, this Court identified *two* distinct ways in which the prosecution could demonstrate the connective relevance of the PBAs to the crime in question to satisfy the “common plan” exception. *See Shaffner v. Commonwealth*, 72 Pa. 60, 65 (1872).

Logical Connection Approach

First, PBA evidence may be admissible if a logical connection exists between the bad acts and the charged crime such that they can be linked together for some common purpose that the defendant intended to accomplish. *Id. See also, Commonwealth v. Hicks*, 156 A.3d 1114, 1143 (Pa. 2017) (Donohue, J., dissenting). To satisfy the “logical connection” exception, a connection between the PBAs must have existed in the mind of the actor, linking them together for

some intended purpose. *Id.* It must be possible to conclude that the PBAs and the charged crime were “both contemplated by the prisoner as parts of one plan in his mind” such that “it is obvious” that committing the prior act “was part of his purpose” in committing the charged crime. *Shaffner*, 72 Pa. at 65-66. It must appear “that the other offenses, though distinct crimes, are in fact . . . part of a larger field of operation, previously conceived and in part executed.” *Id.* See also, *Commonwealth v. Weiss*, 130 A. 403, 404 (Pa. 1925).

Although courts sometimes invoke the “logical connection” language cavalierly, the Record is devoid of any factual basis to support admission of the PBA testimony under this approach. As Chief Justice Saylor acknowledged in his concurring opinion in *Hicks*, it is unhelpful to blend distinct grounds for relevance associated with proffered, uncharged misconduct. *Hicks*, 156 A.3d at 1130 (Saylor, J., concurring). Specifically, the Record does not demonstrate that Cosby’s alleged sexual misconduct as described by five 404(b) witnesses, committed 15 to 22 years prior to the charged offense, was “part of a larger field of operation, previously conceived and in part executed.” *Weiss*, 130 A. at 404.

Precedent from this Court does not support the Panel’s view that a common plan need not be part of a “greater master plan,” and that a “plan” may be analogized to a “playbook of criminal tactics that worked for the offender when committing the past crimes.” *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 402. Rather, under the “logical

connection” approach, PBA evidence *must* be part of a “greater” or “overarching” plan; a “playbook of criminal tactics” does not suffice. *See e.g., Shaffner*, 72 Pa. at 65; *Commonwealth v. Chalfa*, 169 A. 564, 565 (Pa. 1933); *Commonwealth v. Hicks*, 156 A.3d at 1143 (Donohue, J., dissenting). *See also*, McCormick, *Evidence*, § 190 (2013 7th ed.)(cautioning that to prove the existence of a common scheme, “each crime should be an integral part of an over-arching plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant.”).

The Panel’s reliance on *Commonwealth v Hughes*, 555 A.2d 1264, 1283 (Pa. 1989) to support its “playbook” concept is misplaced, where *Hughes* actually reiterated the principle that to allow PBA evidence, it must “truly represent Appellant’s signature.” *Hughes*, 555 A.2d at 1283. In sum, the prosecution did not establish that Cosby committed the alleged PBAs to further some purported assault on Complainant, or that the PBAs were part of an overarching plan to assault Complainant. Employing the “logical connection” approach fails to advance the prosecution’s argument that the PBA evidence was admissible under the common plan exception.

Signature-Crime Approach

Second, PBA evidence is also admissible under the common plan exception if the PBAs evince a “signature crime.” This Court has explained the “signature crime” approach to the common scheme, plan, design exception as follows:

Evidence of other crimes is said to be admissible [to] prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused. Here much more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated burglaries or theft. The device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.

Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A. 3d 595, 606 (Pa. 2013).

In evaluating whether PBAs are admissible under the “signature crime” common plan exception, courts examine: (1) whether the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident reveal criminal conduct that is distinctive and so nearly identical that it represents the signature of the same perpetrator; (2) if the criminal conduct represents the signature of the same perpetrator, whether the PBA evidence is too remote in time; and (3) if the PBA evidence represents the signature of the same perpetrator and is not too remote in time, whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 358-59 (Pa. Super 2015).

When examining the similarities between PBA evidence and the charged offense, courts should consider the time between crimes, the geographical proximity of the crime scenes and the manner in which the crimes were committed.

Commonwealth v. Rush, 646 A. 2d 557 (Pa. 1994). *See also*, *Commonwealth v.*

Clayton, 483 A. 2d 1345 (Pa. 1984). Similarly, *Tyson* instructs that when determining whether PBA evidence is virtually identical to the charged offense, courts consider “...habits or patterns of action or conduct undertaken by the

perpetrator to commit crime, as well as, the time, place, and types of victims typically chosen by the perpetrator.” *Tyson*, 119 A.3d at 359. “Insignificant details that would likely be common elements regardless of the individual committing the crime” do not establish a signature-like crime. *Commonwealth v. Bidwell*, 195 A.3d 610 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Considering these factors, the Record fails to demonstrate that the PBA evidence was “nearly identical” to the charged offense. Although the trial court purported to examine the details of each PBA to ensure that the evidence was sufficiently distinctive to amount to a signature-like crime, the Record reflects a superficial, arguably disingenuous, analysis. Both lower courts ignored important distinctions between the alleged PBAs and the charged offense; strained the Record to find non-existent similarities between the PBA evidence and the charged offense; and exaggerated insignificant details that are, regrettably, all too common with acquaintance rape.

- i. Complainant shared virtually no similarities with the 404(b) accusers.

In determining whether signature-like similarities exist between PBA evidence and the charged offense, courts consider the type of victims chosen by the perpetrator. For example, in *Hicks, supra*, where the defendant was charged with the murder of a drug-addicted prostitute, this Court agreed that evidence of the defendant targeting other drug-dependent women with whom he had prostitution-

type relationships was an appropriate factor to consider for determining whether the charged crime was strikingly similar to the PBA evidence. *Hicks*, 156 A.3d at 1127.

Here, the lower courts found that an uncanny similarity existed between the PBA witnesses and Complainant in that all were “younger” than Cosby and were “physically fit.” Unlike the status of the 404(b) witnesses in *Hicks* as drug-dependent prostitutes, the status of the 404(b) witnesses in this case as “younger” and “physically fit” is too general to have meaning. Furthermore, the Record belies the claim that *all* the women were “physically fit,” at least in the way Complainant described herself. Complainant, a former professional athlete, had no doubts that she could physically stop unwanted sexual advances by Cosby. [R. 3757a-3759a]. No other 404(b) witnesses were described as “physically fit” in this manner.

Additionally, Complainant was a college-educated, professional athlete who had traveled the world, was already in her 30s when she met Cosby and was working in a leadership position as the Director of Operations for Temple Women’s basketball. [R. 3716a-3717a; 3720a; 3734a]. In contrast, the 404(b) witnesses were all aspiring actresses and models (except for Baker-Kinney, a cocktail waitress and casino runner), ranging in ages from 17 to 27. Complainant shared no characteristics with the 404(b) accusers other than being younger than Cosby. This insignificant detail does not suggest that Cosby targeted a particular

“type” of woman since there is nothing distinctive or “signature-like” about an older man having sexual interest in younger women.

- ii. Complainant met Cosby under circumstances significantly different than the circumstances under which Cosby met the 404(b) witnesses.

In examining whether “signature-like” similarities existed between the PBA evidence and the charged crime, the lower courts found that in all cases, “Cosby initiated contact with each woman primarily through their employment.” [Appx. “B,” p. 103]; *See also, Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 402. This pattern of conduct is not distinctive or unique. But more to the point, the Record refutes this finding. In fact, *none* of the 404(b) witnesses met Cosby in a manner remotely similar to the circumstances under which Cosby met Complainant.

Cosby did not initiate a meeting with Baker-Kinney, a Harrah’s casino employee, but rather Baker-Kinney accompanied a friend to the home where Cosby was staying in Las Vegas; the unexpected contact had nothing to do with Baker-Kinney’s employment. [R.5834a-5836a; 3349a-3352a]. The other 404(b) witnesses, all aspiring models and actresses, were introduced to Cosby either because Cosby expressed an interest in developing their careers and contacted their agents to arrange a meeting (as would be expected in the entertainment industry), or in the case of Lasha, someone in her family arranged a meeting between Cosby and Lasha. [R. 5862a; 3241a-3242a].

In contrast, Cosby's initial contact with Complainant was a chance encounter. Cosby made no concerted effort to arrange a meeting with Complainant and was introduced to her by a Temple supporter at a basketball game in the Fall of 2002. [R. 3726a-3727a]. The supporter initiated the introduction because she wanted Cosby to see recent renovations to the Women's locker room. *Id.* Complainant had subsequent conversations with Cosby when he called the Temple athletic department to inquire about costs associated with the renovations – not to inquire about developing Complainant's non-existent acting and modeling career. [R. 3727a-3728a]. Simply put, Cosby did not initiate contact with Complainant and did not contact Temple to express an interest in "mentoring" her; the circumstances under which Cosby met her are highly dissimilar to the circumstances under which he purportedly met the 404(b) witnesses.

iii. Cosby's relationship with Complainant was profoundly dissimilar to his relationships with the 404(b) witnesses.

An accused's relationship with the complainant of the charged offense and his relationship with the PBA accusers can be a factor in support of a common plan if that relationship is uncannily similar and sufficiently unique, and other factors are present. In *Commonwealth v. Aikens*, 990 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2010), the Superior Court found two incidents of child molestation markedly similar, in part, because both victims were the defendant's biological daughters. Conversely, the trial court here strained to find a genuine similarity between Cosby's

relationship with the 404(b) witnesses and his relationship with Complainant, instead making the broad observation that “over the course of their time together, the women came to trust Cosby and developed what the women believed to be a genuine friendship or mentorship.” [Appx. “B,” p. 103]; *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 402.

The Record shows that Cosby’s relationship with Complainant bore no resemblance to his relationships with the 404(b) witnesses. Cosby and Complainant began a relationship in the Fall of 2002. Although she refused to characterize the relationship as romantic, her testimony painted a picture of a friendship that became flirtatious and intensified over 18 months. They spoke by telephone frequently, mostly about Temple University athletics, but also about personal matters, including Complainant’s educational and athletic background and her burgeoning interest in a broadcasting career. [R.3727a-3731a; 3739a].

Complainant accepted multiple invitations to have dinner at Cosby’s home in Montgomery County, sometimes as his only guest, but also as part of larger gatherings attended by members of the Temple community. [R. 3732a-3733a; 3736a-3739a; 3744a-3745a]. Complainant and Cosby exchanged thoughtful gifts. [R. 3752a-3759a; 3845a; 3830a-3831a]. She traveled to meet Cosby outside of Pennsylvania on several occasions, including at two events in New York City where she was introduced to Cosby’s friends and associates. [R. 3741a-3742a].

She also traveled alone to spend time with Cosby at Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut. [R. 3749a-3750a].

In contrast, Cosby's purported "relationships" with the 404(b) witnesses were nothing like his relationship with Complainant. Cosby had a single encounter with Baker-Kinney who appeared at Mr. Harrah's house unexpectedly and uninvited. Cosby did not know Baker-Kinney and certainly did not develop any type of "friendship" or "mentorship" with her during the one evening they allegedly spent together. Similarly, no relationship, "friendship" or "mentorship" existed between Cosby and Lasha during the single occasion on which they met. The same is true of Thomas, who met Cosby on one occasion during a trip to Reno, Nevada. Lasha and Thomas both described how they "auditioned" for Cosby. Although the circumstances of their meetings with Cosby bear a resemblance to one another, the relevant question is whether those relationships are virtually identical to Cosby's relationship with Complainant in the charged offense. Simply answered, "No." Even assuming that Cosby arranged for the model/actress witnesses to "audition" for him as a ruse to sexually assault them, this "plan" was not employed with the actual Complainant; those PBAs have no relevance.

Dickinson and Lublin also did not describe genuine friendships with Cosby, as both women only met him once prior to the alleged misconduct (although Lublin made no claim of sexual misconduct). These limited interactions bear no

resemblance to Cosby's relationship with Complainant, which persisted for 18 months prior to the sexual contact and was characterized by frequent and regular contact, both in person and by telephone, and involved attending social events with Cosby's inner circle.

- iv. The PBAs allegedly occurred in disparate geographical locations and none took place in Cosby's home as Complainant alleges.

There is no similarity between the locations of the uncharged accusations of misconduct and the location of the sexual contact between Complainant and Cosby. All 404(b) witnesses were allegedly abused at a location *other* than Cosby's home, either in residences owned by other people (Lublin and Baker-Kinney) or hotel rooms (Thomas, Dickinson, and Lasha). In contrast, Complainant claims to have been assaulted in Cosby's family home where she was a frequent guest.

Courts consider the location of the commission of PBAs when conducting a common plan analysis because sufficient similarities in location can suggest that the same perpetrator is responsible for distinct crimes. *See Commonwealth v. Newman*, 598 A.2d 275, 279 (Pa. 1990) (finding sufficient similarities between two distinct rapes where "both rapes occurred in the x-ray department, late at night when the x-ray department was otherwise deserted and the appellee was the only technician on duty."). Here, the lower courts contend that sufficient similarities

exist between the uncharged PBA evidence and Complainant's alleged assault because all of the women accepted an invitation from Cosby "to a place in his control." [Appx. "B," p. 103]; *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 402.

The factor - "a place in his control" - is a generic, non-specific and "insignificant detail" that would be a common element regardless of the perpetrator. *Bidwell*, 195 A.3d at 618-619. "Place in his control" is so vague that it could mean anything - Cosby's house, his office, his car, his production studios, his airplane or his backyard. It seems unlikely that any perpetrator intent on sexually assaulting women would purposefully bring them to a location that was controlled by someone else. The courts below created a meaninglessly broad factor that sheds no light on identity or the disputed issue of consent. Regardless, the geographical locations of the alleged 404(b) misconduct are markedly dissimilar from the location of Complainant's alleged assault.

- v. The way Cosby allegedly assaulted the 404(b) witnesses bears little resemblance to the conduct alleged by Complainant.

Finally, the way Cosby purportedly assaulted Complainant is not "chillingly" or "uncannily" similar to the manner in which he was accused of abusing the 404(b) witnesses, even if all the allegations involved Cosby providing the women with intoxicants. No matter how reprehensible the conduct, the use of an intoxicant in the commission of an acquaintance rape is insufficient to establish

a signature-like crime, particularly when the nature of the intoxicant is unknown, and it is administered in a dissimilar manner. Frankly, drug-facilitated rape is a bit like saying gun-facilitated armed robbery. Intoxicants play a significant role in most acquaintance-rapes. According to a 2010 study published in the *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, drug-facilitated sexual assault accounts for over half of the total sexual assault cases while involuntary drug-facilitated sexual assault (in which an incapacitating substance was administered to victims without their knowledge or against their will) accounts for 33% of sexual assault cases. Richer LA, Fields L, Bell S, et al. Characterizing Drug-Facilitated Sexual Assault Subtypes and Treatment Engagement of Victim at a Hospital-Based Rape Treatment Center. *J Interpers Violence*. 2017; Vol. 32(10):1524-1542. As distressing as those statistics may be, the presence of an intoxicant in connection with a sexual assault is not particularly distinct and does little to demonstrate a signature-like crime.

In the instructive case of *Commonwealth v. Kasko*, 469 A.2d 181 (Pa. Super. 1983), the Superior Court held that the trial court erred in consolidating two cases, one involving the molestation of a six-year old, and the other involving the encouragement of two young children to have indecent contact with each other less than one year later. In concluding that sufficient similarities did not exist to justify consolidating the cases, the court observed that “the misconduct alleged in this

case is, sadly, not as rare as it should be, but is rather a common form of child abuse.” *Id.* at 69-69.

The same can be said about drug-facilitated sexual assault. Sadly, intoxicants coupled with sexual misconduct is a rather common form of sexual assault that does not represent a “unique signature.” This was true in the 1970s and it is true today. Drug-facilitated assault is distressingly common and does not constitute the signature handiwork of a deviant perpetrator.

The prosecution’s claim of signature-like similarities between the sexual misconduct alleged by the 404(b) witnesses and Complainant is further doomed, because the prosecution did not demonstrate that the same intoxicant was used or that it was administered in similar fashion. Moreover, the sexual acts that allegedly followed the provision of intoxicants to the 404(b) witnesses are dramatically different than the sexual contact described by Complainant. For example, Lublin testified that she consumed a dark brown drink and recalled Cosby “stroking [her] hair.” She made no allegation that Cosby assaulted her. In addition to the dissimilarities already identified in the preceding sections, there is nothing similar between Lublin and Complainant’s allegations other than a general description of the effects of an intoxicant.

Similarly, Baker-Kinney’s account is vastly dissimilar to Complainant’s in that Baker-Kinney admitted that she voluntarily ingested Quaalude(s) provided by

Cosby and assumed that she had vaginal intercourse with Cosby because she felt “wet” between her legs. Comparatively, the Record is devoid of any evidence that Cosby gave Complainant Quaaludes; Complainant described taking blue pills. No evidence showed that Cosby had access to Quaaludes in 2004, which are white in color. [R.4974a]. Furthermore, Complainant speculated that Cosby duped her into taking an intoxicant that would incapacitate her while Baker-Kinney conceded that she knowingly ingested a Quaalude. These are not inconsequential dissimilarities. Furthermore, the sexual acts are vastly different, as Complainant does not allege that Cosby engaged in vaginal intercourse with her. In short, Baker-Kinney’s allegations are not “nearly identical” to Complainant’s account.

Dickinson’s and Lasha’s allegations are also distinct from the charged offense. Complainant testified generally that Cosby tricked her into taking some type of drug that caused her to lose consciousness and that she believed it to be homeopathic. Dickinson and Lasha both testified that they voluntarily took a blue pill, and Dickinson understood that it was some type of relaxant that would treat her menstrual cramps. Neither woman believed they were consuming some type of natural remedy. Furthermore, while Dickinson alleges that Cosby penetrated her both vaginally and anally, Lasha claimed that Cosby pinched her nipples and humped her leg. Complainant makes no similar claim, let alone a “nearly identical” allegation, as to the nature of the sexual contact described by Dickinson and Lasha.

Thomas contended that she knowingly consumed wine at the behest of Cosby but suggested that he surreptitiously slipped some mystery intoxicant into her drink that rendered her unconscious. Unlike Complainant, Thomas contended that she involuntarily consumed some type of drug rather than voluntarily took an intoxicant under false pretenses. Thomas also claimed that Cosby forced her to perform oral sex, a claim Complainant did not make.

Although the prosecution and the lower courts are prone to examine the accusations of the 404(b) witnesses collectively, mixing and matching factors among the five women to give the illusion of a signature-crime, it is critical that this Court examine each of the 404(b) allegations separately to determine whether each accusation is “nearly identical” to the charged offense. Faithful application of the rules leads to the only reasonable conclusion: none of the 404(b) allegations are “nearly identical” to the charged offense but are generic acquaintance-assault allegations, involving the provision of some type of intoxicant followed by some type of sexual misconduct (with the exception of Lublin who did not allege *any* type of assault). Because there are insufficient similarities between the 404(b) witnesses’ and Complainant’s allegations, the decades-old, uncharged PBA evidence should not have been admitted under the common plan exception.

- b. The absence of Mistake/Accident Exception did not justify the admission of the PBA evidence.

The Panel acknowledged that the standard for admission under the common plan and absence of mistake/accident exceptions is identical, that is, the PBA evidence must be “distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator.” *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 401. *See also, Sherwood*, 982 A.2d at 497; *Commonwealth v. Boczkowski*, 846 A.2d 75, 89 (Pa. 2004) (holding that signature-like similarities are as essential for proving absence of accident as they are for proving identity). However, the Panel passingly observed that the absence-of-mistake exception may also be used to defeat an anticipated defense of consent in a case of sexual misconduct. *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 400. The Panel’s support for this novel contention rests entirely on *Tyson, supra*, where the Superior Court approved the admission of a prior *conviction* of sexual assault under the absence of mistake exception to rebut a claim of consent.

In *Tyson*, the Superior Court recognized that to admit PBA evidence under both the common plan and absence of mistake exceptions, the conduct must be “distinctive” and “so nearly identical” as to “become the signature of the same perpetrator,” but like the Panel below, offered no analysis regarding how this standard applies in cases where the defendant does not deny that he committed the *actus reus* of the crime.

The absence of mistake/accident exception is inapplicable here where the PBA evidence was not nearly identical to the charged offense. More fundamentally, the absence of mistake/accident exception is inapt because Cosby never denied committing the *actus reus*. The Panel confessed that the absence-of-mistake exception typically applies in circumstances where identity is not at issue but where the “evidence serves to prove that the cause of an injury was not accidental.” *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 399. However, the prosecution was allowed to present the uncharged 404(b) evidence for an altogether different purpose: “to undermine any claim that [Cosby] was unaware of or mistaken about [Complainant’s] failure to consent to the sexual contact . . .” *Id.* at 402. Put differently, the PBA evidence was admitted under the absence-of-mistake exception to show that Complainant did not consent to the sexual contact and that Cosby *knew* or should have known that Complainant did not consent.

Notwithstanding *Tyson*, there is a dearth of authority allowing admission of PBA evidence under the absence of mistake/accident exception to refute a defense of consent. When the prosecution invokes the absence-of-mistake exception to establish that the accused committed the *acts* charged, the theory of noncharacter relevance is clear. However, here, the PBA evidence was relied on to demonstrate the accused’s *knowledge* that Complainant had not consented; the theory of relevance only differs superficially from the prohibited character-theory. One

leading commentator explained that when using uncharged misconduct in the manner used here:

The theory certainly requires the jury to draw an intermediate inference as to the accused's disposition or tendency to form a particular mens rea. The charged offense occurred at one time and place while the uncharged crime ordinarily occurs at a different time and place. To bridge the temporal and spatial gap between the two incidents, the prosecution must assume the accused's propensity to entertain the same intent in similar situations. That assumption is the inescapable link between the charged and uncharged crimes. The trier of fact can reason from the starting point of the uncharged crime to a conclusion about the mens rea of the charged crime only through an intermediate assumption about the accused's character or propensity.

Imwinkelreid, Edward J., *The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition*, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 75 (Summer, 1990).

Imwinkelreid further observed that if the disputed issue involves the accused's physical response (*e.g.*, did the accused commit the physical act), application of the laws of the physical sciences can help predict the accused's physical reaction. But, the *mental component* of the accused's conduct is less predictable:

American criminal law operates on the assumption that the typical person possesses cognitive and volitional capacities. The variety of ways in which the person can exercise those capacities make it difficult to forecast the person's mental state at any given time. Even if the accused entertained a certain intent during a similar, uncharged incident, the accused may not have formed that intent on the charged occasion. The risk of overestimation exists because the response to a situation includes a variable mental component.

Id.

Thus, even if the PBA evidence was “nearly identical” to the charged crime, this evidence sheds no light on the question of whether Complainant consented to the sexual conduct and whether Cosby knew or should have known that she had not consented.

To the extent this Court finds *Tyson* persuasive, it is nonetheless inapposite. In *Tyson*, the court determined that the defendant’s prior conviction for sexual assault in a consent case under similar circumstances put him on notice that the victim in the charged offense was in a physical condition that rendered her unable to consent. The court held, “[t]he jury must have a chance to decide if Appellee, *in light of his past legal experience and conviction for a substantially similar criminal episode*, could have reasonably concluded G.B.’s [the victim] consent was possible under comparable circumstances.” *Tyson*, 119 A.3d at 363(emphasis added).

In contrast, Cosby was never charged with or convicted of any sexual misconduct allegedly occurring prior to the events that underlie the charged offense. Critically, the Record fails to reflect that Cosby was even *aware* of the accusations of the 404(b) witnesses (except for Dickinson) at the time he allegedly assaulted Complainant. Thus, unlike *Tyson*, it cannot be said that Cosby’s past legal experience for allegedly similar conduct made it more or less likely that Cosby knew Complainant could not consent to the sexual contact.

Cosby urges this Court to reject the expansion of the absence of mistake/accident exception where the *actus reus* is undisputed. Regardless, because the PBA evidence is not nearly identical to the charged offense, it should have been barred as nothing more than forbidden propensity evidence.

- c. The period of time between the charged offense and the PBA evidence is excessive.

Courts considering whether 404(b) evidence should be admitted under the common plan and absence of mistake exceptions are not only required to find that the PBA evidence is nearly identical to the charged offense, they must also consider the remoteness of the PBA evidence even *if* sufficient similarities exist. *See Tyson, supra*. In this case, not only does the age of the accusations weigh against a finding of signature-like crimes, the PBA evidence should have been barred on remoteness grounds where the gap between the charged offense and the PBAs was excessive. *Commonwealth v. Shively*, 424 A. 2d 1257, 1259 (Pa. 1981).

Four of the PBA allegations occurred at least 20 years prior to the charged offense while the most recent allegation (which did not even involve a claim of sexual assault) occurred 15 years before the charged offense. The prosecution presented no authority for the admission of such excessively remote PBA evidence, and the lower courts simply disregarded this important analytical prong.

Remoteness is an important consideration because as the event becomes

more remote its probative value diminishes. *Commonwealth v. Miller*, 664 A.2d 1310, 1319 (Pa. 1995)(observing that remoteness in time is a factor to be considered in determining the probative value of PBA evidence). Here, the probative value of the PBA evidence was further diminished since the decades-old allegations were also uncharged and unproven. Accusations never subjected to the adversarial process simply do not possess the same level of reliability and relevance as a prior conviction. *See Commonwealth v. Arrington*, 86 A.3d 831, 844-845 (Pa. 2014)(observing that PBA evidence was “relevant, reliable and probative of guilt,” in part, because “the other incidents of abuse resulted in convictions.”).

Here, the PBAs share only *general* similarities with the charged offense. Nonetheless, even if this Court concludes that sufficient similarities exist between the PBA evidence and the charged offense to establish a common plan, the uncharged, unproven accusations should have been barred as excessively remote.

- d. Any probative value of the PBA evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

For PBA evidence to be admitted, its probative value must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice. *Arrington*, 86 A.3d at 842; Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). The lower courts failed to conduct this analysis; they also did not consider whether the PBA evidence was needlessly cumulative. Pa.R.E. 403 (Relevant evidence may be excluded “...if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of...unfair

prejudice...or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). Indeed, the trial court focused almost entirely on the prosecution’s so-called “need” for the evidence without considering the devastating prejudicial impact that the evidence (examined separately and cumulatively) could have on Cosby’s right to a fair trial *on the charged offense*. The Panel endorsed the trial court’s analysis, noting that the trial court *could* have permitted 19 women to testify, but because it limited the number of accusers to five and gave multiple cautionary instructions, the trial court “recognized” the unfair prejudice presented by the PBA evidence.

The Record fails to support the Panel’s assumption that testimony from *all* 19 women proffered by the prosecution would have survived a rigorous Rule 401 and 404(b) inquiry, particularly since the Record is devoid of any live testimony from these women. Nevertheless, the trial court was required to balance the probative value of the admitted PBA evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice. *Tyson*, 119 A. 3d at 361. The fact that “it could have been worse,” as the Panel suggested, did not relieve the trial court of its obligation to conduct a meaningful “undue prejudice” analysis.

Cosby suffered unquantifiable prejudice by the admission of unproven and uncharged sexual assault accusations from the 1980s and other unsavory behavior from the 1970s – notwithstanding the trial court’s cautionary instructions to the jury. The risk of prejudice to Cosby was compounded

since the PBA evidence was uncharged and unproven. *Imwinkelreid, supra.* at 580-81. As Imwinkelreid observes, the jury may have been tempted to rectify perceived past injustices by punishing Cosby even though it harbored doubt about his guilt as to the charged offense. *Id.* This risk of prejudice was particularly acute since some of the 404(b) witnesses testified that they were involved in efforts to abolish the statute of limitations on applicable crimes involving sexual assault [R. 3745a; 3586a-3588a], leaving the jury to infer that Cosby escaped criminal culpability for these crimes and that, but for a legal technicality, he would have been tried and held accountable.

Arguably, the trial court had a heightened obligation to conduct a thoughtful and impassive “undue prejudice” analysis. Nearly every prospective juror expressed familiarity with the case, and more than half confessed their prejudgment of Cosby’s guilt, reflecting the general attitude of the public. [R. 1829a-1833a; 2110a-2113a; 2370a-2375a]. The influence of the widely recognized #MeToo movement peaked at the time of Cosby’s second criminal trial. In this environment, the trial judge had an elevated obligation to ensure that Cosby’s trial did not devolve into a forum more concerned with giving women who, for whatever reason, did not timely press their claims, “their day in court” than with ensuring a fair trial for the accused on the *charged offense*. A scrupulous “undue

prejudice” analysis was never more important, and the trial judge shirked his responsibilities when he failed to conduct that analysis.

The trial court also placed unreasonable weight on the prosecution’s alleged need for the PBA evidence. Unlike those circumstances where there is no direct evidence that the perpetrator committed the crime, such was not the case here. Not only was Complainant’s testimony available to the prosecution, but the trial court permitted several other witnesses to testify to corroborate Complainant’s testimony. The court permitted expert testimony from Dr. Barbara Ziv to bolster Complainant’s testimony and explain away all of Complainant’s conduct that impeached her version of the events and supported Cosby’s claim of consent. [R.3020a-3154a]. In other words, the prosecution had evidence beyond Complainant’s testimony.

Lastly, even if this Court agrees that the prosecution had some “need” for the evidence, the quantity of the PBA evidence was needlessly cumulative, and the collective prejudice of the evidence was extraordinary. To be clear, Cosby maintains that no legitimate non-character purpose existed to justify the admission of *any* of the PBA evidence, and that the prejudice incurred by the admission of even *one* PBA witness outweighed the probative value of the evidence. That aside, there can be no doubt that the incremental probative value of any PBA evidence

beyond a single witness is negligible, serving no legitimate purpose other than to overwhelm the jury with forbidden propensity evidence.

- e. The Doctrine of Chances has no applicability in a sexual assault case where the accused concedes the *Actus Reus* and only the issue of consent is in dispute.

The trial court found that testimony from the five 404(b) witnesses was also admissible pursuant to the doctrine of chances because “numerous other women recounted the same or similar story.” [Appx. “B,” p. 108]. The trial court offered no meaningful legal analysis applying the doctrine of chances; the Panel declined to examine the issue.

No Pennsylvania authority exists to support application of the doctrine of chances in a sexual assault case where the *actus reus* of the crime is not in dispute and the only contested issue is whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity. In *Commonwealth v. Donahue*, 549 A. 2d 121 (Pa. 1987), a child abuse case, a plurality of the Court condoned the doctrine of chances when it affirmed the admission of a prior similar act of child abuse committed by the defendant three years earlier to refute the defendant’s claim that the child’s injuries were sustained in an accidental fall. *Id.* at 126. Although the *Donahue* Court generally discussed the rationale behind the doctrine of chances, it did not expressly adopt the doctrine as an exception to the bar on character evidence. In fact, the *Donahue* Court

referred to the theory as the “accident exception” and offered no comment on how the doctrine applies where the defendant does not allege accident. *Id.* at 127.

Similarly, in *Hicks*, Chief Justice Saylor signaled his approval of the doctrine of chances in his concurring opinion, finding that the doctrine was applicable because the defendant claimed the victim died in an *accidental* drug-overdose. *Hicks*, 156 A.3d at 1131. Chief Justice Saylor noted, “the [PBA] evidence was employed by the prosecution primarily to establish the *actus reus* of the murder by corroborating the autopsy report and the testimony for the Commonwealth by a forensic pathologist that the victim’s death resulted from ‘homicidal violence’ rather than a mishap.” *Id.* In other words, Chief Justice Saylor approved the application of the doctrine of chances in cases where the *actus reus* is contested.

Neither *Donahue* nor Chief Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion in *Hicks* examine how the doctrine of chances applies when the accused does not contest the *actus reus* of the crime. The doctrine of chances turns on “the instinctive logical process that reasonably determines that unusual and abnormal *events* are unlikely to recur by chance.” *Id.* at 1132 (Chief Justice Saylor, concurring) (emphasis added). Here, the prosecution invoked the doctrine of chances not to show that Cosby’s alleged prior sexual misconduct constituted unusual and abnormal events unlikely to recur by chance, but to demonstrate that it was improbable that Cosby

would be so unlucky to be the subject of so many false accusations of sexual misconduct. This use does not pass muster because it requires an *inference* regarding Cosby's moral character.

Even if this Court formally adopted the doctrine of chances as a legitimate theory of relevance, Chief Justice Saylor's concurring opinion in *Hicks* suggests it would not apply under the facts of this case. Citing *Imwinkelried*, the Chief Justice acknowledged that one criteria for determining whether the doctrine of chances permits the admission of "roughly similar" PBA evidence is whether "there is a real dispute between the prosecution and the defense over whether the *actus reus* occurred." *Id.* at 1137.

Because there is *no* dispute involving the *actus reus* of the crime, the doctrine of chances is inapplicable. Cosby did not dispute the *events* of the charged offense; he disputed the issue of *consent*. The present scenario simply does not lend itself to application of the doctrine of chances.

2. Cosby's deposition regarding his use of Quaaludes and his sexual behavior with "Jane Doe" and "Other Women" in the 1970s was irrelevant evidence that served no legitimate non-propensity purpose.

The prosecution piled on additional PBA evidence that had no non-character purpose that did not pass the threshold relevancy requirement. The trial court erred when it allowed the jury to hear excerpts from Cosby's deposition where he admitted that in the 1970s he provided: (1) a Quaalude to a woman referenced as

“Jane Doe Number 1” with whom he had some type of sexual encounter, and (2) Quaaludes to other women with whom he wanted to have sex. Cosby further testified that “Jane Doe” had taken the Quaalude voluntarily. Although no evidence was presented to show that Cosby had non-consensual sex with *any* women from the 1970s, the prosecution nonetheless urged the jury to conclude that Cosby had engaged in a pattern of drugging and raping women in the 1970s with the use of Quaaludes. “Jane Doe” was described as a woman who had “come forward” and the prosecutor told the jury during closing arguments that the other women to whom Cosby gave Quaaludes “have not *yet* come forward.” [R.5573a; 5611a]. The Record, however, is devoid of any information about the identity of these women; whether Cosby actually had sexual contact with these women; the nature of the sexual contact, if any; or even whether any of the women claimed that the sex was not consensual.

This evidence was not relevant to *any* issue in dispute, amounted to impermissible character evidence and was extraordinarily prejudicial. “Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.” *Commonwealth v. Drumheller*, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. 2002). Cosby’s statement that he gave Quaaludes to “Jane Doe” and “other women” with whom he wanted to have sex in the 1970s, and that the

women voluntarily took the Quaaludes, was not relevant to any issue, particularly where there is no evidence that Cosby had consensual or non-consensual sex with these woman. This evidence had no tendency to make it more probable that Cosby duped Complainant into taking some other type of intoxicant (not a Quaalude) in 2004 and had non-consensual contact with her. Having no relevant purpose, this evidence should have been barred.

The trial court suggested that because Cosby's testimony regarding his sexual encounter with "Jane Doe" was exculpatory (*i.e.*, Cosby testified that the sexual encounter was consensual), there was no error in admitting it.⁵ The trial court, however, ignored the true purpose for which the prosecution introduced the evidence, which was to urge the jury to conclude that Cosby had drugged and assaulted "Jane Doe" in the 1970s as he had countless other women and then lied about it. Incredibly, the prosecutor argued in closing:

And you have . . . the defendant, who admitted to being familiar with and utilizing Quaaludes . . . *with unknown numbers of women*, as he testified to in that deposition, many of whom have not yet come forward.

[R.5573a].

The defendant and the people that speak for him would have you believe that disco biscuits, it's a party thing. And that may be the case, but the defendant isn't partying. The defendant wants to stay awake.

⁵ The Panel refused to consider this claim of error, mistakenly concluding that the issue was waived because it was not raised in Cosby's 1925(b) statement. The Record reveals that the issue was raised in Cosby's Rule 1925(b) statement number 8.

The defendant wants to stay awake because it's in his mind that he was going to use Quaaludes for young women that he wanted to have sex with.

And he tried to correct himself when his attorney interjected, but he was forced, of course, to later admit that not only did give those Quaaludes to Jane Doe Number 1 because he wanted to have sex with her, but he had done the same thing with other women that have not yet come forward.

[R.5611a].

Despite having presented no evidence that Cosby drugged or assaulted anyone in the 1970s, the prosecution relied on his exculpatory statements to argue that the jury should conclude the opposite of what he testified to, namely that he was drugging hordes of women in the 1970s with Quaaludes and having non-consensual sex with them. The prosecution went so far as to refer to "Jane Doe" as "Jane Doe Number 1," a less than subtle suggestion that there are numerous other "Jane Does" who were victims of Cosby. Introduction of this evidence brazenly violated the prohibition on character evidence.

The prosecution contended that Cosby's admissions regarding his possession and provision of Quaaludes was relevant because it demonstrated his knowledge about "central nervous system depressants that would induce unconsciousness" and that his knowledge about how Quaaludes operated helped prove that he knew the effect Benadryl would have on Complainant.

This argument is non-sensical. Although the prosecution mentioned the word Quaalude no fewer than 18 times during their closing argument, they simultaneously admitted that they had no evidence that Cosby provided Quaaludes to Complainant. [R.5616a]. It is unclear why Cosby's knowledge of Quaaludes informed his understanding of how Benadryl worked. Regardless, there was no dispute about whether Cosby understood the effect of Benadryl, since he testified during his deposition about the effect it had on him. The prosecution had no need for evidence regarding Cosby's understanding of how an entirely different drug (Quaaludes) would affect someone to prove that he knew how Benadryl would affect Complainant.

In sum, the admission of Cosby's deposition regarding his use of Quaaludes and sexual behavior in the 1970s served no relevant purpose but was nonetheless referenced repeatedly during closing argument for its intended purpose, which was to depict Cosby as a predator of "Jane Doe Number 1" and countless other young women in the 1970s. There can be little doubt that the jury used the evidence precisely in the manner the prosecution expected. This evidence violated Cosby's right to be tried on the crimes charged, rather than on an indictment of his entire life. A new trial is warranted.

B. WHERE: (a) THE MCDA AGREED THAT COSBY WOULD NOT BE PROSECUTED IN ORDER TO FORCE COSBY'S TESTIMONY AT A DEPOSITION IN COMPLAINANT'S CIVIL ACTION; (b) THE MCDA'S OFFICE ISSUED A FORMAL PUBLIC STATEMENT REFLECTING THAT AGREEMENT; AND (c) COSBY REASONABLY RELIED UPON THOSE ORAL AND WRITTEN STATEMENTS BY PROVIDING DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN THE CIVIL ACTION, THUS FORFEITING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, THE PANEL ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO ALLOW NOT ONLY THE PROSECUTION OF COSBY BUT ALSO THE ADMISSION OF COSBY'S CIVIL DEPOSITION TESTIMONY.

Cosby's unduly prejudicial deposition testimony was given after Castor advised Cosby's counsel that Cosby "would not be prosecuted no matter what." [R.475a]. According to Castor, "... that then made it so that he could not take the Fifth Amendment ever as a matter of law." *Id.* Not only did the MCDA renege on that promise, but it also used portions of Cosby's compelled testimony against him. The Panel affirmed the denial of the Habeas Petition and Motion to Suppress. Such must be reversed.

1. The immunity provision set forth in Section 5947 of the Judicial Code is not applicable and is not the exclusive authority for conferring immunity from prosecution.

The Panel first addressed "whether a non-prosecution agreement existed that precluded Appellant's prosecution..." *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 411. Holding, "[a]s a matter of law," that Cosby "was not immune from prosecution based on Mr. Castor's alleged promise not to prosecute," the Panel stated, "[e]ven assuming Mr. Castor promised not to prosecute [Cosby], only a court order can convey such

immunity.” *Id.*⁶ This conclusion is based on the erroneous premise that “[t]he exclusive authority for conferring immunity from prosecution rests within the immunity statute itself, 42 Pa.C.S. §5947.” *Id.* First, the “immunity statute” has no application to the instant case. Moreover, the Panel’s conclusion is in direct conflict with the authority that a prosecutor wields to forever decline to prosecute a case.

The “immunity statute” is set forth in Chapter 59 (“Depositions and Witnesses”) of the Judicial Code. Subchapter A pertains to “Witnesses Generally.” A section providing “Certain Privileges and Immunities” includes §5947, titled “Immunity of witnesses,” and states:

(a) General rule.--Immunity orders shall be available under this section *in all proceedings* before:

- (1) Courts.
- (2) Grand juries.
- (3) Investigating grand juries.
- (4) The minor judiciary or coroners.

42 Pa.C.S. §5947(a)(emphasis added).

⁶ Although the Panel indicated that it could not uncover authority reflecting that a prosecutor may “confer transactional immunity through a declaration as the sovereign,” *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 411 (quoting the trial court), and noted that *Cosby* has not presented authority in support thereof, the Panel stated that it was therefore “clear on the face of the record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was no enforceable non-prosecution agreement...” *Id.* This syllogism reflects a misapplication of the standard of review. The Panel’s assessment was based on an application of the law, or the absence thereof. Whether an express or implied agreement “...can be derived from a set of underlying facts represents a question of law.” *See Konyk*, 183 A.3d at 988, n.6. Questions of law are subject to *de novo* review. *Livingstone*, 174 A.3d at 619.

In such a “proceeding,” the prosecutor may request an immunity order when the prosecutor believes: “(1) the testimony or other information from a witness may be necessary to the public interest; and (2) a witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.” 42 Pa.C.S. §5947(b). “Proceeding” is defined to include “...every declaration, petition or other application which may be made to a court under law or usage or under special statutory authority, but the term does not include an action or an appeal.” 42 Pa.C.S. §102.

For 42 Pa.C.S. §5947 (“Witness Immunity Statute” or “Statute”) to apply, one of the enumerated “proceedings” must exist in which the prosecutor seeks to compel a witness’ testimony. At the time that Castor made the decision that Cosby would not be prosecuted “no matter what,” there was no “proceeding” involved. The Panel’s conclusion that the “exclusive authority for conferring immunity from prosecution rests within the immunity statute itself” disregards that the Statute has no application to Castor’s non-prosecution commitment.

To suggest that the Statute provides the only means for a prosecutor to forever decline to prosecute an individual is to conflate the authority of a prosecutor to seek witness immunity with the significant authority that is conferred on a prosecutor to decide whether charges should be filed *at all*. Indeed, “...the district attorney is permitted to exercise sound discretion to *refrain from*

proceeding in a criminal case whenever he, in good faith, thinks that the prosecution would not serve the best interests of the state.” *Commonwealth v. Brown*, 708 A.2d 81, 84 (Pa. 1998)(citation omitted)(emphasis added).

More recently, discussing the “tremendous” discretion afforded to prosecutors, this Court, in *Commonwealth v. Clancy*, 192 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2018), opined:

The extent of the powers enjoyed by the prosecutor was discussed most eloquently by United States Attorney General (and late Supreme Court Justice) Robert H. Jackson. In his historic address to the nation's United States Attorneys, gathered in 1940 at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., Jackson observed that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous.” Robert H. Jackson, *The Federal Prosecutor*, 31 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 3, 3 (1940). In fact, the prosecutor is afforded such great deference that this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States seldom interfere with a prosecutor’s charging decision. *See, e.g., United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (noting that “the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”); *Commonwealth v. Stipetich*, [*supra.*] (noting that “the ultimate discretion to file criminal charges lies in the district attorney”).

Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted).

The “tremendous” discretion afforded to prosecutors provides them with the authority to decide whether to defer prosecution or to *ever* prosecute a case. Where this authority is exercised and the prosecutor commits to never prosecuting a case, she is bound to that commitment. In *Commonwealt. v. Ginn*, 587 A.2d 314 (Pa. Super. 1991), the prosecutor and the defendants entered into a written agreement to

dismiss the prosecution if the results of an independent audit revealed that there was no diversion of funds. The prosecutor reneged on the agreement. Ultimately, the case was dismissed, and the prosecution appealed.

Affirming, the Superior Court stated, “[t]he Commonwealth’s dissatisfaction with the ultimate conclusion will not release it from complying with the agreement it willingly entered.” *Ginn*, 587 A.2d at 316. The Court concluded: “Because the integrity of the judicial system demands that the Commonwealth live up to its obligation, we affirm the trial court’s decision to enforce the promise made by the Commonwealth in this case and dismiss the prosecutions.” *Id.* at 316-317.

Although the agreement in *Ginn* was in writing, no Pennsylvania authority has been found which reflects that an agreement between a prosecutor and an accused *must* be in writing. Other jurisdictions, however, have found that informal non-prosecution agreements are enforceable. *See e.g. State v. Myrhow*, 865 P.2d 231, 234-235 (Mont. 1993)(“An agreement not to prosecute is generally enforceable and is governed by principles of contract law...The agreement may be express or implied...Additionally, as here, the contract may be oral.”)(citation omitted); *State v. Louis*, 645 So.2d 1144 (La. 1994)(Supreme Court of Louisiana found an oral non-prosecution agreement to be enforceable). No Pennsylvania precedent has been found which constrains the tremendous discretion of a

prosecutor as suggested by the Panel to render an oral or informal non-prosecution agreement nonbinding and unenforceable.

The Panel misses the import of a prosecutor's commitment to *never* prosecute an individual on the ability of that individual to thereafter exercise his Fifth Amendment rights. Fifth Amendment rights attach regardless of the nature of the proceeding in which compelled testimony is sought. *Taylor*, 2020 WL 2532223, *11. Critically, “[s]elf-incriminating statements only may be compelled...*where the potential exposure to criminal punishment no longer exists.*” *Id.* (emphasis added).

Although the Panel found no authority suggesting that “a district attorney ‘may unilaterally confer transactional immunity through a declaration as the sovereign...,’” *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 411 (quoting trial court), the legal significance of a commitment never to prosecute remains. As *Taylor* reflects, where the potential exposure to criminal punishment no longer exists, self-incriminating statements can be compelled. A binding commitment by a prosecutor, whether formally or informally made, that a person will not be subject to criminal prosecution places that person in the position where exposure to criminal

punishment no longer exists and allows the testimony to be compelled. Such is exactly what transpired here.⁷

The legal foundation upon which the Panel rests its decision is fatally flawed. The Statute has no application to, and does not limit, the authority of a prosecutor to commit never to prosecute. The Panel's conclusion must be rejected.

2. Castor made a binding commitment never to prosecute Cosby.

The Panel did not directly address whether Castor made a binding non-prosecution commitment. Instead, the Panel found that even if such promise was made, "...only a court order can convey such immunity." *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 411. As reflected above, that legal conclusion is erroneous.

Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that "there was neither an agreement nor a promise not to prosecute, only an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, memorialized by the February 17, 2005 press release." [Appx. "B," p.72]. The trial court found that there was no enforceable agreement, and that there was no promise made. *Id.* This legal conclusion is belied by the Record and not supported by law.⁸

⁷ The Panel's assertion that only a court order can convey immunity ignores that informal immunity agreements are made routinely through which prosecutors agree to refrain from filing criminal charges, or agree to some disposition, in exchange for an accused's cooperation, including providing testimony.

⁸ The trial court found Castor's testimony to be inconsistent [Appx. "B," p. 63] and its Order on the Habeas Petition reflects that a credibility determination was "an inherent part of this Court's ruling..." [R.1048a]. Whether the Record supports the existence of an agreement is a question of law. Moreover, and as will be chronicled, to the extent that the trial court's determination turned

No one disputes that Castor decided not to prosecute Cosby. In fact, the trial court conceded that there was “an exercise of prosecutorial discretion...” *Id.* Castor issued the signed press release memorializing and publicly advising of his declination of prosecution. [R.382a-383a]. In that press release, Castor acknowledged that a civil suit was possible. *Id.* Less than one month after the issuance of the press release, as anticipated, the civil suit was filed. [R.3807a].

With respect to his declination of prosecution and its scope, Castor testified a multitude of times that: the intent was that Cosby would never be prosecuted for the allegations involving Complainant; he intended to bind the Commonwealth; and he made that decision in order to strip Cosby of his ability to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in a civil deposition, as the threat of prosecution no longer existed. *See e.g.* R.474a (“... I concluded it was better for justice to make a determination that Mr. Cosby would never be arrested...”); R.475a (“I made the decision as the sovereign that Mr. Cosby would not be prosecuted no matter what. As a matter of law, that then made it so that he could not take the Fifth Amendment ever as a matter of law.”); R.506a (“I knew that I had bound the Commonwealth as the representative of the sovereign not to arrest Mr. Cosby.”).

on facts pertinent to this issue, its findings were not based on competent evidence and reflect an abuse of discretion. *See Thatcher’s Drug Store.*, 636 A.2d at 160.

Castor testified that this decision and promise were discussed with Cosby's attorneys:

Q: You informed Mr. Phillips that Mr. Cosby would never be prosecuted for the allegations made by [Complainant]; correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And you did so for the specific purpose of making sure that Mr. Cosby could not assert the Fifth Amendment in any subsequent civil proceedings as they related to [Complainant]?

A: For all time, yes.

[R. 477a].

On September 23, 2015, after reading an article reflecting that the MCDA reopened the Cosby investigation, Castor sent an email to then-MCDA Ferman, reminding her that he "...intentionally and specifically bound the Commonwealth that there would be no state prosecution of Cosby in order to remove from him the ability to claim his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, thus forcing him to sit for a deposition under oath." [R.384a]. Castor's statements to Ferman, more than 10 years after he made the non-prosecution decision, were consistent with that initial decision and the reasons for the same.

The Record reflects that Castor committed to never prosecute Cosby in order to strip him of his Fifth Amendment rights in the deposition. In fact, Cosby sat for four days of deposition and did not invoke the Fifth Amendment since he was no longer subject to criminal prosecution by the MCDA. The decision to forever

decline prosecution for the allegations involving Complainant, which was articulated to Cosby's attorneys, supported by the signed press release and reiterated in a 2015 email, is legally valid and binding on the MCDA, including Castor's successors.

Cosby has found no Pennsylvania precedent squarely on point to support the position that an elected successor prosecutor is bound by a commitment made by the predecessor not to prosecute an individual where there is no *written* non-prosecution agreement, or where immunity has not been conferred via the Witness Immunity Statue, but where the accused relied on that commitment to his detriment. Other jurisdictions, however, provide guidance.

In *State v. Myers*, 513 S.E. 2d 676 (W. Va. 1998), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed whether a plea agreement should be enforced after it was breached by the prosecutor at sentencing. Noting that the prosecutor at sentencing was not the prosecutor who made the agreement, the Court stated that such fact was immaterial: “‘The staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of “letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing” or has done’ ...Likewise, *any change in the duly elected prosecutor does not affect the standard of responsibility for the office.*” *Id.* at 682, n.1 (internal citation omitted; emphasis added).

The elected district attorney in this Commonwealth is a constitutional officer (Pa. Const., Article 9, §4) and serves as the chief law enforcement officer of the county in which he is elected. 71 P.S. §732-206(a). The district attorney conducts all criminal proceedings in the name of the Commonwealth. 16 P.S. §1402(a). Action taken by an elected district attorney is action taken by the office of the district attorney, not the individual serving in that office.

The integrity of the criminal justice system, as well as the integrity of the office of prosecutor, compel the conclusion that an individual who is elected to the office of district attorney is bound by the commitments made by her predecessor, especially where an accused's reliance on those commitments compelled the relinquishment of a fundamental, constitutional right. Principles of fundamental fairness and due process compel that conclusion.

This Court has commented that Commonwealth and federal Due Process clauses "...embody the principle of fundamental fairness, entitling every individual to be free from arbitrary or oppressive government conduct." *Kratsas*, 764 A.2d at 27, citing *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)(footnote omitted). According to the *Kratsas* Court, "[t]he due process inquiry, in its most general form, entails an assessment as to whether the challenged proceeding or conduct "“offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our

people as to be ranked as fundamental,” ... and that ‘define[s] the community's sense of fair play and decency.’” *Id.* (citations omitted).

Where the elected district attorney commits to never prosecute an individual, thus stripping him of his Fifth Amendment rights so as to compel testimony, and such person provides testimony as a result of that commitment, the “community’s sense of fair play and decency” requires the conclusion that the elected district attorney bound the *office of district attorney* to that commitment, including any elected successor. Here, the fundamental right against self-incrimination was lost as a result of Castor’s commitment. “When a person yields rights that our federal and state Constitutions recognize as fundamental, strict performance is required of the prosecution.” *Commonwealth v. Martinez*, 147 A.3d 517, 535 (Pa. 2016)(Wecht, dissenting).

Principles of fundamental fairness under the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution were the basis for the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington in *State v. Bryant*, 42 P.3d 1278 (Wash. 2002), to bind a county prosecutor’s office to a written informal immunity agreement between a neighboring county prosecutor’s office and the accused. In a case of first impression, the issue was: “does an informal use/derivative use immunity agreement, which purports to grant immunity for incriminating statements that ‘can

[n]ever be used against you in any prosecution,’ entered into by one state prosecutor bind another state prosecutor from a sister county?” *Id.* at 1281.⁹

The Court engaged in an analysis of principles of collateral estoppel, contract law and the law of agency. The Court rejected these theories as binding the neighboring prosecutor to the agreement.

Turning to principles of fundamental fairness, however, the Court opined:

“There is more at stake than just the liberty of this defendant. At stake is the honor of the government[,] public confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice in a federal scheme of government.”

Id. at 1285, quoting *United States v. Carter*, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972).

Addressing the import of an informal immunity agreement, the Court opined:

An informal immunity agreement does not require court approval. On the contrary, it is a promise by the government to do nothing. *Plaster v. United States*, 789 F.2d 289, 293 (4th Cir.1986). Fundamental fairness requires that the government be scrupulously fair when honoring the terms of such proposals. In general, “fundamental fairness and public confidence in government officials require that [the government] be held to ‘meticulous standards of both promise and performance.’” *Palermo v. Warden*, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2^d Cir.1976) (quoting *Correale v. United States*, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir.1973)). Therefore, the principle of “fundamental fairness” may require that the government perform a promise made by an agent who exceeded his actual authority. *Bemis v. United States*, 30 F.3d 220, 221 (1st Cir.1994). “Fundamental fairness” has been applied to informal immunity agreements. *United States v. Rodman*, 519 F.2d 1058, 1059 (1st Cir.1975) (dismissing on ground of fairness

⁹ Although the agreement was in writing, it conferred “informal immunity.” As the Court explained, “[f]ormal immunity is imposed upon an unwilling witness” while “[i]nformal immunity is a grant of immunity to a willing witness.” *Id.* at 1282.

indictment of defendant based on unfulfilled promise of Securities and Exchange Commission attorney to recommend strongly no prosecution); *United States v. Carrillo*, 709 F.2d 35, 36 (9th Cir.1983) (enforcing promise of drug enforcement agency agents that defendant would not be prosecuted if he cooperated in their investigation despite apparent lack of participation of a prosecutor in the promise). While courts applying fundamental fairness have not provided us with a precise test or rule, absent credible evidence that the informant testified untruthfully or otherwise failed to perform, the government must scrupulously perform its end of the bargain.

Id. at 1285-1286.

Although the agreement was not signed by the prosecutor's office of the neighboring county, the Court noted that the agreement was very broad and included the language, "nothing you reveal can ever be used against you in any prosecution..." *Id.* at 1286. The Court concluded that "fundamental fairness" required dismissal of the charges that were filed by the neighboring prosecutor's office. *Id.*

Although there was no written agreement signed by both Castor and Cosby, the Record overwhelmingly demonstrates that Castor committed never to prosecute Cosby in order to remove any potential criminal exposure and compel Cosby to testify at a deposition. That deposition testimony was provided. Making that commitment, Castor bound the MCDA's office, not just himself. Fundamental fairness and principles of Due Process require the conclusion that Castor's commitment was binding on the MCDA's office, regardless of whom held the position of MCDA. Cosby's conviction should be vacated.

3. Principles of Promissory Estoppel bind the prosecution to the non-prosecution commitment by Castor.

Even if this Court were to conclude that a prosecutor's authority does not encompass the ability to bind a successor to a decision never to prosecute an individual, this Court must carve out an exception to that rule where the accused acted in detrimental reliance on that promise, as occurred here. Principles of promissory estoppel support this conclusion.

The Panel noted that Cosby "fails to cite any precedent for the proposition that a prosecution can be barred based on a contract theory of promissory estoppel, or anything similar." *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 412. In candor, Cosby has found no binding decision directly on point supporting his position.¹⁰ In *Commonwealth v. Butler*, 621 A.2d 630 (Pa. Super. 1993), however, Judge Cirillo, in a dissenting opinion, applied principles of promissory estoppel to a case addressing whether the prosecution is bound to an agreement between the police and the defendant.¹¹ The *Butler* majority did not address this issue, concluding that no agreement was reached. *Id.* at 631-632. The case, however, was reversed on other grounds and a new trial was ordered.

Judge Cirillo dissented, finding that the remedy of retrial was inadequate and that the charges should be dismissed. Judge Cirillo acknowledged the majority's

¹⁰ Similarly, Cosby has found no case directly on point that repudiates it.

¹¹ *Butler* was decided prior to this Court's decision in *Stipetich*, which is discussed *infra*.

conclusion that no agreement existed between the parties but indicated that Butler “...nonetheless may prevail on an estoppel theory...,” *Id.* at 634, stating: “[a]lthough historically the estoppel theory has been used primarily in the realm of civil actions, it would be difficult to imagine a more fitting set of circumstances in which to apply it to a criminal matter than the case at hand.” *Id.* at 635 (Cirillo, dissenting). Judge Cirillo noted:

Because estoppel is used most often in an attempt to enforce agreements or contracts in civil settings, it is worth noting that contract law principles find their way into situations analogous to the instant appeal. For instance, the Court of Appeals in *United States v. Pelletier*, 898 F.2d 297, 301-2 (2d Cir.1990) stated:

To secure a defendant's cooperation and plea, the government may formally grant him use immunity in exchange for his cooperation. Since a cooperation/immunity agreement is in the nature of a contract, its effect is strongly influenced by contract law principles. The remedies available in event of breach, as well as the conditions constituting breach, are governed by the agreement. *Unlike the normal commercial contract, however, due process requires that the government adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity agreement it makes.* (citations omitted; emphasis added).

Id. at 634, n. 2.

This Court and the United States Supreme Court have applied principles of contract law in criminal proceedings to address the enforceability of certain agreements. In *Santobello v. New York*, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court assessed the impact of a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement to refrain from making a

sentencing recommendation. According to the Court, "...when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." *Id.* at 262. Although the trial court in *Santobello* indicated that it was not impacted by the prosecutor's recommendation, the Supreme Court opined, "Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration." *Id.* at 262-263.

In *Martinez, supra.*, this Court acknowledged that it "...utilizes concepts closely associated with contract law when evaluating issues involving plea agreements." *Martinez*, 147 A.3d at 531. The Court concluded, "...the convicted criminal is entitled to the benefit of his bargain through specific performance of the terms of the plea agreement." *Id.* at 533, citing *Santobello*, 404 U.S. at 262.

Other jurisdictions likewise have applied contract principles to agreements reached between an accused and a prosecutor. In *State v. Howington*, 907 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. 1995), the Supreme Court of Tennessee, overruling prior precedent, concluded that an informal agreement between the prosecutor and the accused concerning the nature of a charge to be filed in exchange for testimony was enforceable under contract principles:

We note with approval that a number of other jurisdictions recognize immunity agreements as contractual in nature and enforceable under the principles of contracts. *United States v. Fitch*, 964 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1992) (“To secure a defendant's cooperation in a criminal investigation, the government may informally grant him immunity in exchange for his testimony. An agreement not to prosecute is contractual in nature, and subject to contract law standards.”) (citations omitted); *see also United States v. Pelletier*, 898 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.1990); *United States v. Packwood*, 848 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.1988); *United States v. Brown*, 801 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.1986); *United States v. Reardon*, 787 F.2d 512 (10th Cir.1986); *United States v. Irvine*, 756 F.2d 708 (9th Cir.1985); *Closson v. State*, 812 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1991); *State v. Myrhow*, 262 Mont. 229, 865 P.2d 231 (1993); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 85 (1989) (“Grants of immunity pursuant to statute are not the only method of acquiring immunity, but courts also recognize informal agreements whereby promises of immunity are made in exchange for cooperation.... A cooperation-immunity agreement is in the nature of a contract and subject to contract law standards”).

Id. at 408. *See also State v. Karey*, 232 So. 3d 1186, 1190 (La. 2017)(“...in determining the validity of agreements not to prosecute or of plea agreements, the courts generally refer to analogous rules of contract law, although a defendant's constitutional right to fairness may be broader than his or her rights under the law of contract.”).

Although the instant issue does not involve the enforceability of a plea agreement, it does involve a promise made by an elected prosecutor who, *at a minimum*, had the ostensible authority to make that promise, followed by detrimental reliance on that promise by Cosby. Here, principles of promissory estoppel are uniquely fitting.

This Court has recognized that "...the doctrine of promissory estoppel is invoked to avoid injustice by making enforceable a promise made by one party to the other when the promisee relies on the promise and therefore changes his position to his own detriment." *Crouse v. Cyclops Industries*, 745 A.2d 606, 610 (Pa. 2000), citing the Restatement (Second) Contracts § 90. According to the Court:

In order to maintain an action in promissory estoppel, the aggrieved party must show that 1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; 2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and 3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise...

Id. at 610 (citation omitted).

Although the Panel rejected the applicability of promissory estoppel, it indicated that, even if such theory is countenanced, the necessary elements of promissory estoppel are not satisfied in that Cosby's reliance on Castor's promise was unreasonable, as "...there is simply no authority for the proposition that immunity from criminal prosecution can be conveyed by a prosecutor absent a valid court order pursuant to the immunity statute." *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 412-413.

This flawed conclusion is addressed above and will not be reiterated. Importantly, as to the "reasonableness" of Cosby's reliance on the non-prosecution commitment, an elected prosecutor made a commitment to an attorney that his client would *never* be prosecuted; memorialized that commitment in a signed press

release; and advised that a basis for that decision was to place that client in the position where he would be unable to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in the anticipated civil deposition. Given these facts, along with the tremendous discretion the law affords to a prosecutor to refrain from prosecuting a case, as well as the absence of Pennsylvania precedent constraining the authority of a prosecutor as suggested by the Panel, reliance on the MCDA's promise was reasonable.

That Cosby gave deposition testimony and refrained from invoking his Fifth Amendment rights based on Castor's commitment is amply supported by the Record. Castor testified that he spoke directly with Cosby's criminal defense attorney, Walter Phillips, about his decision to never prosecute Cosby and the legal ramifications that it had on Cosby's inability to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. [R.585a]; Phillips concurred with that assessment. *Id.* Schmitt learned from Phillips that Castor committed to not prosecute Cosby and that the investigation could not be reopened. [R.703a].

Schmitt testified that he allowed Cosby to sit through four days of deposition because assurance was given to Phillips that charges would not be filed [R. 760a-761a], as well as the signed press release. [R.732a]. Schmitt believed that the criminal matter was closed. [R. 762a]. Schmitt testified:

Q: If you had known that the criminal investigation in Montgomery County could be re-opened, how would it have affected your representation, if at all?

A: We certainly wouldn't have let him sit for a deposition.

[R.706a].

The Panel asserts that "...there is virtually no evidence in the record that [Cosby] actually declined to assert his Fifth Amendment rights at the civil deposition based on Mr. Castor's purported promise not to prosecute." *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 413. Although acknowledging Schmitt's unequivocal testimony on this point, the Panel asserted that "the evidence was entirely inconsistent with [Cosby's] alleged reliance on Mr. Castor's promise in choosing not to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in the civil suit." *Id.* at 413-414. The Panel stated that Schmitt indicated that he did not believe that Cosby could incriminate himself on the testimony that he intended to provide at the deposition and, in that case, there would be no basis to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, which is consistent with the prior decision to sit for an interview with the police. *Id.* at 414. The Panel also stated that Schmitt "...failed to mention the alleged promise to [Complainant's] civil attorneys, and he attempted to negotiate a settlement with [Complainant] to prevent her from cooperating with the police in the future." *Id.*

This analysis ignores the law. The United States Supreme Court has found that the Fifth Amendment's protection is not exclusively available to the guilty. Noting that "...the privilege's protection extends only to witnesses who have

‘reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer,’” *Ohio v. Reiner*, 532

U.S. 17, 21 (2001)(per curiam)(citation omitted), the Court opined:

But we have never held, as the Supreme Court of Ohio did, that the privilege is unavailable to those who claim innocence. To the contrary, we have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment's “basic functions ... is to protect *innocent* men ... ‘who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’” *Grunewald v. United States*, 353 U.S. 391, 421, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957) (quoting *Slochower v. Board of Higher Ed. of New York City*, 350 U.S. 551, 557–558, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956)) (emphasis in original). In *Grunewald*, we recognized that truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker's own mouth. 353 U.S., at 421–422, 77 S.Ct. 963.

Id.

Although an attorney may believe that a client’s anticipated testimony will not be inculpatory, such is not a foregone conclusion, especially in cases involving allegations of sexual misconduct where one, indeed, may be “ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.”¹² With Castor’s commitment in place, Schmitt believed that Cosby could not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, as “the potential exposure to criminal punishment no longer exist[ed].” *Taylor*, 2020 WL 2532223 at * 11. Schmitt believed that he did not “need to worry about the Fifth Amendment because there [was] no risk of jeopardy to Mr. Cosby...” [R.732a].

¹² The scope of the Fifth Amendment is not limited to statements that are directly incriminating. Instead, any fact which “...might constitute an essential link in a chain of evidence by which guilt can be established” is subject to Fifth Amendment protection. *See Commonwealth v. Saranchak*, 866 A.2d 292, 303 (Pa. 2005)(citations omitted).

Additionally, there are significant differences between appearing for a voluntary statement with the police and being subjected to examination at a deposition. A police interview is usually focused on the allegations under investigation and can be terminated by the accused at any time. Depositions are virtually boundless, with questions posed on an array of issues regardless of relevance to the underlying complaint. Moreover, although a deponent may walk out of a civil deposition for some reason, there are likely adverse consequences associated with that conduct. Simply because Cosby cooperated with the police and Schmitt did not believe that Cosby would inculcate himself, does not mean that Cosby did not rely on Castor's non-prosecution commitment when he sat for deposition without invoking the Fifth Amendment.

Furthermore, that Schmitt tried to negotiate a comprehensive settlement agreement with Complainant is no different than that which occurs in most civil cases. Such is not inconsistent with his testimony that he only allowed Cosby to be deposed because of Castor's non-prosecution commitment.¹³ That agreement was reached six months after Cosby sat for the last day of his deposition [R. 186a-244a; 2792a], and 12 months after the first day of his deposition. [R.245a-300a; 2792a].

¹³ Cosby's deposition was contentious [R.109a-363a]. Given the objections lodged by Cosby's counsel, if there was any concern that the investigation by the MCDA could be reopened and that Cosby could be subject to prosecution for the allegations involving Complainant, objections certainly would have been voiced as to questions involving Complainant; Cosby would have been directed not to answer the questions; and Cosby would have been instructed to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. As confirmed by Complainant's counsel, he did not. [R.919a-920a].

The settlement agreement has no bearing on Cosby's and Schmitt's reliance on Castor's commitment at the time of the deposition.

Admittedly, it would have been prudent for counsel to place on the record, prior to the deposition, that Castor irrevocably committed that Cosby would not be prosecuted and that Cosby understood that he no longer had the ability to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. Regarding this omission, Schmitt indicated:

The agreement that was made was made with Mr. Castor, the District Attorney. That matter was concluded. We had our agreement with him. We had his assurances. The civil case is filed subsequent to that.

I don't need to worry about the Fifth Amendment because there is no risk of jeopardy to Mr. Cosby because the District Attorney has agreed irrevocably that there would be no criminal prosecution.

[R.732a].

Schmitt's testimony reflects that Cosby did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights during the deposition because counsel believed that he did not have the ability to do so considering Castor's non-prosecution commitment. The second element of promissory estoppel is satisfied.

As to the third prong, an injustice can be avoided only by enforcing this commitment. Although there may have been a more sagacious means of memorializing that commitment, the signed press release; the subsequent non-prosecution of Cosby; Cosby's deposition testimony without the invocation of the Fifth Amendment; Castor's 2015 emails to Ferman; Castor's testimony; and

Schmitt's testimony establish, as a matter of law, the existence of the commitment that was made to not prosecute Cosby.

This Court has commented that “[a]s an officer of the court, the prosecutor has the responsibility to serve the public interest and to ‘seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.’” *Clancy*, 192 A.3d. at 52. Justice, including the integrity of the criminal justice system, can only be served by holding the MCDA's office to the promise that it made in 2005. Cosby's conviction should be vacated.

4. Alternatively, Cosby's deposition testimony should have been suppressed.

The facts and law support the conclusion that Cosby's conviction should be vacated, as Castor irrevocably committed that Cosby would never be prosecuted. If this Court were to find that this commitment was not binding on Castor's successor, or was some-how defective in its scope such that the filing of charges against Cosby in 2015 was lawful, then, alternatively, Cosby's deposition testimony should have been suppressed. This Court's decision in *Commonwealth v. Stipetich*, 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1995) supports that conclusion.

In *Stipetich*, the police searched the home of Heidi and George Stipetich, uncovering contraband. The officer and Stipetichs' counsel reached an agreement that George Stipetich would answer questions concerning the source of the

contraband and that neither Stipetich would be charged if he did so. George Stipetich complied with the agreement.

Nonetheless, the Stipetiches were charged by the prosecutor's office. Relying on the non-prosecution agreement, a motion to dismiss was filed. It was granted by the trial court but reversed by the Superior Court. This Court reversed.

This Court first concluded that the non-prosecution agreement was invalid. *Id.* at 1295. According to the Court, "...the ultimate discretion to file criminal charges lies in the district attorney" and "[p]olice officers have no authority to enter agreements limiting the power of the district attorney in this regard." *Id.*

Despite finding that the non-prosecution agreement was invalid, the Court observed that the trial court's decision to bar the prosecution embodied the concern that allowing the charges to be brought after the defendants kept their end of the bargain "...would be fundamentally unfair because in answering the questions [Stipetich] may have disclosed information that could be used against him." *Id.* at 1296. The Court opined:

The proper response to this concern is not to bar prosecution; rather, it is to suppress... any detrimental evidence procured through the inaccurate representation that he would not be prosecuted. See *Commonwealth v. Peters*, 473 Pa. 72, 86–87, 373 A.2d 1055, 1062–63 (1977). This places the Stipetiches in the same position as if the unauthorized promise not to prosecute had never been made by the police. See *People v. Gallego*, 430 Mich. 443, 424 N.W.2d 470 (1988) (where police entered an unauthorized agreement not to prosecute, appropriate remedy was suppression of evidence obtained thereby, not dismissal of the criminal charges).

Id.

The Court reversed and remanded to the trial court.

Consistent with *Stipetich*, if Castor's non-prosecution commitment was not binding on his successors or was somehow defective, then, alternatively, Cosby's deposition testimony should have been suppressed. As demonstrated above, Cosby relied on Castor's commitment that he would not be prosecuted in assessing whether he could invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. Frankly, it was Castor who adamantly maintained that Cosby was precluded from invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, emphasizing that Cosby was no longer exposed to prosecution and therefore could not assert his Fifth Amendment rights. [R.476a]. Cosby's criminal counsel agreed and conveyed that assessment to civil counsel. [R.476a-477a; 702a-703a].

Refusing to apply *Stipetich*, the Panel asserted that this Court's decision on the appropriate remedy to address the invalid non-prosecution agreement was *dicta*. *Cosby*, 224 A.3d at 416. This assertion is wrong.¹⁴ The conclusion that the statement should be suppressed was central to the Court's analysis, with the Court

¹⁴ See *Commonwealth v. Romero*, 183 A.3d 364, 400, n.18 (Pa. 2018) (“See ‘*obiter dictum*,’ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1240 (10th ed. 2014) (‘A judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).’); *c.f.* ‘*holding*,’ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (10th ed. 2014) (‘A court’s determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision; a principle drawn from such a decision.’).”

reversing and remanding the case to the trial court. Certainly, the trial court did not believe that the *Stipetich* Court's analysis regarding the appropriate remedy to be merely *dicta* that could be ignored.

The Panel also distinguished *Stipetich* by asserting that, in Cosby's case, there was "no negotiated agreement" or "reasonable reliance" on the "defective grant of immunity" when Cosby was deposed. *Id.* at 416-417. This argument is refuted above. In short, Castor made a non-prosecution commitment in order to remove any potential criminal exposure thus allowing Cosby to be compelled to sit for a deposition. [See e.g., R.476a]. The *Stipetich* Court's analysis is on-point and controlling. To conclude otherwise would be fundamentally unfair because Cosby, at deposition, disclosed information that was used against him, *Stipetich*, 652 A.2d at 1296, as demonstrated in Argument A.

Other cases also provide guidance. In *Commonwealth v. Peters*, 373 A.2d 1055, 1062 (Pa. 1977), the Court found that a statement made by appellant should have been suppressed where it was "induced by a promise of immunity from a person in apparent authority to perform the promise" In *Commonwealth v. Bryan*, 818 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. 2003), citing *Stipetich*, the Superior Court suggested that had the defendant made incriminating statements in reliance on a later unenforced agreement with agents from the Attorney General's office, the defendant's statement would have been suppressed. *Id.* at p. 542. Although these

cases are factually distinguishable from Cosby's case, the underlying legal premise is applicable. The courts in each case assessed the facts before it and fashioned a remedy that attempted to do justice.

In sum, Cosby and his counsel relied on the commitment of the elected MCDA that Cosby would not be prosecuted, thus placing Cosby in a position where he was compelled to give deposition testimony without having the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment. More than ten years later, the MCDA breached that commitment and charged Cosby for the crimes for which he and his counsel were told he would not be prosecuted. Cosby's deposition testimony was then used against him *13 years later* at trial. That the prosecutor used this testimony to vilify Cosby is addressed in Argument A. This conduct not only impugns the integrity of the office of prosecutor, but undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system. The motion to suppress should have been granted.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Appellant, William H. Cosby, Jr., respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse and arrest judgment. Alternatively, it is requested that this Court reverse and award Cosby a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATION

I certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the *Public Access Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial Courts* that require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential information and documents.

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Brian W. Perry, Esquire

CERTIFICATION

This 11th day of August, 2020, I certify that this brief contains 20,726 words, as counted by the undersigned's Microsoft Word processing software. On August 4, 2020, an Application for Relief Seeking Permission to Exceed Page Limit on Primary Brief was filed with this Court seeking to file a brief in excess of the word count limit set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a) and to file a primary brief not to exceed 21,000 words. The Commonwealth did not lodge an objection to the request. As of the date of filing of this Brief, this Court has not ruled on the Application. I certify that this Brief is within the word limit requested in the Application.

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APPENDIX A

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment

Appeal Granted in Part by COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Respondent v. WILLIAM HENRY COSBY JR., Petitioner, Pa., June 23,
2020

224 A.3d 372
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.

William Henry COSBY, Jr. Appellant

No. 3314 EDA 2018

Argued August 12, 2019

Filed December 10, 2019

Synopsis

Background: Defendant was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, Criminal Division, No. CP-46-CR-3932-2016, Steven T. O'Neill, J., of three counts of aggravated indecent assault and sentenced to 3-10 years' incarceration. Defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Superior Court, No. 3314 EDA 2018, Bender, P.J.E., held that:

[1] testimony of five prior victims relating to defendant's prior sexual misconduct involved acts that were sufficiently distinctive to warrant application of common plan/scheme/design or absence of mistake exceptions to rule against prior bad acts evidence;

[2] lapse in time between sexual misconduct to which five prior victims testified and sexual assault for which defendant was charged was not too remote in time as to undermine probative value;

[3] trial court did not fail to make assessment of prejudicial nature of testimony of five prior victims;

[4] defendant was not immune from prosecution based on former district attorney's alleged promise not to prosecute;

[5] promissory estoppel did not apply to bar defendant's criminal prosecution;

[6] portion of defendant's civil deposition testimony pertaining to his possession and distribution of central nervous system depressants in 1970s was relevant to show whether defendant acted recklessly in giving victim central nervous system depressants; and

[7] consciousness-of-guilt jury charge was warranted by evidence.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (70)

[1] **Criminal Law** ⚙️ Sex offenses, incest, and prostitution

Criminal Law ⚙️ Similar means or method; modus operandi

Testimony of five prior victims of defendant's alleged sexual misconduct that defendant had drugged and sexually assaulted them involved acts that were sufficiently distinctive to warrant application of common plan/scheme/design or absence of mistake exceptions to the rule against prior bad acts evidence; victims' testimony established a distinct, signature pattern, in which defendant presented himself as a mentor or potential mentor to much younger women in order to establish trust, and then he abused that trust by drugging those women in order to sexually assault them. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[2] **Criminal Law** ⚙️ Remoteness

Lapse in time of 15-22 years between sexual misconduct to which five prior victims testified and the sexual assault for which defendant was charged was not too remote in time as to undermine its probative value, in trial for aggravated indecent assault; although time period was substantial, there were distinctive similarities between prior bad acts evidence and defendant's charged sexual assault, there were multiple prior sexual assaults, all of those prior assaults evidenced same, signature pattern of misconduct, and because defendant's identity was not in dispute, as he claimed he only engaged

in consensual sexual contact with victim, there was no risk of misidentification by use of prior bad acts evidence despite gap in time. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[3] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Manner of proving other misconduct

Criminal Law ⇌ Limiting effect of evidence of other offenses

At trial for aggravated indecent assault, trial court did not fail to make assessment of prejudicial nature of testimony of five prior victims who testified that defendant had drugged and sexually assaulted them; Commonwealth sought 19 witnesses, and trial court found that testimony of all 19 witnesses was relevant and admissible, but that to mitigate any prejudicial effect it would limit the number of witnesses to five, and trial court issued multiple cautionary instructions to jury. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[4] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Necessity and scope of proof

Criminal Law ⇌ Reception and Admissibility of Evidence

The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.

5 Cases that cite this headnote

[5] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Innocence

Criminal Law ⇌ Showing bad character or criminal propensity in general

Criminal Law ⇌ Reasonable Doubt

Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character is prohibited because the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant

has committed the particular crime of which he is accused, and it may not strip him of the presumption of innocence by proving that he has committed other criminal acts. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).

[6] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Plan or scheme in general

A determination of admissibility under the common plan/scheme/design exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence must be made on a case by case basis in accordance with the unique facts and circumstances of each case; however, in each case, the trial court is bound to follow the same controlling, albeit general, principles of law. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[7] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Similar means or method; modus operandi

When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the common plan exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence, the trial court must first examine the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[8] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Similar means or method; modus operandi

When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the common plan exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence, relevant to a finding that criminal conduct is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator will be the habits or patterns of action or conduct undertaken by the perpetrator to commit crime, as well as the time, place, and types of victims typically chosen by the perpetrator. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[9] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Similar means or method;
modus operandi
Criminal Law ⇌ Remoteness
When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the common plan exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence, the trial court is bound to engage in a careful balancing test to assure that the common plan evidence is not too remote in time to be probative. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[10] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Similar means or method;
modus operandi
Criminal Law ⇌ Remoteness
When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the common plan exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence, if the common plan evidence reveals that the details of each criminal incident are nearly identical, the fact that the incidents are separated by a lapse of time will not likely prevent the offer of the evidence unless the time lapse is excessive. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[11] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Similar means or method;
modus operandi
The common plan/scheme/design exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence aids in identifying a perpetrator based on his or her commission of extraordinarily similar criminal acts on other occasions. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[12] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Similar means or method;
modus operandi
The common plan/scheme/design exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence is demanding in its constraints, requiring nearly unique factual circumstances in the commission of a crime, so as to effectively eliminate the possibility that it could have been committed by anyone other than the accused. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[13] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Other Misconduct Showing
Absence of Mistake or Accident
The absence-of-mistake exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence typically applies in circumstances where the identity of the accused is not at issue, such as where the evidence serves to prove that the cause of an injury was not accidental. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[14] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Other Misconduct Showing
Absence of Mistake or Accident
Criminal Law ⇌ Similar means or method;
modus operandi
Criminal Law ⇌ Remoteness
Under both the common plan/scheme/design exception and the absence-of-mistake exception to the rule against prior bad acts evidence, the standard for admission is virtually the same; the prior bad acts evidence must be distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator, and its probative value must not be undermined by the lapse in time between incident. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[15] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Sex offenses
It is impossible for two incidents of sexual assault involving different victims to be identical in all respects, for purposes of determining admissibility of prior bad acts evidence under the common plan/scheme/design or absence of mistake exceptions to the rule against prior bad acts evidence. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[16] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Other Misconduct Showing
Absence of Mistake or Accident
Criminal Law ⇌ Similar means or method;
modus operandi
For purposes of determining whether a pattern of misconduct demonstrated by prior bad acts evidence was sufficiently distinctive to warrant application of common plan/scheme/design or absence of mistake exceptions to the rule

against prior bad acts evidence, a distinct pattern does not require outlandish or bizarre criminal conduct, nor does it demand proof that the conduct was part of a greater master plan; rather, what is essential is that the similarities are not confined to insignificant details that would likely be common elements regardless of who had committed the crimes. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[17] Criminal Law ⇌ Remoteness

Even if evidence of prior criminal activity is otherwise admissible under an exception to the rule against prior bad acts, said evidence will be rendered inadmissible if it is too remote. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

[18] Criminal Law ⇌ Custody and conduct of jury

Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court's instructions.

[19] Criminal Law ⇌ Limiting effect of evidence of other offenses

Limiting instructions weigh in favor of upholding admission of other bad acts evidence. Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[20] Criminal Law ⇌ Proceedings at Trial in General

Criminal Law ⇌ Points and authorities

Defendant waived for appellate review claim that trial judge failed to disclose prior allegedly acrimonious relationship with former district attorney and should have recused himself as a result of bias against the former district attorney, who essentially testified as a witness for the defense, during prosecution for aggravated indecent assault; defendant waited 167 days to raise recusal issue after discovering factual basis for the claim, and defendant provided no argument indicating why he waited 167 days to seek recusal.

[21] Judges ⇌ Determination of objections

It is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially.

[22] Judges ⇌ Determination of objections

Until evidence establishes a jurist's bias, Superior Court presumes judges of this Commonwealth are honorable, fair and competent, and, when confronted with a recusal demand, have the ability to determine whether they can rule impartially and without prejudice.

[23] Judges ⇌ Time of making objection

In this Commonwealth, a party must seek recusal of a jurist at the earliest possible moment, i.e., when the party knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to recuse.

[24] Judges ⇌ Time of making objection

If the party seeking recusal of a jurist fails to present a motion to recuse at the earliest possible moment, then the party's recusal issue is time-barred and waived.

[25] Criminal Law ⇌ Limitation by Scope of Record

As an appellate court, Superior Court's review is limited by the contents of the certified record. Pa. R. App. P. 1921.

[26] Criminal Law ⇌ Grounds of review in general

On appeal, the appellant has the duty to ensure that all documents essential to his case are included in the certified record.

[27] Criminal Law ⇌ Omission of evidence

If a document is not in the certified record then the Superior Court cannot take it into account.

[28] Criminal Law ⇌ Agreements Granting Immunity

There was no enforceable non-prosecution agreement arising from former district attorney's alleged promise not to prosecute defendant, and therefore defendant was not immune from prosecution based on former district attorney's alleged promise not to prosecute, for aggravated indecent assault; former district attorney never sought an immunity order from a judge of a designated court, and, at most, former district attorney exercised his prosecutorial discretion in promising not to prosecute defendant, which did not convey immunity from future prosecution for same offense. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5947(b).

[29] Criminal Law ⇌ Agreements Granting Immunity

Promissory estoppel did not apply to bar defendant's criminal prosecution for aggravated indecent assault, and therefore trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's habeas corpus motion seeking to bar his trial based on former district attorney's alleged promise not to prosecute and defendant's subsequent civil deposition in which he did not assert Fifth Amendment rights; criminal prosecution could not be barred based on a contract theory of promissory estoppel, or anything similar. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

[30] Criminal Law ⇌ Agreements Granting Immunity

Defendant's reliance on former district attorney's alleged promise not to prosecute was not reasonable, as would be required for defendant to establish that promissory estoppel applied to bar his trial for aggravated indecent assault; there was no authority for proposition that immunity from criminal prosecution could be conveyed by a prosecutor absent a valid court order pursuant to the immunity statute, and defendant's reliance

on the alleged promise could not be deemed reasonable when he was represented by counsel, especially when immunity could only be granted by a court order, and no court order granting immunity existed.

[31] Criminal Law ⇌ Agreements Granting Immunity

Defendant's allegations that he relied upon former district attorney's alleged promise not to prosecute when he provided civil deposition in which he did not assert Fifth Amendment rights failed to state a claim that promissory estoppel applied to bar trial for aggravated indecent assault; there was virtually no evidence in record that defendant actually declined Fifth Amendment rights at civil deposition based on former district attorney's purported promise, and defendant's general counsel's actions were entirely inconsistent with reliance on the purported promise, as he failed to mention the alleged promise to victim's civil attorneys, and he attempted to negotiate settlement with victim to prevent her from cooperating with police in future. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

[32] Criminal Law ⇌ Amendments and rulings as to indictment or pleas

Indictments and Charging Instruments ⇌ Discretion of court

The decision to grant or deny a motion to quash a criminal complaint is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed on appeal only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion.

[33] Indictments and Charging Instruments ⇌ Grounds

A trial court should not sustain a motion to quash a criminal complaint except in a clear case where it is convinced that harm has been done to the defendant by improper conduct that interfered with his substantial rights.

[34] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Indictment and information
To the extent that denying a motion to quash a criminal complaint turns in some part on issues of fact, Superior Court is highly deferential to the findings of the trial court.

[35] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Province of jury or trial court
Criminal Law ⇌ Province of jury or trial court

Questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence presented are for the trial court to resolve, not appellate courts.

[36] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Evidence
As long as sufficient evidence exists in the record which is adequate to support a finding found by the trial court, as factfinder, Superior Court is precluded from overturning that finding.

[37] **Estoppel** ⇌ Future events; promissory estoppel
Promissory estoppel enables a person to enforce a contract-like promise that would be otherwise unenforceable under contract law principles.

[38] **Estoppel** ⇌ Future events; promissory estoppel
To establish promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the promisor made a promise that would reasonably be expected to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.

[39] **Estoppel** ⇌ Future events; promissory estoppel

Factors to establish promissory estoppel are strictly enforced to guard against the loose application of promissory estoppel.

[40] **Witnesses** ⇌ Form and Purpose of Inquiry
The privilege against self-incrimination can only be asserted when the witness is being asked to testify to self-incriminating facts and only when a witness is asked a question demanding an incriminating answer. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

[41] **Witnesses** ⇌ Determination of right to privilege
The witness has the burden of demonstrating that he or she has a reasonable ground for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. Amend. 5.

[42] **Constitutional Law** ⇌ Immunity and privilege
Criminal Law ⇌ Agreements Granting Immunity
Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to suppress contents of civil deposition taken as part of civil suit filed by victim and in which defendant did not assert Fifth Amendment rights due to alleged reliance on a promise by former district attorney not to prosecute, in aggravated indecent assault case; there was neither an agreement nor a promise not to prosecute, only an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and because there was no promise, there could be no reliance on part of defendant, and principles of fundamental fairness and due process were not violated. U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 14.

[43] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Illegally obtained evidence
Criminal Law ⇌ Evidence wrongfully obtained
Superior Court's standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining

whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.

[44] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Review De Novo
Criminal Law ⇌ Evidence wrongfully obtained
In addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion, Superior Court is bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; Superior Court's standard of review on questions of law is de novo.

[45] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Reception of evidence
Where the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, Superior Court may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted.

[46] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Evidence wrongfully obtained
Superior Court's scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.

[47] **Estoppel** ⇌ Future events; promissory estoppel
Where there is no enforceable agreement between parties because the agreement lacked consideration, the agreement may still be enforceable on a theory of promissory estoppel to avoid injustice.

[48] **Estoppel** ⇌ Future events; promissory estoppel
Showing that injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise, as required for a party asserting promissory estoppel, may depend, inter alia, on the reasonableness of the promisee's

reliance and the formality with which the promise was made.

[49] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Sex offenses, incest, and prostitution
Portion of defendant's civil deposition testimony pertaining to his possession and distribution of central nervous system depressants in 1970s was relevant, in trial for aggravated indecent assault, to show whether defendant acted recklessly in giving victim central nervous system depressants; defendant's admissions in deposition that he gave other women central nervous system depressants, knowing their effects, helped prove that he knew the pills he gave to victim to help her sleep would render her unconscious or nearly unconscious, and thus, make her unable to consent to sex with him and, at the very least, he disregarded this risk. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 302(b)(3), 3125(a); Pa. R. Evid. 404(b).

[50] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Evidence and witnesses
Defendant waived for appellate review claim that trial court abused its discretion in issuing a consciousness-of-guilt jury charge, at aggravated indecent assault trial; even though defendant argued prior to jury charge that trial court should not issue a consciousness of guilt instruction, he failed to object immediately after jury was charged when prompted by trial court. Pa. R. App. P. 302(a), 302(b); Pa. R. Crim. P. 647(C).

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[51] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Suppression or fabrication of evidence
Consciousness-of-guilt jury charge was warranted by evidence in aggravated indecent assault prosecution, given that Commonwealth's evidence, if believed by jury, demonstrated that defendant offered to pay for victim's education, therapy, and travel during phone conversations he had with victim and victim's mother in which they confronted defendant with victim's accusation that defendant sexually

assaulted her; admission of the evidence did not conflict with constitutional principles, a reasonable person could have interpreted defendant's actions as an attempt to entice victim with economic incentives not to pursue criminal prosecution, and jury could have reasonably inferred that by offering significant economic benefits immediately after being confronted, defendant was attempting to influence witnesses to shield himself from prosecution.

[52] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Objections in General

In order to preserve a claim that a jury instruction was erroneously given, the appellant must have objected to the charge at trial.

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[53] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Construction and Effect of Charge as a Whole

When evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, Superior Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated portions, to determine if the instructions were improper.

[54] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Form and Language in General

A trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration.

[55] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Instructions

Criminal Law ⇌ Instructions in general

For purposes of evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, only where there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.

[56] **Jury** ⇌ Bias and Prejudice

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decision not to strike for cause ostensibly biased prospective juror, who was accused by another prospective juror of expressing bias against defendant; trial court, as factfinder, determined that accusation of bias against the prospective juror was not credible, and that the prospective juror's testimony, which directly contradicted the accusing prospective juror's testimony, was credible, and trial court's credibility determination was buttressed by testimony of three other seated jurors who were in immediate vicinity of both prospective jurors at time purported statement expressing bias was made.

[57] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Selection and impaneling

Jury ⇌ Discretion of court

A trial court's decision regarding whether to disqualify a juror for cause is within its sound discretion and will not be reversed in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion.

[58] **Jury** ⇌ Personal Opinions and Conscientious Scruples

The test for determining whether a prospective juror should be disqualified is whether he is willing and able to eliminate the influence of any scruples and render a verdict according to the evidence, and this is to be determined on the basis of answers to questions and demeanor.

[59] **Jury** ⇌ Influence on verdict

In determining whether a prospective juror should be disqualified, it must be determined whether any biases or prejudices can be put aside on proper instruction of the trial court.

[60] **Jury** ⇌ Bias and Prejudice

A challenge to strike a prospective juror for cause should be granted when the prospective juror has such a close relationship, familial, financial, or situational, with the parties, counsel, victims,

or witnesses that the trial court will presume a likelihood of prejudice or demonstrates a likelihood of prejudice by his or her conduct or answers to questions.

[61] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Misconduct of or Affecting Jurors

The refusal of a new trial on grounds of alleged misconduct of a juror is largely within the discretion of the trial judge.

[62] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Jury selection

When the facts surrounding possible misconduct of a juror are in dispute, the trial judge should examine the various witnesses on the question, and his findings of fact will be sustained unless there is an abuse of discretion.

[63] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Specification of errors

Defendant waived for appellate review any challenge to general provisions of current version of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II) that were unrelated to his designation as sexually violent predator (SVP), where defendant only challenged trial court's application of SVP provisions of SORNA II on ex post facto grounds in his statement of errors complained of on appeal. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 17; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9799.10 et seq.; Pa. R. App. P. 1925(b).

3 Cases that cite this headnote

[64] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Specification of errors

Defendant waived for appellate review claim that his sexually violent predator (SVP) status was imposed below beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof, where defendant only challenged trial court's application of SVP provisions of current version of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II) on ex post facto grounds in his statement of errors complained of on appeal. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10,

cl. 1; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 17; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9799.10 et seq.; Pa. R. App. P. 1925(b).

[65] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Points and authorities

Defendant waived for appellate review claim that trial court's application to defendant of sexually violent predator (SVP) provisions of current version of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II) violated ex post facto clauses of Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions, where defendant failed to provide a meaningful analysis for Superior Court's review. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 17; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9799.10 et seq.; Pa. R. App. P. 2119.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[66] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Points and authorities

Defendant's failure to address changes between previously-held-unconstitutional version of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA I) and current version of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II), and in particular, whether sexually violent predator (SVP) provisions of SORNA II remained punitive despite addition of mechanism by which sex offender registrants, including SVPs, could be relieved of part or all of their registration, reporting, and counseling requirements under SORNA II, demonstrated that defendant could not overcome heavy burden of persuasion to demonstrate that SVP-triggered provisions of SORNA II clearly, palpably, and plainly violated state and federal ex post facto clauses. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; Pa. Const. art. 1, § 17; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9799.10 et seq., 9799.51(d)(4), 9799.59.

2 Cases that cite this headnote

[67] **Criminal Law** ⇌ Points and authorities

The failure to provide a relevant analysis that discusses pertinent facts may result in waiver under rule of appellate procedure governing argument section of briefs. Pa. R. App. P. 2119.

[68] **Constitutional Law** ⇌ Questions of law or fact

Criminal Law ⇌ Constitutional issues in general

When an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the appellant presents Superior Court with a question of law; Superior Court's consideration of questions of law is plenary.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[69] **Constitutional Law** ⇌ Presumptions and Construction as to Constitutionality

A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution.

[70] **Constitutional Law** ⇌ Burden of Proof

The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of persuasion.

***380** Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 25, 2018, In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-3932-2016. Steven T. O'Neill, J.

Attorneys and Law Firms

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Virginia A. Gibson, Philadelphia, RAINN, Amicus Curiae.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

Opinion

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

Appellant, William Henry Cosby, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence of 3-10 years' incarceration, imposed following his conviction for three counts of aggravated indecent assault, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(1), (4), and (5). After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:

***381** In January 2004[,]¹ [] [Appellant] sexually assaulted [the] then thirty[-]year[-]old [Victim] at his home in Elkins Park, Cheltenham, Montgomery County. On the evening of the assault, [Victim] was invited to the then sixty-six[-]year[-]old [Appellant]'s home to discuss her upcoming career change. She had decided to leave her position as the Director of Basketball Operations for the Temple women's basketball team, and to return to her native Canada to pursue a career in massage therapy. When she arrived at the home, she entered through the kitchen door, as she had on prior visits. She and [Appellant] sat at the kitchen table and began talking. There was a glass of water and a glass of wine on the table when she arrived. Initially, she drank only the water because she had not eaten a lot and did not want to drink on an empty stomach. Eventually, [Appellant] convinced her to taste the wine. They discussed the stress she was feeling at the prospect of telling [the basketball coach] that she was leaving Temple. [Victim] left the table to use the restroom. When she returned, [Appellant] was standing by the table, having gone upstairs himself while she was in the bathroom. He reached out his hand and offered her three blue pills. He told her, "These are your friends. They'll help take the edge off." She asked him if she should put the pills under her tongue. He told her to put them down with water, and she did.

¹ In each of her statements to police, and in prior testimony, [Victim] indicated that the assault took place in 2004. She indicated to police that the assault happened prior to her cousin[s] visiting from Canada; border crossing records indicate that he entered the United States on January 22, 2004. There was no evidence to indicate that the assault happened prior to December 30, 2003.

After she took the pills, [Victim] and [Appellant] sat back down at the kitchen table and continued their conversation. She began to have double vision and told [Appellant] that she could see two of him. Her mouth became cottony and she began to slur her words. [Appellant] told her that he thought she needed to relax. [Victim] did not know what was happening to her, but felt that something was wrong. They stood up from the table and [Appellant] took her arm to help steady her. Her legs felt rubbery as he walked her through the dining room to a sofa in another room. He placed her on the sofa on her left side and told her to relax there. She began to panic and did not know what was happening to her body. She felt weak and was unable to speak. She was unable to maintain consciousness. She was jolted awake by [Appellant] forcefully penetrating her vagina with his fingers. [Appellant] had positioned himself behind her on the couch, penetrated her vagina with his fingers, and fondled her breasts. He took her hand[,] placed it on his penis[,] and masturbated himself with her hand. [Victim] was unable to tell him to stop or to physically stop the assault.

She awoke sometime between four and five a.m. to find her pants unzipped and her bra up around her neck. She fixed her clothing and began to head towards the front door. As she walked towards the door, she saw [Appellant] standing in the doorway between the kitchen and the dining room. He was wearing a robe and slippers and told her there was a muffin and tea for her on the table. She sipped the tea[,] took a piece of the muffin with her[,] and drove herself home.

At the time of assault, [Victim] had known [Appellant] since the fall of 2002 *382 when she met him in her capacity as the Director of Basketball Operations. She was introduced to [Appellant] by Joan Ballast at a basketball game at the Liacouras Center. [Victim] accompanied Ms. Ballast and several others [who were] giving [Appellant] a tour of the newly renovated facilities. Several days after the initial introduction, [Appellant] called Temple with some questions about the renovations and spoke to [Victim] on the phone. Several weeks later, she again spoke to him on the phone at her office. They discussed having met at the game at Temple. They began having more regular conversations, mostly pertaining to Temple sports. The conversations also included personal information about [Victim]'s history as a professional basketball player, her educational background and her career goals.

After several phone conversations, [Appellant] invited [Victim] to his home for dinner. When she arrived at the home, [Appellant] greeted her and took her to the room where she ate her dinner. The chef served her meal and a glass of wine and she ate alone. As she was finishing her meal, [Appellant] came into the room and sat next to her on the couch. At this point, he placed his hand on her thigh. She was aware that this was the first time [Appellant] touched her, but thought nothing of it and left shortly after as she had been preparing to do.

Subsequently, [Appellant] invited her to attend a blues concert in New York City with other young women who shared similar interests, particularly related to health and homeopathic remedies. She did not see [Appellant] in person on that trip.

Sometime later, she was again invited to dine at [Appellant]'s home alone. The chef called her about the meal and again she ate in the same room as she had on the first occasion. For a second time, when she was finished [with] her meal, [Appellant] sat beside her on the couch. The conversation again revolved around things [Victim] could do to ... break into sports broadcasting. On this occasion, [Appellant] reached over and attempted to unbutton and to unzip her pants. She leaned forward to prevent him from undoing her pants. He stopped. She believed that she had made it clear she was not interested in any of that. She did not feel threatened by him and did not expect him to make a romantic or sexual advance towards her again.

[Victim] continued to have contact with [Appellant], primarily by phone and related to Temple sports. [Appellant] also had contact with [Victim]'s family. [Victim]'s mother ... and ... sister ... attended one of [Appellant]'s performances in Ontario, and afterward, met him backstage.

In late 2003, [Appellant] invited [Victim] to meet him at the Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut. He put her in touch with Tom Cantone, who worked at the casino. When she arrived at the casino, she had dinner with [Appellant] and Mr. Cantone. After dinner, Mr. Cantone escorted [Victim] to her room. She thanked him and told him that she would have to leave early in the morning and would not have time to tour the Indian reservation that was on the property. [Appellant] called her and asked her to come back upstairs to his room for some baked goods. When she arrived at the room, he invited her in and continued to unpack his

luggage cart. She believed that the baked goods were on the cart. During this time, they discussed their usual topics of conversation, Temple and sports broadcasting. [Victim] was seated on the edge of the bed. *383 [Appellant] laid down on the bed. He fell asleep. [Victim] remained in the room for several minutes, and then she went back to her own room.

[Victim] testified that during this time, she came to view [Appellant] as a mentor and a friend.² He was well respected at Temple as a trustee and alumni, and [Victim] was grateful for the help that he tried to give her in her career. She continued her friendship with him, despite what she felt were two sexual advances; she was a young, fit woman who did not feel physically threatened by [Appellant].

² In his statement to police, [Appellant] agreed and indicated that [Victim] saw him as a mentor and that he encouraged that relationship as a mentor.

Following the assault, between January[] 2004 and March[] 2004, [Victim] and [Appellant] continued to have telephone contact, solely regarding Temple sports. In March 2004[, Appellant] invited [Victim] to a dinner at a restaurant in Philadelphia. [Victim] attended the dinner, hoping to speak to [Appellant] about the assault. After the dinner, [Appellant] invited her to his home to talk. Once at the home, she attempted to confront him to find out what he gave her and why he assaulted her. She testified that he was evasive and told her that he thought she had an orgasm. Unable to get an answer, she lost her courage and left the home.

At the end of March 2004, [Victim] moved back to Canada. [Victim]'s mother ... testified that when her daughter returned home, she seemed to be depressed and was not herself. She would hear her daughter screaming in her sleep, but [Victim] denied that anything was wrong.

After returning to Canada, [Victim] had some phone contact with [Appellant] related to his performance in the Toronto area. [Appellant] invited [Victim] and her family to attend that show. Her parents were excited to attend the show, and her mother had previously spoken with [Appellant] on the phone and attended two of his shows prior to the assault. [Victim]'s mother brought [Appellant] a gift to the show.

In January 2005, [Victim] disclosed the assault to her mother. She woke up crying and called her mother. [Victim's mother] was on her way to work and called [Victim] back once she arrived at work. They decided to contact the Durham Regional Police in Ontario, Canada[,] when [Victim's mother] returned home from work. Unsure of how the American criminal justice system worked, and afraid that [Appellant] could retaliate against her or her family, [Victim] attempted to reach two attorneys in the Philadelphia area during the day.

Ultimately, that evening, [Victim] and her mother contacted the Durham Regional Police and filed a police report. Following the report, [Victim's mother] asked for [Appellant]'s phone number and called him. [Appellant] returned [Victim's mother]'s call the next day. During this call, both [Victim] and her mother spoke to [Appellant] on separate phone extensions. [Victim] confronted him about what happened and the three blue pills that he gave her. [Appellant] apologized, but would not tell her what he had given her. He indicated that he would have to check the prescription bottle and that he would write the name down and send it to them. [Victim] hung up the phone and her mother continued to speak to [Appellant]. He told [Victim's mother] that there was no penile *384 penetration. [Victim] did not tell [Appellant] that she had filed a police report.

After this initial phone conversation with [Appellant], [Victim's mother] purchased a tape recorder and called him again. In the call, [Appellant] indicated that he wanted to talk about a "mutual feeling or friendship," and "to see if [Victim] is still interested in sports [broad]casting or something in T.V." [Appellant] also discussed paying for [Victim] to continue her education. He continued to refuse to give [Victim's mother] the name of the medication he had given [Victim]. Additionally, he invited her and [Victim] to meet him in another city to meet with him to discuss these offers in person and told her that someone would call them to arrange the trip.

Subsequently, [Victim] received a phone message from Peter Weiderlight, one of [Appellant]'s representatives. Mr. Weiderlight indicated in his message that he was calling on behalf of [Appellant] to offer [Victim] a trip to see [Appellant]'s upcoming performance in Florida.

When [Victim] returned Mr. Weiderlight's call, she recorded the conversation. During this conversation, Mr. Weiderlight discussed [Appellant]'s offer for [Victim] and

her mother to attend a performance ... in Miami and sought to obtain her information so that he could book flights and make reservations. [Victim] did not give him that information or call him back to provide the same. [Victim] also received a message from [Appellant]'s attorney, Marty Singer, Esq., wherein he indicated that [Appellant] wished to set up an educational trust for [Victim]. [Victim] did not return Mr. Singer's call. Both of these calls were received within days of [Victim]'s report to police.

The Durham Regional Police referred the report to the Philadelphia Police, who ultimately referred it to the Cheltenham Police Department in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Sergeant Richard Schaeffer, of the Cheltenham Township Police Department, was assigned to the case in 2005. Cheltenham police investigated jointly with the Montgomery County Detective Bureau. On January 19, 2005, Sgt. Schaeffer spoke to [Victim] by phone to obtain a brief description of her allegations. He testified that [Victim] was nervous and anxious during this call. She then drove from Canada to meet with law enforcement in person in Montgomery County. She testified that in each of her meetings with law enforcement she was very nervous. She had never had any previous contact with law enforcement, and discussing the nature of the assault made her uncomfortable. She testified that she cooperated with the police and signed releases for her mental health, banking and phone records.

On January 24, 2005, then Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce L. Castor, Jr., issued a signed press release indicating that an investigation had commenced following [Victim]'s January 13, 2005[] report to authorities in Canada. As part of the investigation, law enforcement, including Sgt. Schaeffer, took a written[] question and answer statement from [Appellant] in New York City on January 26, 2005. [Appellant] was accompanied by counsel, both his criminal defense attorney Walter M. Phillips[, Esq.,]³ [] and his longtime general counsel John P. Schmitt, Esq., when he provided his statement to police.

³ Mr. Phillips passed away in early 2015.

In his statement to police, [Appellant] stated that he met [Victim] in 2002 at *385 the Liacouras Center. He stated [that] they had a social and romantic relationship that began on her second visit to his home. He stated that she was alone with him in the home on three occasions. As to the night of the assault, he stated that [Victim] had come to his home and they were talking in the kitchen about her

inability to sleep. He told police that he gave her Benadryl that he uses to help him sleep when he travels. He stated that he would take two Benadryl and would become sleepy right away. He gave [Victim] one and [one-]half pills. He did not tell [Victim] what the pills were. He stated that he was comfortable giving her pills to relax her. He stated that she did not appear to be under the influence when she arrived at his home that night.

He stated that after he gave her the pills, they began to touch and kiss on the couch with clothes on. He stated that she never told him to stop and that he touched her bare breasts and genitalia. He stated that he did not remove his clothing and [Victim] did not touch him under his clothes. He told police, "I never intended to have sexual intercourse, like naked bodies with [Victim]. We were fully clothed. We are petting. I enjoyed it. And then I stopped and went up to bed. We stopped and then we talked."

He stated that there were at least three other occasions where they engaged in similar petting in his home. When asked if they had ever had intercourse, he stated, "[n]ever asleep or awake." He stated that on each occasion, he initiated the petting. He stated that on her second visit to his home, they were kissing in the hallway and he lifted her bra to kiss her breasts and she told him to stop.

He stated that, just prior to the date of his statement, he spoke to [Victim's mother] on the phone and she asked him what he had given her daughter. He told her that he gave [Victim] some pills and that he would send her the name of them. He further stated that [he] told [Victim's mother] there was no penile penetration, just petting and touching of private parts. He also stated that he did not recall using the word 'consensual' when describing the encounter to [Victim's mother]. He also answered "no," when asked if he ever knew [Victim] to be untruthful. Following that interview, [Appellant], unprompted, provided law enforcement with pills that were later identified as Benadryl.

On February 17, 2005, law enforcement had a strategy meeting where they created a plan for the next steps in the investigation. Later that same day, then District Attorney, Bruce L. Castor, Jr., issued a second, signed press release, this time stating that he had decided not to prosecute [Appellant]. The press release cautioned that the decision could be reconsidered. Mr. Castor never personally met with [Victim].

[Victim]'s attorneys, Dolores Troiani, Esq., and Bebe Kivitz, Esq., first learned of Mr. Castor's decision not to prosecute when a reporter arrived at Ms. Troiani's office on the evening of February 17, 2005[,] seeking comment about what Bruce Castor had done. The reporter informed her that Mr. Castor had issued a press release in which he declined prosecution. Ms. Troiani had not received any prior notification of the decision not to prosecute.

At a pretrial hearing held on February 2 and 3, 2016, Mr. Castor testified that it was his intention in 2005 to strip [Appellant] of his Fifth Amendment right to force him to sit for a deposition in a yet[-]to[-]be[-]filed civil case, and that Mr. Phillips, [Appellant]'s criminal *386 attorney, agreed with his legal assessment. Mr. Castor also testified that he relayed this intention to then First Assistant District Attorney Risa V. Ferman.⁴

⁴ Ms. Ferman is now a Judge on the Court of Common Pleas.

Disappointed with the declination of the charges, [Victim] sought justice civilly. On March 8, 2005, she filed a civil suit against [Appellant] in federal court. As part of the lawsuit, both parties were deposed. On four dates, September 28 and 29, 2005[,] and March 28 and 29, 2006, [Appellant] sat for depositions in the civil matter. He was accompanied by counsel, including Mr. Schmitt. Mr. Schmitt testified that Mr. Phillips had informed him of Mr. Castor's promise not to prosecute. [Appellant] did not invoke the Fifth Amendment during the depositions; however, counsel did advise him not to answer questions pertaining to [Victim] and her attorneys filed motions to compel his testimony. [Appellant] did not invoke the Fifth Amendment when asked about other alleged victims. At no time during the civil litigation did any of the attorneys for [Appellant] indicate on the record that [Appellant] could not be prosecuted. There was no attempt by defense attorneys to confirm the purported promise before the depositions, even though Mr. Castor was still the District Attorney; it was never referenced in the stipulations at the outset of the civil depositions.

In his depositions, [Appellant] testified that he met [Victim] at the Liacouras Center and developed a romantic interest in her right away. He did not tell her of his interest. He testified that he was open to "sort of whatever happens" and that he did not want his wife to know about any relationship with [Victim]. When asked what he meant by a romantic interest,

he testified "[r]omance in terms of steps that will lead to some kind of permission or no permission or how you go about getting to wherever you're going to wind up." After their first meeting, they spoke on the phone on more than one occasion. He testified that every time [Victim] came to his Elkins Park home it was at his invitation; she did not initiate any of the visits.

He testified that there were three instances of consensual sexual contact with [Victim], including the night he gave her the pills. [During] one of the encounters, he testified that he tried to suck her breasts and she told him "no, stop," but she permitted him to put his hand inside of her vagina. He also testified about the pills he gave law enforcement at the January 26, 2005 interview. Additionally, he testified that he believed the incident during which he gave [Victim] the pills was in the year 2004, "[b]ecause it's not more than a year away. That's a time period that I knew-it's a ballpark of when I knew [Victim]."

He testified that he and [Victim] had discussed herbal medicines and that he gave [Victim] pills on one occasion, that he identified to police as Benadryl[]. He testified about his knowledge of the types of Benadryl and their effects. He indicated that he would take two pills to help him go to sleep.

[Appellant] testified that on the night of the assault, [Victim] accepted his invitation to come to his home. They sat at a table in the kitchen and talked about [Victim]'s position at Temple as well as her trouble concentrating, tension and relaxation. By his own admission, he gave [Victim] one and one[-]half Benadryl and told her to take it, indicating, "I have three friends to make you relax." He did not tell her the pills were Benadryl. He testified that he gave her the *387 three half pills because he takes two and she was about his height. He testified that she looked at the pills, but did not ask him what they were.

[Appellant] testified that, after he gave her the pills, they continued to talk for 15-20 minutes before he suggested they move into the living room. He testified that [Victim] went to the bathroom and returned to the living room where he asked her to sit down on the sofa. He testified that they began to "neck and we began to touch and feel and kiss, and kiss back," and that he opened his shirt. He then described the encounter,

[t]hen I lifted her bra up and our skin-so our skin could touch. We rubbed. We kissed. We stopped. I moved back to the sofa, coming back in a position. She's on top of

me. I place my knee between her legs. She's up. We kiss. I hold her. She hugs. I move her to the position of down. She goes with me down. I'm behind her. I have [my left arm behind] her neck ...[.] Her neck is there and her head. There's a pillow, which is a pillow that goes with the decoration of the sofa. It's not a bedroom pillow. I am behind her. We are in what would be called ... a spooning position. My face is right on the back of her head, around her ear. I go inside her pants. She touches me. It's awkward. It's uncomfortable for her. She pulls her hand-I don't know if she got tired or what. She then took her hand and put it on top of my hand to push it in further. I move my fingers. I do not talk, she does not talk but she makes a sound, which I feel was an orgasm, and she was wet. She was wet when I went in.

He testified that after the encounter he told her to try to go to sleep and then he went upstairs. He set an alarm and returned downstairs about two hours later when it was still dark out. [Victim] was awake and they went to the kitchen where he gave her some tea and a blueberry muffin that she took a bite of and wrapped up before she left.

During his depositions, [Appellant] also discussed his phone calls with [Victim's mother]. He testified that he told [Victim] and her mother that he would write the name of the pills he gave [Victim] on a piece of paper and send it to her. He testified that he did not tell them it was Benadryl because,

I'm on the phone. I'm listening to two people. And at first I'm thinking the mother is coming at me for being a dirty old man, which is also bad-which is bad also, but then, what did you give my daughter? And [if] I put these things in the mail and these people are in Canada, what are they going to do if they receive it? What are they going to say if I tell them about it? And also, to be perfectly frank, I'm thinking and praying no one is recording me.

He testified that after his first, unrecorded phone call with [Victim], he had "Peter" from William Morris contact [Victim] to see if she would be willing to meet him in Miami. He also testified that he apologized to [Victim's mother] "because I'm thinking this is a dirty old man with a young girl. I apologized. I said to the mother it was digital penetration." He later offered to pay for [Victim] to attend graduate school. [Appellant] contacted his attorney Marty Singer and asked him to contact [Victim] regarding an educational trust.

He also testified that he did not believe that [Victim] was after money. When asked if he believed it was in his best interest that the public believe [Victim] consented, he replied "yes." He believed there would be financial consequences *388 if the public believed that he drugged [Victim] and gave her something other than Benadryl.

In his deposition testimony, [Appellant] also testified about his use of Quaaludes with women with whom he wanted to have sex.

On November 8, 2006, the civil case settled and [Victim] entered into a confidential settlement agreement with [Appellant], Marty Singer and American Media.⁵ [Appellant] agreed to pay [Victim] \$3.38 million[,] and American Media agreed to pay her \$20,000. As part of the settlement agreement, [Victim] agreed that she would not initiate a criminal complaint arising from the instant assault.

⁵ American Media was a party to the lawsuit as a result of [Appellant's] giving an interview about [Victim's] allegations to the National Enquirer.

The 2005-2006 civil depositions remained under temporary seal until 2015 when the federal judge who presided over the civil case unsealed the records in response to a media request. As a result, in July 2015, the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, led by then District Attorney Ferman, reopened the investigation.

On September 22, 2015, at 10:30 am, Brian McMonagle, Esq. and Patrick O'Connor, Esq., met with then District Attorney Ferman and then First Assistant District Attorney Kevin Steele at the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office for a discussion regarding [Appellant], who was represented by Mr. McMonagle and Mr. O'Connor. On September 23, 2015, at 1:30 pm, Bruce L. Castor, Jr., Esq., now a County Commissioner, sent an unsolicited email to then District Attorney Ferman.⁶

⁶ This email was marked and admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 5 at the February 2016 *Habeas Corpus* hearing held in this matter.

In this September 23, 2015 email, Mr. Castor indicated "[a]gain with the agreement of the defense lawyer and [Victim's] [lawyers,] I intentionally and specifically bound the Commonwealth that there would be no state

prosecution of [Appellant] in order to remove from him the ability to claim his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, thus forcing him to sit for a deposition under oath." The correspondence further stated,

I signed the press release for precisely this reason, at the request of [Victim]'s counsel, and with the acquiescence of [Appellant]'s counsel, with full and complete intent to bind the Commonwealth that anything [Appellant] said in the civil case would not be used against him, thereby forcing him to be deposed and perhaps testify in a civil trial without him having the ability to 'take the 5th....' [B]ut one thing is fact: the Commonwealth, defense and [Victim]'s lawyers were all in agreement that the attached decision [February 17, 2005 press release] from me stripped [Appellant] of his Fifth Amendment privilege, forcing him to be deposed. []

However, in his testimony at the hearing on [Appellant]'s Petition for *Habeas Corpus*, Mr. Castor indicated that there was no agreement and no *quid pro quo*. On September 23, 2015, at 1:47 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded this email identified above as Defendant's *Habeas* Exhibit 5 to Mr. McMonagle.

On September 25, 2015, then District Attorney Ferman sent a letter to Mr. Castor by way of hand delivery.⁷ In her letter[,] Ms. Ferman stated, "[t]he first I heard of such a binding agreement was your email sent this past Wednesday." *389 On September 25, 2015, at 3:41 pm, Mr. Castor sent an email to District Attorney Ferman.⁸ In this email, he wrote Ms. Ferman, "[n]aturally, if a prosecution could be made out without using what [Appellant] said, or anything derived from what [Appellant] said, I believed then and continue to believe that a prosecution is not precluded."

⁷ This letter was marked and admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 6 at the February 2016 *Habeas Corpus* hearing held in this matter. At 3:02 pm that same day, Mr. Castor's secretary forwarded a scanned copy of the letter to him by way of email.

⁸ This email was marked and admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 7 at the February 2016 *Habeas Corpus* hearing in this matter.

On September 25, 2015, at 3:59 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded the letter from Ms. Ferman, identified above as Defendant's *Habeas* Exhibit 6, to Mr. McMonagle. On September 25,

2015, at 4:19 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded the email identified above as Defendant's *Habeas* Exhibit 7 to Mr. McMonagle along with the message "Latest." In his final email to Ms. Ferman on the subject, Mr. Castor stated, "I never said we would not prosecute [Appellant]."

In 2015, prosecutors and [d]etectives from Montgomery County visited [Victim] in Canada and asked her if she would cooperate in the instant case. As a part of the reopened investigation in 2015, the Commonwealth interviewed numerous women who claimed that [Appellant] had sexually assaulted them. The Commonwealth proffered nineteen women for this [c]ourt's consideration[;] ultimately, five such women were permitted to testify at trial.

Heidi Thomas testified that in 1984, she was a twenty-two[-]year[-]old aspiring actress working as a model, represented by JF [I]mages. JF Images was owned by Jo Farrell.⁹ In April of 1984, her agent told her that a prominent figure in the entertainment world was interested in mentoring young talent. She learned that [Appellant] was going to call her to arrange for one-on-one acting sessions. [Appellant] called Ms. Thomas at her home and spoke to both of her parents. Ms. Thomas' agency paid for her to travel to Reno, Nevada[,] to meet with [Appellant] and booked her a room at Harrah's. Her family took a photo of her with her father and boyfriend when she was leaving for the airport; she testified that she dressed professionally because she wanted [Appellant] to know she took this opportunity very seriously. Ms. Thomas purchased a postcard of Harrah's when she arrived in Reno to commemorate her trip and kept several other mementos. When she arrived in Reno, Ms. Thomas was met by a driver. She eventually realized that they were driving out of Reno. They pulled up to a house, the driver told her that this is where the coaching would take place and that she should go in.

⁹ In his deposition testimony, [Appellant] testified that Jo Farrell would send her clients to see him perform in Denver, C[olorado].

She rang the doorbell and [Appellant] answered the door. The driver showed her to her room. [Appellant] instructed her to change into something more comfortable and to come back out with her prepared monologue. She returned to a kitchen area and performed her monologue for [Appellant]. Unimpressed with her monologue, [Appellant] suggested that she try a cold read. In the script

he gave her, her character was supposed to be intoxicated. She performed the scene. *390 Again, unimpressed, [Appellant] questioned whether she had ever been drunk. She told him that she did not really drink, but that she had seen her share of drunk people in college. He asked her what she would drink if she were to have a drink and she indicated perhaps a glass of white wine. He got up and returned with a glass of white wine. He told her it was a prop and to sip on it to see if she could get more into character. She took a sip and then remembers only “snap shots” of what happened next. She remember[ed] [Appellant's] asking her if she was relaxing into the part. She remember[ed] waking up in a bed, fully clothed with [Appellant] forcing his penis into her mouth. In her next memory, she awoke with her head at the foot of the bed, and hear[d] [Appellant] say[,] “your friend is going to come again.” Her next memory [wa]s slamming the door and then apologizing to [Appellant].

She awoke, presumably the next morning, feeling unwell. She decided to get some fresh air. She went to the kitchen, where she saw someone other than the driver for the first time. The woman in the kitchen offered her breakfast, but she declined. She went outside with her camera that she always carried with her, and took pictures of the estate. She took a number of photos of both the interior and exterior of the house where she was staying. She also remembers going to a show and being introduced to the Temptations and being in [Appellant]'s dressing room. She testified that it did not occur to her to report the assault to her agent, and that she felt she must have given [Appellant] some signal to think it was okay to do that to her.

Two months later, in June 1984, [Ms.] Thomas called [Appellant], as he told her she could, in an attempt to meet with him to find out what had happened; she was told by his representative that she would be able to see him. She made arrangements to see him in St. Louis, using her own money. When she arrived in St. Louis, she purchased a postcard. On this trip, she photographed her hotel room and the driver who picked her up. Ms. Thomas attended the show, but was not allowed backstage. After [Appellant]'s performance, she accompanied him and others to a dinner. There were a number of people at the dinner and Ms. Thomas was unable to confront [Appellant] about what happened in Reno. As the evening came to a close and it became clear she would not be able to speak to him, she asked the driver or valet to take her picture with [Appellant]. She had no further contact with [Appellant]. At some time later, she told both a psychologist and her husband what happened.

Chelan Lasha testified that in 1986[,] when she was a seventeen-year-old senior in high school[] in Las Vegas, Nevada, a connection of her father's ex-wife put her in touch with [Appellant]. At that time, Ms. Lasha lived with her grandparents[.] [Appellant] called her home and spoke to her and to her grandmother. [Appellant] told her that he was looking forward to meeting her and to helping her with her education and pursuit of a career in acting and modeling. The first time she met [Appellant] in person, he came to her grandparents' home for a meal. They remained in phone contact and she sent headshots to his agency in New York.

After she graduated from high school that same year, she worked at the Las Vegas Hilton. [Appellant] returned to Las Vegas and invited Ms. Lasha to meet him at the Las Vegas Hilton. When she arrived at the hotel, she called *391 [Appellant] and a bellman took her to the Elvis [Presley] Suite. Ms. Lasha understood the purpose of their meeting was to help her break into modeling and that someone from the Ford Modeling Agency would be meeting her and taking her picture. Ms. Lasha testified that she had a cold on the day of the meeting. [Appellant] directed her to wet her hair to see what it looked like, and someone took some photographs of her. The photographer left. A second person came into the suite, who [Appellant] said was a therapist related to stress and relaxation; this person also left the suit[e].

Ms. Lasha was congested and blowing her nose, [and Appellant] offered her a decongestant. He gave her a shot of amaretto and a little blue pill. She took the pill. He gave her a second shot of amaretto. He sat behind her and began to rub her shoulders. She began to feel woozy and he told her that she needed to lay down. [Appellant] took her to the back bedroom; prior to that time, they had been in the living area of the suite.

When she stood up[,] she could barely move and [Appellant] guided her to the back bedroom. He laid her on the bed, at which point she could no longer move. He laid down next to her and began pinching her breasts and rubbing his genitals on her leg. She felt something warm on her leg. Her next memory is [Appellant] clapping to wake her up. When she awoke, she had a Hilton robe and her shorts on, but her top had been removed. Her top was folded neatly on a table with money on top. [Appellant] told her to hurry up and get dressed and to use the money to buy something nice for herself and her grandmother. During

her incapacitation, she was aware of what was happening but was powerless to stop it. When she left the hotel, she drove to her guidance counselor's house and told her what happened. She also told her sister.

The day after the assault, Ms. Lasha's mother and grandmother attended a performance at the Hilton where [Appellant] was a participant. [Appellant] called her and asked her why she did not attend, [and] she told him she was sick and hung up the phone. A couple days later, Ms. Lasha attended a performance at the Hilton with her grandmother, where she heckled [Appellant]. Afterwards, she told her grandmother what happened. She was ultimately fired from her position at the Hilton. She reported the assault to the police in 2014.

Janice Baker-Kinney testified that she lived in Reno, Nevada[,] and worked at Harrah's Casino from 1981-1983. In 1982, Ms. Baker-Kinney was a twenty-four[-]year[-]old bartender at Harrah's. During the course of her employment, she met several celebrities who performed in one of Harrah's two showrooms. Performers could stay either in the hotel, or in a home owned by Mr. Harrah, just outside of town. Ms. Baker[-]Kinney attended a party at that home hosted by Wayne Newton.

On one particular evening, one of the cocktail waitresses invited her to go to a pizza party being hosted by [Appellant]. [Appellant] was staying at Mr. Harrah's home outside of town. Ms. Baker-Kinney agreed to attend the party and met her friend at the front door of the home. [Appellant] answered the door. Ms. Baker-Kinney was surprised to find that there was no one else in the home for a party. She began to think that her friend was romantically interested in [Appellant] and asked her to come along so she would not be alone. She decided to stay for a little while and have a slice of pizza and a beer.

*392 [Appellant] offered Ms. Baker-Kinney a pill, which she believes he said were Quaaludes. She accepted the pill and then he gave her a second pill, which she also accepted. Having no reason not to trust [Appellant], she ingested the pills. After taking the pill, she sat down to play backgammon with [Appellant]. Shortly after starting the game, she became dizzy and her vision blurred. She told [Appellant] that the game was not fair anymore because she could not see the board and fell forward and passed out [] the game.

Ms. Baker-Kinney next remembers hearing voices behind her and finding herself on a couch. She realized it was her

friend leaving the house. She looked down at her clothing and realized that her shirt was unbuttoned and her pants were unzipped. [Appellant] sat down on the couch behind her and propped her up against his chest. She remembers him speaking, but could not recall ... the words he said. His arm was around her, inside her shirt, fondling her. He then moved his hand toward her pants. She was unable to move.

Her next memory is of [Appellant] helping her into a bed and then being awoken the next day by the phone ringing. She heard [Appellant] speaking on the phone and realized that they were in bed together and both naked. When [Appellant] got off of the phone, Ms. Baker-Kinney apologized for passing out and tried to explain that dieting must have affected her ability to handle the pills. She had a sticky wetness between her legs that she knew indicated they had sex at some point, which she could not remember.

Afraid that someone she worked with would be coming to clean the home, Ms. Baker-Kinney rushed to get herself dressed and get out of the home. [Appellant] walked her to the front door and told her that it was just between them and that she should not tell anyone. She made a joke that she would not alert the media and left, feeling mortified.

The day after the assault, she worked a shift at Harrah's. At the end of her shift, she was leaving with a friend and heard [Appellant] calling her name across the room. She gave a slight wave and asked her friend to get her out of there and they left. Within days of the assault, she told her roommate, one of her sisters, and a friend what had happened.

Mary Chokran testified that in 1982, Ms. Baker-Kinney called her and was very distraught. Ms. Baker[-]Kinney told Ms. Chokran that she had taken what she thought was a Quaalude and that [Appellant] had given it to her. Ms. Baker-Kinney told her that she thought it was a mood-enhancing party drug, not something that would render her unconscious as it did.

Janice Dickinson testified that in 1982, when she was a twenty-seven[-]year[-]old [] established model represented by Elite Modeling Agency, [Appellant] contacted the agency seeking to meet with her. She first met [Appellant] at his townhouse in New York City. She went to the home with her business manager. She was excited about the meeting; she had been told that [Appellant] mentored people and had taken an interest in her. During the meeting[,] they discussed her potential singing career as well as acting. [Appellant] gave her a book about acting. After the meeting[,] she and her manager left the home.

Sometime later, Ms. Dickinson was working on a calendar shoot in Bali, Indonesia[,] when [Appellant] contacted her. [Appellant] offered her a plane ticket *393 and a wardrobe to come meet him in Lake Tahoe to further discuss her desire to become an actress. She accepted the invitation and left her boyfriend in Bali to go meet [Appellant] to discuss the next steps to further her career.

When she arrived at the airport in Reno, Nevada, she was met by Stu Gardner, [Appellant]'s musical director. He took Ms. Dickinson to the hotel where she checked in to her room and put on the clothes ... provided for her by the hotel boutique. She arranged to meet [Mr.] Gardner on a sound stage to go over her vocal range. [Appellant] arrived in the room. She attended [Appellant]'s performance and had dinner afterwards with [Appellant] and [Mr.] Gardner.

During the dinner, Ms. Dickinson drank some red wine. She began to experience menstrual cramps, which she expressed to the table. [Appellant] said he had something for that and gave her a little, round blue pill. She ingested the pill. Shortly after taking the pill, she began to feel woozy and dizzy. When they finished in the restaurant, Mr. Gardner left and [Appellant] invited her to his room to finish their conversation.

Ms. Dickinson traveled with a camera and took photographs of [Appellant], including one of him making a phone call, inside of his hotel room. She testified that after taking the photos, she felt very lightheaded and like she could not get her words to come out. When [Appellant] finished his phone call, he got on top of her and his robe opened. Before she passed out, she felt vaginal pain as he penetrated her vagina. She awoke the next morning in her room with semen between her legs and she felt anal pain.

Later that day, she saw [Appellant] and they went to Bill Harrah's house. At the house, she confronted [Appellant] and asked him to explain what happened the previous evening. He did not answer her. She left Lake Tahoe the next day on a flight to Los Angeles with [Appellant] and Mr. Gardner. From Los Angeles, she returned to Bali to complete her photo shoot. Ms. Dickinson did not report the assault; she was having commercial success as a model and feared that it would impact her career.

In 2002, Ms. Dickinson sought to include the rape in her memoir, *No Lifeguard on Duty*, but the publishing house's legal team would not allow her to include it. Judith Regan testified that she was the publisher of Ms. Dickinson's

2002 memoir. She testified that Ms. Dickinson told her that [Appellant] had raped her and that she wanted to include that in her book. Ms. Regan told Ms. Dickinson that the legal department would not allow her to include the story without corroboration. Ms. Dickinson was angry and upset when she learned she could not include her account in the book.

In 2010, Ms. Dickinson disclosed what happened to her to Dr. Drew Pinsky in the course of her participation in the reality show *Celebrity Rehab*. That conversation was never broadcast. She testified that she also disclosed [it] to a hairdresser and makeup artist.

Maud Lise-Lotte Lublin testified that when she was in her early twenties and living in Las Vegas, she modeled as a way to make money to finance her education. She met [Appellant] in 1989, when she was twenty-three years old. Her modeling agency told her that [Appellant] wanted to meet her. The first time she met with him in person, he was reviewing other headshots from her agency; he told her that he would send her photos to a New York agency to see *394 if runway or commercial modeling was the best fit for her.

She had subsequent contact with [Appellant]. [Appellant] also developed a relationship with her family. On one occasion, she and her mother went to the [University of Nevada, Las Vegas] track with [Appellant] where he introduced her to people as his daughter. She and her sister spent time with [Appellant] on more than one occasion. He was aware that her goal was to obtain an education and thought that modeling or acting would help her earn enough money to reach her educational goals. She felt that [Appellant] was a father figure or mentor. Eventually, that relationship changed.

[Appellant] called her and invited her to the Hilton in Las Vegas. She arrived at the suite and he began talking to her about improvisation and acting, as she had not done any acting at this point. During the conversation, he went over to a bar and poured her a shot, told her to drink it and that it would relax her. She told him that she did not drink alcohol. He insisted that it would help her work on improvisation and help the lines flow. She trusted his advice and took the drink. He went back to the bar and prepared her a second drink, which she accepted.

Within a few minutes, she started to feel dizzy and woozy and her hearing became muffled. [Appellant] asked her to come sit with him. He was seated on the couch; Ms.

Lise-Lotte Lublin was standing. He asked her to come sit between his knees. She sat down; he began stroking her hair. [Appellant] was speaking to her, but the sound was muffled. She felt very relaxed and also confused about what this had to do with learning improvisation. She testified that she remembers walking towards a hallway and being surprised at how many rooms were in the suite. She has no further memory of the night. When she woke up, she was at home. She thought she had a bad reaction to the alcohol and told her family about the meeting. In the days that followed, she told additional friends that she thought she had accidentally had too much to drink and gotten sick and embarrassed herself. She continued to have contact with [Appellant].

On one occasion[,] she traveled to see [Appellant] at Universal Studios in California. She invited a friend to go with her as she felt uncomfortable seeing him alone after what happened. On the drive to Universal Studios, she told her friend that she was uncomfortable because [Appellant] had her sit down and he stroked her hair and she could not remember what happened. She came forward in 2014.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/14/19, at 1-33 (citations to the record omitted).

It is unnecessary to recount fully the tortured procedural history of this case, but for the following summary of the pertinent procedural events. On December 30, 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant by criminal complaint with three counts of aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(1), (4), and (5), for the incident involving Victim that occurred in Appellant's home in January of 2004.¹ Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of *Habeas Corpus* ("Habeas Motion I") on January 11, 2016, arguing for, *inter alia*, the dismissal of the charges based on Former District Attorney Castor's alleged promise *395 not to prosecute Appellant.² See Reproduced Record ("RR") at 389a.³ The trial court heard testimony and argument at a hearing held on February 2 and 3, 2016. *Id.* at 412a-1047a. On February 4, 2016, the trial court denied *Habeas Motion I*.⁴ *Id.* at 1048a.

Following a preliminary hearing held on May 24, 2016, the magistrate held the aforementioned charges over for trial. Subsequently, Appellant and the Commonwealth filed numerous pretrial motions.⁵ On August 12, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the contents of his civil deposition testimony. *Id.* at 6271a-6290a. On September 6, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a motion to introduce evidence of

Appellant's prior bad acts ("First PBA Motion"). Both matters were addressed at hearings held on November 1 and 2, 2016. *Id.* at 1049a-1191a. Appellant's suppression motion was denied on December 5, 2016. *Id.* at 1197a. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the First PBA Motion on February 24, 2017. *Id.* at 1198a (granting the motion with respect to a single prior-bad-acts witness, but denying the motion with respect to twelve other proffered witnesses).

Appellant's first jury trial began on June 5, 2017, and concluded on June 17, 2017, when the jury deadlocked on all three counts, leading the trial court to issue an order declaring a mistrial based upon "manifest necessity." Order, 6/17/17, at 1 (single page). On July 6, 2017, the trial court ordered a new trial. Order, 7/6/17, at 1 (single page).

On January 18, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a second motion *in limine*, seeking to introduce Appellant's prior bad acts ("Second PBA Motion"). RR at 1200a-1206a; *Id.* at 1208a-1308a (memorandum in support thereof). On January 25, 2018, Appellant filed a motion seeking to incorporate all of his previous pretrial motions from his first trial. On March 15, 2018, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's Second PBA Motion in part, and denied it in part. *Id.* at 1672a-1673a (permitting five of the nineteen proffered prior-bad-acts witnesses to testify).

Appellant's second trial commenced on April 2, 2018. On April 6, 2018, Appellant filed a motion seeking to excuse Juror 11 for cause. *Id.* at 2541a-2548a. The trial court denied the motion. *Id.* at 2714a (N.T., 4/9/18, at 153). On April 26, 2018, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. *Id.* at 5813a (N.T., 4/26/18, at 10). Sentencing was deferred pending an assessment by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board.

On July 25, 2018, Appellant filed a post-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of the trial court's retroactively applying to him the current version of Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA II"), *396 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10 *et seq.* *Id.* at 6291a-6297a. Appellant also filed a post-trial motion seeking recusal of the trial court judge on September 11, 2018, alleging newly-discovered evidence that the judge harbored a bias toward one of Appellant's pretrial hearing witnesses, Mr. Castor. *Id.* at 5874a-5886a. The trial court denied the recusal motion on September 19, 2018. *Id.* at 5887a-5894a.

The trial court conducted a combined Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) and sentencing hearing on September 24

and 25, 2018. The trial court deemed Appellant to be an SVP under a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. *Id.* at 6213a. The trial court also denied Appellant's constitutional challenge to SORNA II, which was later memorialized in an order dated September 27, 2018. *Id.* at 6214a. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to 3-10 years' incarceration. *Id.* at 6198a (N.T., 9/25/18, at 120).

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on October 23, 2018. He then filed a timely notice of appeal on November 19, 2018, and a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on December 11, 2018. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 14, 2019.

Appellant now presents the following questions for our review:

- A. Where the lower court permitted testimony from five women (and a de facto sixth via deposition), as well as purported admissions from [Appellant]'s civil deposition, concerning alleged uncharged misconduct by [Appellant] that was: (a) more than fifteen years old; (b) lacking any striking similarities or close factual nexus to the conduct for which he was on trial; and (c) unduly prejudicial[,] was the lower court's decision clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion, thus requiring that a new trial be granted?
- B. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in failing to disclose his acrimonious relationship with an imperative defense witness[,] which not only created the appearance of impropriety[,] but was evidenced by actual bias?
- C. Did the lower court err in denying the writ of *habeas corpus* filed on January 11, 2016[,] and failing to dismiss the criminal complaint where the Commonwealth, in 2005 through District Attorney Castor, promised [Appellant] that he would not be charged for the allegations made by [Victim]?
- D. Did the lower court err in denying the motion to suppress where [Appellant], relying on the Commonwealth's promise not to prosecute him for the allegations by [Victim], had no choice but to abandon his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and testify at a civil deposition?
- E. Where the excerpts of [Appellant]'s deposition concerning his possession and distribution of Quaaludes to women in the 1970s had no relevance to the issue

at trial, was the lower court's decision to allow this evidence to be presented to the jury clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion, thus requiring that a new trial be granted?

- F. Where the lower court's final charge to the jury erroneously included an instruction on "consciousness of guilt," a charge which was misleading and had no application to [Appellant]'s case, was the charge legally deficient, thus requiring a new trial [to] be granted?

*397 G. Where the lower court allowed a juror to be impaneled, despite evidence demonstrating that the juror had prejudged [Appellant]'s guilt, did the lower court abuse its discretion and deprive [Appellant] of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, thus, requiring that a new trial be granted?

- H. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in applying SORNA II to the 2004 offenses for which [Appellant] had been convicted, in violation of the *ex post facto* clauses of the state and federal constitutions?

Appellant's Brief at 11-13.

A. Prior Bad Acts Evidence

[1] [2] [3] Appellant's first claim concerns the trial court's admission of prior bad acts ("PBA") evidence. The court admitted the testimony of five witnesses who essentially testified that Appellant had drugged and then sexually assaulted them in circumstances similar to that recounted by Victim. The PBA evidence was admitted under the 'common plan/scheme/design' and 'absence of mistake' exceptions to the general evidentiary ban on PBA evidence. *See Pa.R.E.* 404(b). Appellant asserts that this PBA evidence was not admissible because it did not satisfy any exception.

The at-issue PBA evidence was the subject of the Commonwealth's January 18, 2018 Second PBA Motion. RR at 1200a-1206a. Pursuant to that motion, the Commonwealth sought to admit the testimony of 19 prior victims of Appellant's alleged sexual misconduct. Following a hearing held on March 5 and 6, 2018, the trial court granted the Second PBA Motion in part, and denied it in part. *Id.* at 1672a-1673a (Order, 3/15/18, at 1-2). The Commonwealth was thereby permitted to present the PBA testimony of five witnesses: Heidi Thomas, Chelan Lasha, Janice Baker-Kinney, Janice Dickinson, and Maud Lise-Lotte Lublin. The

trial court did not permit the Commonwealth to introduce the testimony of the remaining 14 PBA witnesses proffered by the Commonwealth.

[4] [5] “The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.” *Commonwealth v. Minich*, 4 A.3d 1063, 1068 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) prohibits “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). This is because “[t]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has committed the particular crime of which he is accused, and it may not strip him of the presumption of innocence by proving that he has committed other criminal acts.” *Commonwealth v. Ross*, 57 A.3d 85, 98-99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). However, PBA “evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident[,]” if “the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

Here, the trial court admitted the testimony of Heidi Thomas, Chelan Lasha, Janice Baker-Kinney, Janice Dickinson, and Maud Lise-Lotte Lublin under two PBA exceptions: the common plan/scheme/design exception, and the absence-of-mistake exception. Both exceptions were invoked to serve similar evidentiary goals for the Commonwealth. The *398 Commonwealth sought to demonstrate that Appellant engaged in a pattern of non-consensual sex acts with his victims that were “quite distinct from a typical sexual abuse pattern; so distinct, in fact, that they are all recognizable as the handiwork of the same perpetrator—[Appellant].” Commonwealth’s Brief at 44.

[6] [7] [8] [9] [10] A determination of admissibility under the common plan/scheme/design exception

must be made on a case by case basis in accordance with the unique facts and circumstances of each case. However, we recognize that in each

case, the trial court is bound to follow the same controlling, albeit general, principles of law. When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the common plan exception, the trial court must first examine the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator. Relevant to such a finding will be the habits or patterns of action or conduct undertaken by the perpetrator to commit crime, as well as the time, place, and types of victims typically chosen by the perpetrator. Given this initial determination, the court is bound to engage in a careful balancing test to assure that the common plan evidence is not too remote in time to be probative. If the evidence reveals that the details of each criminal incident are nearly identical, the fact that the incidents are separated by a lapse of time will not likely prevent the offer of the evidence unless the time lapse is excessive.

Commonwealth v. Frank, 395 Pa. Super. 412, 577 A.2d 609, 614 (1990).

[11] [12] Thus, the common plan/scheme/design exception aids in identifying a perpetrator based on his or her commission of extraordinarily similar criminal acts on other occasions. The exception is demanding in its constraints, requiring nearly unique factual circumstances in the commission of a crime, so as to effectively eliminate the possibility that it could have been committed by anyone other than the accused. *See Commonwealth v. Miller*, 541 Pa. 531, 664 A.2d 1310, 1318 (1995) (holding admissible, to prove a common scheme, plan, or design, evidence that the defendant lured other victims of similar race and weight into his car, took them to remote areas to force sex upon them, beat them in a similar manner, and killed or attempted to kill them), *abrogation on other grounds recognized by Commonwealth v. Hicks*, 638 Pa. 444, 156 A.3d 1114 (2017); *Commonwealth v. Clayton*, 506 Pa. 24, 483 A.2d 1345,

1349–50 (1984) (holding admissible, to prove a common scheme, plan, or design, evidence of a subsequent crime for which the defendant had already been acquitted, because it was strikingly similar in geographic location, motive and method of execution); *but see Commonwealth v. Fortune*, 464 Pa. 367, 346 A.2d 783, 787 (1975) (holding inadmissible in a trial for felony murder, under the common scheme, plan, or design exception, evidence of defendant's commission of six prior robberies where “too many details ... [were] unexplained or incongruous to say that one crime naturally tend[ed] to show that the accused [was] the person who committed the other”).

This Court has also permitted PBA evidence under the common plan/scheme/design exception “to counter [an] anticipated defense of consent.” *Commonwealth v. Tyson*, 119 A.3d 353, 361 (Pa. Super. 2015). In *Tyson*, the defendant was accused of rape and related offenses based on the following course of conduct:

*399 On July 31, 2010, [the victim,] G.B.[,] left work because she felt ill after donating plasma. G.B. asked [Tyson], whom she knew casually, to bring her some food. [Tyson] arrived at G.B.'s apartment and stayed as she fell asleep. During the early morning hours of August 1, 2010, G.B. claims she awoke to find [Tyson] having vaginal intercourse with her. [Tyson] told G.B. she had taken her pants off for him. G.B. claims she told [Tyson] to stop, and he complied. After falling back asleep, G.B. woke again later that night and went into her kitchen, where she allegedly found [Tyson] naked. G.B. claims she told [Tyson] she did not want to have sex with him and returned to bed. Shortly thereafter, G.B. claims, she woke up[, and] [Tyson] was again having vaginal intercourse with her. G.B. told [Tyson] to stop and asked him what he was doing. [Tyson] told G.B. her eyes were open the whole time.

Id. at 356.

The Commonwealth filed a motion *in limine* seeking to introduce evidence of Tyson's then 12-year-old rape conviction in Delaware, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that the PBA evidence regarding the prior rape was admissible under both the common plan/scheme/design and absence-of-mistake exceptions, because Tyson “engaged in a pattern of non-consensual sexual intercourse with acquaintances who were in an unconscious or diminished state.” *Id.* at 357. This Court noted

numerous similarities between the two incidents: (1) the victims were the same race and similar in age; (2) both victims were casually acquainted with [Tyson]; (3) [Tyson]'s initial interaction with each victim was legitimate, where [Tyson] was invited into the victim's home; (4) [Tyson] had vaginal intercourse with each victim in her bedroom; (5) both incidents involved vaginal intercourse with an alleged unconscious victim who woke up in the middle of the act; and (6) in each case, [Tyson] knew the victim was in a compromised state.

Id.

This Court reversed the trial court's determination that the PBA evidence was not admissible, reasoning that the “relevant details and surrounding circumstances of each incident further reveal criminal conduct that is sufficiently distinctive to establish [that Tyson] engaged in a common plan or scheme.” *Id.* at 360. The *Tyson* Court further stated:

The factual overlap between the two incidents goes beyond the commission of crimes or conduct ‘of the same general class.’ The evidence does not merely show [Tyson] sexually assaulted two different women or that [his] actions are generically common to many sexual assault cases. To the contrary, the incidents reflect

a clear pattern where [Tyson] was legitimately in each victim's home; [he] was cognizant of each victim's compromised state; and [he] had vaginal intercourse with each victim in her bedroom in the middle of the night while the victim was unconscious.

Id. The *Tyson* Court also opined that the lapse in time between the rapes did not undermine its probative value, both because Tyson was incarcerated for a majority of that time, and because the “similarities [between] the two incidents render[ed] the five-year time gap even less important.” *Id.* at 361.

[13] The absence-of-mistake exception typically applies in circumstances where the identity of the accused is not at issue, such as where the evidence serves to prove that the cause of an injury was not accidental. A quintessential example of the absence-of-mistake exception to the ban on PBA evidence occurred in *400 *Commonwealth v. Boczkowski*, 577 Pa. 421, 846 A.2d 75 (2004), where the defendant's wife, Maryann, was found unconscious in the couple's hot tub. She later died. Maryann had alcohol in her blood, and paramedics observed the defendant trying to revive her when they arrived on the scene, suggesting that her death may have been accidental. However, other injuries to the victim's body suggested that she had been the target of foul play.

The defendant's former wife, Elaine, had died under similar circumstances just 4 years earlier.

Elaine died in her bathtub, Maryann in a hot tub. Both women were in their thirties and in good health. [The defendant] reported to the North Carolina police that Elaine had been drinking alcoholic beverages before entering the bathtub; he told Ross Township police that Maryann had been drinking prior to entering the hot tub. [The defendant] told police in both jurisdictions that he and his wife had a minor argument on the evening before the death. In each case, police noticed that [the defendant] had fresh scratch marks on his arms, hands and

torso shortly after his wife's death. The autopsies of both women revealed that they had died from asphyxiation, not drowning.

Id. at 82. The Commonwealth presented evidence of Elaine's death in Boczkowski's trial pursuant to Rule 404(b)(2) in order to demonstrate that Maryann's death was not an accident. Our Supreme Court determined that such evidence was admissible even if the defendant does not “actually forward a formal defense of accident, or even present an argument along those lines,” because “the Commonwealth may have a practical need to exclude the theory of accidental death.” *Id.* at 89.

The absence-of-mistake exception has also been used to defeat an anticipated defense of consent in a case of sexual misconduct. The *Tyson* Court permitted the PBA evidence at issue in that case under the absence-of-mistake exception, reasoning that:

[Tyson] disputes G.B.'s account that she was asleep when [he] initiated sexual intercourse with her—[Tyson] maintains he thought G.B. consented to the act. Given the relevant similarities between the two incidents, evidence of [Tyson]'s prior rape would tend to prove he did not “mistakenly believe” G.B. was awake or gave her consent. [Tyson] was invited into G.B.'s home for another reason, [he] knew G.B. was in a compromised state, and G.B. awoke to find [him] having vaginal intercourse with her. [Tyson]'s prior conviction would likewise show he had been invited into the home of an acquaintance, knew the victim was in a compromised state, and had non-consensual sex with the victim while the victim was unconscious. The prior conviction would tend to prove [Tyson] was previously in a very similar situation and suffered legal consequences from his decision to have what proved to be non[-]consensual vaginal intercourse

with an unconscious victim. Thus, the evidence would tend to show [Tyson] recognized or should have recognized that, as with T.B., G.B.'s physical condition rendered her unable to consent.

Tyson, 119 A.3d at 362–63.

[14] Instantly, Appellant contends that the PBA evidence—the testimony of Heidi Thomas, Chelan Lasha, Janice Baker-Kinney, Janice Dickinson, and Maud Lise-Lotte Lublin—should not have been permitted under either exception. Appellant argues that their testimony involved “strikingly dissimilar acts” and were too distant in time to outweigh the potential for undue prejudice. Appellant’s Brief at 42. Thus, he asserts that the trial court *401 abused its discretion by admitting the PBA evidence. Notably, under both exceptions, the standard for admission is virtually the same. The PBA evidence must be “distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator,” and its probative value must not be undermined by the lapse in time between incidents. *Frank*, 577 A.2d at 614; *see also Tyson*, 119 A.3d at 359-60. Appellant first contends that the acts in question were too dissimilar to be admitted under either exception, and second, that the lapse in time between the conduct at issue in this case and the PBA evidence undermined its probative value.

The trial court justified its admission of the PBA evidence as follows:

The testimony of the five 404(b) witnesses was admissible under both the common plan, scheme or design exception and the lack of accident or mistake exception, with admissibility further supported by the doctrine of chances. Therefore, this claim must fail.

First, [Appellant] asserts that testimony of the permitted witnesses was too dissimilar to [Victim]’s allegations. This claim is belied by the record. Victim’s testimony can be summarized as follows: 1) [Victim] was substantially younger than the married [Appellant] and physically fit; 2) she met him through her employment at Temple University; 3) they developed what she believed to be a genuine friendship and mentorship. Over the course of that friendship, she accepted invitations to see [Appellant] socially, both with other people and alone; 4) after a period of time, during which he gained her trust, he invited her

to his home to discuss her upcoming career change; 5) he offered her three blue pills and urged her to take them; 6) once she took the pills, she became incapacitated and was unable to verbally or physically stop the assault[; s]he did not consent to sexual contact with [Appellant]; [and] 7) during intermittent bouts of consciousness, she was aware of [Appellant’s] digitally penetrating her vagina and using her hand to masturbate himself.

The allegations of the Commonwealth’s 404(b) witnesses may be summarized as follows: 1) each woman was substantially younger than the married [Appellant] and physically fit; 2) [Appellant] initiated the contact with each woman, primarily through her employment; 3) over the course of their time together, she came to trust him and often developed what the woman believed to be a genuine friendship or mentorship; 4) each woman accepted an invitation from [Appellant] to a place in his control, where she was ultimately alone with him; 5) each woman accepted the offer of a drink or a pill, often after insistence on the part of [Appellant]; 6) after ingesting the pill or drink, each woman was rendered incapacitated and unable to consent to sexual contact; [and] 7) [Appellant] sexually assaulted her while she was under the influence of the intoxicant he administered. These chilling similarities rendered the 404(b) testimony admissible under the common plan, scheme or design and the absence[-]of[-]mistake exceptions.

TCO at 102-04 (footnotes omitted).

Appellant points to various dissimilarities between the PBA incidents and the instant matter. Appellant’s Brief at 59-62. For instance, Appellant’s relationship with Victim lasted longer than his relationship with any of the PBA witnesses. *Id.* at 59. Prior to the at-issue assault, Victim was a guest at Appellant’s home for dinner on multiple occasions, and Appellant and Victim had exchanged gifts. *Id.* at 59-60. Appellant had made prior attempts at sexual contact with Victim, unlike with the other *402 victims. *Id.* at 60. Additionally, the nature of the sexual contact between Appellant and his victims varied in each incident. *Id.* at 60-61. Finally, Appellant’s assault of Victim was the only reported assault to occur in Appellant’s home, whereas the PBA evidence only involved incidents “in a hotel room or in some third person’s house.” *Id.* at 62.

[15] [16] We disagree that these differences render the PBA evidence inadmissible under the common plan/scheme/design or absence of mistake exceptions. It is impossible for

two incidents of sexual assault involving different victims to be identical in all respects. Indeed, we instead subscribe to the statement offered by Amicus Curiae, the Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, when it states:

A distinct pattern does not require outlandish or bizarre criminal conduct, nor does it demand proof that the conduct was part of a greater master plan. Rather, what is essential is that the similarities “are not confined to insignificant details that would likely be common elements regardless of who had committed the crimes.” *Commonwealth v. Hughes*, [521 Pa. 423] 555 A.2d 1264, 1283 (1989). A criminal “plan” may be analogized to a script or playbook of criminal tactics that worked for the offender when committing past crimes.

Brief of Amicus Curiae, the Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, at 18. We further observe that no two events will ever be identical, and it is simply unreasonable to hold the admission of PBA evidence to such a standard. The question for the trial court was whether the pattern of misconduct demonstrated by the PBA evidence was sufficiently distinctive to warrant application of the Rule 404(b)(2) exceptions. It is the pattern itself, and not the mere presence of some inconsistencies between the various assaults, that determines admissibility under these exceptions.

Here, the PBA evidence established Appellant’s unique sexual assault playbook. His assault of Victim followed a predictable pattern based on the PBA evidence:

[E]ach woman was substantially younger than the married [Appellant]; each woman met [Appellant] through her employment or career; most of the women believed he truly wanted to mentor them; [Appellant] was legitimately in each victim’s presence because each had accepted an invitation to get together with him socially; each incident occurred in a setting controlled by [Appellant], where he would be without interruption and undiscovered by a third party; [Appellant] had the opportunity to perpetrate each crime because he instilled trust in his victims due to his position of authority, his status in

the entertainment industry, and his social and communication skills; he administered intoxicants to each victim; the intoxicant incapacitated each victim; [Appellant] was aware of each victim’s compromised state because he was the one who put each victim into that compromised state; he had access to sedating drugs and knew their effects on his victims; he sexually assaulted each victim—or in the case of one of his victims, engaged in, at minimum, untoward sexual conduct—while she was not fully conscious and, thus, unable to resist his unwelcomed sexual contact; and, none of the victims consented to any sexual contact with [Appellant].

Commonwealth Brief’s at 42–44 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, not only did the PBA evidence tend to establish a predictable pattern of criminal sexual behavior unique to Appellant, it simultaneously tended to undermine any claim that Appellant was unaware of or mistaken about Victim’s failure to consent to the sexual contact that *403 formed the basis of the aggravated indecent assault charges. Thus, both exceptions applied to the circumstances of this case.

Appellant argues that the trial court’s admission of the PBA evidence conflicts with this Court’s recent ruling in *Commonwealth v. Bidwell*, 195 A.3d 610 (Pa. Super. 2018), *reargument denied* (Nov. 13, 2018), *appeal denied*, 208 A.3d 459 (Pa. 2019). In *Bidwell*, the victim was discovered “hanging from an electrical heating wire tied to a refrigeration unit that was located in a trailer” in the appellee’s scrap yard. *Id.* at 612. However, the victim’s “face was not swollen or discolored, as is commonly seen in victims of hanging or ligature strangulation.” *Id.* Nevertheless, “the original investigators and the coroner concluded that the [v]ictim committed suicide by hanging.” *Id.*

Other evidence emerged linking Bidwell to the death, including a witness who claimed that he had admitted to killing the victim and to having arranged it to look like a suicide. It was also revealed that Bidwell had been involved in an extra-marital affair with the victim. *Id.* Bidwell also “made several contradictory statements regarding the circumstances of the [v]ictim’s death and his whereabouts at that time.” *Id.*

at 613. The Commonwealth charged Bidwell with criminal homicide.

The Commonwealth subsequently filed a motion *in limine*, seeking to introduce PBA evidence, including evidence of Bidwell's prior violent conduct toward other women. The trial court granted admission of some PBA evidence (such as evidence concerning Bidwell's infidelity), but denied, *inter alia*, evidence of his prior violent behavior toward other women.⁶ The Commonwealth sought to use such evidence to demonstrate that the victim's death was not a suicide, and to show Bidwell's motive. The trial court excluded the evidence because "it was 'improper propensity evidence of [Bidwell]'s prior, *dissimilar* assaults on other women.'" *Id.* at 618 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal from that order.

On appeal, this Court affirmed, ruling that the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the proffered PBA evidence regarding Bidwell's prior violent conduct. The *Bidwell* Court reasoned that:

The Commonwealth's evidence failed to show that each woman was assaulted in the same manner or had been involved in a sexual relationship with [Bidwell] or that [he] was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the encounters with the women. To the contrary, the women's testimony establishes, at most, the commission of crimes or conduct in the past "of the same general class," namely physical and/or sexual assaults. Their testimony does not evidence any particular distinctive pattern of behavior by [Bidwell] in that [Bidwell]'s allegedly abusive behavior appears to have been triggered in each incident by different causes. For instance, it is alleged that [Bidwell] assaulted his wives during the course of their marriages, but he spontaneously attacked Ms. Sickle whom he had just met while she interviewed for a job. Ms. Benek indicated [Bidwell] did not physically accost her.

In addition, the trial court found that the [PBA] testimony was not admissible to prove a "common scheme, plan or design." Under Pennsylvania law, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible to prove "a common scheme, plan or design where the crimes are so related that proof of one tends to prove the others." *404 *Commonwealth v. Elliott*, ... [549 Pa. 132] 700 A.2d 1243, 1249 ([Pa.] 1997). In *Elliott*, the appellant had been accused of sexually assaulting and killing a young woman whom he had approached outside a nightclub at 4:30 a.m. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's

decision to permit three other young women to testify that the appellant also had preyed upon and physically and/or sexually assaulted each of them as they left the same club in the early morning hours. *Id.* at ... 1250–51. Our Supreme Court held that evidence of the similarities among the assaults was admissible to establish a common scheme, plan or design. *Id.*

As the trial court found herein, the proposed testimony of Denise Bidwell, Jennifer Bidwell, Alyssa Benek and Danielle Sickle does not establish a pattern of conduct on the part of [Bidwell] so distinctive that proof of one tends to prove the others. Instead, the prior bad acts testimony demonstrates that [Bidwell] was a domestic abuser of women, some of whom he was involved in ongoing romantic relationships in the past, but it does not show a unique "signature" *modus operandi* relevant to the [v]ictim's murder.

Bidwell, 195 A.3d at 626–27.

We find *Bidwell* easily distinguishable from the instant case. First, the procedural posture here is not the same as this Court confronted in *Bidwell*. In *Bidwell*, the Commonwealth appealed from the denial of a motion *in limine* concerning the admissibility of evidence. The burden was on the Commonwealth in that case to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in deeming the PBA evidence inadmissible. Here, Appellant bears the burden on appeal of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion by deeming admissible the at-issue PBA evidence. Given the deference we pay to trial courts under the abuse of discretion standard, it would not necessarily follow that the holding in *Bidwell* dictates the same result in the instant case.

Second, the evidence in this case is not comparable to the facts in *Bidwell*, as the circumstances here present a far more compelling argument for admission of the PBA evidence under Rule 404(b)(2). Here, the PBA evidence established a distinct, signature pattern: Appellant presented himself as a mentor or potential mentor to much younger women in order to establish trust, and then he abused that trust by drugging those women in order to sexually assault them. This constitutes far more distinctive behavior than the PBA evidence of prior domestic abuse considered by the *Bidwell* Court. The PBA evidence does not, as Appellant claims, merely "match[] the alleged act on trial only in its general nature." Appellant's Brief at 65. Accordingly, we reject his contention that *Bidwell* supports his claim.

Appellant also alleges that his assault on Victim and the assaults detailed in the PBA evidence are too remote in time to be probative. He argues:

Baker-Kinney and Dickinson claim that [Appellant]'s alleged inappropriate contact with them occurred in 1982, more than two decades before the alleged incident with [Victim]. Thomas claims that [Appellant] forced her to perform oral sex on him in 1984; Lasha claims that her contact with [Appellant] was in 1986; and Lublin claimed that she became intoxicated with [Appellant] in 1989.... As to "Jane Doe 1," [Appellant] gave her a Quaalude, which she took knowing that it was a Quaalude, in the 70s.

Id. at 66-67 (citations omitted). The allegation of sexual assault in this case concerned conduct that occurred in 2004. Thus, the PBA evidence spanned between *405 15-22 years prior to the conduct in this case for the testifying witnesses, and at least a few years prior to that for the incident involving Jane Doe 1, about whom Appellant testified in his civil deposition.⁷

[17] As our Supreme Court has stated, "even if evidence of prior criminal activity is [otherwise] admissible under [Rule 404(b)(2)], said evidence will be rendered inadmissible if it is too remote." *Commonwealth v. Shively*, 492 Pa. 411, 424 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1981). However, this Court has also held that "while remoteness in time is a factor to be considered in determining the probative value of other crimes evidence under the theory of common scheme, plan or design, the importance of the time period is inversely proportional to the similarity of the crimes in question." *Commonwealth v. Aikens*, 990 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

Here, the time period in question is substantial, especially in relation to existing case law. Nevertheless, several factors tend to demonstrate that the probative value of the PBA evidence remains strong, despite that substantial time gap. There are distinctive similarities between the PBA evidence and Appellant's sexual assault of Victim. Furthermore, there

were multiple prior sexual assaults, not merely one, and all of those prior assaults evidenced the same, signature pattern of misconduct. Had there only been a single prior bad act, it would be easier to write off the similarities as coincidental, especially given the passage of time. However, because the pattern here was well-established in this case, both in terms of frequency and similarity, the at-issue time gap is relatively inconsequential. Moreover, because Appellant's identity in this case was not in dispute (as he claimed he only engaged in consensual sexual contact with Victim), there was no risk of misidentification by use of the PBA evidence despite the gap in time. Accordingly, we conclude that the remoteness of the PBA evidence was so substantial as to undermine its probative value.

[18] [19] Appellant also contends that the trial court failed to make "any assessment of the highly prejudicial nature" of the PBA evidence. Appellant's Brief at 83. The record belies this claim. The Commonwealth sought the admission of 19 witnesses, and the trial court "found that the testimony of all 19 witnesses was relevant and admissible" under Rule 404(b)(2). TCO at 110. Nevertheless, "the [c]ourt sought to mitigate any prejudicial effect of such evidence by limiting the number of witnesses" to five. *Id.* Moreover, the trial court

gave a cautionary instruction no less than four times during trial, and again in its concluding instructions, limiting the prejudicial effect of the testimony. N.T.[, 4/11/18,] at 45-46, 50-51; N.T.[, 4/12/18,] at 69, 167. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. *Commonwealth v. La Cava*, [542 Pa. 160] 666 A.2d 221, 228 (Pa. 1995). Limiting instructions weigh in favor of upholding admission of other bad acts evidence.... *Boczkowski*, 846 A.2d [at] 89....

Id. at 110-11. By limiting the number of relevant and admissible witnesses, as well as by issuing multiple cautionary instructions, the trial court necessarily recognized the potential for unfair prejudice presented by the PBA evidence. Thus, Appellant's argument to the contrary is baseless.

*406 Finally, we deem it unnecessary to address Appellant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on the 'Doctrine of Chances'⁸ in admitting the PBA evidence,⁹ as we agree with the trial court that the PBA evidence was admissible under both the common plan/scheme/design and the absence-of-mistake exceptions to Rule 404(b)(1)'s prohibition on PBA evidence. For all the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the PBA evidence and, therefore, Appellant's first claim lacks merit.

B. Trial Judge's Failure to Disclose Prior Relationship with Former District Attorney Castor

[20] Next, Appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge in this case, the Honorable Steven T. O'Neill ("Judge O'Neill"), failed to disclose his prior and allegedly "acrimonious" relationship with former District Attorney Castor ("Mr. Castor"). Appellant's Brief at 92. As discussed in more detail *infra*, Mr. Castor purportedly promised not to prosecute Appellant while he was serving as Montgomery County's District Attorney during the initial investigation into Victim's accusations against Appellant. Judge O'Neill received testimony from Mr. Castor regarding that issue at a pretrial hearing, and Mr. Castor was essentially a witness for the defense. Appellant contends that Judge O'Neill was biased against Mr. Castor due to interactions between the two that are alleged to have occurred in 1999. The Commonwealth contends that Appellant waived this claim by failing to raise it at the earliest possible opportunity.

It is undisputed that, in 1999, Judge O'Neill and Mr. Castor were both "seeking the [R]epublican nomination for District Attorney in Montgomery County." *Id.* at 94. Mr. Castor won the nomination, and ultimately was elected as District Attorney. However, Appellant alleges that Mr. Castor's use of smear tactics during that campaign (allegedly prompting a confrontation with Judge O'Neill at a campaign event) produced a long-held bias in Judge O'Neill toward Mr. Castor. Appellant asserts that this purported bias calls into question the propriety of Judge O'Neill's making credibility determinations regarding Mr. Castor's purported promise not to prosecute Appellant, which occurred at a hearing held on February 2, 2016. Appellant essentially claims that Judge O'Neill should have recused himself from hearing testimony from Mr. Castor as a result of this bias. Appellant argues:

The fact that the lower court and [Mr.] Castor had a previous relationship and disagreement is not a valid reason, alone, for the lower court to have recused himself. However, the issue is not their prior relationship, or a mere confrontation. Rather, then-Candidate O'Neill engaged [Mr.] Castor, in a contentious and very public confrontation over two highly sensitive topics: love and politics. Despite knowing [Mr.] Castor would be a crucial witness in deciding whether the high-profile, nationally publicized trial of Cosby would be allowed to go forward, the lower court made the *407 decision not to disclose his history with [Mr.] Castor.

Id. at 96-97.

In his Rule 1925(a) opinion, Judge O'Neill flatly denies that he harbors any bias against Mr. Castor, and states that he had nothing to disclose to the defense, and no reason to recuse. TCO at 125 ("This [c]ourt cannot disclose that which does not exist. This [c]ourt simply has no bias against Mr. Castor, thus no disclosure was necessary."). In any event, the trial court agrees with the Commonwealth that Appellant waived this claim. *Id.* at 126 (finding that Appellant "failed to raise the alleged issue at th[e] earliest possible moment").

[21] [22] "The standards for recusal are well established. It is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially." *Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal*, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (1998) (citations omitted). Until evidence establishes a jurist's bias, "[t]his Court presumes judges of this Commonwealth are 'honorable, fair and competent,' and, when confronted with a recusal demand, have the ability to determine whether they can rule impartially and without prejudice." *Commonwealth v. Luketic*, 162 A.3d 1149, 1157 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting *Commonwealth v. Druce*, 577 Pa. 581, 848 A.2d 104, 108 (2004)).

[23] [24] Before we address the merits of this claim, we must address the Commonwealth's contention that Appellant waived our consideration of this issue, as

the law is clear. In this Commonwealth, a party must seek recusal of a jurist at the earliest possible moment, *i.e.*, when the party knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to recuse. If the party fails to present a motion to recuse at that time, then the party's recusal issue is time-barred and waived.

Lomas v. Kravitz, 642 Pa. 181, 170 A.3d 380, 390 (2017).

The Commonwealth contends that Appellant waived his recusal issue by waiting 167 days to raise it after discovering the factual basis for the claim. We agree. Although Mr. Castor testified before Judge O'Neill on February 2, 2016, prior to Appellant's first trial, Appellant did not raise the instant claim until after his second trial, and just prior to sentencing, on September 11, 2018. Appellant initially asserted this after-discovered-evidence-recusal claim based on a Radar Online article published on March 28, 2018. *See* Motion for Disclosure, Recusal, and for Reconsideration of Recusal, 9/11/18, at 3 ¶¶ 7-8 (asserting that neither Appellant nor his attorneys had any knowledge of the 1999 incident until the article was published). In the article, Appellant's spokesperson, Andrew Wyatt, was quoted as having just learned of the purported 1999 confrontation between Mr. Castor and Judge O'Neill. RR at 1679a ("A spokesman for Cosby, Andrew Wyatt, told Radar: 'It's very interesting—it's my first time hearing about it.'").

[25] [26] [27] Appellant provided virtually no argument in his September 11, 2018 motion, nor does he provide any argument in his brief, indicating why he waited 167 days to seek Judge O'Neill's recusal based on the factual allegations contained in the Radar Online article.¹⁰ Appellant has not denied that his spokesperson, Mr. Wyatt, *408 made the quoted statement, nor has he asserted that Mr. Wyatt withheld that information from him or his attorneys. In any event, even if we were inclined to disregard the obvious—that Mr. Wyatt would have no rational reason for withholding such information from Appellant or Appellant's counsel—Appellant has not offered any explanation as to why he was

unable to discover the Radar Online article at an earlier time. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court and the Commonwealth that Appellant waived this claim, as he failed to raise it at the earliest possible opportunity.¹¹ *See Reilly by Reilly v. S.E. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth.*, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291, 1300 (1985) (holding that an 8-month delay in raising a recusal motion after the facts were known to the moving party resulted in waiver of the recusal claim); *see also Lomas*, 170 A.3d at 391 ("[I]t is obvious that October 15, 2007, was not 'the earliest possible moment' that [the a]ppellants could have raised their objections regarding recusal, as all of the facts underlying the recusal issue were known to [them] ... on September 6, 2007.").

C. Mr. Castor's Alleged Promise Not to Prosecute

[28] [29] [30] [31] Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it *409 denied his *habeas corpus* motion seeking to quash the criminal complaint and bar his trial based on Mr. Castor's purported promise in 2005 not to prosecute him for his sexual assault of Victim. As noted in the trial court's summary of the facts, *supra*, the original investigation into Appellant's 2004 sexual assault of Victim began in January of 2005, and ended the following month when, on February 17, 2005, Mr. Castor personally issued a press release in his capacity as District Attorney, which read in pertinent part as follows:

Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce L. Castor, Jr. has announced that a joint investigation by his office and the Cheltenham Township Police Department into allegations against actor and comic Bill Cosby is concluded.

...

The District Attorney has reviewed the statements of the parties involved, those of all witnesses who might have first[-]hand knowledge of the alleged incident.... Detectives searched Mr. Cosby's Cheltenham home for potential evidence. Investigators further provided District Attorney Castor with phone records and other items that might have evidentiary value. Lastly, the District Attorney reviewed statements from other persons claiming that Mr. Cosby behaved inappropriately with them on prior occasions. However, the detectives could find no instance in Mr. Cosby's past where anyone complained to law enforcement of conduct, which would constitute a criminal offense.

After reviewing the above and consulting with County and Cheltenham detectives, the District Attorney finds insufficient[] credible[] and admissible evidence exists upon which any charge against Mr. Cosby could be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt.

In making this finding, the District Attorney has analyzed the facts in relation to the elements of any applicable offenses, including whether or not evidence is admissible. Evidence may be inadmissible if it is too remote in time to be considered legally relevant or if it was illegally obtained pursuant to Pennsylvania law. After this analysis, the District Attorney concludes that a conviction under the circumstances of this case would be unattainable. As such, District Attorney Castor declines to authorize the filing of criminal charges in connection with this matter.

Because a civil action with a much lower standard of proof is possible, the District Attorney renders no opinion concerning the credibility of any party involved so as not to contribute to the publicity, and taint prospective jurors. The District Attorney does not intend to expound publicly on the details of his decision for fear that his opinions and analysis might be given undue weight by jurors in any contemplated civil action. District Attorney Castor cautions all parties to this matter that he will reconsider this decision should the need arise.

RR at 382a-383a.

After he was charged by the current District Attorney of Montgomery County on December 30, 2015, Appellant filed a *habeas corpus* petition alleging that his prosecution was barred by a non-prosecution agreement. *Id.* at 389a-391a (Appellant's Petition for Writ of *Habeas Corpus*, 1/11/16). However, it is undisputed that no written, formalized non-prosecution agreement exists in this case. Additionally, no order granting Appellant immunity from prosecution was previously sought by Appellant or Mr. Castor. Appellant contends that the above-stated press release, coupled with testimonial evidence regarding Mr. Castor's intent to bar Appellant's *410 prosecution (and communication of that intent to Appellant's now deceased, former attorney in 2005), constituted a *de facto* "agreement, contract, arrangement, or promise" not to prosecute him.¹² Appellant's Brief at 127. Alternatively, Appellant argues that the principle of promissory estoppel barred his trials, reasoning that Mr. "Castor's promise was tailored to force [Appellant] to relinquish his Fifth Amendment right and sit for a civil

deposition[.]" even if the promise was formally defective in conveying immunity from prosecution.¹³ *Id.* at 129.

The trial court rejected both claims. The court first determined that

the only conclusion that was apparent to this [c]ourt was that no agreement or promise not to prosecute ever existed, only the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. A press release, signed or not, was legally insufficient to form the basis of an enforceable promise not to prosecute. The parties did not cite, nor has this [c]ourt found any support in Pennsylvania law for the proposition that a prosecutor may unilaterally confer transactional immunity through a declaration as the sovereign. Thus, the District Attorney was required to utilize the immunity statute, which provides the only means for granting immunity in Pennsylvania.

TCO at 62.

In rejecting Appellant's claim that the principle of promissory estoppel barred his prosecution, the trial court reasoned:

Even assuming, arguendo, that there was a defective grant of immunity, as would support a theory of promissory estoppel, any reliance on a press release as a grant of immunity was unreasonable. [Appellant] was represented by a competent team of attorneys who were versed in written negotiations. Yet none of these attorneys obtained Mr. Castor's promise in writing or memorialized it in any way, further supporting the conclusion that there was no promise. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not estopped from proceeding with the prosecution following their

reinvestigation. The [c]ourt did not abuse its discretion and this claim must fail.

Id. at 65-66.

[32] [33] We review the denial of a motion seeking to quash a criminal complaint or information under a well-settled standard of review.

The decision to grant or deny a motion to quash is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed on appeal only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion. *See Commonwealth v. Hackney*, ... [117 Pa.Super. 519] 178 A. 417, 418 ([Pa. Super.] 1935)... A court, moreover, “should not sustain a motion to quash ... except in a clear case where it is convinced that harm has been done to the defendant by improper conduct that interfered with his substantial rights.”

Commonwealth v. Niemetz, 282 Pa.Super. 431, 422 A.2d 1369, 1373 (1980).

[34] [35] [36] Additionally, to the extent that denying such a motion turns in some part on issues of fact, this Court is highly deferential to the findings of the trial court.

*411 Questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence presented are for the trial court to resolve, not our appellate courts.

As long as sufficient evidence exists in the record which is adequate to support the finding found by the trial court, as factfinder, we are precluded from overturning that finding[.]

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O'Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873, 875 (1989) (citations omitted); *accord Commonwealth v. Doolin*, 24 A.3d 998, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“It is well settled that the decision to grant a pretrial motion to dismiss a criminal charge is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court and may be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion or error of law.”) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted).

We first address whether a non-prosecution agreement existed that precluded Appellant's prosecution for the instant offenses. As a matter of law and based on the uncontested

facts, independent of any credibility determination by the trial court, we hold that Appellant was not immune from prosecution based on Mr. Castor's alleged promise not to prosecute.

Like the trial court, we cannot uncover any authority suggesting that a district attorney “may unilaterally confer transactional immunity through a declaration as the sovereign.” TCO at 62. Appellant has yet to present any authority suggesting otherwise and, therefore, it is clear on the face of the record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was no enforceable non-prosecution agreement in this case; *i.e.*, there was no legal grant of immunity from criminal prosecution conferred to Appellant by Mr. Castor. Even assuming Mr. Castor promised not to prosecute Appellant, only a court order can convey such immunity. Such promises exist only as exercises of prosecutorial discretion, and may be revoked at any time.

The exclusive authority for conferring immunity from prosecution rests within the immunity statute itself, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947. Section 5947 provides, in pertinent part, that

a district attorney may request an immunity order *from any judge of a designated court*, and that judge shall issue such an order, when in the judgment of the Attorney General or district attorney:

- (1) the testimony or other information from a witness may be necessary to the public interest; and
- (2) a witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(b) (emphasis added).

Mr. Castor indicated that he never sought such an order, and no evidence of such an order exists in this case.¹⁴ Instead, Mr. Castor testified that he “made the decision as the sovereign that [Appellant] would not be prosecuted no matter what.” RR at 475a (N.T., 2/2/16, at 64). Mr. Castor *412 did not suggest under what statute or relevant case law he relied in exercising such authority outside the parameters of Section 5947. Indeed, Appellant makes no attempt in his brief to legally support Mr. Castor's contention at all. Thus, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that Appellant was not immune from prosecution, because Mr. Castor failed to seek or obtain an immunity order pursuant to Section 5947. At most, Mr.

Castor exercised his prosecutorial discretion in promising not to prosecute Appellant. We have not discovered any case law, nor does Appellant cite to any relevant authority, holding that when a prosecutor exercises his or her discretion not to prosecute, such action conveys immunity from future prosecution for the same accusation or offense, even if such a decision takes the form of an agreement. Only a court order conveying such immunity is legally binding in this Commonwealth.

Alternatively, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his *habeas corpus* motion seeking to bar his trial based on a promissory estoppel theory. As Appellant contends:

The Commonwealth through [Mr.] Castor made a promise not to prosecute. In reliance on that promise, [Appellant] testified in a civil deposition without asserting his Fifth Amendment rights. Justice can only be served by holding the Commonwealth to their promise and upholding the non-prosecution agreement.

Appellant's Brief at 130.

Initially, we note that Appellant fails to cite any precedent for the proposition that a prosecution can be barred based on a contract theory of promissory estoppel, or anything similar. Rather, he merely provides this Court with boilerplate law concerning the theory and its application in contract law. As such, Appellant has utterly failed to convince us of the applicability of such a theory in barring a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this basis alone.

[37] [38] [39] In any event, even if we were to countenance Appellant's novel theory, we agree with the trial court that he cannot establish the necessary elements of a promissory estoppel claim. "Promissory estoppel enables a person to enforce a contract-like promise that would be otherwise unenforceable under contract law principles." *Peluso v. Kistner*, 970 A.2d 530, 532 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

To establish promissory estoppel, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the promisor made a promise that would reasonably be expected to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. These factors are strictly enforced to guard against the "loose application" of promissory estoppel.

Id. (citation omitted).

With regard to the first element, we agree with the trial court that it was not reasonable for Appellant to rely on Mr. Castor's promise, even if the trial court had found credible the testimony provided by Mr. Castor and Appellant's civil attorney, John Patrick Schmitt, Esq.¹⁵ As noted above, there is simply no authority for the proposition that immunity from criminal prosecution can be conveyed by a prosecutor absent a valid court order pursuant to *413 the immunity statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947. We cannot deem reasonable Appellant's reliance on such a promise when he was represented by counsel, especially when immunity can only be granted by a court order, and where no court order granting him immunity existed.

With regard to the second element, there is virtually no evidence in the record that Appellant actually declined to assert his Fifth Amendment rights at the civil deposition based on Mr. Castor's purported promise not to prosecute. Appellant did not testify to this fact at either hearing on the at-issue *habeas* petition. Appellant's only witnesses were Mr. Castor and Attorney Schmitt. Mr. Castor testified that he had made such a promise through the press release, in part, and through conversations he had with Appellant's prior criminal defense attorney, Walter Phillips, Esq. (now deceased).

Yet, Attorney Schmitt was the only witness who could ostensibly testify as to whether Appellant relied on the alleged promise not to prosecute by sitting for a deposition in the civil case. Attorney Schmitt testified regarding his conversations with Mr. Phillips, indicating that Mr. Phillips had assured him

that Mr. Castor's promise not to prosecute was binding,¹⁶ and therefore Appellant could be compelled to testify during any subsequent civil litigation. RR at 703a (N.T., 2/3/16, at 11). However, as the Commonwealth accurately notes,

Schmitt was forced to admit on cross-examination that he permitted [Appellant] to be questioned by police and, during an interview in advance of that questioning, did not believe that [Appellant] could incriminate himself[. N.T., 2/3/16, at 22-24]. He also admitted to negotiating with the *National Enquirer* on the details of a published interview with [Appellant] regarding the criminal investigation while the criminal investigation was ongoing, and also trying to negotiate the settlement agreement to prohibit [Victim] from ever cooperating with police in the future[. *Id.* at 31-33, 44-48]. It was not necessary for the trial court to specifically state that it rejected ... Schmitt's testimony, as it is patently obvious that his testimony belies his claim that there was some "promise" from [Mr.] Castor not to prosecute[. *Id.* at 25-27.] Further, by crediting the testimony of Troiani and Kivitz the trial court necessarily discredited Schmitt just as it did [Mr.] Castor.^[17]

While [Appellant] seemingly takes issue with the trial court's treatment of Schmitt's testimony in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, he completely ignores the trial court's thorough analysis of his testimony in its 1925([a]) opinion, which makes it abundantly clear that Schmitt's conduct in representing [Appellant] was totally and completely inconsistent with the existence of any promise or agreement not to prosecute from [Mr.] Castor.

Commonwealth's Brief at 136-37.

[40] [41] We agree with the Commonwealth and the trial court that the evidence was entirely inconsistent with Appellant's alleged reliance on Mr. Castor's *414 promise in choosing not to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in the civil suit. It is axiomatic that:

The privilege against self-incrimination can only be asserted when the witness is being asked to testify to self-incriminating facts and only when a witness is asked a question demanding an incriminating answer. The witness has the burden of demonstrating that he or she has

a reasonable ground for asserting the privilege.

McDonough v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 384, 618 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1992) (citation omitted).

Attorney Schmitt believed that Appellant could not incriminate himself based on the testimony he intended to provide. If this was the case, then there was no basis for Appellant to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege in the civil suit, which is consistent with Appellant's prior decision to sit for an interview with criminal investigators. Moreover, Attorney Schmitt's actions were entirely inconsistent with reliance on the purported promise, as he failed to mention the alleged promise to Victim's civil attorneys, and he attempted to negotiate a settlement with Victim to prevent her from cooperating with the police in the future. Thus, even if Appellant's promissory estoppel theory were cognizable (and we hold that it is not), he would not be entitled to relief.

D. Motion to Suppress the Contents of Appellant's Civil Deposition

[42] [43] [44] [45] [46] Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the contents of his civil deposition.

[O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is *de novo*. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes

only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 639 Pa. 100, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (2017) (citations omitted).

[47] [48] Appellant's suppression argument is contingent upon his claim that Mr. Castor unilaterally immunized Appellant from criminal prosecution, which we have already rejected. We have also rejected Appellant's promissory estoppel theory as a basis for barring his prosecution, and we agree with the trial court that suppression is not warranted for the following reasons:

1. Instantly, this [c]ourt concludes that there was neither an agreement nor a promise not to prosecute, only an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, memorialized by the February 17, 2005 press release.
2. In the absence of an enforceable agreement, [Appellant] relies on a theory of promissory estoppel and the principles of due process and fundamental fairness to support his motion to suppress.
3. Where there is no enforceable agreement between parties because the agreement lacked consideration, the agreement may still be enforceable on a theory of promissory estoppel to avoid injustice. *Crouse v. Cyclops Indus.*, 560 Pa. 394, 745 A.2d 606 (2000).
- *415 4. The party who asserts promissory estoppel must show (1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. *Id.* (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90). Satisfaction of the third requirement may depend, *inter alia*, on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance and the formality with which the promise was made. *Thatcher's Drug Store of W. Goshen, Inc. v. Consol. Supermarkets, Inc.*, 535 Pa. 469, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, comment b).
5. Because there was no promise, there can be no reliance on the part of [Appellant] and principles of fundamental fairness and due process have not been violated.

6. This [c]ourt finds that there is no Constitutional barrier to the use of [Appellant]'s civil deposition testimony.

TCO at 72 (quoting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 12/5/16, at 5 (RR at 1196a)).

Appellant cites several cases in support of his claim, discussed below. However, we conclude that none of these cases suggest, much less compel, a ruling that the trial court abused its discretion in denying suppression of Appellant's civil deposition testimony in this matter.

Appellant first cites *Commonwealth v. Eiland*, 450 Pa. 566, 301 A.2d 651 (1973), for the proposition that: "If the Commonwealth makes a promise to a defendant, who acts in detriment to their protected rights as a result of that promise, the District Attorney, as an 'administrator of justice,' cannot then renege on the promise and seek to benefit from the deceit." Appellant's Brief at 131.

However, *Eiland* did not involve circumstances comparable to the matter at hand. There, the defendant had claimed that his incriminating statement, given while in custody, was unlawfully induced through physical coercion and a substantial delay between his arrest and his arraignment. The *Eiland* Court ultimately granted relief, based on the following facts:

The record evinces [u]ncontradicted evidence that [the defendant], a 20-year-old with a tenth grade education, was isolated for several periods of time; that upon his initial interrogation he refused to admit involvement in the shooting; that eleven hours later when told by the police he would get more lenient treatment if he confessed, he signed an incriminating statement; and that he was not arraigned until some twenty-five hours after arrest.

Eiland, 301 A.2d at 654. The *Eiland* Court concluded that the defendant had been subject to "impermissible psychological coercion." *Id.* at 655. Accordingly, the Court ruled that his incriminating statement should have been suppressed.

Here, Appellant was not in custody when he was deposed. The at-issue statement was given in the presence of experienced counsel at a civil deposition, and his civil deposition testimony was not compelled based on a promise that he would be shown leniency if he confessed directly to criminal conduct. Thus, *Eiland* is completely inapposite.

Next Appellant argues that relief is due pursuant to *United States v. Hayes*, 946 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1991). In *Hayes*, the defendant alleged that the Commonwealth had breached the terms of his plea agreement, which stated, *in writing*, that the district attorney would not recommend a *416 specific sentence at sentencing. The Commonwealth breached that agreement by recommending a sentence in its sentencing memorandum. On that basis, the *Hayes* Court granted relief and vacated the defendant's sentence, reasoning that, "the government must honor its bargain with the defendant." *Id.* at 233.

The instant case does not involve a promise made pursuant to a plea agreement. Moreover, the agreement in *Hayes* was memorialized in writing and accepted by the trial court, and the specific terms of that agreement were not in dispute. Here, the purported promise by Mr. Castor was not memorialized in writing, and Appellant's alleged consideration for that promise was nonexistent at the time; indeed, the Commonwealth in this case claims that no agreement or promise existed at all. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the purported promise not to prosecute was the product of a negotiation, rather than merely being a unilateral declaration made by Mr. Castor. Thus, *Hayes* does not support Appellant's claim.

Appellant also cites *Commonwealth v. Stipetich*, 539 Pa. 428, 652 A.2d 1294 (1995). In that case, Pittsburgh police searched George and Heidi Stipetich's home pursuant to a warrant and discovered a small quantity of drugs and related paraphernalia.

Sergeant Thomas, the officer in charge of the search, was subsequently contacted by the Stipetiches' attorney, Charles Scarlata. Thomas and Scarlata reached an agreement that, if George Stipetich would answer questions concerning the source of the controlled substances and drug paraphernalia found in his residence, no charges would be filed against either of the Stipetiches. George Stipetich then fulfilled his part of the agreement by answering all questions posed by the police.

Nevertheless, ... on the basis of the contraband recovered in the foregoing search, Allegheny County authorities charged the Stipetiches with possession of controlled substances. Citing the non-prosecution agreement entered with the Pittsburgh police, the Stipetiches filed a motion seeking dismissal of the charges. The motion was granted by the [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas.

Id. at 1294-95. Our Supreme Court reversed that decision because the "non-prosecution agreement was, in short, invalid. The Pittsburgh police did not have authority to bind the Allegheny County District Attorney's office as to whether charges would be filed." *Id.* at 1295.

However, the *Stipetich* Court opined that:

The decisions below, barring prosecution of the Stipetiches, embodied concern that allowing charges to be brought after George Stipetich had performed his part of the agreement by answering questions about sources of the contraband discovered in his residence would be fundamentally unfair because in answering the questions he may have disclosed information that could be used against him. The proper response to this concern is not to bar prosecution; rather, it is to suppress, at the appropriate juncture, any detrimental evidence procured through the inaccurate representation that he would not be prosecuted.

Id. at 1296.

This language from *Stipetich*, relied upon by Appellant, is merely *dicta*. The holding in *Stipetich* was solely that the Stipetiches' prosecution was not barred by the invalid non-prosecution agreement. Nevertheless, *Stipetich* is also factually distinguishable from the instant case. Here, there was no negotiated agreement, just a unilateral declaration by Mr. Castor, which on its face did not grant Appellant *417 immunity from prosecution. Moreover, as Mr. Castor testified, "there wasn't any *quid pro quo* here." RR at 99 (N.T.,

2/2/16, at 99). Indeed, at the time of Mr. Castor's statement, Victim had not yet filed a civil claim against Appellant. Additionally, as discussed above, there was no reasonable reliance on a defective grant of immunity when the suit was filed and Appellant was ultimately deposed. Accordingly, *Stipetich* does not support Appellant's suppression claim.

Appellant also relies on *Commonwealth v. Peters*, 473 Pa. 72, 373 A.2d 1055 (1977), but provides practically no analysis of that case. We find that *Peters* is easily distinguishable from the instant matter. In *Peters*, an uncounseled defendant waived his rights under *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and gave an incriminating statement when promised by a detective with the District Attorney's Office that he would not be prosecuted. Our Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth had not "carried its burden" to demonstrate that the defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his *Miranda* rights, where "[n]o explanation of this promise was provided by the Commonwealth." *Peters*, 373 A.2d at 1062. Here, Appellant was represented by multiple attorneys throughout the initial criminal investigation and civil proceedings, and gave the at-issue statement during a civil deposition, not during a custodial interrogation.

Appellant offers another cursory analysis of *Commonwealth v. Bryan*, 818 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. 2003), but that case also does not suggest that he is entitled to relief. In *Bryan*, the defendant failed to comply with an invalid and unenforceable non-prosecution agreement with police. The trial court dismissed the subsequently filed charges due to a delay in filing the charges. We reversed, ruling, in part, that there was no demonstrable prejudice to the defendant due to the delay. *Id.* at 541-42. We then, in *dicta*, suggested that, "[h]ad incriminating information been obtained against [the defendant] as a result of the unauthorized agreement, he would be entitled to have that evidence suppressed." *Id.* at 542. In any event, in that case, the police offered not to prosecute in exchange for the defendant's assistance in unrelated criminal matters. The offer was made while the uncounseled defendant was detained for blood testing during a DUI arrest. Again, in this case, Appellant was represented by counsel, and there was no negotiation. The Commonwealth did not receive any benefit from Mr. Castor's promise, and Appellant provided testimony while counseled at a civil deposition, not while under duress from a custodial interrogation.

Finally, in assessing the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress, we are bound by the court's factual determinations. The trial court determined that Mr. Castor's testimony and, by implication, Attorney Schmitt's testimony (which was premised upon information he indirectly received from Mr. Castor) were not credible. The court found that the weight of the evidence supported its finding that no agreement or grant of immunity was made, and that Appellant did not reasonably rely on any overtures by Mr. Castor to that effect when he sat for his civil deposition. Thus, for all of the aforementioned reasons, we do not ascertain any abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress his civil deposition.

E. Evidence from Appellant's Civil Deposition Concerning His Possession and Distribution of Quaaludes in the 1970's

[49] Next, Appellant challenges the admission of the portion of his civil deposition *418 testimony pertaining to his possession and distribution of Quaaludes in the 1970s. Appellant asserts that such evidence was inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 404(b), and that it did not satisfy any exception thereto as set forth in Rule 404(b)(2). Specifically, Appellant challenges the admission at trial of his civil deposition testimony pertaining to

the circumstances under which [Appellant] was prescribed the Quaaludes[, RR at 4789a-4790a;] the number of scripts obtained[, *id.* at 4790;] and his decision to share the Quaaludes, noting that, at that time (*i.e.*, the 1970s), "Quaaludes happen to be the drug that kids, young people, were using to party with and there were times when I wanted to have them just in case." [*id.* at 4793a].

Appellant's Brief at 138.

The trial court determined that this evidence was admissible to establish Appellant's intent and motive in giving "a depressant to [Victim]" for the purpose of impairing her ability to refuse to consent to sexual activity. TCO at 115; *see* Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (permitting the admission of PBA evidence that demonstrates "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident[.]" if "the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.").

Appellant contends:

The [r]ecord is barren of any evidence which reflects that [Appellant] had Quaaludes in his possession in 2004[,] and that the pills [Victim] was given were Quaaludes. In fact, the [r]ecord reflects otherwise. Moreover, the fact that [Appellant] may have shared Quaaludes with women in the 1970s is not probative of his motive or intent concerning providing Benadryl to [Victim] in 2004.

Quaaludes were legal in the 1970s and were a “party drug” widely used in the 1970s and early 1980s. [RR at 4969a-4970a]. The fact that [Appellant] possessed but unlawfully shared Quaaludes in the 1970s while partying with other individuals may be salacious, but it does not establish any material fact in this case, nor does it make a fact at issue (*i.e.*, whether [Appellant] had non[-]consensual sexual contact with [Victim]) more or less probable.... Further, it does not raise any reasonable inference supporting a material fact. It had no probative value and was not relevant but was extraordinarily prejudicial.

The prosecution offered this evidence to raise the innuendo that [Appellant] supplied women with Quaaludes back in the 1970s and then had sex with them. No facts were presented, however, to support the conclusion that the women: (a) were forced to take the Quaaludes; (b) did not know that they were taking Quaaludes; (c) actually had sex with [Appellant]; and (d) if they had sex with [Appellant], had nonconsensual sex with [him]. The fact is, a person can be impaired by voluntarily taking a controlled or noncontrolled substance, or by consuming alcohol, and still engage in consensual sexual contact. That such may have happened between [Appellant] and some women in the 1970s in no way establishes whether, on some night in 2004, [Appellant] had nonconsensual contact with [Victim]. This prejudicial evidence was offered for no reason other than to smear [Appellant], a reason which certainly does not support the admissibility of the evidence. A new trial is warranted.

Appellant's Brief at 142-44.

The Commonwealth responds, first, that Appellant's admissions regarding his distribution of Quaaludes “were relevant because *419 they tended to establish that he had knowledge of substances—particularly, central nervous system depressants—that would induce unconsciousness and facilitate a sexual assault.” Commonwealth's Brief at 151.

[Appellant] specifically testified in his deposition that he obtained numerous prescriptions for Quaaludes, without intending to use the pills himself, but to give to “young women [he] wanted to have sex with[.]” [N.T.], 4/18/18, at 35, 40-42, 47.... He admitted that he knew the drugs caused at least one woman—“Jane Doe Number 1”—to get “high,” appear “unsteady,” and “walk[] like [she] had too much to drink[.]” [*Id.*] at 35-37.... He knew the drug was a central nervous system “depressant” because he had taken a similar medication following surgery. For that that reason, he did not take the drugs himself because he “get[s] sleepy” and he “want[s] to stay awake[.]” [*Id.*] at 41-43....

Id. at 151-52.

The Commonwealth argues that these admissions were critical to the prosecution in order to prove Appellant's commission of an aggravated indecent assault, where the Commonwealth was required to prove that he engaged in “penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the person's body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures” and

- (1) the person does so without the complainant's consent; ...
- (4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that the complainant is unaware that the penetration is occurring;
- (5) the person has substantially impaired the complainant's power to appraise or control his or her conduct by administering or employing, without the knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance....

18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a).

The Commonwealth correctly notes, and Appellant does not dispute, that the minimum *mens rea* for these offenses is recklessness. “A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). That risk “must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct *and the circumstances known to him*, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

The Commonwealth argues that Appellant's

admissions that he gave other women central nervous system depressants (Quaaludes), knowing their effects, helped prove that he knew that the supposed Benadryl he gave to [Victim] would render her unconscious, or nearly unconscious, and[,] thus[,] make her] unable to consent to sex with him—at the very least, he disregarded this risk. Indeed, [Appellant]'s admission to knowing the effect of a central nervous system depressant was critically relevant to the case because it demonstrated his familiarity with a certain prescription drug that falls within the same class of drugs as that which he alleges to have given [Appellant] on the night of the assault.

Commonwealth's Brief at 154-55.¹⁸ The Commonwealth maintains that Appellant's

*420 familiarity with one drug and its effects in an overall class of drugs is highly probative where he claimed, in this prosecution, to have used a different drug in the same class with effects he knows to be similar. That is, his own words about his use and knowledge of a central nervous system depressant drug, when coupled with the admissions he made claiming to have provided [Victim] Benadryl, and the expert testimony indicating that the effects experienced by [Victim] are consistent with being given a central nervous system depressant, were relevant to demonstrate [Appellant]'s intent and motive in giving [Victim] a central nervous system depressant; to

wit, to render her unconscious so that he could facilitate a sexual assault.

Id. at 156-57.

Second, the Commonwealth contends that Appellant's admissions regarding his distribution of Quaaludes were relevant to strengthen evidence provided by the five PBA witnesses, discussed *supra*. The Commonwealth argues that, in combination, such evidence was necessary to establish Appellant's "motive and intent in administering these intoxicants. The ability of the Commonwealth to establish [Appellant]'s motive and intent through the absence of mistake was particularly critical here, where consent was a defense." *Id.* at 160.

We agree with the Commonwealth, and we are not convinced that Appellant's attempts to draw a hard distinction between Quaaludes and Benadryl present a meaningful argument for our consideration. First, the jury was free to disbelieve Appellant's assertion that he only provided Victim with Benadryl. Second, even accepting that Appellant gave Benadryl to Victim, his testimony regarding his knowledge of the effects of other central nervous system depressants, such as Quaaludes, was highly probative of "the circumstances known to him" for purposes of determining whether he acted with the requisite *mens rea* for the offense of aggravated indecent assault—recklessness. 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). This was particularly relevant where Appellant's own admissions to his sexual contact with Victim left him contesting only her consent. His knowledge of the use of central nervous system depressants, coupled with his likely past use of the same with the PBA witnesses, were essential to resolving the otherwise he-said-she-said nature of Victim's allegations. Thus, this evidence was highly probative of Appellant's *mens rea*.

Furthermore, we do not ascertain any abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its "potential for unfair prejudice." Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). In a vacuum, Appellant's use and distribution of a then-legal 'party drug' nearly half a century ago, does not appear highly prejudicial, at least not to the extent that there was a serious risk that it would overwhelm the good sense of a rational juror. It only becomes significantly prejudicial, *and fairly so*, when, in the context of other evidence, it establishes Appellant's knowledge of and familiarity with central nervous system depressants for

purposes of demonstrating that he was at least reckless in *421 providing a central nervous system depressant to Victim before engaging in sexual acts with her, as he should have been aware that it would substantially impair her ability to consent.

Moreover, whatever potential for unfair prejudice existed was substantially mitigated by the trial court's issuance of cautionary instructions regarding the admission of this evidence. It is undisputed that the jury was instructed to consider the evidence in question only for its admitted purpose. *See Tyson*, 119 A.3d at 362 (holding that "to alleviate the potential for unfair prejudice, the court can issue a cautionary instruction to the jury, to advise the jury of the limited purpose of the evidence and to clarify that the jury cannot treat the prior crime as proof of [Tyson's] bad character or criminal tendencies"). Moreover, "[j]urors are presumed to follow the trial court's instructions." *Id.* Accordingly, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of Appellant's civil deposition statements regarding his use and distribution of Quaaludes in the 1970s.

F. Consciousness-of-Guilt Jury Charge

[50] [51] Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it issued a consciousness-of-guilt jury charge. The Commonwealth argues that this claim is waived, and the trial court agrees. *See* Commonwealth's Brief at 170-71; TCO at 116-18. We agree that Appellant waived this claim by failing to adequately preserve it below.

The Commonwealth contends that, "[a]lthough [Appellant] argued prior to the jury charge that the trial court should not issue a consciousness of guilt instruction, he made no objection to the actual instructions after they were given...." Commonwealth's Brief at 170. Indeed, regardless of any prior discussions, when the court concluded giving the instructions to the jury, neither the Commonwealth nor Appellant offered any objections. N.T., 4/25/18, at 61. At 11:08 a.m., the jury retired to deliberate. *Id.* at 66. The following day, Appellant filed written objections to the court's jury instructions. *See* Defendant William H. Cosby, Jr.'s Objections to Jury Instructions, 4/26/18, at 2 ¶ 5. Appellant contends that he adequately preserved his objection by 1) opposing the instruction during the charging conference; and 2) filing the written objections the day after the jury retired to deliberate. We disagree that those actions were sufficient to preserve his claim.

[52] "Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Furthermore, a "general exception to the charge to the jury will not preserve an issue for appeal. Specific exception shall be taken to the language or omission complained of." Pa.R.A.P. 302(b). "In order to preserve a claim that a jury instruction was erroneously given, the [a]ppellant must have objected to the charge at trial." *Commonwealth v. Parker*, 104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014); *see also* Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) ("No portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.").

In *Parker*, as here, the defendant contested a jury charge "at the charging conference." *Parker*, 104 A.3d at 29. However, he failed to object immediately after the jury was charged when prompted by the court. *Id.* We held in that case that Parker's objection at the charging conference was not sufficient to preserve a claim challenging that instruction on appeal. *Id.*; *see also* *Commonwealth v. Smallhoover*, 389 Pa.Super. 575, 567 A.2d 1055, 1059 (1989) *422 (deeming waived a challenge to a jury instruction under similar circumstances).

Here, under *Parker*, Appellant's objections at the charging conference were not sufficient to preserve his challenge to the consciousness-of-guilt jury charge issued by the trial court because he did not also object when the charge was given to the jury. Moreover, Appellant's attempt to preserve that challenge in the subsequently-filed written objections does not satisfy the explicit requirement in Rule 647(C) that the objection must be filed "before the jury retires to deliberate." Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C). Thus, we agree with the trial court that Appellant waived this claim.

[53] [54] [55] Nevertheless, had Appellant not waived this claim, we would deem it meritless.

[W]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated portions, to determine if the instructions were improper. We further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its

instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting *Commonwealth v. Trippett*, 932 A.2d 188, 200 (Pa. Super. 2007)).

Here, Appellant concedes that the Commonwealth's evidence, if believed by the jury, demonstrated that he offered "to pay for [Victim]'s education, therapy[,] and travel" during the phone conversations he had with Victim and Victim's mother, in which they confronted Appellant with Victim's accusation that Appellant had sexually assaulted her. Appellant's Brief at 148. However, Appellant contends that those offers did not constitute evidence of his consciousness of guilt, because:

Unlike those cases in which the courts have upheld the submission of a "consciousness of guilt" instruction to the jury, [Appellant] is not accused of fleeing; of concealing himself in some way; of altering his appearance; of threatening any witness; or of intimidating any witness. The conduct which ostensibly served as the basis for the lower court's "consciousness of guilt" instruction was consistent with wholly innocent conduct that occurred between [Appellant] and [Victim] over the period of their friendship....

Id. at 150.

We disagree. First, Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that consciousness-of-guilt instructions are limited to the circumstances he listed. Pennsylvania courts have specifically rejected the use of certain types of evidence as consciousness-of-guilt evidence, especially when the admission of such evidence conflicts with well-established constitutional protections. *See Commonwealth v. Welch*, 401 Pa.Super. 393, 585 A.2d 517 (1991) (holding that a

defendant's refusal to consent to a search in the absence of a warrant was not admissible under a consciousness-of-guilt theory of relevancy); *see also Commonwealth v. Chapman*, 635 Pa. 273, 136 A.3d 126 (2016) (holding that a defendant's refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test for DNA purposes was inadmissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt). Here, the admission of evidence concerning Appellant's offers to Victim does not conflict with these or similar constitutional principles. Indeed, Appellant fails to cite any case law that suggests the inadmissibility of this or similar evidence.

*423 Second, the jury was under no obligation to view Appellant's offers to Victim as "wholly innocent conduct[.]" Appellant's Brief at 150. In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable person could interpret Appellant's actions as an attempt to entice Victim with economic incentives not to pursue a criminal prosecution. Appellant's argument goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility under a consciousness-of-guilt theory, nor to the propriety of issuing an instruction on that theory.

Third, the evidence in question does not fall outside the underlying purpose of the consciousness-of-guilt theory for the admissibility of evidence. The courts of this Commonwealth have permitted a wide variety of evidence under auspices of the consciousness-of-guilt theory. *See Commonwealth v. Homeyer*, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A.2d 743, 747 (1953) (recognizing, as consciousness of guilt, "manifestations of mental distress" and "fear at the time of our just before or just after discovery of the crime"); *Commonwealth v. Sanchez*, 416 Pa.Super. 160, 610 A.2d 1020, 1028 (1992) (holding that evidence of "suicide ideation" and "attempt to commit suicide" are admissible "to show consciousness of guilt"); *Commonwealth v. Pestinikas*, 421 Pa.Super. 371, 617 A.2d 1339, 1348 (1992) (holding "that an attempt by a criminal defendant to obtain and apply political pressure for the purpose of obtaining a dismissal of charges is a relevant circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt"); *id.* (recognizing that an "attempt to influence witnesses" can constitute evidence of consciousness of guilt). Appellant's argument that he did not attempt to "conceal himself in some way" is purely semantical. Appellant's Brief at 150 (emphasis added). The jury could reasonably infer that by offering Victim and her mother significant economic benefits immediately after being confronted with his unlawful behavior, Appellant was attempting to influence witnesses in order to shield himself from prosecution. Accordingly, even had we not deemed this issue waived, we would ascertain no abuse of discretion

by the trial court in its decision to present the jury with a consciousness-of-guilt instruction.

G. Juror Bias

[56] Next, Appellant claims he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court deprived him of a fair and impartial jury when it failed to remove an ostensibly biased juror. The trial court explained the circumstances leading to its decision not to dismiss the juror in question as follows:

Jury selection was completed on April 5, 2018[,] with the selection of twelve jurors and six alternates; although the jury was selected, the jury was not yet sworn. N.T., [4/5/18,] at 190. On April 6, 2018, the [c]ourt and counsel had a conference to address any outstanding issues in advance of the commencement of trial.... Following this conference, ... [Appellant] filed "Defendant's Motion, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law In Support Thereof, to Excuse Juror for Cause and for Questioning of Jurors." In the Motion, [Appellant] alleged that during the jury selection process, Juror 11 indicated that he believed [Appellant] was guilty. In support of this Motion, [Appellant] filed declarations of Priscilla Horvath, the administrative assistant for [Appellant]'s Attorney Kathleen Bliss, the declaration of Richard Beasley, a defense private investigator, and the declaration of prospective Juror 9.

Ms. Horvath indicated that when she arrived at work on April 5, 2018, there was a message from prospective Juror 9. In the message, [prospective] Juror 9 indicated that she had been dismissed from the jury on April 4, 2018[,] and that there was a potential juror who stated that "he is guilty" in reference to [Appellant]. *424 Ms. Horvath called the prospective juror back and obtained a description of the juror who purportedly made the statement. Private investigator Beasley also contacted the prospective juror; the juror relayed the same information to Beasley. Despite learning of this purported issue on April 5, 2018, at which time jury selection was still taking place, defense counsel did not bring this issue to the [c]ourt's attention at that time, or during the April 6, 2018 conference, but instead undertook an independent investigation.

On April 9, 2018, the [c]ourt held an in-camera hearing prior to the commencement of trial. At the hearing, prospective Juror 9 testified that she was on the second panel of jurors, summoned on April 3, 2018. The jurors

who were not stricken for cause returned the next day, April 4, 2018, for individual *voir dire*. Prospective [J]uror 9 and eleven other prospective jurors waited in a small jury room for individual *voir dire*. The court noted during the in chambers proceeding that the room is a small room, approximately 10 feet by 15 feet. Prospective [J]uror 9 testified that she was sitting across the room from Juror 11. She testified that she was able to hear anything that anyone said in the room unless they were having a private conversation.

She testified that when they returned to the jury room after lunch, at some point in the afternoon, Juror 11 was standing by the window, playing with the blinds. She testified that he stated that he was ready to just say [Appellant] was guilty so they could all get out of there. She testified that she was unsure if he was joking. She indicated that no one else in the room reacted to the statement and people continued to make small talk. She indicated that Juror 11 also made a statement about a comedy show that [Appellant] performed after the first trial. There was also some discussion in the group about a shooting at YouTube.

Prospective Juror 9 contacted defense counsel and left a message regarding this information. When questioned by the [c]ourt, she unequivocally indicated that she was told by the defense team that if she signed the declaration, she would not have to return to court. Defense counsel, Becky James, Esq., stated that she spoke to prospective Juror 9 over the phone and told her twice that she could not guarantee that she would not have to come back. Defense investigator Scott Ross, who actually obtained the signed declaration of prospective Juror 9, also indicated that he told her he could not guarantee she would not have to return to testify.

The [c]ourt questioned Juror 11 about the statement. The following exchange took place:

The [c]ourt: Let me just ask you: At any time during the afternoon, for whatever reason, did you make the statement, I just think he's guilty, so we can all be done and get out of here, or something similar to that? ...

Juror 11: No.

The [c]ourt: You never made such a statement?

Juror 11: No.

The [c]ourt: So if you were standing at the window there, you don't recall making a statement, for whatever reason, it could have been just to break the ice?

Juror 11: I do not recall that.

The [c]ourt: You don't recall it. Could you have made a statement like that?

Juror 11: I don't think I would have.

The [c]ourt: You don't think you would have?

Juror 11: No.

*425 The [c]ourt: I just want to make perfectly clear, it is okay if you did. We just-I need to track down a lot of different things and, you know, I will ask you some other questions afterwards, but it is important that if you made such a statement you do tell us.

Juror 11: (Nods).

The [c]ourt: And I'm going to let you reflect on it because it's part of the process and we do have to check these things out.

Juror 11: Okay.

The [c]ourt: So did you make that statement? If you did, it's perfectly okay.

Juror 11: No.

The [c]ourt: You did not?

Juror 11: No.

[...]

The [c]ourt: So did you hear anyone at any time mention an[] opinion when you [were] back in this room regarding the guilt or innocence of [Appellant]?

Juror 11: No.

The [c]ourt: That means whether it was joking or not joking, just any comment?

Juror 11: No, I don't remember anything like that.

The [c]ourt: So you don't remember, but you clearly know that you did not say it; is that correct?

Juror 11: Yes.

[N.T., 4/9/18, at 56-59].

Juror 11 consistently denied making any such statement, even as a joke. He also stated that he did not remark on a comedy performance of [Appellant] and indicated that people in the room discussed the shooting at YouTube.

Following Juror 11's repeated denials, the [c]ourt then interviewed the seated jurors who were in the room at the time of the alleged statement. First, the [c]ourt interviewed seated Juror 9. [Seated J]juror 9 indicated that they did not hear anyone make a comment to the effect that [Appellant] was guilty, any comment about his guilt or innocence, or any discussion of YouTube. The [c]ourt interviewed seated Juror 10. Juror 10, likewise, did not hear anyone make a comment regarding [Appellant]'s guilt or innocence. Juror 10 indicated that they heard people discussing the shooting at YouTube. Juror 10 did not hear anyone talk about a comedy performance [by Appellant]. The [c]ourt interviewed seated Juror 12 who did not hear anyone say that they thought [Appellant] was guilty. Juror 12 did hear people discuss the shooting at YouTube. He did not hear any discussion of a comedy performance [by Appellant] that may have been on YouTube. Juror 12 was seated next to Juror 11 at the time of the alleged statement.

Following the interviews of Jurors 9, 10 and 12, the [c]ourt again questioned Juror 11. At this point, the [c]ourt told Juror 11 that a prospective juror claimed that he made a statement to the effect of "I think he's guilty, so we can all be done and get out of here." Again the juror denied making the statement.

Based on this [c]ourt's observations of the demeanor of all of the people questioned regarding the statement and its review of the declarations attached to the Motion, the [c]ourt denied the motion on credibility grounds.

TCO at 83-88 (some citations and footnotes omitted).

[57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] Appellant contends that the trial court erred in two respects. First, Appellant claims that the trial court "palpably abused its discretion in refusing to provide [Appellant] with a complete evidentiary *426 hearing into [Juror 11]'s expressed bias." Appellant's Brief at 160-61. In this regard, Appellant believes the trial court erred by failing to call other prospective jurors to testify regarding Juror 11's alleged comment. Second, Appellant argues that

the trial court “committed a palpable abuse of discretion in refusing to strike [Juror 11] based on the evidence that was adduced at [the] hearing.” *Id.* at 162. Thus, Appellant essentially argues that Juror 11 should have been removed for cause based on the record that was developed below and, alternatively, that even if he was not entitled to relief based upon the record as it stands, the trial court should have heard additional testimony.

A trial court’s decision regarding whether to disqualify a juror for cause is within its sound discretion and will not be reversed in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion. *Commonwealth v. Stevens*, [] [559 Pa. 171] 739 A.2d 507, 521 ([Pa.] 1999). In determining if a motion to strike a prospective juror for cause was properly denied our Court is guided by the following precepts:

The test for determining whether a prospective juror should be disqualified is whether he is willing and able to eliminate the influence of any scruples and render a verdict according to the evidence, and this is to be determined on the basis of answers to questions and demeanor.... It must be determined whether any biases or prejudices can be put aside on proper instruction of the court.... A challenge for cause should be granted when the prospective juror has such a close relationship, familial, financial, or situational, with the parties, counsel, victims, or witnesses that the court will presume a likelihood of prejudice or demonstrates a likelihood of prejudice by his or her conduct or answers to questions.

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 608 Pa. 430, 12 A.3d 291, 332-33 (2011) (quoting *Commonwealth v. Cox*, 603 Pa. 223, 983 A.2d 666, 682 (2009)). Additionally,

[t]he refusal of a new trial on grounds of alleged misconduct of a juror is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. When the facts surrounding the possible misconduct are in dispute, the trial judge should examine the various witnesses on the question, and his findings of fact will be sustained unless there is an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Posavek, 278 Pa.Super. 265, 420 A.2d 532, 537 (1980) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court rejected Appellant’s biased-juror claims, stating:

Based on this [c]ourt’s observations of the demeanor of all of the people questioned regarding the statement and its review of the declarations attached to the Motion [to remove the juror], the [c]ourt denied the motion on credibility grounds. Juror 11 answered the questions without hesitation. This [c]ourt did not find [p]rospective Juror 9 to be credible. Prospective Juror 9 claimed that she heard people talking about a comedy performance by [Appellant]; no other interviewed juror heard any such conversation. Additionally, prospective Juror 9 had a history with the District Attorney’s Office. She had previously been required to complete community service and at the time of this allegation had been interviewed in connection with an ongoing fraud investigation. Based on the foregoing, this court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Juror 11.

TCO at 88 (citations omitted).

We ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to remove Juror 11 from the jury based on the record *427 before us. The trial court, as factfinder, determined that prospective Juror 9’s accusation was not credible, and that Juror 11’s testimony, which directly contradicted prospective Juror 9’s testimony, was credible. Indeed, the court’s credibility determination was buttressed by the testimony of three other seated jurors who were in the immediate vicinity of prospective Juror 9 and Juror 11 at the time the purported statement was made. We are bound by the trial court’s credibility determination that Juror 11 did not make any statement prejudging Appellant’s culpability.

We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s reliance on *State v. Ess*, 453 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. 2015). *Ess* is not a controlling authority in this jurisdiction. In any event, that case did not involve similar circumstances to the instant matter. In *Ess*, a juror had

purportedly evinced prejudgment of a case during a break in *voir dire* by stating to another juror that it was a “cut-and-dry []case.” *Id.* at 200. Ess filed a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct, and the prosecutor objected. The trial court ultimately “sustained the prosecutor’s objections, which were to a lack of foundation, speculation, and hearsay.” *Id.* The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, because, *inter alia*, the trial court had failed to make any credibility assessment regarding the juror’s purported statement. *Id.* at 203. Instead, the trial court had determined that, even if the statement had been made, it was not alone sufficient to demonstrate bias against the defendant rather than the prosecution. *Id.* The instant case is clearly disanalogous to *Ess*. Here, the trial court conducted a hearing, assessed the credibility of multiple witnesses, and ultimately determined that Juror 11 did not make the at-issue statement.

We also disagree with Appellant’s claim that he was entitled to a more extensive hearing that would have included additional witnesses. Appellant cites no authorities to support his argument. As is evident from the record, the trial court conducted a hearing, at which no less than five witnesses testified—all of whom were in the small room at the time when Juror 11 supposedly made his biased statement. Appellant fails to produce a cogent argument that more was required. Neither case cited by Appellant suggests otherwise.

For instance, Appellant suggests a more extensive hearing was required under *Commonwealth v. Horton*, 485 Pa. 115, 401 A.2d 320 (1979). We disagree. In *Horton*, “[i]n the presence of the judge and jury panel from which his jury was later selected, [Horton] was asked by the court clerk how he pleaded to the charges against him.” *Id.* at 322. Horton (mistakenly) answered, “GUILTY.” *Id.* During the subsequent *voir dire*, a juror indicated that Horton’s initial response of “GUILTY” had “preconditioned” his mind against Horton. *Id.* When defense counsel sought to disqualify the entire jury panel, the court refused his request.

Defense counsel then asked to be allowed to pose an appropriate question to the jurors to determine whether or not any other jurors had heard [Horton] respond “guilty” when asked how he would plead, and, if so, whether they had been predisposed by that statement to believe [Horton was]

guilty. This request was also denied by the trial judge.

Id. at 323. Our Supreme Court held in *Horton* that the trial court had “erred when it refused to examine the jurors regarding this incident.” *Id.*

However, here, unlike what occurred in *Horton*, where the whole jury was potentially influenced by a statement by the defendant (the content of which was not disputed), the only accusation of potential bias pertained to the alleged comment made by a single juror. In *Horton*, the *428 trial court refused to hold a hearing to question the jurors. Here, the trial court held a hearing and questioned more than five witnesses. The court questioned four seated jurors and prospective Juror 9, who had made the accusation, and concluded that prospective Juror 9’s accusation was simply not credible. In *Horton*, by contrast, the content of Horton’s statement was not in dispute, and it was also undisputed that he made the problematic statement in front of the jury; the only issue that remained was how many of the jurors had heard him make the statement. Thus, we conclude that *Horton* provides no support for Appellant’s assertion that he was entitled to a more extensive hearing on Juror 11’s alleged statement. Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, Appellant is not entitled to a new trial based on his allegation of Juror 11’s bias.

H. Constitutionality of Applying SORNA II to Appellant’s 2004 Offense

[63] [64] [65] [66] Finally, Appellant, challenges the constitutionality of his SVP designation, as well as his registration and reporting requirements under SORNA II. Appellant contends that the SVP provisions of SORNA II impose punitive sanctions that cannot be retroactively applied to his 2004 crime without violating the *ex post facto* clauses of the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions. He also argues that his SVP designation was imposed under a constitutionally insufficient standard of proof.

As background,

[c]ourts have also referred to SORNA as the Adam Walsh Act. SORNA [I was] the General Assembly’s fourth enactment of the law commonly referred to as Megan’s Law. Megan’s Law I, the Act of October 24, 1995, P.L. 1079 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), was enacted on October 24,

1995, and became effective 180 days thereafter. Megan's Law II was enacted on May 10, 2000[,] in response to Megan's Law I being ruled unconstitutional by our Supreme Court in *Commonwealth v. Williams*, ... 557 Pa. 285, 733 A.2d 593 ([Pa.] 1999). Our Supreme Court held that some portions of Megan's Law II were unconstitutional in *Commonwealth v. Gomer Williams*, ... 574 Pa. 487, 832 A.2d 962 ([Pa.] 2003), and the General Assembly responded by enacting Megan's Law III on November 24, 2004. The United States Congress expanded the public notification requirements of state sexual offender registries in the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16945, and the Pennsylvania General Assembly responded by passing SORNA [I] on December 20, 2011[,] with the stated purpose of "bring[ing] the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006." 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.10(1). SORNA [I] went into effect a year later on December 20, 2012. Megan's Law III was also struck down by our Supreme Court for violating the single subject rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. [*Commonwealth*] v. *Neiman*, ... 624 Pa. 53, 84 A.3d 603, 616 ([Pa.] 2013). However, by the time it was struck down, Megan's Law III had been replaced by SORNA [I].

M.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 212 A.3d 1142, 1143 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting *Dougherty v. Pennsylvania State Police*, 138 A.3d 152, 155 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (*en banc*)).

SORNA I also failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny. In *Commonwealth v. Muniz*, 640 Pa. 699, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017), *cert. denied*, *Pennsylvania v. Muniz*, — U.S. —, 138 S.Ct. 925, 200 L.Ed.2d 213 (2018), our Supreme Court held that

*429 1) SORNA's registration provisions constitute punishment notwithstanding the General Assembly's identification of the provisions as nonpunitive; 2) retroactive application of SORNA's registration provisions violates the federal *ex post facto* clause; and 3) retroactive application of SORNA's registration provisions also violates

the *ex post facto* clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Id. at 1193. The *Muniz* Court deemed SORNA I's registration provisions to be punitive by applying the seven-factor test established in *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). Applying *Muniz*, in conjunction with *Alleynes v. United States*, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), this Court deemed unconstitutional the SVP assessment provision of SORNA I, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24, because "it increases the criminal penalty to which a defendant is exposed without the chosen fact-finder making the necessary factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt." *Commonwealth v. Butler*, 173 A.3d 1212, 1218 (Pa. Super. 2017), *reargument denied* (Jan. 3, 2018), *appeal granted*, 190 A.3d 581 (Pa. 2018).

In direct response to *Muniz* and *Butler*, our General Assembly passed SORNA II, which became effective on June 12, 2018. *See* 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.51(d)(4) (indicating the "intention of the General Assembly" to "[a]ddress the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in ... *Muniz*..., and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in ... *Butler*..."). This Court has already addressed a constitutional challenge to SORNA II. In *Commonwealth v. Moore*, 222 A.3d 16, 2019 PA Super 320 (2019), a panel of this Court held that the internet registration provisions of SORNA II violate the federal *ex post facto* clause. *Id.* at 26–27, at *9. However, the *Moore* Court also determined that "the Internet provisions of SORNA II are severable from the rest of the statutory scheme." *Id.* Additionally, the constitutionality of SORNA II as a whole is currently before our Supreme Court. *See Commonwealth v. Lacombe*, 35 MAP 2018 (Pa. 2018).

Instantly, Appellant claims "SORNA II still violates ... *Alleynes*. A sexually violent predator determination still punishes a defendant with automatic lifetime registration and counseling." Appellant's Brief at 172. He continues:

Specifically, with the Aggravated Assault conviction for which [Appellant] has been convicted, the registration period was extended from ten years to lifetime; thereby drastically increasing his punishment without the benefit of trial, and without

a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. Appellant then goes on to present a challenge to SORNA II in its entirety. *See id.* at 173-75.

The Commonwealth contends that:

As an initial matter, if [Appellant] now attempts to challenge the imposition of his non-SVP registration requirements under [SORNA II], that claim is waived, as he did not raise it in his 1925(b) statement. *See ... Lord*, 719 A.2d [at] 309 ... (any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal). In that statement, [Appellant] stated only that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on [Appellant’s] constitutional rights in applying the [SVP] provisions of [SORNA II] for a 2004 offense in violation of the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.” [Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement] at ¶ 11. Accordingly, he has only preserved a challenge to the SVP provisions of Subchapter I.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 198.

We agree with the Commonwealth. Appellant only challenged the trial court’s *430 application of the SVP provisions of SORNA II on *ex post facto* grounds in his Rule 1925(b) statement. As such, he has waived any challenge to the general provisions of SORNA II that are unrelated to his designation as an SVP. *Lord, supra*. He has also waived his claim that his SVP status was imposed below the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Thus, the only issue raised in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement that was preserved for appellate review is whether the trial court’s application to Appellant of the SVP provisions of SORNA II violates the *ex post facto* clauses of the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions.

[67] Before we address the merits of Appellant’s constitutional claim, however, the Commonwealth presents a second waiver argument based on Appellant’s ostensible failure to adequately develop the SVP claim in his brief. The failure to provide a relevant analysis that discusses pertinent facts may result in waiver under Pa.R.A.P. 2119. *See Commonwealth v. Rhodes*, 54 A.3d 908, 915 (Pa. Super. 2012); *see also* Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive

type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein, *followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.*”) (emphasis added).

As noted by the Commonwealth:

[Appellant] has presented no pertinent discussion here. His claim rests on the premise that Subchapter I [of SORNA II] constitutes criminal punishment. Although he notes the existence of the seven-factor *Mendoza-Martinez* test for determining whether a statute is punitive, [Appellant]’s Brief ... at 173-[]74, he never *applies* the test to the statute. Instead, he identifies three random provisions of Subchapter I and asserts that “[SORNA II] is still punitive.” *Id.* His failure to provide any meaningful analysis of how the statute is supposedly punitive in light of the *Mendoza-Martinez* factors renders his claim waived.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 199 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).

We agree. The portion of Appellant’s argument that specifically addresses the constitutionality of his registration and reporting requirements as an SVP is poorly developed. Appellant cites—but fails to adequately apply—the *Mendoza-Martinez* test to the provisions of SORNA II triggered by his SVP status. While he identifies several aspects of SORNA II that have remained virtually unchanged since SORNA I, he fails to provide any discussion, whatsoever, concerning the alterations made by the General Assembly in crafting SORNA II in response to *Muniz* and *Butler*. This omission is fatal under Rule 2119, as the discussion of such changes is critical to any pertinent analysis of whether SORNA II’s SVP provisions are punitive and, thus, subject to state and federal prohibitions of *ex post facto* laws.

Most importantly, Appellant fails to discuss the impact of the addition of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a) in SORNA II. Unlike in SORNA I, or in any prior version of Megan’s Law for that matter, Section 9799.59(a) provides a mechanism by which sex offender registrants, including SVPs, can be relieved of

part or all of their registration, reporting, and counseling requirements under SORNA II. Specifically, an SVP may petition the sentencing court for complete relief from their obligations under SORNA II after 25 years, or after “the petitioner’s release from custody following the petitioner’s most recent conviction for an offense, whichever is later.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a)(1). Upon receiving such a petition, the sentencing court must direct the Sexual Offender Assessment Board to assess whether, if the petitioner *431 is granted relief, he or she “is likely to pose a threat to the safety of any other persons.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a)(2). The Sexual Offender Assessment Board must respond to the sentencing court with its report within 90 days. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a)(3). The petitioner is then entitled to a hearing within 120 days of the petition, where the

petitioner and the district attorney shall be given notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard, the right to call witnesses and the right to cross-examine witnesses. The petitioner shall have the right to counsel and to have a lawyer appointed to represent the petitioner if the petitioner cannot afford one.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a)(4). The petitioner may then be exempted

from application of any or all of the requirements of this subchapter, at the discretion of the court, only upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence that exempting the petitioner from a particular requirement or all of the requirements of this subchapter is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of any other person.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a)(5). Both the Commonwealth and the petitioner are entitled to appellate review from that decision. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a)(7). Moreover, if denied relief, the “petitioner may file an additional petition with the sentencing court no sooner than five years from the date of the final

determination of a court regarding the petition and every five years thereafter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.59(a)(8).

In his brief, Appellant provides no accounting for Section 9799.59 in his constitutional challenge to the SVP-triggered provisions of SORNA II. Appellant does not discuss how that provision impacts the *Mendoza-Martinez* test for determining whether SORNA II is punitive. Thus, Appellant does not provide a pertinent discussion of whether this Court’s concerns in *Butler* have been adequately alleviated by the General Assembly’s crafting of SORNA II. Accordingly, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant has waived this claim by failing to provide a meaningful analysis for our review.

[68] [69] [70] In any event, for the same reason, had we reached the merits of his claim, it would fail.

When an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the appellant presents this Court with a question of law. *See Commonwealth v. Atwell*, 785 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). Our consideration of questions of law is plenary. *See id.* ... (citation omitted). A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution. *See Commonwealth v. Etheredge*, 794 A.2d 391, 396 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). Thus, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden of persuasion. *See id.* ... (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 441 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Here, Appellant’s failure to address the changes between SORNA I and SORNA II, and in particular, whether the SVP provisions of SORNA II remain punitive despite the addition of Section 9799.59, demonstrates that he cannot overcome the heavy burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the SVP-triggered provisions of SORNA II clearly,

palpably, and plainly violate the state and federal *ex post facto* clauses. Accordingly, had we reached the merits of his claim, Appellant would still not be entitled to relief.

All Citations

224 A.3d 372, 2019 PA Super 354

Judgment of sentence *affirmed*.

Footnotes

- 1 The Commonwealth later filed a criminal information setting forth the same charges on July 13, 2016.
- 2 Appellant has not raised the other issues preserved in *Habeas Motion I* in the instant appeal.
- 3 Due to the massive size of the certified record in this case, we will primarily cite to the reproduced record for ease of disposition. We note that the Commonwealth has not issued any objections to the contents of the reproduced record.
- 4 Appellant filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of *Habeas Motion I*. After initially granting a temporary stay, this Court granted the Commonwealth's motion to quash that appeal on April 25, 2016. Our Supreme Court denied further review on June 20, 2016. Indeed, Appellant filed numerous, unsuccessful interlocutory appeals from the decisions of the trial court. The remainder have been omitted as none impact our decision today.
- 5 We will discuss only the pretrial motions that have at least some relevance to the issues raised in the current appeal.
- 6 The trial court in *Bidwell* did not prohibit PBA evidence concerning Bidwell's prior violent conduct toward the deceased victim. *Id.* at 618.
- 7 We will not separately address Appellant's contention that Jane Doe 1 was effectively a sixth PBA witness, as Appellant only challenged the admission of the testimony of the five PBA witnesses in his Rule 1925(b) statement. *See* Appellant's 1925(b) Statement, 12/11/18, at ¶ 6; *Commonwealth v. Lord*, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998) (holding that any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement are waived).
- 8 In his concurring opinion in *Commonwealth v. Hicks*, 638 Pa. 444, 156 A.3d 1114 (2017), Chief Justice Saylor endorsed the 'Doctrine of Chances' theory, which holds, generally, that PBA evidence may be admissible where a logical inference can be drawn "that does not depend on an impermissible inference of bad character, and which is most greatly suited to disproof of accident or mistake." *Id.* at 1132 (Saylor, J., concurring).
- 9 *See* Appellant's Brief at 79-82; TCO at 99-100.
- 10 Appellant attempts to claim that his *sentencing counsel* had no knowledge of the Radar Online article until after June 14, 2018, when *sentencing counsel* entered his appearance. Appellant's Brief at 114. This excuse borders on frivolity. It is undisputed that Appellant was represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings below. Yet, he has thus far failed to argue why he or his prior attorneys were unable to ascertain the contents of the Radar Online article at an earlier time. In any event, even if we were to countenance the notion that only sentencing counsel's oversight of Appellant's defense was relevant to our analysis, Appellant has still not justified the delay of 89 days from when sentencing counsel entered his appearance until the recusal motion was filed. Furthermore, nowhere in Appellant's numerous filings has he ever stated a specific date, or even a general range of dates, establishing when he or his attorneys actually learned of the contents of the Radar Online article. This alone demonstrates that Appellant has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating why he did not raise the matter at the earliest possible time.
- 11 We note that Appellant provided this Court with an affidavit from Mr. Castor in the reproduced record (hereinafter "Castor's Affidavit"). *See* RR at 6215a-6223a. Castor's Affidavit is dated October 20, 2018. *Id.* at 6223a. Therein, Mr. Castor ostensibly provides additional details concerning his prior relationship with Judge O'Neill not contained in the Radar Online article, such as his recollections concerning the 1999 campaign, as well as various opinions held by Mr. Castor regarding Judge O'Neill's purported bias against him over the ensuing years. However, it is undisputed that Castor's Affidavit was never presented in the trial court, and it does not appear in the certified record in this case.
 [A]s an appellate court, our review is limited by the contents of the certified record. Pa.R.A.P. 1921; *Commonwealth v. Young*, ... 456 Pa. 102, 317 A.2d 258, 264 ([Pa.] 1974) ("only the facts that appear in [the] record may be considered by a court"). *See also Ritter v. Ritter*, ... 359 Pa. Super. 12, 518 A.2d 319, 323 ([Pa. Super.] 1986) ("the appellate court can only look at the certified record on appeal when reviewing a case"). All documents in a criminal matter must be filed with the clerk of courts in order to become part of the certified record. 42 Pa. C. S. § 2756(a)(1). Additionally, [the] appellant has the duty to ensure that all documents essential to his case are included in the certified record. *Fiore v. Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr.*, ... 401 Pa. Super. 446, 585 A.2d 1012, 1019 ([Pa. Super.] 1991) ("It is the obligation of the appellant to make sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents necessary

to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal[.]"). If a document is not in the certified record then this Court cannot take it into account.

Commonwealth v. Walker, 878 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Thus, we cannot consider the contents of Castor's Affidavit. Nonetheless, even if we could consider it, we would still deem Appellant's recusal claim waived due to his failure to raise it at the earliest opportunity, as the basic, underlying facts were contained in the Radar Online article published on March 28, 2018.

12 As noted by the trial court, Mr. Castor also "testified that he intended to confer transactional immunity upon [Appellant] and that his power to do so as the sovereign was derived from common law not from the statutes of Pennsylvania." TCO at 57 (citing N.T., 2/2/16, at 232-36 (RR 643a-647a)).

13 Elements of Appellant's civil deposition were used as evidence against him at trial as discussed, *infra*.

14 Nor does it appear that such an order would have been granted by a trial court had it been sought. Even if Mr. Castor's speculation was reasonable that a civil suit against Appellant was inevitable, and that it was equally inevitable that Appellant would have likely attempted to refuse to testify based on his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination, there is no reason to believe that his testimony was "necessary to the public interest." 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(b)(1). It was, at best, potentially helpful to Victim's private interest in a civil suit. However, regardless of whether Mr. Castor could have procured such an order, he did not even attempt to obtain one.

15 The trial court did not find Mr. Castor's testimony regarding the promise not to prosecute to be credible.

16 As noted above, Mr. Phillips was clearly mistaken in that regard, as immunity from prosecution can only be obtained by a court order pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947.

17 Troiani, one of Victim's attorneys in her civil case against Appellant, testified that she never received any information from Appellant's civil attorneys indicating that he could never be prosecuted. N.T., 2/3/16, at 177. She also indicated several reasons why it would not have been to Appellant's advantage to assert his Fifth Amendment rights during a civil trial in any event. *Id.* at 176.

18 The Commonwealth's expert forensic toxicologist, Dr. Timothy Rohrig, testified that both Benadryl and Quaaludes fall in the same class of central nervous system depressants. See N.T., 4/18/18, at 60, 85. Dr. Rohrig also indicated his knowledge of several cases where Benadryl (or its active ingredient, diphenhydramine) had been used to facilitate sexual assaults. *Id.* at 74-76. He testified that numerous other central nervous system depressants are manufactured as small, blue pills. *Id.* at 81-82. In any event, the Commonwealth notes that it never conceded that Appellant had given Victim Benadryl rather than another central nervous system depressant. Commonwealth's Brief at 154 n.34.

APPENDIX B

**IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION**

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : No. 3932-16
: :
: : 3314 EDA 2018
v. : :
: :
WILLIAM H. COSBY, JR. :

2018 MAY 14 PM 3:07
CLERK OF COURTS
OFFICE
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
PENNA.

OPINION

O'NEILL, J.

May 14, 2019

I. Introduction

The Defendant, William H. Cosby, Jr. appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on September 25, 2018, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence motion on October 23, 2018. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.

II. Facts

In January 2004¹, the Defendant sexually assaulted then thirty year old Andrea Constand at his home in Elkins Park, Cheltenham, Montgomery County. Notes of Testimony (N.T), Trial by Jury, April 13, 2018 at 56. On the evening of the assault, Ms. Constand was invited to the then sixty-six year old Defendant's home to discuss her upcoming career change. Id. at 56. She had

¹ In each of her statements to police, and in prior testimony, Ms. Constand indicated that the assault took place in 2004. N. T. Apr. 16, 2018 at 111-113; N.T. Apr. 17, 2018, Trial by Jury, at 217. She indicated to police that the assault happened prior to her cousin visiting from Canada; border crossing records indicate that he entered the United States on January 22, 2004. N.T., Apr. 18, 2018, Excerpted Testimony of James Reape From Trial by Jury at 19. There was no evidence to indicate that the assault happened prior to December 30, 2003. Id. at 26.

decided to leave her position as the Director of Basketball Operations for the Temple women's basketball team, and to return to her native Canada to pursue a career in massage therapy. Id. When she arrived at the home, she entered through the kitchen door, as she had on prior visits. Id. at 57. She and the Defendant sat at the kitchen table and began talking. Id. at 58. There was a glass of water and a glass of wine on the table when she arrived. Id. Initially, she drank only the water because she had not eaten a lot and did not want to drink on an empty stomach. Id. Eventually, the Defendant convinced her to taste the wine. Id. at 59. They discussed the stress she was feeling at the prospect of telling Coach Staley that she was leaving Temple. Id. Ms. Constand left the table to use the restroom. Id. When she returned, the Defendant was standing by the table, having gone upstairs himself while she was in the bathroom. Id. at 59. He reached out his hand and offered her three blue pills. Id. He told her, "These are your friends. They'll help take the edge off." Id. at 60. She asked him if she should put the pills under her tongue. Id. He told her to put them down with water, and she did. Id.

After she took the pills, Ms. Constand and the Defendant sat back down at the kitchen table and continued their conversation. Id. at 61. She began to have double vision and told the Defendant that she could see two of him. Id. Her mouth became cottony and she began to slur her words. Id. The Defendant told her that he thought she needed to relax. Id. Ms. Constand did not know what was happening to her, but felt that something was wrong. Id. They stood up from the table and the Defendant took her arm to help steady

her. Id. at 62. Her legs felt rubbery as he walked her through the dining room to a sofa in another room. Id. He placed her on the sofa on her left side and told her to relax there. Id. She began to panic and did not know what was happening to her body. Id. She felt weak and was unable to speak. Id. She was unable to maintain consciousness. Id. She was jolted awake by the Defendant forcefully penetrating her vagina with his fingers. Id. at 63. The Defendant had positioned himself behind her on the couch, penetrated her vagina with his fingers, and fondled her breasts. Id. He took her hand and placed it on his penis and masturbated himself with her hand. Id. Ms. Constand was unable to tell him to stop or to physically stop the assault. Id.

She awoke sometime between four and five a.m. to find her pants unzipped and her bra up around her neck. Id. at 65. She fixed her clothing and began to head towards the front door. Id. As she walked towards the door, she saw the Defendant standing in the doorway between the kitchen and the dining room. Id. at 66. He was wearing a robe and slippers and told her there was a muffin and tea for her on the table. Id. She sipped the tea and took a piece of the muffin with her and drove herself home. Id.

At the time of assault, Ms. Constand had known the Defendant since the fall of 2002 when she met him in her capacity as the Director of Basketball Operations. Id. at 23. She was introduced to the Defendant by Joan Ballast at a basketball game at the Liacouras Center. Id. Ms. Constand accompanied Ms. Ballast and several others giving the Defendant a tour of the newly renovated facilities. Id. at 24. Several days after the initial introduction, the

Defendant called Temple with some questions about the renovations and spoke to Ms. Constand on the phone. Id. at 25. Several weeks later, she again spoke to him on the phone at her office. Id. They discussed having met at the game at Temple. Id. They began having more regular conversations, mostly pertaining to Temple sports. Id. The conversations also included personal information about Ms. Constand's history as a professional basketball player, her educational background and her career goals. Id. at 26-27.

After several phone conversations, the Defendant invited Ms. Constand to his home for dinner. Id. at 28. When she arrived at the home, the Defendant greeted her and took her to the room where she ate her dinner. Id. at 29. The chef served her meal and a glass of wine and she ate alone. Id. As she was finishing her meal, the Defendant came in to the room and sat next to her on the couch. Id. at 30. At this point, he placed his hand on her thigh. Id. She was aware that this was the first time the Defendant touched her, but thought nothing of it and left shortly after as she had been preparing to do. Id. at 31-32.

Subsequently, the Defendant invited her to attend a blues concert in New York City with other young women who shared similar interests, particularly related to health and homeopathic remedies. Id. at 39. She did not see the Defendant in person on that trip. Id. at 41.

Sometime later, she was again invited to dine at the Defendant's home alone. Id. at 42. The chef called her about the meal and again she ate in the same room as she had on the first occasion. Id. For a second time, when she

was finished her meal, the Defendant sat beside her on the couch. Id. at 44. The conversation again revolved around things Ms. Constand could do to potentially break into sports broadcasting. Id. On this occasion, the Defendant reached over and attempted to unbutton and to unzip her pants. Id. She leaned forward to prevent him from undoing her pants. Id. He stopped. Id. She believed that she had made it clear she was not interested in any of that. Id. She did not feel threatened by him and did not expect him to make a romantic or sexual advance towards her again. Id. at 45.

Ms. Constand continued to have contact with the Defendant, primarily by phone and related to Temple sports. Id. at 45-46. The Defendant also had contact with Ms. Constand's family. N.T. Apr. 16, 2018 at 175. Ms. Constand's mother, Gianna Constand, and her sister, Diana, attended one of the Defendant's performances in Ontario, and afterward, met him backstage. Id. at 176.

In late 2003, the Defendant invited Ms. Constand to meet him at the Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 46, 49. He put her in touch with Tom Cantone, who worked at the casino. Id. at 46. When she arrived at the casino, she had dinner with the Defendant and Mr. Cantone. Id. at 47. After dinner, Mr. Cantone escorted Ms. Constand to her room. Id. She thanked him and told him that she would have to leave early in the morning and would not have time to tour the Indian reservation that was on the property. Id. at 48. The Defendant called her and asked her to come back upstairs to his room for some baked goods. Id. When she arrived at the room,

he invited her in and continued to unpack his luggage cart. Id. She believed that the baked goods were on the cart. Id. During this time, they discussed their usual topics of conversation, Temple and sports broadcasting. Id. Ms. Constand was seated on the edge of the bed. Id. The Defendant laid down on the bed. Id. He fell asleep. Id. at 49. Ms. Constand remained in the room for several minutes, and then she went back to her own room. Id.

Ms. Constand testified that during this time, she came to view the Defendant as a mentor and a friend.² Id. at 52. He was well respected at Temple as a trustee and alumni, and Ms. Constand was grateful for the help that he tried to give her in her career. Id. at 53. She continued her friendship with him, despite what she felt were two sexual advances; she was a young, fit woman who did not feel physically threatened by the Defendant. Id. at 53, 55.

Following the assault, between January, 2004 and March, 2004, Ms. Constand and the Defendant continued to have telephone contact, solely regarding Temple sports. Id. at 69. In March 2004 the Defendant invited Ms. Constand to a dinner at a restaurant in Philadelphia. Id. at 67. Ms. Constand attended the dinner, hoping to speak to the Defendant about the assault. Id. After the dinner, the Defendant invited her to his home to talk. Id. Once at the home, she attempted to confront him to find out what he gave her and why he assaulted her. Id. at 68. She testified that he was evasive and told her that he

² In his statement to police, the Defendant agreed and indicated that Ms. Constand saw him as a mentor and that he encouraged that relationship as a mentor. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 142.

thought she had an orgasm. Id. Unable to get an answer, she lost her courage and left the home. Id.

At the end of March 2004, Ms. Constand moved back to Canada. Id. Ms. Constand's mother, Gianna Constand, testified that when her daughter returned home, she seemed to be depressed and was not herself. N.T. Apr. 16, 2018 at 178. She would hear her daughter screaming in her sleep, but Ms. Constand denied that anything was wrong. Id.

After returning to Canada, Ms. Constand had some phone contact with the Defendant related to his performance in the Toronto area. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 73. The Defendant invited Ms. Constand and her family to attend that show. Id. Her parents were excited to attend the show, and her mother had previously spoken with the Defendant on the phone and attended two of his shows prior to the assault. Id. at 74. Her mother brought the Defendant a gift to the show. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 75; N.T. Apr. 16, 2018 at 180.

In January 2005, Ms. Constand disclosed the assault to her mother. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 76; N.T. Apr. 16, 2018 at 182. She woke up crying and called her mother. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 76. Mrs. Constand was on her way to work and called Andrea back once she arrived at work. Id. at 78. They decided to contact the Durham Regional Police in Ontario, Canada when Mrs. Constand returned home from work. Id. Unsure of how the American criminal justice system worked, and afraid that the Defendant could retaliate against her or her family, Ms. Constand attempted to reach two attorneys in the Philadelphia area during the day. Id. at 81.

Ultimately, that evening, Ms. Constand and her mother contacted the Durham Regional Police and filed a police report. Id. at 82. Following the report, Mrs. Constand asked for the Defendant's phone number and called him. Id. at 83. The Defendant returned Mrs. Constand's call the next day. Id. During this call, both Ms. Constand and her mother spoke to the Defendant on separate phone extensions. Id. at 84. Ms. Constand confronted him about what happened and the three blue pills that he gave her. Id. The Defendant apologized, but would not tell her what he had given her. Id. at 85. He indicated that he would have to check the prescription bottle and that he would write the name down and send it to them. Id. Ms. Constand hung up the phone and her mother continued to speak to the Defendant. Id. He told Mrs. Constand that there was no penile penetration. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 124. Ms. Constand did not tell the Defendant that she had filed a police report. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 85-86.

After this initial phone conversation with the Defendant, Mrs. Constand purchased a tape recorder and called him again. N.T. Apr. 16, 2018 at 195. In the call, the Defendant indicated that he wanted to talk about a "mutual feeling or friendship," and "to see if Andrea is still interested in sportscasting or something in T.V." Id. at 203; Exhibit C-39, Exhibit C-40. The Defendant also discussed paying for Ms. Constand to continue her education. N.T. Apr. 16, 2018 at 204. He continued to refuse to give Mrs. Constand the name of the medication he had given Ms. Constand. Id. at 206. Additionally, he invited her and Ms. Constand to meet him in another city to meet with him to discuss

these offers in person and told her that someone would call them to arrange the trip. Id.

Subsequently, Ms. Constand received a phone message from Peter Weiderlight, one of the Defendant's representatives. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 86; Exhibit C-20, Exhibit C-21. Mr. Weiderlight indicated in his message that he was calling on behalf of the Defendant to offer Ms. Constand a trip to see the Defendant's upcoming performance in Florida. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 86. When Ms. Constand returned Mr. Weiderlight's call, she recorded the conversation. Id. at 90; Exhibit C-22, Exhibit C-23. During this conversation, Mr. Weiderlight discussed the Defendant's offer for Ms. Constand and her mother to attend a performance to come in Miami and sought to obtain her information so that he could book flights and make reservations. Exhibit C-23. Ms. Constand did not give him that information or call him back to provide the same. N.T., Apr. 13, 2018 at 93. Ms. Constand also received a message from the Defendant's attorney, Marty Singer, Esq., wherein he indicated that the Defendant wished to set up an educational trust for Ms. Constand. Exhibit C-24 (disc), Exhibit C-25. Ms. Constand did not return Mr. Singer's call. N.T., Apr. 13, 2018 at 93. Both of these calls were received within days of Ms. Constand's report to police. Id. at 88.

The Durham Regional Police referred the report to the Philadelphia Police, who ultimately referred it to the Cheltenham Police Department in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Id. at 97. Sergeant Richard Schaeffer, of the Cheltenham Township Police Department, was assigned to the case in

2005. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 67-68. Cheltenham police investigated jointly with the Montgomery County Detective Bureau. Id. at 81. On January 19, 2005, Sgt. Schaeffer spoke to Ms. Constand by phone to obtain a brief description of her allegations. Id. at 71. He testified that Ms. Constand was nervous and anxious during this call. Id. at 73. She then drove from Canada to meet with law enforcement in person in Montgomery County. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 98-99. She testified that in each of her meetings with law enforcement she was very nervous. Id. at 99. She had never had any previous contact with law enforcement, and discussing the nature of the assault made her uncomfortable. Id. She testified that she cooperated with the police and signed releases for her mental health, banking and phone records. Id. at 100-101.

On January 24, 2005, then Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce L. Castor, Jr., issued a signed press release indicating that an investigation had commenced following the victim's January 13, 2005, report to authorities in Canada. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 65; Habeas Exhibit C-17. As part of the investigation, law enforcement, including Sgt. Schaeffer, took a written, question and answer statement from the Defendant in New York City on January 26, 2005. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 113-155; Exhibit C-60. The Defendant was accompanied by counsel, both his criminal defense attorney Walter M. Phillips³, Esq., and his longtime general counsel John P. Schmitt, Esq., when he provided his statement to police. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 19, 52-53.

³ Mr. Phillips passed away in early 2015.

In his statement to police, the Defendant stated that he met Ms. Constand in 2002 at the Liacouras Center. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 121. He stated they had a social and romantic relationship that began on her second visit to his home. Id. He stated that she was alone with him in the home on three occasions. Id. As to the night of the assault, he stated that Ms. Constand had come to his home and they were talking in the kitchen about her inability to sleep. Id. He told police that he gave her Benadryl that he uses to help him sleep when he travels. Id. at 126. He stated that he would take two Benadryl and would become sleepy right away. Id. at 150. He gave Ms. Constand one and half pills. Id. He did not tell Ms. Constand what the pills were. Id. at 126. He stated that he was comfortable giving her pills to relax her. Id. He stated that she did not appear to be under the influence when she arrived at his home that night. Id. at 135.

He stated that after he gave her the pills, they began to touch and kiss on the couch with clothes on. Id. at 127. He stated that she never told him to stop and that he touched her bare breasts and genitalia. Id. at 128. He stated that he did not remove his clothing and Ms. Constand did not touch him under his clothes. Id. at 129. He told police, "I never intended to have sexual intercourse, like naked bodies with Andrea. We were fully clothed. We are petting. I enjoyed it. And then I stopped and went up to bed. We stopped and then we talked." Id.

He stated that there were at least three other occasions where they engaged in similar petting in his home. Id. When asked if they had ever had

intercourse, he stated, “[n]ever asleep or awake.” Id. at 130. He stated that on each occasion, he initiated the petting. Id. at 132. He stated that on her second visit to his home, they were kissing in the hallway and he lifted her bra to kiss her breasts and she told him to stop. Id. at 133.

He stated that, just prior to the date of his statement, he spoke to Mrs. Constand on the phone and she asked him what he had given her daughter. Id. at 122-123. He told her that he gave Ms. Constand some pills and that he would send her the name of them. Id. at 123. He further stated that told Mrs. Constand there was no penile penetration, just petting and touching of private parts. Id. at 124. He also stated that he did not recall using the word ‘consensual’ when describing the encounter to Mrs. Constand. Id. at 125. He also answered “no,” when asked if he ever knew Ms. Constand to be untruthful. Id. at 152. Following that interview, the Defendant, unprompted, provided law enforcement with pills that were later identified as Benadryl. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 159; Exhibit C-93.

On February 17, 2005, law enforcement had a strategy meeting where they created a plan for the next steps in the investigation. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 82. Later that same day, then District Attorney, Bruce L. Castor, Jr., issued a second, signed press release, this time stating that he had decided not to prosecute the Defendant. N.T., Feb. 2, 2016 at 71-72, 89; Habeas Exhibit D-4; N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 84. The press release cautioned that the decision could be reconsidered. N.T. Feb. 2, 2016 at 215; Habeas Exhibit D-4. Mr. Castor never personally met with Ms. Constand. Id. at 115.

Ms. Constand's attorneys, Dolores Troiani, Esq., and Bebe Kivitz, Esq., first learned of Mr. Castor's decision not to prosecute when a reporter arrived at Ms. Troiani's office on the evening of February 17, 2005 seeking comment about what Bruce Castor had done. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 141. The reporter informed her that Mr. Castor had issued a press release in which he declined prosecution. Id. at 141-142. Ms. Troiani had not received any prior notification of the decision not to prosecute. Id. at 142.

At a pretrial hearing held on February 2 and 3, 2016, Mr. Castor testified that it was his intention in 2005 to strip the Defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to force him to sit for a deposition in a yet to be filed civil case, and that Mr. Phillips, the Defendant's criminal attorney, agreed with his legal assessment. N.T. Feb. 2, 2016 at 63-68. Mr. Castor also testified that he relayed this intention to then First Assistant District Attorney Risa V. Ferman.⁴ Id. at 67.

Disappointed with the declination of the charges, Ms. Constand sought justice civilly. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 104. On March 8, 2005, she filed a civil suit against the Defendant in federal court. Id. As part of the lawsuit, both parties were deposed. Id. at 105-106. On four dates, September 28 and 29, 2005 and March 28 and 29, 2006, the Defendant sat for depositions in the civil matter. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 36. He was accompanied by counsel, including Mr. Schmitt. Id. at 13, 36. Mr. Schmitt testified that Mr. Phillips had informed him of Mr. Castor's promise not to prosecute. Id. at 11. The

⁴ Ms. Ferman is now a Judge on the Court of Common Pleas.

Defendant did not invoke the Fifth Amendment during the depositions; however, counsel did advise him not to answer questions pertaining to Ms. Constand and her attorneys filed motions to compel his testimony. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 41-42, 181-184, 248-249. The Defendant did not invoke the Fifth Amendment when asked about other alleged victims. Id. at 58-59. At no time during the civil litigation did any of the attorneys for the Defendant indicate on the record that the Defendant could not be prosecuted. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 177, 184, 247-248. There was no attempt by defense attorneys to confirm the purported promise before the depositions, even though Mr. Castor was still the District Attorney; it was never referenced in the stipulations at the outset of the civil depositions. Id. at 71, 178-179, 247-248.

In his depositions, the Defendant testified that he met Ms. Constand at the Liacouras Center and developed a romantic interest in her right away. N.T., Apr. 17, 2018, Excerpt, at 20-21, 22, 24-25. He did not tell her of his interest. Id. at 21. He testified that he was open to “sort of whatever happens” and that he did not want his wife to know about any relationship with Ms. Constand. Id. at 22. When asked what he meant by a romantic interest, he testified “[r]omance in terms of steps that will lead to some kind of permission or no permission or how you go about getting to wherever you’re going to wind up.” Id. at 24-25. After their first meeting, they spoke on the phone on more than one occasion. Id. at 24. He testified that every time Ms. Constand came to his Elkins Park home it was at his invitation; she did not initiate any of the visits. Id. at 26.

He testified that there were three instances of consensual sexual contact with Ms. Constand, including the night he gave her the pills. Id. at 26-33. On one of the encounters, he testified that he tried to suck her breasts and she told him “no, stop,” but she permitted him to put his hand inside of her vagina. Id. at 31-33. He also testified about the pills he gave law enforcement at the January 26, 2005 interview. Id. at 33-36. Additionally, he testified that he believed the incident during which he gave Ms. Constand the pills was in the year 2004, “[b]ecause it’s not more than a year away. That’s a time period that I knew—it’s a ballpark of when I knew Andrea.” Id. at 43.

He testified that he and Ms. Constand had discussed herbal medicines and that he gave Ms. Constand pills on one occasion, that he identified to police as Benadryl,. Id. at 36, 45-46. He testified about his knowledge of the types of Benadryl and their effects. Id. at 46, 55. He indicated that he would take two pills to help him go to sleep. Id. at 55.

The Defendant testified that on the night of the assault, Ms. Constand accepted his invitation to come to his home. Id. at 48. They sat at a table in the kitchen and talked about Ms. Constand’s position at Temple as well as her trouble concentrating, tension and relaxation. Id. at 48, 50. By his own admission, he gave Ms. Constand one and one half Benadryl and told her to take it, indicating, “I have three friends to make you relax.” Id. at 48-49. He did not tell her the pills were Benadryl. Id. at 54. He testified that he gave her the three half pills because he takes two and she was about his height. Id. at

55. He testified that she looked at the pills, but did not ask him what they were. Id. at 57.

The Defendant testified that, after he gave her the pills, they continued to talk for 15-20 minutes before he suggested they move into the living room. Id. at 50. He testified that Ms. Constand went to the bathroom and returned to the living room where he asked her to sit down on the sofa. Id.

He testified that they began to “neck and we began to touch and feel and kiss, and kiss back,” and that he opened his shirt. Id. He then described the encounter,

[t]hen I lifted her bra up and our skin—so our skin could touch. We rubbed. We kissed. We stopped. I moved back to the sofa, coming back in a position. She’s on top of me. I place my knee between her legs. She’s up. We kiss. I hold her. She hugs. I move her to the position of down. She goes with me down. I’m behind her. I have [my left arm behind] her neck . . . Her neck is there and her head. There’s a pillow, which is a pillow that goes with the decoration of the sofa. It’s not a bedroom pillow. I am behind her. We are in what would be called in a spooning position. My face is right on the back of her head, around her ear. I go inside her pants. She touches me. It’s awkward. It’s uncomfortable for her. She pulls her hand—I don’t know if she got tired or what. She then took her hand and put it on top of my hand to push it in further. I move my fingers. I do not talk, she does not talk but she makes a sound, which I feel was an orgasm, and she was wet. She was wet when I went in.

Id. at 51.

He testified that after the encounter he told her to try to go to sleep and then he went upstairs. Id. at 52. He set an alarm and returned downstairs about two hours later when it was still dark out. Id. at 52, 55. Ms. Constand was awake and they went to the kitchen where he gave her some tea and a

blueberry muffin that she took a bite of and wrapped up before she left. Id. at 52-53.

During his depositions, the Defendant also discussed his phone calls with Gianna Constand. Id. at 59. He testified that he told Ms. Constand and her mother that he would write the name of the pills he gave Ms. Constand on a piece of paper and send it to her. Id. at 61. He testified that he did not tell them it was Benadryl because,

I'm on the phone. I'm listening to two people. And at first I'm thinking the mother is coming at me for being a dirty old man, which is also bad—which is bad also, but then, what did you give my daughter? And [if] I put these things in the mail and these people are in Canada, what are they going to do if they receive it? What are they going to say if I tell them about it? And also, to be perfectly frank, I'm thinking and praying no one is recording me.

Id. at 62.

He testified that after his first, unrecorded phone call with Mrs. Constand, he had “Peter” from William Morris contact Ms. Constand to see if she would be willing to meet him in Miami. Id. at 60-61. He also testified that he apologized to Mrs. Constand “because I’m thinking this is a dirty old man with a young girl. I apologized. I said to the mother it was digital penetration.” Id. at 66. He later offered to pay for Ms. Constand to attend graduate school. Id. at 79. The Defendant contacted his attorney Marty Singer and asked him to contact Ms. Constand regarding an educational trust. Id. at 85.

He also testified that he did not believe that Ms. Constand was after money. Id. at 73. When asked if he believed it was in his best interest that the public believe Ms. Constand consented, he replied “yes.” Id. at 77. He believed

there would be financial consequences if the public believed that he drugged Ms. Constand and gave her something other than Benadryl. Id. at 77.

In his deposition testimony, the Defendant also testified about his use of Quaaludes with women with whom he wanted to have sex. N.T., Apr. 18, 2018, commencing at 10:31 a.m. at 35-50.

On November 8, 2006, the civil case settled and Ms. Constand entered into a confidential settlement agreement with the Defendant, Marty Singer and American Media.⁵ Apr. 13 at 106; Exhibit C-27. The Defendant agreed to pay Ms. Constand \$3.38 million and American Media agreed to pay her \$20,000. Id. at 108-109. As part of the settlement agreement, Ms. Constand agreed that she would not initiate a criminal complaint arising from the instant assault. Id. at 110.

The 2005-2006 civil depositions remained under temporary seal until 2015 when the federal judge who presided over the civil case unsealed the records in response to a media request. As a result, in July 2015, the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, led by then District Attorney Ferman, reopened the investigation. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018, Excerpt, at 8.

On September 22, 2015, at 10:30 am, Brian McMonagle, Esq. and Patrick O'Connor, Esq., met with then District Attorney Ferman and then First Assistant District Attorney Kevin Steele at the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office for a discussion regarding the Defendant, who was

⁵ American Media was a party to the lawsuit as a result of the Defendant giving an interview about Ms. Constand's allegations to the National Enquirer. Id. at 109-110.

represented by Mr. McMonagle and Mr. O'Connor. Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #1. On September 23, 2015, at 1:30 pm, Bruce L. Castor, Jr., Esq., now a County Commissioner, sent an unsolicited email to then District Attorney Ferman.⁶

In this September 23, 2015 email, Mr. Castor indicated “[a]gain with the agreement of the defense lawyer and Andrea’s lawyer’s I intentionally and specifically bound the Commonwealth that there would be no state prosecution of Cosby in order to remove from him the ability to claim his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, thus forcing him to sit for a deposition under oath.” Habeas Exhibit D-5. The correspondence further stated,

I signed the press release for precisely this reason, at the request of the Plaintiff’s counsel, and with the acquiescence of Cosby’s counsel, with full and complete intent to bind the Commonwealth that anything Cosby said in the civil case would not be used against him, thereby forcing him to be deposed and perhaps testify in a civil trial without him having the ability to ‘take the 5th. . . [B]ut one thing is fact: the Commonwealth, defense and civil plaintiff’s lawyers were all in agreement that the attached decision [February 17, 2005 press release] from me stripped Cosby of his Fifth Amendment privilege, forcing him to be deposed.”

N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 195; Habeas Exhibit D-5.

However, in his testimony at the hearing on Defendant’s Petition for Habeas Corpus, Mr. Castor indicated that there was no agreement and no quid pro quo. N.T. Feb. 2, 2016 at 99, 227. On September 23, 2015, at 1:47 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded this email identified above as Defendant’s Habeas Exhibit 5

⁶This email was marked and admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit 5 at the February 2016 *Habeas Corpus* hearing held in this matter. (Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #2).

to Mr. McMonagle. Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #3.

On September 25, 2015, then District Attorney Ferman sent a letter to Mr. Castor by way of hand delivery.⁷ In her letter Ms. Ferman stated, “[t]he first I heard of such a binding agreement was your email sent this past Wednesday.” Habeas Exhibit D-6. On September 25, 2015, at 3:41 pm, Mr. Castor sent an email to District Attorney Ferman.⁸ In this email, he wrote Ms. Ferman, “[n]aturally, if a prosecution could be made out without using what Cosby said, or anything derived from what Cosby said, I believed then and continue to believe that a prosecution is not precluded.” Habeas Exhibit D-7.

On September 25, 2015, at 3:59 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded the letter from Ms. Ferman, identified above as Defendant's Habeas Exhibit 6, to Mr. McMonagle. Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #5. On September 25, 2015, at 4:19 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded the email identified above as Defendant's Habeas Exhibit 7 to Mr. McMonagle along with the message “Latest.” Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #7. In his final email to Ms. Ferman on the

⁷This letter was marked and admitted as the Defendant's Exhibit 6 at the February 2016 Habeas Corpus hearing held in this matter. At 3:02 pm that same day, Mr. Castor's secretary forwarded a scanned copy of the letter to him by way of email. Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #4.

⁸This email was marked and admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 7 at the February 2016 Habeas Corpus hearing in this matter. Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #6.

subject, Mr. Castor stated, "I never said we would not prosecute Cosby."
Habeas Exhibit D-8.

In 2015, prosecutors and Detectives from Montgomery County visited Ms. Constand in Canada and asked her if she would cooperate in the instant case. N.T., April 13 at 111. As a part of the reopened investigation in 2015, the Commonwealth interviewed numerous women who claimed that the Defendant had sexually assaulted them. N.T., Apr. 17, 2018, Excerpted Testimony of James Reape from Trial by Jury, at 13. The Commonwealth proffered nineteen women for this Court's consideration, ultimately, five such women were permitted to testify at trial.

Heidi Thomas testified that in 1984, she was a twenty-two year old aspiring actress working as a model, represented by JF images. N.T. Apr. 10, 2018, Testimony of Heidi Thomas, at 7. JF Images was owned by Jo Farrell.⁹ Id. In April of 1984, her agent told her that a prominent figure in the entertainment world was interested in mentoring young talent. Id. at 18. She learned that the Defendant was going to call her to arrange for one-on-one acting sessions. Id. at 19, 21. The Defendant called Ms. Thomas at her home and spoke to both of her parents. Id. at 21. Ms. Thomas' agency paid for her to travel to Reno, Nevada to meet with the Defendant and booked her a room at Harrah's. Id. at 22, 25. Her family took a photo of her with her father and boyfriend when she was leaving for the airport; she testified that she dressed

⁹ In his deposition testimony, the Defendant testified that Jo Farrell would send her clients to see him perform in Denver, Co. N.T., Apr. 18, 2018, Excerpt at 86-87.

professionally because she wanted the Defendant to know she took this opportunity very seriously. Id. at 27; Exhibit C-3W. Ms. Thomas purchased a postcard of Harrah's when she arrived in Reno to commemorate her trip and kept several other mementos. Id. at 26. When she arrived in Reno, Ms. Thomas was met by a driver. Id. at 28. She eventually realized that they were driving out of Reno. Id. They pulled up to a house, the driver told her that this is where the coaching would take place and that she should go in. Id.

She rang the doorbell and the Defendant answered the door. Id. at 29. The driver showed her to her room. Id. The Defendant instructed her to change into something more comfortable and to come back out with her prepared monologue. Id. She returned to a kitchen area and performed her monologue for the Defendant. Id. at 31. Unimpressed with her monologue, the Defendant suggested that she try a cold read. Id. at 32. In the script he gave her, her character was supposed to be intoxicated. Id. She performed the scene. Id. Again, unimpressed, the Defendant questioned whether she had ever been drunk. Id. at 33. She told him that she did not really drink, but that she had seen her share of drunk people in college. Id. He asked her what she would drink if she were to have a drink and she indicated perhaps a glass of white wine. Id. He got up and returned with a glass of white wine. Id. He told her it was a prop and to sip on it to see if she could get more into character. Id. She took a sip and then remembers only "snap shots" of what happened next. Id. at 34. She remembers the Defendant asking her if she was relaxing into the part. Id. She remembers waking up in a bed, fully clothed with the

Defendant forcing his penis into her mouth. Id. at 35. In her next memory, she awoke with her head at the foot of the bed, and hearing the Defendant say “your friend is going to come again.” Id. at 36. Her next memory is slamming the door and then apologizing to the Defendant. Id.

She awoke, presumably the next morning, feeling unwell. Id. She decided to get some fresh air. Id. at 37. She went to the kitchen, where she saw someone other than the driver for the first time. Id. The woman in the kitchen offered her breakfast, but she declined. Id. She went outside with her camera that she always carried with her, and took pictures of the estate. Id. She took a number of photos of both the interior and exterior of the house where she was staying. Id. at 37-41; Exhibits C-3W-Y. She also remembers going to a show and being introduced to the Temptations and being in the Defendant’s dressing room. Id. at 41. She testified that it did not occur to her to report the assault to her agent, and that she felt she must have given the Defendant some signal to think it was okay to do that to her. Id. at 42.

Two months later, in June 1984, Thomas called the Defendant, as he told her she could, in an attempt to meet with him to find out what had happened; she was told by his representative that she would be able to see him. Id. at 43-44, 45-46. She made arrangements to see him in St. Louis, using her own money. Id. at 44. When she arrived in St. Louis, she purchased a postcard. Id. at 46. On this trip, she photographed her hotel room and the driver who picked her up. Id. at 48-49; Exhibit C-3nn. Ms. Thomas attended the show, but was not allowed backstage. N.T. Apr. 11, 2018, Trial By Jury, at

13. After the Defendant's performance, she accompanied him and others to a dinner. N.T. Apr. 10, 2018, Testimony of Heidi Thomas, at 49-50. There were a number of people at the dinner and Ms. Thomas was unable to confront the Defendant about what happened in Reno. Id. As the evening came to a close and it became clear she would not be able to speak to him, she asked the driver or valet to take her picture with the Defendant. Id. at 51; Exhibit C-3pp. She had no further contact with the Defendant. Id. at 52. At some time later, she told both a psychologist and her husband what happened. Id. at 54.

Chelan Lasha testified that in 1986 when she was a seventeen-year-old senior in high school, in Las Vegas, Nevada, a connection of her father's ex-wife put her in touch with the Defendant. N.T. Apr. 11, 2018, Trial By Jury, at 56. At that time, Ms. Lasha lived with her grandparents, the Defendant called her home and spoke to her and to her grandmother. Id. at 57. The Defendant told her that he was looking forward to meeting her and to helping her with her education and pursuit of a career in acting and modeling. Id. at 58. The first time she met the Defendant in person, he came to her grandparents' home for a meal. Id. at 59. They remained in phone contact and she sent headshots to his agency in New York. Id. at 60.

After she graduated from high school that same year, she worked at the Las Vegas Hilton. Id. at 63. The Defendant returned to Las Vegas and invited Ms. Lasha to meet him at the Las Vegas Hilton. Id. When she arrived at the hotel, she called the Defendant and a bellman took her to the Elvis Pressley Suite. Id. Ms. Lasha understood the purpose of their meeting was to help her

break into modeling and that someone from the Ford Modeling Agency would be meeting her and taking her picture. Id. at 64. Ms. Lasha testified that she had a cold on the day of the meeting. Id. The Defendant directed her to wet her hair to see what it looked like, and someone took some photographs of her. Id. at 65. The photographer left. Id. A second person came into the suite, who the Defendant said was a therapist related to stress and relaxation; this person also left the suit. Id.

Ms. Lasha was congested and blowing her nose, the Defendant offered her a decongestant. Id. at 65-66. He gave her a shot of amaretto and a little blue pill. Id. at 66. She took the pill. Id. He gave her a second shot of amaretto. Id. He sat behind her and began to rub her shoulders. Id. She began to feel woozy and he told her that she needed to lay down. Id. The Defendant took her to the back bedroom; prior to that time, they had been in the living area of the suite. Id.

When she stood up she could barely move and the Defendant guided her to the back bedroom. Id. at 67. He laid her on the bed, at which point she could no longer move. Id. He laid down next to her and began pinching her breasts and rubbing his genitals on her leg. Id. She felt something warm on her leg. Id. Her next memory is the Defendant clapping to wake her up. Id. When she awoke, she had a Hilton robe and her shorts on, but her top had been removed. Id. Her top was folded neatly on a table with money on top. Id. The Defendant told her to hurry up and get dressed and to use the money to buy something nice for herself and her grandmother. Id. During her

incapacitation, she was aware of what was happening but was powerless to stop it. Id. at 68. When she left the hotel, she drove to her guidance counselor's house and told her what happened. Id. She also told her sister. Id.

The day after the assault, Ms. Lasha's mother and grandmother attended a performance at the Hilton where the Defendant was a participant. Id. at 69. The Defendant called her and asked her why she did not attend, she told him she was sick and hung up the phone. Id. A couple days later, Ms. Lasha attended a performance at the Hilton with her grandmother, where she heckled the Defendant. Id. at 69-70. Afterwards, she told her grandmother what happened. Id. at 70. She was ultimately fired from her position at the Hilton. Id. at 79. She reported the assault to the police in 2014. Id. at 80.

Janice Baker-Kinney testified that she lived in Reno, Nevada and worked at Harrah's Casino from 1981-1983. Id. at 164. In 1982, Ms. Baker-Kinney was a twenty-four year old bartender at Harrah's. Id. at 165. During the course of her employment, she met several celebrities who performed in one of Harrah's two showrooms. Id. at 166. Performers could stay either in the hotel, or in a home owned by Mr. Harrah, just outside of town. Id. Ms. Baker-Kinney attended a party at that home hosted by Wayne Newton. Id.

On one particular evening, one of the cocktail waitresses invited her to go to a pizza party being hosted by the Defendant. Id. at 167. The Defendant was staying at Mr. Harrah's home outside of town. Id. at 167. Ms. Baker-Kinney agreed to attend the party and met her friend at the front door of the home. Id.

The Defendant answered the door. Id. at 168. Ms. Baker-Kinney was surprised to find that there was no one else in the home for a party. Id. at 169. She began to think that her friend was romantically interested in the Defendant and asked her to come along so she would not be alone. Id. She decided to stay for a little while and have a slice of pizza and a beer. Id.

The Defendant offered Ms. Baker-Kinney a pill, which she believes he said were Quaaludes. Id. at 170. She accepted the pill and then he gave her a second pill, which she also accepted. Id. at 170-171. Having no reason not to trust the Defendant, she ingested the pills. Id. at 173. After taking the pill, she sat down to play backgammon with the Defendant. Id. Shortly after starting the game, she became dizzy and her vision blurred. Id. at 174. She told the Defendant that the game was not fair anymore because she could not see the board and fell forward and passed out onto the game. Id.

Ms. Baker-Kinney next remembers hearing voices behind her and finding herself on a couch. Id. at 175. She realized it was her friend leaving the house. Id. She looked down at her clothing and realized that her shirt was unbuttoned and her pants were unzipped. Id. The Defendant sat down on the couch behind her and propped her up against his chest. Id. at 175-176. She remembers him speaking, but could not recall not the words he said. Id. at 176. His arm was around her, inside her shirt, fondling her. Id. He then moved his hand toward her pants. Id. She was unable to move. Id.

Her next memory is of the Defendant helping her into a bed and then being awoken the next day by the phone ringing. Id. at 176-177. She heard

the Defendant speaking on the phone and realized that they were in bed together and both naked. Id. at 177. When the Defendant got off of the phone, Ms. Baker-Kinney apologized for passing out and tried to explain that dieting must have affected her ability to handle the pills. Id. She had a sticky wetness between her legs that she knew indicated they had sex at some point, which she could not remember. Id. at 178.

Afraid that someone she worked with would be coming to clean the home, Ms. Baker-Kinney rushed to get herself dressed and get out of the home. Id. at 179-180. The Defendant walked her to the front door and told her that it was just between them and that she should not tell anyone. Id. at 180. She made a joke that she would not alert the media and left, feeling mortified. Id. at 180-181.

The day after the assault, she worked a shift at Harrah's. Id. at 185. At the end of her shift, she was leaving with a friend and heard the Defendant calling her name across the room. Id. She gave a slight wave and asked her friend to get her out of there and they left. Id. Within days of the assault, she told her roommate, one of her sisters, and a friend what had happened. Id. at 185.

Mary Chokran testified that in 1982, Ms. Baker-Kinney called her and was very distraught. N.T. Apr. 12 2018, Trial By Jury, at 57. Ms. Baker-Kinney told Ms. Chokran that she had taken what she thought was a Quaalude and that the Defendant had given it to her. Id. at 58. Ms. Baker-Kinney told

her that she thought it was a mood-enhancing party drug, not something that would render her unconscious as it did. Id.

Janice Dickinson testified that in 1982, when she was a twenty-seven year old, established model represented by Elite Modeling Agency, the Defendant contacted the agency seeking to meet with her. N.T., Apr. 12, 2018, Testimony of Janice Dickinson, at 8. She first met the Defendant at his townhouse in New York City. Id. She went to the home with her business manager. Id. at 9. She was excited about the meeting; she had been told that the Defendant mentored people and had taken an interest in her. Id. During the meeting they discussed her potential singing career as well as acting. Id. at 10. The Defendant gave her a book about acting. Id. After the meeting she and her manager left the home. Id.

Sometime later, Ms. Dickinson was working on a calendar shoot in Bali, Indonesia when the Defendant contacted her. Id. at 11. The Defendant offered her a plane ticket and a wardrobe to come meet him in Lake Tahoe to further discuss her desire to become an actress. Id. at 12. She accepted the invitation and left her boyfriend in Bali to go meet the Defendant to discuss the next steps to further her career. Id. at 13.

When she arrived at the airport in Reno, Nevada, she was met by Stu Gardner, the Defendant's musical director. Id. at 14. He took Ms. Dickinson to the hotel where she checked in to her room and put on the clothes the provided for her by the hotel boutique. Id. She arranged to meet Gardner on a sound stage to go over her vocal range. Id. The Defendant arrived in the room.

Id. at 15. She attended the Defendant's performance and had dinner afterwards with the Defendant and Gardner. Id. at 16.

During the dinner, Ms. Dickinson drank some red wine. Id. at 17. She began to experience menstrual cramps, which she expressed to the table. Id. The Defendant said he had something for that and gave her a little, round blue pill. Id. She ingested the pill. Id. Shortly after taking the pill, she began to feel woozy and dizzy. Id. at 18. When they finished in the restaurant, Mr. Gardner left and the Defendant invited her to his room to finish their conversation. Id. at 18.

Ms. Dickinson traveled with a camera and took photographs of the Defendant, including one of him making a phone call, inside of his hotel room. Id. at 19; Exhibit C-11-C-13. She testified that after taking the photos, she felt very lightheaded and like she could not get her words to come out. Id. at 21. When the Defendant finished his phone call, he got on top of her and his robe opened. Id. at 22. Before she passed out, she felt vaginal pain as he penetrated her vagina. Id. at 23. She awoke the next morning in her room with semen between her legs and she felt anal pain. Id. at 24.

Later that day, she saw the Defendant and they went to Bill Harrah's house. Id. At the house, she confronted the Defendant and asked him to explain what happened the previous evening. Id. at 25. He did not answer her. Id. She left Lake Tahoe the next day on a flight to Los Angeles with the Defendant and Mr. Gardner. Id. at 26. From Los Angeles, she returned to Bali to complete her photo shoot. Id. Ms. Dickinson did not report the assault;

she was having commercial success as a model and feared that it would impact her career. Id. at 27.

In 2002, Ms. Dickinson sought to include the rape in her memoir, *No Lifeguard on Duty*, but the publishing house's legal team would not allow her to include it. Id. at 33-34. Judith Regan testified that she was the publisher of Ms. Dickinson's 2002 memoir. N.T. Apr. 18, 2018 at 4. She testified that Ms. Dickinson told her that the Defendant had raped her and that she wanted to include that in her book. Id. at 5. Ms. Regan told Ms. Dickinson that the legal department would not allow her to include the story without corroboration. Id. at 6. Ms. Dickinson was angry and upset when she learned she could not include her account in the book. Id. at 7.

In 2010, Ms. Dickinson disclosed what happened to her to Dr. Drew Pinsky in the course of her participation in the reality show *Celebrity Rehab*. N.T., Apr. 12, 2018, Testimony of Janice Dickinson at 31. That conversation was never broadcast. Id. at 32. She testified that she also disclosed to a hairdresser and makeup artist. Id. at 33.

Maud Lise-Lotte Lublin testified that when she was in her early twenties and living in Las Vegas, she modeled as a way to make money to finance her education. N.T. Apr. 11, 2018, Trial by Jury, at 73-75. She met the Defendant in 1989, when she was twenty-three years old. Id. at 76. Her modeling agency told her that the Defendant wanted to meet her. Id. The first time she met with him in person, he was reviewing other headshots from her agency; he told

her that he would send her photos to a New York agency to see if runway or commercial modeling was the best fit for her. Id. at 77.

She had subsequent contact with the Defendant. Id. The Defendant also developed a relationship with her family. Id. at 78. On one occasion, she and her mother went to the UNLV track with the Defendant where he introduced her to people as his daughter. Id. She and her sister spent time with the Defendant on more than one occasion. Id. at 81. He was aware that her goal was to obtain an education and thought that modeling or acting would help her earn enough money to reach her educational goals. Id. She felt that the Defendant was a father figure or mentor. Id. Eventually, that relationship changed. Id.

The Defendant called her and invited her to the Hilton in Las Vegas. Id. at 82. She arrived at the suite and he began talking to her about improvisation and acting, as she had not done any acting at this point. Id. During the conversation, he went over to a bar and poured her a shot, told her to drink it and that it would relax her. Id. at 82-83. She told him that she did not drink alcohol. Id. at 83. He insisted that it would help her work on improvisation and help the lines flow. Id. She trusted his advice and took the drink. Id. He went back to the bar and prepared her a second drink, which she accepted. Id. at 83-84.

Within a few minutes, she started to feel dizzy and woozy and her hearing became muffled. Id. at 84. The Defendant asked her to come sit with him. Id. He was seated on the couch; Ms. Lise-Lotte Lublin was standing. Id.

He asked her to come sit between his knees. Id. at 85. She sat down; he began stroking her hair. Id. at 86. The Defendant was speaking to her, but the sound was muffled. Id. She felt very relaxed and also confused about what this had to do with learning improvisation. Id. She testified that she remembers walking towards a hallway and being surprised at how many rooms were in the suite. Id. She has no further memory of the night. Id. at 87. When she woke up, she was at home. Id. She thought she had a bad reaction to the alcohol and told her family about the meeting. Id. at 88. In the days that followed, she told additional friends that she thought she had accidentally had too much to drink and gotten sick and embarrassed herself. Id. at 89. She continued to have contact with the Defendant. Id.

On one occasion she traveled to see the Defendant at Universal Studios in California. Id. at 90. She invited a friend to go with her as she felt uncomfortable seeing him alone after what happened. Id. at 92. On the drive to Universal Studios, she told her friend that she was uncomfortable because the Defendant had her sit down and he stroked her hair and she could not remember what happened. Id. She came forward in 2014. Id. at 93.

III. Procedural History

On December 30, 2015, the Defendant was charged with three counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault.¹⁰ On January 11, 2016, the Defendant filed a document styled as “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to

¹⁰ 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3125 (a)(1), (a)(4), and (a)(5).

Disqualify the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office."¹¹ While artfully misnomered as a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus," this Court treated the filing as containing three distinct motions (1) a motion to dismiss based on an alleged non-prosecution agreement;¹² (2) a motion to dismiss based on pre-arrest delay;¹³ and (3) a motion to disqualify the District Attorney's Office.¹⁴

The Commonwealth filed a Response/Motion to Dismiss the Motion on January 20, 2016. On January 28, 2016, the Defendant filed his "Opposition to the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Disqualify the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office." A hearing/argument on the matter was scheduled for February 2, 2016. By order of January 22, 2016, the February 2, 2016 hearing was limited to the issue of an alleged non-prosecution agreement and this Court noted that all other issues raised by the Defendant would be preserved. However, following a conference and by agreement of the parties, the Court agreed to hear argument on the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify the District Attorney's Office as well.

Following two days of testimony and argument on February 2 and 3, 2016, this Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the alleged non-prosecution agreement and the Defendant's Motion to Disqualify the District Attorney's Office. The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on

¹¹ This document was docketed as a miscellaneous matter indexed at MD-3156-2015. All filings under that docket number have been migrated to the instant docket.

¹² Defendant's "Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Disqualify," para. III(B).

¹³ Memorandum of Law, para. III(C).

¹⁴ Memorandum of Law, para. III(D).

February 12, 2016.¹⁵ The Commonwealth filed a Motion to Quash the Appeal with the Superior Court, indexed at 488 EDA 2016. By Order of March 1, 2016, the Superior Court stayed further trial court proceedings pending the disposition of the Commonwealth's Motion to Quash the Appeal. On March 4, 2016, the Defendant filed a Petition for Review with the Superior Court, indexed at 23 EDM 2016. On April 25, 2016, the Superior Court denied the Petition for Review, granted the Commonwealth's Motion to Quash the February 12, 2016 appeal and lifted the stay.¹⁶

A preliminary hearing was held before District Justice Elizabeth McHugh on May 24, 2016 and the charges were held for court. On June 8, 2016, the Defendant filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" and accompanying memorandum of law. The Commonwealth filed a response, the Defendant filed a reply, and a hearing was held on July 7, 2016. This Court denied the Petition by order of July 7, 2016. On July 20, 2016, the Defendant again sought appellate review of this Order.¹⁷

On August 12, 2016, the Defendant filed a "Motion to Suppress the Contents of his Deposition Testimony and Any Evidence Derived therefrom on the Basis that the District Attorney's Promise not to Prosecute him Induced

¹⁵ This Court denied the Motion to Amend the February 4, 2016 order to certify it for appeal pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 702 (b).

¹⁶ The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also denied Defendant's emergency application for a stay, Petition for Allowance of Appeal, and Petition for Review. 58 MM 2016, 326 MAL 2016, 63 MM 2016.

¹⁷ This Court denied the Motion to Amend the July 7, 2016 order to certify it for appeal pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 702 (b). That appeal, indexed at 2330 EDA 2016, was quashed by order of October 12, 2016. The Supreme Court denied Defendant's Petition for Allowance of Appeal by Order of April 12, 2017. Commonwealth v. Cosby, 765 MAL 2016.

Him to Waive His Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination.”¹⁸ The Commonwealth filed a response. On September 6, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a “Motion to Introduce Evidence of Other Bad Acts of the Defendant.”

On October 6, 2016, the Defendant filed “Motion to Dismiss Charges Based on Deprivation of Defendant’s Due Process Rights,” on the basis of pre-arrest delay, and supporting memorandum of law. On October 18, 2016, the Commonwealth filed its response. On October 31, 2016, the Defendant filed his “Opposition to the Commonwealth’s Motion to Introduce Evidence of Prior Bad Acts of Defendant: Remote, Vague, Unreported Allegations of Other Accusers.” and a “Motion for a Hearing on the Competency of any Prior Accuser that the Court is inclined to let Testify at Trial.” Hearings on pretrial motions were held on November 1 and 2, 2016.

By Orders of November 16, 2016, the Court denied Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Charges Based on Deprivation of Defendant’s Due Process Rights,” “Motion for a Competency Hearing,” and “Motion for In Camera Voir Dire” of 404 (b) proffered witnesses. The Court took the Defendant’s “Motion to Suppress the Contents of his Deposition Testimony and Any Evidence Derived therefrom on the Basis that the District Attorney’s Promise not to Prosecute him Induced Him to Waive His Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination” under advisement. On December 5, 2016, this Court issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, thereby denying the

¹⁸ On August 3, 2016, the Defendant filed his “Motion to Suppress the Recording of a Telephone Call Obtained in Violation of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act.” Following a hearing on September 6, 2016, that Motion was Denied by Order of September 16, 2016.

Defendant's "Motion to Suppress the Contents of his Deposition Testimony and Any Evidence Derived therefrom on the Basis that the District Attorney's Promise not to Prosecute him Induced Him to Waive His Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination."

Remaining pretrial motions were argued on December 13th and 14th, 2016. On December 30, 2016, the Defendant filed a "Motion for Change of Venue/Venire." On February 24, 2017, this Court granted the Commonwealth's 404(b) Motion in part, allowing one prior alleged victim to testify. A hearing on Motion for Change of Venue/Venire was held on February 27, 2017. This Court granted the Change of Venire; a jury was selected from Allegheny County.

On June 17, 2017, following trial and several days of deliberation, the jury was unable to reach a verdict; this Court declared a mistrial. Retrial was scheduled for November 6, 2017. A pretrial conference was held on August 22, 2017; all defense counsel withdrew and a new team of trial counsel entered its appearance. The retrial was continued until April 2, 2018.

On January 18, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a "Motion to Introduce Evidence of 19 Prior Bad Acts of Defendant" and accompanying memorandum of law. The Defendant filed a response. On January 25th and 26th 2018 the Defendant filed the following relevant motions, with supporting memorandum of law: (1) "Motion to Dismiss Due to Insufficient Evidence to Prove Alleged Encounter Occurred Within the Statute of Limitations Period;" (2) "Motion to Incorporate All Prior Pretrial Motions and Oppositions to Commonwealth

Motions;” and (3) “Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct.”¹⁹ Hearings on the Motions were scheduled for March 5 and 6, 2018. The Commonwealth filed responses.

On March 6, 2018, following argument, the Court denied the “Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct” and the “Motion to Dismiss Due to Insufficient Evidence to Prove Alleged Encounter Occurred Within the Statute of Limitations Period.” The Court took the Commonwealth’s 404 (b) motion under advisement, and following review of post-argument submissions, granted the motion, in part, by order of March 15, 2018 permitting five 404 (b) witnesses to testify. This Court denied the Motion to Amend the March 15, 2018 order to certify it for appeal pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 702 (b). The Defendant did not attempt an interlocutory appeal.

On March 20, 2018, the Commonwealth filed several Motions in Limine regarding evidentiary issues. On March 21, 2018, the Defendant filed a “Motion for Recusal of the Honorable Steven T. O’Neill and Request for Reassignment.” On March 28, 2018, following argument, the Court denied the “Motion for Recusal.” Additional pretrial motions and responses to Commonwealth Motions, not relevant to the instant appeal, were filed by the Defendant on March 28, 2018. The following day, the Commonwealth filed a “Motion to Introduce Admissions of the Defendant” and memorandum of law. The Motion pertained to the civil deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes. The Court heard argument on March 30, 2018 and deferred a ruling until trial.

¹⁹The Defendant filed a supplement to this Motion on February 5, 2018.

Jury selection commenced on April 2, 2018. On April 6, 2018, after the jury had been selected, but before it was sworn, the Defendant filed a “Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, to Excuse Juror for Cause,” seeking to remove Juror 11 on the basis of a statement purportedly overheard by a prospective juror during jury selection. On April 8, 2018, the Defendant supplemented his memorandum. Prior to the swearing of the jury, on April 9, 2018, argument and questioning of the jurors took place. The Court denied the Motion to remove Juror 11 and the case proceeded to trial.

At trial, Dr. Barbara Ziv testified as an expert in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence, and the impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being assaulted, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920. The Defendant presented a defense, wherein he attempted to show, *inter alia*, that Ms. Constand fabricated the assault in order to obtain money from the Defendant. N.T. Apr. 18, 2018, Excerpted Testimony of Marguerite Jackson From Trial By Jury; N.T. Apr. 18, 2018, Excerpted Testimony of Pamela Gray-Young. Additionally, he presented evidence purporting to show that he was not at his Elkins Park home during the time period in which the assault occurred. N.T. Apr. 20, 2018 at 57-83, 84-110; N.T. Apr. 23, 2018 at 46-98.

On April 26, 2018, the jury convicted the Defendant on all three counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault. The Court ordered a Sexually Violent Predator Assessment. On June 14, 2018, post-trial counsel entered his appearance and all trial counsel withdrew. On July 25, 2018, the Defendant filed a “Motion for

Declaration of Unconstitutionality” and a “Motion for Production of Information Collected, Considered or Relied on By SOAB,” the latter of which was granted by Order of August 2, 2018.

On September 11, 2018, the Defendant filed a “Motion for Disclosure, Recusal, and for Reconsideration of Recusal” and supporting memorandum of law. The Commonwealth filed its response on September 13, 2018. By memorandum and order of September 19, 2018, this Court denied this motion.

On September 24, 2018, following argument, the Court denied the “Motion for Declaration of Unconstitutionality” and proceeded to a Sexually Violent Predator hearing. The Defendant was sentenced to three to ten years’ incarceration in a state correctional facility and was also designated a Sexually Violent Predator, pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9799.58. Defendant’s request to remain on bail pending appeal was denied by this Court. The Defendant filed a “Post-Sentence Motion to Reconsider and Modify sentence and For a New Trial in the Interest of Justice” on October 5, 2018. One week later, on October 12, 2018, post-trial counsel withdrew and appellate counsel entered his appearance. By Order of October 23, 2018, the Defendant’s post-sentence motion was denied. This timely appeal followed. By Order of December 11, 2018, the Defendant was directed to file a concise statement of errors, pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 1925 (b). He has since complied with that directive.

IV. Issues

The Defendant raises the following issues in his concise statement, reproduced verbatim:

1. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights by failing to excuse juror 11 where evidence was introduced of the juror's inability to be fair and impartial. Specifically, a prospective juror testified that juror 11 prejudged guilty prior to the commencement of trial. Moreover, the trial judge abused its discretion, erred and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights by refusing to interview all jurors who were in the room with juror 11 to ascertain whether they heard the comment and, if so, the impact the comment had on them.
2. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights in allowing Dr. Barbara Ziv to testify as an expert witness pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920 regarding an offense that occurred 12 years prior to the conception of that statute, and in violation of Mr. Cosby's rights under the fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and under Article I §§1, 9 and 17 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania where the statute is unconstitutional and not retroactive in application.
3. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights to Due Process of Law under the Constitution of the United States and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by failing to disclose his biased relationship with Bruce Castor, and by failing to recuse himself as presiding judge as a result of this biased relationship. Judge Steven T. O'Neill confronted Mr. Castor for, in his opinion, exploiting an affair in order to gain a political advantage in their 1999 political race for Montgomery County District Attorney. Mr. Castor's conduct as District Attorney in 2005, however, was a material and dispositive issue in this case; specifically, a significant question arose as to whether Mr. Castor agreed in 2005 that the Commonwealth would never prosecute Mr. Cosby

for the allegations involving Andrea Constand and whether he relayed that promise to Mr. Cosby's attorneys. The defense alleged that the Commonwealth was precluded from prosecuting Mr. Cosby due to former District Attorney Bruce Castor's agreement to never prosecute Mr. Cosby for the Constand allegations. The trial court erred in failing to disclose his bias against District Attorney Castor, and in failing to recuse himself, prior to determining the credibility of former District Attorney Castor and whether he made said agreement. The trial court similarly erred in failing to disclose his bias or recuse himself prior to ruling upon the admissibility of the defendant's civil deposition where the trial court was again determining the credibility of former District Attorney Castor.

4. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights to Due Process of Law under the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed January 11, 2016, and failing to dismiss the criminal information where the Commonwealth, in 2005, promised to never prosecute Mr. Cosby for the Constand allegations. Moreover, given the agreement that was made by the Commonwealth in 2005 to never prosecute Mr. Cosby and Mr. Cosby's reliance thereon, the Commonwealth was also estopped from prosecuting Mr. Cosby.
5. The trial court erred in permitting the admission of Mr. Cosby's civil deposition as evidence at trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions and in violation of Mr. Cosby's right against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitutions and Article I § 9 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Moreover, the prosecution was estopped from arguing the admission of the civil deposition at trial, as Mr. Cosby gave the deposition testimony in reliance on the promise by former District Attorney Castor that Mr. Cosby would never be prosecuted for the Constand allegations.
6. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights to Due Process of Law under the

Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in admitting five prior "bad act witnesses" pursuant to Pa. R. Evid. § 404(b). The witness' allegations were too remote in time and too dissimilar to the Constand allegations to fall within the proper scope of Pa. R. Evid. 404(b). Furthermore, during the first trial, the trial court allowed one 404(b) witness; however, after that trial resulted in a mistrial, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth, without explanation or justification, to call five 404 (b) witnesses in violation of Mr. Cosby's Due Process rights under the State and Federal Constitutions.

7. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights under the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in allowing the Commonwealth to proceed with the prosecution of Mr. Cosby where the offense did not occur within the twelve year statute of limitations pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5552 and the Commonwealth made no showing of due diligence. Moreover, the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence concerning whether the offense occurred within the twelve year statute of limitations. Furthermore, even if the alleged offense occurred within the twelve year statute of limitations, the delay in prosecuting Mr. Cosby caused him substantial prejudice and infringed on his Due Process rights under the Constitutions of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and of the United States, as a material witness to the non-prosecution agreement died within the twelve year period.
8. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce Mr. Cosby's civil deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes. This testimony was not relevant to the Constand allegations; was remote in time; "backdoored" the admission of a sixth 404(b) witness; and constituted "bad act" evidence that was not admissible. Furthermore, the testimony was highly prejudicial in that it included statements regarding the illegal act of giving a narcotic to another person.
9. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights to Due Process of Law under the

Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by denying Mr. Cosby's objections to the trial court's charge and including or refusing to provide certain instructions. Specifically, the trial court abused its discretion, erred and violated Mr. Cosby's rights to Due Process of Law by: 1) providing to the jury an instruction on the "consciousness of guilt" where this charge was not appropriate to the facts before the jury; 2) refusing to provide an instruction, consistent with *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), that the jury may consider the circumstances under which the case was investigated; and 3) by failing to provide the jury the instruction on 404 (b) witnesses suggested by the defense; indeed the trial court's charge effectively instructed the jury that Mr. Cosby was guilty of the uncharged alleged crimes and failed to properly explain how this uncharged, alleged misconduct should be considered. Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights to Due Process of Law under the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by refusing to provide to the jury a special interrogatory on whether the offense occurred within the statute of limitations.

10. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights in finding that Mr. Cosby was a sexually violent predator pursuant to SORNA where the Commonwealth expert relied upon unsubstantiated, uncorroborated evidence not admitted at trial; specifically relying on hearsay evidence that there were approximately 50 more women making allegations Mr. Cosby.[sic]
11. The trial court abused its discretion, erred, and infringed on Mr. Cosby's constitutional rights to Due Process of Law under the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in applying the sexually violent predator provisions of SORNA (Act 2018-29) for a 2004 offense in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

For ease of review, these issues will be reordered and divided into pretrial issues, evidentiary issues, jury instructions and post-trial issues.

V. Discussion

The Court notes preliminarily that pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal shall,

concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge...The Statement should not be redundant or provide lengthy explanations as to any error. Where non-redundant, non-frivolous issues are set forth in an appropriately concise manner, the number of errors raised will not alone be grounds for finding waiver.

Pa. R.A.P. 1925 (b)(ii), (iv). The Superior Court has stated,

a [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all. The court's review and legal analysis can be fatally impaired when the court has to guess at the issues raised. Thus, if a concise statement is too vague, the court may find waiver.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and internal quotations omitted). It is well-established that “[a] party complaining, on appeal, of the admission of evidence in the court below will be confined to the specific objection there made.’ If counsel states the grounds for an objection, then all other unspecified grounds are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. McGriff, 160 A.3d 863, 871–72 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted). The law is clear that “issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2017)(citations omitted). Likewise, “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa. R.A.P. 302(a).

The Defendant has raised eleven issues, many of which contain multiple subparts, and many of which contain allegations of error that were not raised before this Court as will be noted below where relevant.

A. Pretrial Issues

1. The Court properly denied Defendant’s January 11, 2016 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Concise Statement Issue 4)

The Defendant’s first contention is that this Court erred in denying his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Habeas Petition”).²⁰ First, he alleges that in 2005 the Commonwealth promised that he could never be prosecuted. Second, he alleges that the Commonwealth made an agreement by which he would never be prosecuted, thereby estopping the Commonwealth from bringing the instant prosecution. Initially, the Court notes that the Defendant did not raise a due process argument in conjunction with his motion to dismiss based on a non-prosecution agreement, thus constituting waiver. As there was no promise or agreement, only an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, these claims must fail.

“[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss criminal charges is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court and may be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion or error of law.” Commonwealth v.

²⁰ As outlined above, this Court treated the January 11, 2016 filing as containing three distinct motions: (1) a motion to dismiss based on an alleged non-prosecution agreement; (2) a motion to dismiss based on pre-arrest delay; and (3) a motion to disqualify the District Attorney’s Office. As worded, the Defendant’s concise statement appears only to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss based on the non-prosecution agreement. Thus, the other grounds are waived.

Handfield, 34 A.3d 187, 202 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). This Court did not abuse its discretion and this claim is without merit.

In his Habeas Petition, the Defendant contended that he, through his now deceased former attorney, Walter J. Phillips, Esq., entered into an express agreement in 2005 with the former District Attorney Bruce L. Castor, Jr., whereby Mr. Castor agreed to not to prosecute the Defendant for the purpose of inducing him to testify fully in Ms. Constand's then unfiled civil case. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and to Disqualify Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, Jan. 11, 2016 at 1. Mr. Castor testified on behalf of the Defendant at the hearing on his Motion.

On January 24, 2005, then District Attorney Bruce L. Castor, Jr. issued a signed press release announcing an investigation into Ms. Constand's allegations. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 65; Habeas Exhibit C-17. Mr. Castor testified that as the District Attorney in 2005, he oversaw the investigation into Ms. Constand's allegations. N.T. Feb. 2, 2016 at 24. Ms. Ferman²¹ supervised the investigation along with County Detective Richard Peffall and Detective Richard Shaffer of Cheltenham. Id. at 25. Mr. Castor testified that "I assigned who I thought were our best people to the case. And I took an active role as District Attorney because I thought I owed it to Canada to show that, in America, we will investigate allegations against celebrities." Id. at 34.

Mr. Castor testified that Ms. Constand went to the Canadian police almost exactly one year after the alleged assault and that the case was

²¹ Ms. Ferman is now a Judge on the Court of Common Pleas.

ultimately referred to Montgomery County. Id. at 25, 27. The lack of a prompt complaint was significant to Mr. Castor in terms of Ms. Constand's credibility and in terms of law enforcement's ability to collect physical evidence. Id. at 27, 29. He also placed significance on the fact that Ms. Constand told the Canadian authorities that she contacted a lawyer in Philadelphia prior to speaking with them. Id. at 43-44. He also reviewed Ms. Constand's statements to police. Id. at 47. Mr. Castor felt that there were inconsistencies in her statements. Id. at 48. Mr. Castor did not recall press quotes attributed to him calling the case "weak" at a 2005 press conference. Id. at 148; Habeas Exhibit C-3. Likewise, he did not recall the specific statement, "[i]n Pennsylvania we charge people for criminal conduct. We don't charge people with making a mistake or doing something foolish;" however, he indicated that it is a true statement. Id. at 154.

As part of the 2005 investigation, the Defendant gave a full statement to law enforcement and his Pennsylvania and New York homes were searched. Id. at 49-51. The Defendant was accompanied by counsel and did not invoke the Fifth Amendment at any time during his statement.²² Id. at 119. After the Defendant's interview, Ms. Constand was interviewed a second time. Id. at 51. Mr. Castor never personally met with Ms. Constand. Id. at 115. Following that interview of Ms. Constand, Mr. Castor spoke to the Defendant's attorney Walter M. Phillips, Jr. Id. at 52. Mr. Phillips told Mr. Castor that during the year

²²In his statement to police, the Defendant recounted giving Ms. Constand Benadryl and described what he categorized as a consensual, romantic relationship. N.T. Apr. 17, 2018 at 121-134, 137; Exhibit C-60.

between the assault and the report, Ms. Constand had multiple phone contacts with the Defendant. Id. at 53. Mr. Phillips was also concerned that Ms. Constand had recorded phone calls with the Defendant. Id. at 54. Mr. Phillips told Mr. Castor that if he obtained the phone records and the recorded calls he would conclude that Ms. Constand and her mother were attempting to get money from the Defendant so they would not go to the police. Id. While he did not necessarily agree with the conclusions Mr. Phillips thought would be drawn from the records, Mr. Castor directed the police to obtain the records. Id. at 55. Mr. Castor's recollection was that there was an "inordinate number of [phone] contacts" between the Defendant and Ms. Constand after the assault. Id. at 55. He also confirmed the existence of at least two "wire interceptions," which he did not believe would be admissible. Id. at 56-57.

As part of the 2005 investigation, allegations made by other women were also investigated. Id. at 59. Mr. Castor delegated that investigation to Ms. Ferman. Id. He testified that he determined that, in his opinion, these allegations were unreliable. Id. at 60.

Following approximately one month of investigation, Mr. Castor concluded that "there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence upon which any charge against Mr. Cosby related to the Constand incident could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. He testified that he could either leave the case open at that point or definitively close the case to allow a civil case. Id. He did not believe there was a chance that the criminal case could get any

better. Id. at 61. He believed Ms. Constand's actions created a credibility issue that could not be overcome. Id. at 62. He testified:

At that point I concluded it was better for justice to make a determination that Mr. Cosby would never be arrested. I did that because of the rules that—there's special rules that prosecutors have to operate under . . . [that say] that the prosecutor is a Minister of Justice.

And I did not believe it would be just to go forward with a criminal prosecution but I wanted some measure of justice. So I made the final determination as sovereign. You understand, I am not Bruce Castor, the District Attorney. I am the sovereign Commonwealth of Pennsylvania when I am making these decisions. And as the sovereign, I decided that we would not prosecute Mr. Cosby and that would set off the chain of events that I thought as Minister of Justice would gain some justice for Andrea Constand. . . .

I made the decision as the sovereign that Mr. Cosby would not be prosecuted no matter what. As a matter of law, that then made it so he could not take the Fifth Amendment ever as a matter of law.

So I have heard banter in the courtroom and in the press the term "agreement," but everybody has used the wrong word. I told Mr. Phillips that I had decided that, because of the defects in the case, that the case, that the case could not be won and that I was going to make a public statement that we were not going to charge Mr. Cosby.

I told him that I was making it as the sovereign of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, in my legal opinion, that meant that Mr. Cosby would not be allowed to take the Fifth Amendment in the subsequent civil suit that Andrea Constand's lawyers had told us they wanted to bring.

Mr. Phillips agreed with me that that is, in fact, the law of Pennsylvania and of the United States and agreed that if Cosby was subpoenaed he would be required to testify.

But those two things were not connected to one another. Mr. Cosby was not getting prosecuted at all ever as far as I was

concerned. And my belief was that, as the Commonwealth and the representative of the sovereign, that I had the power to make such a statement and that, by doing so, as a matter of law Mr. Cosby would be unable to assert the Fifth Amendment in a civil deposition.

Id. at 63-65.

Mr. Castor further indicated, “Mr. Philips never agreed to anything in exchange for Mr. Cosby not being prosecuted.” Id. at 67. Mr. Castor testified that he told Mr. Philips of his legal assessment and then told Ms. Ferman of the analysis and directed her to contact Constand’s attorneys. Id. at 67, 185-186, 188. He testified that she was to contact the attorneys to let them know “that Cosby was not going to be prosecuted and that the purpose for that was that I wanted to create the atmosphere or the legal conditions such that Mr. Cosby would never be allowed to assert the Fifth Amendment in the civil case”²³ Id. at 68. He testified that she did not come back to him with any objection from Constand’s attorneys and that any objection from Ms. Constand’s attorneys would not have mattered anyway. Id. at 185. He later testified that he did not have any specific recollection of discussing his legal analysis with Ms. Ferman, but would be surprised if he did not. Id. at 207-208.

Mr. Castor testified that he could not recall any other case where he made this type of binding legal analysis in Montgomery County. Id. at 117. He testified that in a half dozen cases during his tenure in the District Attorney’s

²³ Ms. Constand’s attorneys testified that they were never contacted regarding Mr. Castor’s decision nor were the reasons for the decision ever communicated to them.

office, someone would attempt to assert the Fifth Amendment in a preexisting civil case. Id. The judge in that case would then call Mr. Castor to determine if he intended to prosecute the person asserting the privilege. Id. at 118. He would confirm that he did not and the claim of privilege would be denied. Id. Mr. Castor was unable to name a case in which this happened. Id.

After making his decision not to prosecute, Mr. Castor personally issued a second, signed press release on February 17, 2005.²⁴ Id. at 71; Habeas Exhibit D-4. Mr. Castor testified that he signed the press release at the request of Ms. Constand's attorneys in order to bind the Commonwealth so it "would be evidence that they could show to a civil judge that Cosby is not getting prosecuted." Id. at 212. The press release stated, "After reviewing the above and consulting with County and Cheltenham Detectives, the District Attorney finds insufficient, credible and admissible evidence exists upon which any charge against Mr. Cosby could be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt." Habeas Exhibit D-4. Mr. Castor testified that this language made it absolute that the Defendant would never be prosecuted, "[s]o I used the present tense, [exists], . . . So I'm making it absolute. I said I found that there was no evidence—there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence in existence upon which any charge against Mr. Cosby could be sustained. And the use of "exists" and "could" I meant to be absolute." Id. at 204.

²⁴The Court notes that the January 24, 2005 press release confirming the investigation was also personally signed by Mr. Castor. Exhibit C-17. The Defendant and Mr. Castor ascribed no legal significance to the signing of that earlier press release.

The press release specifically cautioned the parties that the decision could be revisited, “District Attorney Castor cautions all parties to this matter that he will reconsider this decision should the need arise.” Id. at 85. He testified that inclusion of this sentence, warning that the decision could be revisited, in the paragraph about a civil case and the use of the word “this,” was intended to make it clear that it applied to the civil case and not to the prosecution. Id. at 217. Mr. Castor testified that this sentence was meant to advise the parties that if they criticized his decision, he would contact the media and explain that Ms. Constand’s actions damaged her credibility, which would severely hamper her civil case. Id. at 85. He testified that once he was certain a prosecution was not viable “I operated under the certainty that a civil suit was coming and set up the dominoes to fall in such a way that Mr. Cosby would be required to testify.” Id. at 88. He included the language “much exists in this investigation that could be used by others to portray persons on both sides of the issue in a less than flattering light,” as a threat to Ms. Constand and her attorneys should they attack his office. Id. at 86, 156-157. In a 2016 Philadelphia Inquirer article, in reference to this same sentence, Castor stated, “I put in there that if any evidence surfaced that was admissible I would revisit the issue. And evidently, that is what the D.A. is doing.” Id. at 219-220; Habeas Exhibit C-12. He testified that he remembered making that statement but that it referred to the possibility of a prosecution based on other victims in Montgomery County or perjury. Id. at 220-221.

He testified that the press release was intended for three audiences, the media, the greater legal community, and the litigants. Id. at 72-73. He testified about what meaning he hoped that each audience would glean from the press release. Id. at 75-87. He did not intend for any of the three groups to understand the entirety of what he meant. Id. at 120. The media was to understand only that the Defendant would not be arrested. Id. Lawyers would parse every word and understand that he was saying there was enough evidence to arrest the Defendant but that Mr. Castor thought the evidence was not credible or admissible. Id. at 121. The third audience was the litigants, and they were to understand that they did not want him to damage the civil case. Id. at 122. He then stated that the litigants would understand the entirety of the press release, the legal community most of it and the press little of it. Id.

Mr. Castor testified that in November of 2014 he was contacted by the media as a result of a joke a comedian made about the Defendant. Id. at 92. Again, in the summer of 2015 after the civil depositions were released, media approached Mr. Castor. Id. at 93. He testified that he told every reporter that he spoke to in this time frame that the reason he had declined the charges was to strip Mr. Cosby of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 201-202, 204-206. He testified that he did not learn the investigation had been reopened until he read in the paper that the Defendant was arrested in December 2015, but there was media speculation in September 2015 that an arrest might be imminent. Id. at 95.

On September 23, 2015, apparently in response to this media speculation, unprompted and unsolicited, Mr. Castor sent an email to then District Attorney Risa Vetri Ferman. Habeas Exhibit D-5. His email indicated, in pertinent part,

I'm writing you just in case you might have forgotten what we did with Cosby back in 2005 . . . Once we decided that the chances of prevailing in a criminal case were too remote to make an arrest, I concluded that the best way to achieve justice was to create an atmosphere where Andrea would have the best chance of prevailing in a civil suit against Cosby. With the agreement of Wally Phillips and Andrea's lawyer, I wrote the attached [press release] as the ONLY comment I would make while the civil case was pending. Again, with the agreement of the defense lawyer and Andrea's lawyers, I intentionally and specifically bound the Commonwealth that there would be no state prosecution of Cosby in order to remove from him the ability to claim his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, thus forcing him to sit for a deposition under oath . . . But those lawyers representing Andrea civilly . . . were part of this agreement because they wanted to make Cosby testify. I believed at the time that they thought making him testify would solidify their civil case, but the only way to do that was for us (the Commonwealth) to promise not to prosecute him. So in effect, that is what I did. I never made an important decision without discussing it with you during your tenure as First Assistant.

[B]ut one thing is a fact. The Commonwealth, defense and civil plaintiff's lawyers were all in agreement that the attached decision from me stripped Cosby of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination forcing him to be deposed.

Habeas Exhibit D-5.

He indicated in his email that he learned Mr. Phillips had died on the date of his email. Id. The email also suggested that the deposition testimony might be subject to suppression. Id.

Ms. Ferman responded to Mr. Castor's email by letter of September 25, 2015, requesting a copy of the "written declaration" indicating that the Defendant would not be prosecuted. N.T. Feb. 2, 2016 at 104; Habeas Exhibit D-6. In her letter, Ms. Ferman indicated that the "[t]he first I heard of such a binding agreement was your email sent this past Wednesday. The first I heard of a written declaration documenting the agreement not to prosecute was an article authored on 9/24/15 and published today by Margaret Gibbons of the Intelligencer. . . We have been in contact with counsel for both Mr. Cosby and Ms. Constand and neither has provided us with any information about such an agreement." Habeas Exhibit D-6.

Mr. Castor responded via email. Habeas Exhibit D-7. His email indicated,

The attached Press Release is the written determination that we would not prosecute Cosby. That was what the lawyers for the plaintiff wanted and I agreed. The reason I agreed and the plaintiff's lawyers wanted it in writing was so Cosby could not take the 5th Amendment to avoid being deposed or testifying . . . That meant to all involved, include Cosby's lawyer at the time, Mr. Phillips, that what Cosby said in the civil litigation could not be used against him in a criminal prosecution for the event we had him under investigation for in early 2005. I signed the press release for precisely this reason, at the request of Plaintiff's counsel, and with the acquiescence of Cosby's counsel, with full and complete intent to bind the Commonwealth that anything Cosby said in the civil case could not be used against him, thereby forcing him to be deposed and perhaps testify in a civil trial without the ability to "take the 5th." I decided to create the best possible environment for the Plaintiff to prevail and be

compensated. By signing my name as District Attorney and issuing the attached, I was "signing off" on the Commonwealth not being able to use anything Cosby said in the civil case against him in a criminal prosecution, because I was stating the Commonwealth will not bring a case against Cosby for the incident based on the then-available evidence in order to help the Plaintiff prevail in her civil action . . . [n]aturally, if a prosecution could be made out without using what Cosby said, or anything derived from what Cosby said, I believed then and continue to believe that a prosecution is not precluded.

Habeas Exhibit D-7.

Mr. Castor testified that he intended to confer transactional immunity upon the Defendant and that his power to do so as the sovereign was derived from common law not from the statutes of Pennsylvania. N.T. Feb. 2, 2016 at 232, 234, 236. In his final email to Ms. Ferman, Mr. Castor stated, "I never agreed we would not prosecute Cosby." Habeas Exhibit D-8.

As noted above, Ms. Constand's civil attorneys also testified at the hearing. Dolores Troiani, Esq. testified that during the 2005 investigation, she had no contact with the District Attorney's office and limited contact with the Cheltenham Police Department. N.T. Feb. 3, 2018 at 139. Bebe Kivitz, Esq. testified that during the 2005 investigation she had limited contact with then-First Assistant District Attorney Ferman. Id. at 236. The possibility of a civil suit was never discussed with anyone from the Commonwealth or anyone representing the Defendant during the criminal investigation. Id. at 140. At no time did anyone from Cheltenham Police, or the District Attorney's Office, convey to Ms. Troiani, or Ms. Kivitz, that the Defendant would never be prosecuted. Id. at 140, 235-237. They learned that the criminal case was

declined from a reporter who came to Ms. Troiani's office in the evening of February 17, 2005 seeking comment about what Bruce Castor had done. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 141. The reporter informed her that Mr. Castor had issued a press release in which he declined prosecution. Id. at 141-142. Ms. Troiani had not received any prior notification of the decision not to prosecute. Id. at 142.

Ms. Constand and her attorneys did not request a declaration from Mr. Castor that the Defendant would not be prosecuted. Id. at 140. Ms. Troiani testified that if the Defendant attempted to invoke the Fifth Amendment during his civil depositions they would have filed a motion and he would have likely been precluded since he had given a statement to police. Id. at 176. If he was permitted to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, they would have been entitled to an adverse inference jury instruction. Id. Additionally, if the Defendant asserted the Fifth Amendment, Ms. Constand's version of the story would have been the only version for the jury to consider. Id. Ms. Constand and her counsel had no reason to request immunity. Id. At no time during the civil suit did Ms. Troiani receive any information in discovery or from the Defendant's attorneys indicating that the Defendant could never be prosecuted. Id. at 177.

Ms. Troiani testified that she understood the press release to say that Mr. Castor was not prosecuting at that time but if additional information arose, he would change his mind. Id. at 152, 175. She did not take the language, "District Attorney Castor cautions all parties to this matter that he will

reconsider this decision should the need arise,” to be a threat not to speak publicly. Id. at 175. She continued to speak to the press; Mr. Castor did not retaliate. Id.

Ms. Troiani was present for the Defendant’s depositions. Id. at 178. At no point during the depositions was there any mention of an agreement or promise not to prosecute. Id. at 178-179. In her experience, such a promise would have been put on the record at the civil depositions. Id. at 179. She testified that during the four days of depositions, the Defendant was not cooperative and the depositions were extremely contentious. Id. at 181. Ms. Troiani had to file motions to compel the Defendant’s answers. Id. The Defendant’s refusal to answer questions related to Ms. Constand’s allegations formed the basis of a motion to compel. Id. at 182, 184. When Ms. Troiani attempted to question the Defendant about the allegations, the Defendant’s attorneys sought to have his statement to police read into the record in lieu of cross examination. Id.

Ms. Troiani testified that one of the initial provisions the Defendant wanted in the civil settlement was a release from criminal liability. Id. at 191. Mr. O’Connor’s letter²⁵ to Ms. Ferman does not dispute this fact. Id. at 195; Habeas Exhibit C-22. The Defendant and his attorneys also requested that Ms. Troiani agree to destroy her file, she refused. Id. at 193. Eventually, the parties agreed on the language that Ms. Constand would not initiate any

²⁵ By letter of September 22, 2015, Ms. Ferman requested that Ms. Troiani and Mr. O’Connor provide her with any portions of the settlement agreement pertaining to bringing criminal charges. Habeas Exhibit C-20.

criminal complaint. Id. The first Ms. Troiani heard of a promise not to prosecute was in 2015. Id. at 184. The first Ms. Kivitz learned of the purported promise was in 2014 in a newspaper article. Id. at 237.

John P. Schmitt, Esq. testified that he has represented the Defendant since 1983. N.T. Feb. 3, 2016 at 7. In the early 1990s, he became the Defendant's general counsel. Id. at 8. In 2005, when he became aware of the instant allegations, he retained criminal counsel, Walter Phillips, Esq., on the Defendant's behalf. Id. 8-9. Mr. Phillips dealt directly with the prosecutor's office and would then discuss all matters with Mr. Schmitt. Id. at 9. The Defendant's January 2005 interview took place at Mr. Schmitt's office. Id. at 10. Both Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Phillips were present for the interview. Id. Numerous questions were asked the answers to which could lead to criminal charges. Id. at 22. At no time during his statement to police did the Defendant invoke the Fifth Amendment or refuse to answer questions. Id. at 18. Mr. Schmitt testified that he had interviewed the Defendant prior to his statement and was not concerned about his answers. Id. at 23. Within weeks of the interview, the District Attorney declined to bring a prosecution. Id. at 10. Mr. Schmitt testified that Mr. Phillips told him that the decision was an irrevocable commitment that District Attorney Castor was not going to prosecute the Defendant. Id. at 11. He received a copy of the press release. Id. at 12.

On March 8, 2005, Ms. Constand filed her civil suit and Mr. Schmitt retained Patrick O'Connor, Esq., as civil counsel. Id. Mr. Schmitt participated in the civil case. Id. at 13. The Defendant sat for four days of depositions. Id.

Mr. Schmitt testified that the Defendant did not invoke the Fifth Amendment in those depositions and that he would not have let him sit for the depositions if he knew the criminal case could be reopened. Id. at 14.

He testified that generally he does try to get agreements on the Defendant's behalf in writing. Id. at 16. During this same time period, Mr. Schmitt was involved in written negotiations with the National Enquirer. Id. at 27-28, 33-34; Habeas Exhibit C-14. He testified that he relied on the press release, Mr. Castor's word and Mr. Phillips' assurances that what Mr. Castor did was sufficient. Id. at 40. Mr. Schmitt did not personally speak to Mr. Castor or get the assurance in writing. Id. at 41. During the depositions, Mr. O'Connor objected to numerous questions. Id. At the time of the depositions, Mr. Schmitt, through his negotiations with the National Enquirer, learned that there were Jane Doe witnesses making allegations against the Defendant. Id. at 58, 66. The Defendant did not assert a Fifth Amendment privilege when asked about these other women. Id. at 59. Mr. Schmitt testified that he had not formed an opinion as to whether Mr. Castor's press release would cover that testimony. Id.

Mr. Schmitt testified that that during negotiations of the settlement agreement there were references to a criminal case. Id. at 47. The settlement agreement indicated that Ms. Constand would not initiate a criminal complaint against Mr. Cosby. Id. at 48. Mr. Schmitt did not come forward when he learned the District Attorney's office re-opened the case in 2015. Id. at 72.

Based on the testimony of Mr. Castor, Mr. Schmitt, Ms. Troiani and Ms. Kivitiz, the only conclusion that was apparent to this Court was that no agreement or promise not to prosecute ever existed, only the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. A press release, signed or not, was legally insufficient to form the basis of an enforceable promise not to prosecute. The parties did not cite, nor has this Court found any support in Pennsylvania law for the proposition that a prosecutor may unilaterally confer transactional immunity through a declaration as the sovereign. Thus, the District Attorney was required to utilize the immunity statute, which provides the only means for granting immunity in Pennsylvania.²⁶

²⁶ Specifically, the statute governing grants of immunity reads, in pertinent part: Immunity orders shall be available under this section in all proceedings before:

- (1) Courts;
- (2) Grand juries;
- (3) Investigating grand juries;
- (4) The minor judiciary or coroners.

The Attorney General or a district attorney **may request an immunity order from any judge of a designated court**, and that judge shall issue such an order, when in the judgment of the Attorney General or district attorney:

- (1) the testimony or other information from a witness may be necessary to the public interest; and
- (2) a witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.

No testimony or other information compelled under an immunity order, or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, may be used against a witness in any criminal case, except that such information may be used in a

As outlined above, Mr. Castor's testimony about what he did and how he did it was equivocal at best. His testimony was both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with his writings to then District Attorney Ferman during her reinvestigation of the case. For example, he testified that Cosby could never be prosecuted, "Mr. Cosby was not getting prosecuted at all ever as far as I was concerned." N.T. Feb. 2, 2016 at 65. However, in his emails to Ms. Ferman, he wrote that the depositions could be subject to suppression and that "I believed

prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4902 (relating to perjury) or under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4903 (relating to false swearing)...

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947 (a)-(b), (d) (emphasis added).

As defined by the statute, an immunity order is "[a]n order issued under this section by a designated court, directing a witness to testify or produce other information over a claim of privilege against self-incrimination."

§ 5947(g). The statute provides for only use and derivative use immunity.

§ 5947(d).

"Use" immunity provides immunity only for the testimony actually given pursuant to the order compelling said testimony." Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 499-500 (Pa.Super.2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 541 Pa. 500, 664 A.2d 957, 960 n. 5 (1995)). Second, "[u]se and derivative use" immunity enlarges the scope of the grant to cover any information or leads that were derived from the actual testimony given under compulsion...." Id. Finally, "[t]ransactional" immunity is the most expansive, as it in essence provides complete amnesty to the witness for any transactions which are revealed in the course of the compelled testimony." Id.

It is well settled that,

[t]ransactional immunity is not required in order to compel testimony over a Fifth Amendment claim of privilege against self-incrimination. "[I]mmunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While grant of immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be broader.

Commonwealth v. Webster, 470 A.2d 532, 535 (1983)(citations omitted).

then and continue to believe that a prosecution is not precluded.” Habeas Exhibits D-5, D-7.

Mr. Castor was called as a witness in support of the Defendant’s motion to support his claim that there was an agreement not to prosecute. Mr. Castor specifically testified that there was no such agreement. Likewise, he repeatedly indicated in his correspondence with Ms. Ferman that Ms. Constand’s counsel was specifically in agreement and he testified that he signed the press release at their request. However, Ms. Troiani’s testified that she did not, and would not have made such a request, and did not even learn the prosecution was declined until a reporter showed up at her office. The Court credited Ms. Troiani’s testimony in this regard.

Furthermore, at the time of the 2005 press release declining to charge the Defendant, there was no civil suit filed and no one representing Ms. Constand had discussed the possibility of the same with *anyone* representing the Commonwealth. In fact, the civil suit was not filed until three weeks after the prosecution was declined. Ms. Troiani and Ms. Kivitz never spoke directly to Mr. Castor; Ms. Kivitz had limited interaction with then-First Assistant District Attorney Ferman. Mr. Castor never met with Ms. Constand. Ms. Troiani testified in no uncertain terms that she did not and would not have requested that the Defendant not be prosecuted. In fact, if the Defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment in his subsequent depositions that would have benefited their civil case. Ms. Troiani testified that the Defendant attempted to include a provision in the settlement agreement absolving him from criminal

liability in the instant case. Such a provision would be unnecessary if Mr. Castor had, in fact, promised not to prosecute him.

During the District Attorney's 2005 investigation, the Defendant voluntarily sat for a question and answer statement in the presence of two of his attorneys, never invoking the Fifth Amendment or declining to answer a question. Instead, he presented his narrative of a consensual sexual relationship with Ms. Constand, the same narrative he ultimately testified to in his deposition. Mr. Schmitt testified that he interviewed the Defendant prior to his police statement and was not concerned about his answers. Thus, there was nothing to indicate that the Defendant's cooperation would cease if a civil case were filed.

Even if Mr. Castor had been aware of the civil suit that was ultimately filed, there is no evidence of record to indicate that the Defendant intended to "take the 5th," necessitating such a grant of immunity. Mr. Castor did nothing more than decline prosecution at that time. No non-prosecution agreement or promise was ever memorialized by any writing, memorandum to investigative file, letter to counsel or filed with any court. Thus, there was nothing for the Defendant to purportedly rely upon in sitting for depositions.

Even assuming, *arguendo*, that there was a defective grant of immunity, as would support a theory of promissory estoppel, any reliance on a press release as a grant of immunity was unreasonable. The Defendant was represented by a competent team of attorneys who were versed in written negotiations. Yet none of these attorneys obtained Mr. Castor's promise in

writing or memorialized it in any way, further supporting the conclusion that there was no promise. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not estopped from proceeding with the prosecution following their reinvestigation. The Court did not abuse its discretion and this claim must fail.

2. The Court did not err in denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress His Deposition Testimony. (Concise Statement Issue 5)

The Defendant's next contention is that the Court erred in allowing the admission of his civil deposition testimony, in violation of his Constitutional rights. The Court will treat this issue as a challenge to the denial of "Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition Testimony and Any Evidence Derived Therefrom On the Basis that the District Attorney's Promise Not to Prosecute Him Induced Him to Waive his Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination," filed on August 23, 2017. This claim is without merit and must fail.

The standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion is well settled. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:

[o]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (Pa. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 750 A.2d. 261 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Hall, 701 A.2d 109,

197 (Pa. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082 (1998)). Following the denial of his January 11, 2016 Habeas Corpus petition, the Defendant file a motion to suppress his deposition testimony on August 12, 2016. This Court made the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

I. Findings of Fact

1. The Defendant seeks to suppress the contents of his civil deposition testimony, and any evidence derived therefrom, on the basis that he expressly relied upon former District Attorney Bruce L. Castor, Jr.'s alleged promise not to prosecute him as the basis for not invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at his civil depositions in 2005 and 2006. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition Testimony and Any Evidence Derived Therefrom On the Basis that the District Attorney's Promise Not to Prosecute Him Induced Him to Waive his Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination at 1.)
2. A hearing was held before the undersigned on November 1, 2016. No new evidence was presented at the hearing. Rather, the Notes of Testimony from the February 2 and 3, 2016 hearing on the Defendant's "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Disqualify the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office," (Commonwealth's Suppression Exhibit 1 (CS-1))²⁷ and a series of stipulations (CS-2) were admitted as evidence sufficient to dispose of the instant Motion to Suppress which was filed August 12, 2016. (N.T. 11/1/16 at 7-8). This Court considered no other evidence in making its findings and conclusions.
3. On January 24, 2005, then Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce L. Castor, Jr., Esq. issued a signed press release indicating that an investigation had commenced following the victim's January 13, 2005, report to authorities in Canada that she was allegedly sexually assaulted by the Defendant at his home in Pennsylvania. Ultimately, the case was referred to Cheltenham Township Police Department. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 65; C-17).
4. On January 26, 2005, the Defendant gave a written, question and answer statement to law enforcement. The Defendant was accompanied by counsel, both his criminal defense attorney

²⁷ All other exhibits referenced herein are cited by the exhibit number assigned at the February 2 and 3, 2016 hearing.

- Walter M. Phillips²⁸, Esq., and his longtime general counsel John P. Schmitt, Esq., when he provided his statement to police. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 19, 52-53).
5. At no time during the statement to police did the Defendant invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. (Id. at 18).
 6. Mr. Schmitt testified that he interviewed the Defendant prior to both his statement to police and to his civil depositions and did not believe that he was going to incriminate himself. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 22-24).
 7. On February 17, 2005, then District Attorney, Bruce L. Castor, Jr., issued a signed press release stating that he had decided not to prosecute William H. Cosby, Jr. (N.T. 2/2/16 at 71-72, 89); Defendant's Exhibit 4 (D-4)).
 8. Mr. Castor testified that it was his intention to strip the Defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to force him to sit for a deposition in an unfiled civil case and that Mr. Phillips, the Defendant's criminal attorney, agreed with his legal assessment. (N.T. 2/2/16 at 63-68). He also testified that he relayed this intention to then First Assistant District Attorney Risa V. Ferman. (Id. at 67).
 9. The press release cautions that the decision could be reconsidered. (N.T. 2/2/16 at 215; D-4).
 10. There was no agreement not to prosecute and no "quid pro quo." (N.T. 2/2/16 at 99, 227).
 11. The decision not to prosecute was not the result of any agreement with, or request from, the victim's attorneys, Dolores Troiani, Esq. and Bebe Kivitz, Esq. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 175, 238, 247-248).
 12. In fact, Ms. Troiani had no contact with the District Attorney's Office during the investigation. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 139-140). Ms. Kivitz had limited contact with then-First Assistant Risa V. Ferman. (Id. at 236, 247).
 13. Further, Ms. Troiani had no discussions with anyone involved in the investigation regarding a possible civil case against the Defendant. (Id. at 140).
 14. Additionally, Ms. Troiani testified that if the Defendant had invoked the Fifth Amendment at his depositions, it would have benefitted their civil case in the event of a jury trial, because she would have requested an adverse inference jury instruction. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 176).
 15. At no time was the purported promise not to prosecute reduced to writing. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 26, 41). Likewise, there was no Court approval of any promise or agreement not to prosecute.

²⁸ Mr. Phillips passed away in early 2015.

16. Neither of the victim's attorneys was aware of the purported promise until 2015. (Id. at 184, 237-238).
17. In fact, Ms. Troiani only learned of Mr. Castor's decision not to prosecute when a reporter came to her office to obtain a comment on the decision. (Id. at 141-142).
18. During the 2005 criminal investigation, the Defendant's attorneys were negotiating, in writing, with the National Enquirer for the defendant to give an interview regarding the instant allegations, which he gave following the conclusion of the criminal investigation. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 33-34).
19. On March 8, 2005, the victim filed a civil lawsuit against the Defendant in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
20. On four dates, September 28-29, 2005 and March 28-29, 2006, the Defendant sat for depositions in the civil matter. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 36).
21. He was accompanied by counsel, including Mr. Schmitt. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 13, 36). Mr. Schmitt testified that Mr. Phillips had informed him of Mr. Castor's promise not to prosecute. (Id. at 11).
22. The Defendant did not invoke the Fifth Amendment during the depositions, however, counsel did advise him not to answer questions pertaining to the victim in the instant case and her attorneys had to file motions to compel his testimony. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 41-42, 181-184, 248-249).
23. The Defendant did not invoke the Fifth Amendment when asked about other alleged victims. (Id. at 58-59).
24. At no time during the civil litigation did any of the attorneys for the Defendant indicate on the record that the Defendant could not be prosecuted. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 177, 184, 247-248).
25. There was no attempt to confirm the purported promise before the depositions, even though Mr. Castor was still the District Attorney; it was never referenced in the stipulations at the outset of the civil depositions. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 71, 178-179, 247-248).
26. In the late summer of 2006, the victim and the Defendant settled the civil case. As part of the settlement agreement defendant's attorneys initially attempted to negotiate a provision whereby the victim would absolve the Defendant of criminal responsibility and not cooperate with law enforcement. Additionally, the defendant's attorney requested that Ms. Troiani agree to destroy her file. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 47-48, 190-193).
27. The settlement agreement contains a provision that Ms. Constand would not initiate a criminal complaint against the Defendant based on the instant allegations. (N.T. 2/3/16 at 48; C-22).

28. On July 6, 2015, in response to a request by the Associated Press, a federal judge unsealed previously sealed portions of the record in the civil case, which included portions of the defendant's 2005 depositions. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress The Contents Of His Deposition Testimony and Any Evidence Derived Therefrom on the Basis that the District Attorney's Promise Not to Prosecute Him Induced Him to Waive His Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination at 4).
29. Around this time, the District Attorney's Office reopened the investigation. (C-19, C-20).
30. On September 22, 2015, at 10:30 am, Brian McMonagle, Esq. and Patrick O'Connor, Esq., met with then District Attorney Risa Vetri Ferman and then First Assistant District Attorney Kevin Steele at the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office for a discussion regarding William H. Cosby, Jr., who Mr. McMonagle and Mr. O'Connor represented. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #1).
31. On September 23, 2015, at 1:30 pm, Bruce L. Castor, Jr., Esq. sent an email to then District Attorney Ferman. This email was marked and admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 5 at the February 2016 *Habeas Corpus* hearing held in this matter. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #2).
32. On September 23, 2015, at 1:47 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded the email identified above as Defendant's Exhibit 5 to Mr. McMonagle. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #3).
33. On September 25, 2015, then District Attorney Ferman sent a letter to Mr. Castor by way of hand delivery. This letter was marked and admitted as the Defendant's Exhibit 6 at the February 2016 *Habeas Corpus* hearing held in this matter. At 3:02 pm that same day, Mr. Castor's secretary forwarded a scanned copy of the letter to him by way of email. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #4).
34. In her letter Ms. Ferman stated, "[t]he first I heard of such a binding agreement was your email sent this past Wednesday." (D-6)
35. On September 25, 2015, at 3:59 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded the letter identified above as Defendant's Exhibit 6 to Mr. McMonagle. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #5).
36. On September 25, 2015, at 3:41 pm, Mr. Castor sent an email to then District Attorney Ferman. This email was marked and admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 7 at the February 2016

- Habeas Corpus hearing in this matter. (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #6).
37. On September 25, 2015, at 4:19 pm, Mr. Castor forwarded the email identified above as Defendant's Exhibit 7 to Mr. McMonagle along with the message "Latest." (Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Contents of His Deposition: Stipulations #7).
 38. On December 31, 2015, the instant charges were filed.
 39. The Defendant principally relies on the testimony and writings of Mr. Castor to support his motion.
 40. In that regard, the Court finds that there were numerous inconsistencies in the testimony and writings of Mr. Castor and has previously ruled that credibility determinations were an inherent part of this Court's denial of the Defendant's initial "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." (Court Order 2/4/16).
 41. There were multiple inconsistencies between Mr. Castor's communications with the District Attorney's Office in September of 2015 and with his testimony on February 2, 2016.
 42. For example, in his September 23, 2015 email, he indicated that the decision not to prosecute was an attempt to force the Defendant to sit for depositions in an unfiled civil case and that the decision was made with the "agreement" of defense counsel and plaintiff's counsel. (D-5). However, in his testimony, he indicated that there was no agreement and no quid pro quo.
 43. The correspondence further states, "I signed the press release for precisely this reason, at the request of the Plaintiff's counsel, and with the acquiescence of Cosby's counsel, with full and complete intent to bind the Commonwealth that anything Cosby said in the civil case would not be used against him, thereby forcing him to be deposed and perhaps testify in a civil trial without him having the ability to 'take the 5th.'" (D-5). "[B]ut one thing is fact: the Commonwealth, defense and civil plaintiff's lawyers were all in agreement that the attached decision [February 17, 2005 press release] from me stripped Cosby of his Fifth Amendment privilege, forcing him to be deposed." (N.T. 2/3/16 at 195; D-5).
 44. This Court credits the testimony of Ms. Kivitz and Ms. Troiani, whose relevant testimony regarding such agreement is outlined in paragraphs 11-17 above.
 45. Mr. Castor's testimony about who was in agreement with his decision, as well as what he purportedly promised, was equivocal. (N.T. 2/2/16 at 185-195).
 46. In his final email to Ms. Ferman on the subject Mr. Castor states, "I never said we would not prosecute Cosby." (D-8)

47. Additionally, there were multiple inconsistencies between Mr. Castor's accounts to the press and his testimony on February 2, 2016. (E.g., N.T. 2/2/16 at 218-220, C-12).
48. There is no basis in the record to support the contention that there was ever an agreement or a promise not to prosecute the Defendant.
49. There is no basis in the record to support justifiable reliance on the part of the Defendant.

II. Conclusions of law

1. Instantly, this Court concludes that there was neither an agreement nor a promise not to prosecute, only an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, memorialized by the February 17, 2005 press release.
2. In the absence of an enforceable agreement, the Defendant relies on a theory of promissory estoppel and the principles of due process and fundamental fairness to support his motion to suppress.
3. Where there is no enforceable agreement between parties because the agreement lacked consideration, the agreement may still be enforceable on a theory of promissory estoppel to avoid injustice. Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606 (Pa. 2000).
4. The party who asserts promissory estoppel must show (1) the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; (2) the promisee actually took action or refrained from taking action in reliance on the promise; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90). Satisfaction of the third requirement may depend, *inter alia*, on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance and the formality with which the promise was made. Thatcher's Drug Store of W. Goshen, Inc. v. Consol. Supermarkets, Inc., 636 A.2d 156, 160 (Pa. 1994) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, comment b).
5. Because there was no promise, there can be no reliance on the part of the Defendant and principles of fundamental fairness and due process have not been violated.
6. This Court finds that there is no Constitutional barrier to the use of the Defendant's civil deposition testimony.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Sur Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence Pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 581 (i), Dec. 5, 2016 at 1-5.

The Defendant is limited to the Constitutional grounds raised in his motion to suppress. As this Court concluded, there was no constitutional impediment to the admission of this evidence, and this claim must fail. Likewise, as concluded in section A(1), there was no promise not to prosecute, only an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Thus, there was nothing for the Defendant to purportedly rely on in sitting for his civil deposition and the Commonwealth was not estopped from using the same in its subsequent prosecution. Therefore, this claim must fail.

3. Statute of Limitations (Concise Statement Issue 7).

The Defendant's next allegation of error conflates three distinct issues. First, he alleges error in "allowing the Commonwealth to proceed with prosecution," which this Court will treat as an allegation relating to the denial of his "Motion to Dismiss Charges Due to Insufficient Evidence to Prove Alleged Encounter Occurred Within the Statute of Limitations." ("Motion to Dismiss-SOL"). Next, he raises a weight of the evidence claim with regard to the statute of limitations. Finally, he appears to assert a claim related to pre-arrest delay. As set forth below, these claims must fail.

The Defendant's first claim is that this Court erred by denying his "Motion to Dismiss Charges-SOL." At the outset, this Court notes that the Defendant erroneously attempts to ascribe a due diligence standard on the Commonwealth. This standard is applicable only in civil cases relating to the tolling of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Pocono Intern. Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa., 1983) (holding that "the

“discovery rule” exception arises from the inability, despite the exercise of diligence, to determine the injury or its cause, not upon a retrospective view of whether the facts were *actually* ascertained within the [statute of limitations] period”). In the criminal context, a “due diligence” standard applies exclusively to the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Pa. R. Crim. P. 600 (C) (1) (including in the speedy trial calculation “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence”). As this is a criminal matter and no speedy trial issue was raised, the “due diligence” standard is inapplicable to the instant issue.

Likewise, as to this first allegation of error, again, no constitutional claim was raised before this Court and none is specified in his concise statement, thus constituting waiver of that ground. Cline, 177 A.3d at 927 (citations omitted) (stating “issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal”). This Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the “Motion to Dismiss-SOL” and sending the issue of the statute of limitations to the jury and the Defendant’s first claim fails.

The statute of limitations is a waivable, affirmative defense. Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 862 A.2d 1185, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2004). In order for prosecution to be precluded, the issue must solely be a question of law, as opposed to a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law. Commonwealth v. Groff, 548 A.2d 1237, n.8 (Pa. Super. 1988) (stating “[i]f the statute of limitations defense poses a question of law, the judge may decide the

issue pretrial or at an appropriate time during trial. If the statute of limitations defense poses a question of fact, the judge should not decide the question but should present the question for jury consideration”).

The Defendant relied on Commonwealth v. Bethlehem, 570 A.2d 563, 568 (Pa. Super. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Gerstner, 656 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. 1995) to support his argument that this Court should decide the issue pretrial. In Bethlehem, the Commonwealth agreed that the charges were brought outside the statute of limitations; however, it believed that the statute of limitations was tolled because the victim was a minor based on an erroneous interpretation of case law. Id. at 564. On appeal, the Superior Court noted that because there was clear and uncontradicted evidence that the statute of limitations had run and there was no factual dispute that the offenses were outside the statute of limitations, “the failure to grant dismissal of the charges on statute of limitations grounds at the preliminary hearing or pretrial motions stage is inexplicable.” Id. at 565.

Bethlehem is easily distinguishable from the instant case. The statute of limitations for aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. 3125, is twelve years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552 (b.1). Instantly, there was no such “clear and uncontradicted evidence” that the assault did not happen within the statute of limitations. As discussed above, Ms. Constand consistently maintained that the assault took place in 2004. While she initially reported that it took place in March of 2004, she ultimately determined that it took place in January of 2004. By his own admission, the Defendant agreed that the assault took place

in 2004 as that was the “ballpark” of when he knew her and it was “not more than a year away.” N.T. Apr. 18, 2018, Excerpt, at 43. The Defendant was charged on December 30, 2015, within the twelve year statute of limitations. As presented in this case, the statute of limitations was a question of fact properly sent to the jury as both parties agreed that the encounter happened. Thus, this claim fails.

The Defendant’s next claim is that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence concerning the statute of limitations. Preliminarily, the Court submits that this claim is more properly categorized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence that the assault took place within the twelve year limitations period.²⁹ Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, once the Defendant asserted the statute of limitations as a defense, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the offense happened within the limitations period. Bethlehem, 570 A.2d at 568; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 103 (stating “an element of an offense is such conduct or such attendant circumstances or such a result of conduct as negatives a defense under the statute of limitation”). As the jury was instructed, in a sex crimes prosecution, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Pa. SSJI (Crim) 4.13 (B). Ms. Constand testified that the assault took place in January 2004. Thus, the

²⁹ In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to view the evidence, and all permissible inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner. The test is whether, taking as true the evidence most favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the evidence is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 463 A.2d 1117, 1118-19 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citations omitted).

evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the offense happened within the statute of limitations. However, as he failed to challenge the sufficiency of that evidence, a sufficiency claim is waived.

A true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001)). The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003)). Accordingly, a weight of the evidence challenge contests the weight that is accorded the testimonial evidence. Morgan, 913 A.2d at 909 (citing Armbruster v. Horowitz, 744 A.2d 285, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999)). In reviewing a weight of the evidence challenge, “[a] new trial should be granted only where the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

Ms. Constand testified that the assault took place in January 2004. N.T. Apr. 13, 2018 at 56. Likewise, Detective Reape testified that there was no evidence to indicate that the assault happened prior to 2004. N.T. Apr. 18, 2018, Excerpted Testimony of James Reape from Trial by Jury, at 26. The Defendant presented evidence in his defense. In addition to testimony

purporting to show that Ms. Constand lied about the assault to obtain money, the Defendant presented records and schedules in an attempt to prove that he was not at his Elkins Park home in January of 2004 during the period of time Ms. Constand testified that the assault took place. Clearly, the jury afforded greater weight to the testimony of Ms. Constand that the assault took place in January 2004. The Court discerns no error in the jury's verdict and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's post sentence motion for a new trial on this basis.

Finally, the defendant appears to be raising a claim of pre-arrest delay; it is unclear why such a claim has been raised in an allegation of error related to the statute of limitations. By its plain language, this allegation of error presumes that the assault happened within the statute of limitations.

Preliminarily, this Court notes that this claim may be waived.³⁰ Prior to his first trial, the Defendant filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Charges Based on the Deprivation of the Defendant's Due Process Rights," on October 6, 2016. By Order of November 16, 2016, this Court denied the Motion *without prejudice* to the Defendant's ability to raise the claim again during trial. His first trial ended in a mistrial, constituting a nullity.

³⁰This Court submits that this claim is vague and potentially waived on that ground. While this Court assumes the issue is referring to Mr. Phillips, the Defendant does not specify the witness who died during the twelve year period. Hansley, 24 A.3d at 415; Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 38, (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating "[w]e specifically conclude that when an appellant fails to identify in a vague Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement the specific issue he/she wants to raise on appeal, the issue is waived, even if the trial court guesses correctly and addresses the issue in its Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) opinion").

On January 25, 2018, the Defendant filed a “Motion to Incorporate All Prior Pretrial Motions And Oppositions to the Commonwealth’s Motions.” At the March 5, 2018 hearing on pretrial motions, this Court stated, “[T]here is a motion to incorporate all prior pretrial motions. . . I’m proceeding with the concept that no rulings that I made previously—this is a new trial...[s]o[,]although I have granted the motion to incorporate all pretrial motions, you have to tell me what it is you want to deal with.” N.T. Mar. 5, 2018 at 9. The Defendant did not seek to relitigate this issue. The Court submits that the Motion to Incorporate Prior Pretrial Motions was insufficient to preserve this claim where the motion was denied without prejudice. Even if this claim is not waived, it is without merit and must fail.

First, to prevail on a claim of pre-arrest delay, the Defendant must show actual prejudice, not “substantial prejudice,” as stated in his concise statement. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1998) (“Snyder I”). If he makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to show that the delay was proper. Id. In any event, as discussed in section A(1), there was no agreement not to prosecute, thus the death of Mr. Phillips did not prejudice the Defendant. Likewise, Mr. Phillips was not the only source of evidence regarding the purported agreement. Furthermore, the delay in prosecution was not a result of the Commonwealth’s actions or an attempt to gain a strategic advantage. Rather, the Defendant and his legal team managed to keep his depositions in the 2005 civil case shielded from public view until 2015. Once the Defendant’s depositions were unsealed, containing, *inter alia*,

an admission that he digitally penetrated Ms. Constand, the Commonwealth reopened its investigation. As a result of the reopened investigation, which included new allegations from additional women, the Defendant was ultimately charged on December 30, 2015, within the statute of limitations. Thus, this claim must fail.

4. This Court properly denied the Defendant's Motion to Excuse Juror 11. (Concise Statement Issue 1)

The Defendant's next contention is that the Court erred by not removing Juror 11. The Defendant made no constitutional argument in his motion³¹ seeking the removal of Juror 11 or at the in camera hearing on his motion and thus, this Court submits any such argument is waived. Commonwealth v. McGriff, 160 A.3d 863, 871-72 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted)(stating "[i]f counsel states the grounds for an objection, then all other unspecified grounds are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal").

Likewise, to the extent that the Defendant is attempting to assign error to this Court's refusal to interview all of the *prospective* jurors that were in the room, the Court submits such a claim is waived. The Court cannot be made to guess at what issues the Defendant seeks to raise on appeal. Hansley, 24 A.3d at 415. Moreover, the Court did interview the *selected* jurors who were in the room to determine whether they heard the purported comment, thus, no allegation of error can be assigned on that basis and, again, the Defendant

³¹ His supplemental memorandum of law, filed at 6:50 p.m. on Sunday, April 8, 2018 on the eve of the hearing on the motion, includes a constitutional argument based on Article 1 § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, however, he did not pursue this argument at the in-camera hearing.

made no constitutional argument. This Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion on credibility grounds, thus, this claim must fail.

It is well settled that, “[t]he decision whether to disqualify a juror is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and is reversible only in the event of a ‘palpable abuse of discretion.’” Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 747, 756 (Pa. Super., 2003) (citation omitted). Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure “[w]ithout declaring a mistrial, a judge may allow a challenge for cause at any time before the jury begins to deliberate, provided sufficient alternates have been selected” Pa. R. Crim. P. 631 (F)(1)(b). “The test for determining whether a prospective juror should be disqualified is whether [the potential juror] is willing and able to eliminate the influence of any scruples and render a verdict according to the evidence, and this is to be determined on the basis of answers to questions and demeanor.” Commonwealth v. Bridges, 757 A.2d 859, 873 (Pa. 2000) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by, Commonwealth v. Freeman, 872 A.2d 385 (Pa. 2003).

During jury selection, the prospective jurors were extensively *voir dire*d about, *inter alia*, their knowledge of this case and whether they had a fixed opinion regarding the Defendant’s guilt or innocence. Specifically, during individual *voir dire*, the following exchange took place with the individual who ultimately became Juror 11:

The Court: So I assume what you heard [about the case] came from the print or online or wherever you get your information, you heard something about this case. Have you formed any opinion about the case?

Juror 11:³² Not really. I thought it was over.

The Court: Okay. So when you say, "not really, I thought it was over," let's now go back. So it could be from any time, this information [about the case]. That's what would be important. You did indicate on your under-oath question that you didn't have a fixed opinion; is that right?

Juror 11: Correct.

The Court: Okay. So let's start with do you think you've heard online, T.V., radio, or anything that you have an opinion about the case?

Juror 11: I haven't heard much. I mean, I don't have a fixed opinion. I can't say if he's guilty or innocent. I don't know. I don't know nothing.

The Court: So you don't have an opinion then?

Juror 11: Correct.

The Court: Or you don't have a fixed opinion?

Juror 11: Yeah.

The Court: Well, yeah to both of them. Well I'm going to ask my next questions and that's important. So we don't know how much you may have been exposed to, but as that information comes in, would you be able to take an oath that would say no matter what I may have heard back then, I thought it was over, maybe I heard something, maybe I didn't, would you take an oath that would say that you would not consider any of that evidence or not that—any of those things that I heard or saw, I just wouldn't consider it because I'll take an oath to say I'll only consider evidence that is coming in from a witness stand or there? Could you take such an oath?

Juror 11: Yeah.

The Court: Then, finally, the fact of whatever you've heard, whatever it has been, whenever you remember it from, would it

³² During his individual *voir dire*, he was referred to as prospective juror 93.

affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this case?

Juror 11: No.

N.T., Jury Selection/Day 3, Apr. 4, 2018 at 131-132. Following the individual *voir dire* of this juror, both the Defense and the Commonwealth indicated that they had no additional questions and accepted him as Juror 11. Id. at 135.

Jury selection was completed on April 5, 2018 with the selection of twelve jurors and six alternates; although the jury was selected, the jury was not yet sworn. N.T. Apr. 5, 2018 at 190. On April 6, 2018, the Court and counsel had a conference to address any outstanding issues in advance of the commencement of trial on Monday, April 9, 2018. Following this conference, in the late afternoon on April 6, 2018, the Defendant filed “Defendant’s Motion, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law In Support Thereof, to Excuse Juror for Cause and for Questioning of Jurors.” In the Motion, the Defendant alleged that during the jury selection process, Juror 11 indicated that he believed the Defendant was guilty. In support of this Motion, the Defendant filed declarations of Priscilla Horvath, the administrative assistant for the Defendant’s Attorney Kathleen Bliss, the declaration of Richard Beasley, a defense private investigator, and the declaration of prospective Juror 9.³³

Ms. Horvath indicated that when she arrived at work on April 5, 2018, there was a message from prospective Juror 9. In the message, prospective

³³ On April 4, 2018, the Commonwealth exercised its third peremptory strike to remove prospective Juror 9. N.T. Apr. 4, 2018 at 45. The Defendant has not challenged that strike on appeal.

Juror 9 indicated that she had been dismissed from the jury on April 4, 2018 and that there was a potential juror who stated that “he is guilty” in reference to Defendant. Horvath Declaration para. 3. Ms. Horvath called the prospective juror back and obtained a description of the juror who purportedly made the statement. Id. at para 4. Private investigator Beasley also contacted the prospective juror; the juror relayed the same information to Beasley. Beasley Declaration at para 2. Despite learning of this purported issue on April 5, 2018, at which time jury selection was still taking place, defense counsel did not bring this issue to the Court’s attention at that time, or during the April 6, 2018 conference, but instead undertook an independent investigation.

On April 9, 2018, the Court held an in-camera hearing prior to the commencement of trial. At the hearing, prospective Juror 9 testified that she was on the second panel of jurors,³⁴ summoned on April 3, 2018. N.T., Trial by Jury, Apr. 9, 2018 at 34. The jurors who were not stricken for cause returned the next day, April 4, 2018, for individual *voir dire*. Id. at 35. Prospective juror 9 and eleven other prospective jurors waited in a small jury room for individual *voir dire*. Id. at 36. The court noted during the in chambers proceeding that the room is a small room, approximately 10 feet by 15 feet. Id. at 36. Prospective juror 9 testified that she was sitting across the room from Juror 11. Id. at 37. She testified that she was able to hear anything that anyone said in the room unless they were having a private conversation. Id. at 36-37.

³⁴ Jurors 9, 10, 11, and 12 were ultimately secured from this panel.

She testified that when they returned to the jury room after lunch, at some point in the afternoon, Juror 11 was standing by the window, playing with the blinds. Id. at 46. She testified that he stated that he was ready to just say the Defendant was guilty so they could all get out of there. Id. She testified that she was unsure if he was joking. Id. She indicated that no one else in the room reacted to the statement and people continued to make small talk. Id. at 47. She indicated that Juror 11 also made a statement about a comedy show that the Defendant performed after the first trial. Id. at 48-49. There was also some discussion in the group about a shooting at YouTube. Id. at 49.

Prospective Juror 9 contacted defense counsel and left a message regarding this information. When questioned by the Court, she unequivocally indicated that she was told by the defense team that if she signed the declaration, she would not have to return to court. Id. at 40, 99-100. Defense counsel, Becky James, Esq., stated that she spoke to prospective Juror 9 over the phone and told her twice that she could not guarantee that she would not have to come back. Id. at 115-116. Defense investigator Scott Ross, who actually obtained the signed declaration of prospective Juror 9, also indicated that he told her he could not guarantee she would not have to return to testify. Id. at 146.

The Court questioned Juror 11 about the statement. The following exchange took place:

The Court: Let me just ask you: At any time during the afternoon, for whatever reason, did you make the statement, I just think he's

guilty, so we can all be done and get out of here, or something similar to that? . . .

Juror 11: No.

The Court: You never made such a statement?

Juror 11: No.

The Court: So if you were standing at the window there, you don't recall making a statement, for whatever reason, it could have been just to break the ice?

Juror 11: I do not recall that.

The Court: You don't recall it. Could you have made a statement like that?

Juror 11: I don't think I would have.

The Court: You don't think you would have?

Juror 11: No.

The Court: I just want to make perfectly clear, it is okay if you did. We just—I need to track down a lot of different things and, you know, I will ask you some other questions afterwards, but it is important that if you made such a statement you do tell us.

Juror 11: (Nods).

The Court: And I'm going to let you reflect on it because it's part of the process and we do have to check these things out.

Juror 11: Okay.

The Court: So did you make that statement? If you did, it's perfectly okay.

Juror 11: No.

The Court: You did not?

Juror 11: No.

Id. at 56-57

The Court: So did you hear anyone at any time mention and opinion when you back in this room regarding the guilt or innocence of Mr. Cosby?

Juror 11: No.

The Court: That means whether it was joking or not joking, just any comment?

Juror 11: No, I don't remember anything like that.

The Court: So you don't remember, but you clearly know that you did not say it; is that correct?

Juror 11: Yes.

Id. at 59.

Juror 11 consistently denied making any such statement, even as a joke.

Id. at 56-59. He also stated that he did not remark on a comedy performance of the Defendant and indicated that people in the room discussed the shooting at YouTube. Id. at 58-59.

Following Juror 11's repeated denials, the Court then interviewed the seated jurors who were in the room at the time of the alleged statement. First, the Court interviewed seated Juror 9. Id. at 62. Juror 9 indicated that they did not hear anyone make a comment to the effect that the Defendant was guilty, any comment about his guilt or innocence, or any discussion of YouTube. Id. at 63-64. The Court interviewed seated Juror 10. Id. at 66. Juror 10, likewise, did not hear anyone make a comment regarding the Defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 69. Juror 10 indicated that they heard people discussing the shooting at YouTube. Id. at 72. Juror 10 did not hear anyone talk about a comedy performance of the Defendant. Id. at 73. The

Court interviewed seated Juror 12 who did not hear anyone say that they thought the Defendant was guilty. Id. at 76. Juror 12 did hear people discuss the shooting at YouTube. Id. at 77. He did not hear any discussion of a comedy performance of the Defendant that may have been on YouTube. Id. Juror 12 was seated next to Juror 11 at the time of the alleged statement. Id. at 75, 111.

Following the interviews of Jurors 9, 10 and 12, the Court again questioned Juror 11. At this point, the Court told Juror 11 that a prospective juror claimed that he made a statement to the effect of “I think he’s guilty, so we can all be done and get out of here.” Id. at 92. Again the juror denied making the statement. Id.

Based on this Court’s observations of the demeanor of all of the people questioned regarding the statement and its review of the declarations attached to the Motion, the Court denied the motion on credibility grounds. Id. at 117, 154. Juror 11 answered the questions without hesitation. This Court did not find Prospective Juror 9 to be credible. Prospective Juror 9 claimed that she heard people talking about a comedy performance by the Defendant; no other interviewed juror heard any such conversation. Additionally, prospective Juror 9 had a history with the District Attorney’s Office. She had previously been required to complete community service and at the time of this allegation had been interviewed in connection with an ongoing fraud investigation. Id. at 96-97. Based on the foregoing, this court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Juror 11.

B. Evidentiary Issues

The Defendant's next two issues are that this Court erred in the admission of evidence. It is well settled that, "[a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion." Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. 2002). Likewise, when reviewing challenges to the admission of expert testimony, appellate courts leave such decisions "largely to the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings thereon will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 605 (Pa. Super. 2018). "An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record." Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 726, 928 A.2d 1289 (2007). This standard also applies to rulings on a motion *in limine*. Commonwealth v. Parker, 104 A.2d 17 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, the threshold inquiry in determining the admissibility of evidence is relevance. "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Pa.R.E. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible. Pa. R.E. 402. However, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger

of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa. R.E. 403.

1. The Court properly allowed expert testimony pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5920. (Concise Statement Issue 2)

The Defendant’s first evidentiary claim is that this Court erred by allowing Dr. Barbara Ziv to testify as an expert witness pursuant to 42 Pa C.S.A. § 5920. This Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Dr. Ziv’s testimony and this claim must fail.

The Defendant does not appear to challenge Dr. Ziv’s qualifications as an expert, but rather the statute itself, which allowed for her testimony. The grounds for that error are not entirely clear from the Defendant’s concise statement. First, the Defendant alleges that Dr. Ziv’s testimony violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. However, he has not specified how Dr. Ziv’s testimony violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Pretrial, counsel made a vague, theoretical argument on these grounds based on testimony that could potentially be elicited at trial in the form of hypotheticals or on the subject of offender profiling. N.T., Apr. 10, 2018, Excerpt from Trial by Jury, at 14-15. However, at trial, no such testimony was elicited and defense counsel made no constitutional objections to Dr. Ziv’s testimony on direct or redirect examination. N.T. Apr. 10, 2018,

Testimony of Dr. Babara Ziv, M.D., at 37-78; 124-131. Thus, this Court submits such a claim is waived.³⁵

Likewise, any claim related to Article I §§ 1 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was not developed and, thus, waived. The Court further notes that the Defendant has failed to assert an *ex post facto* challenge under the United States Constitution in his concise statement, thus any such challenge is waived. Even if a federal *ex post facto* claim is not waived, it is without merit. The Defendant's sole claim is that under the Pennsylvania Constitution³⁶, the statute, which took effect on August 28, 2012, cannot apply to the instant case because the assault took place in 2004.³⁷ He is mistaken.

Section 5920 provides, in pertinent part,

In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a witness may be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness has specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average layperson based on the witness's experience with, or specialized training or education in, criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim services issues, related to sexual violence, that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence, victim

³⁵ Pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, in order to preserve a claim of error relating to the admission or exclusion of evidence, a contemporaneous objection which states the specific ground for the objection or an offer of proof is required. Pa. R.E. 103. Likewise “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa. R.A.P. 302(a).

³⁶ This Court notes that the only constitutional challenge to this law that has been litigated to date is whether the law violates the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's authority over procedural rules under Article V § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Supreme Court held that § 5920 is a substantive evidentiary rule and does not violate the Supreme Court's authority over procedural rules. Commonwealth v. Olivio, 127 A.3d 769, 780-81.

³⁷ The Defendant's concise statement indicates that the assault took place 12 years before the inception of the statute, which is factually incorrect.

responses to sexual violence and the impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being assaulted. If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and victim behaviors. The witness's opinion regarding the credibility of any other witness, including the victim, shall not be admissible.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920 (b)(1)-(3). The statute applies to “[a]criminal proceeding for an offense under 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 31 (relating to sexual offenses).” § 5920 (a)(2).

Furthermore, as noted in the enabling act, “[t]he addition of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920 shall apply to actions *initiated* on or after the effective date of this section.” 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2012-75 (H.B. 1264) (emphasis added). The statute took effect on August 28, 2012. The instant case was initiated on December 30, 2015, well after the effective date of the statute. Thus, the statute is applicable to the instant matter. The Defendant claims that such application violates the *ex post facto* clause.

This Court’s analysis under both the state and federal *ex post facto* clauses is substantially the same. Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 184 (2012) (noting “that the *ex post facto* clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions are virtually identical in language, and the standards applied to determine *ex post facto* violations under both constitutions are comparable”). The United States Constitution provides “No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, *ex post facto* Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts... .” USCA CONST Art. I § 10, cl. 1. Article 1 § 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides “[n]o *ex post facto* law nor any law

impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.” It is well settled that,

[a] law violates the *ex post facto* clause of the United States Constitution if it (1) makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender.

Allhouse, 36 A.3d at 184 (citing Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798))) (some citations omitted).

In Carmell v. Texas, the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed a Texas statute that was amended to allow for a conviction of certain sexual offenses on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim alone. 529 U.S. 513, 516, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000). Carmell was indicted on fifteen counts of sexual abuse between 1991 and 1995 of a victim who was 12 to 16 years old during the time of the abuse.³⁸ Id. Until September 1, 1993, to sustain a conviction the statute at issue required “outcry or corroboration”³⁹ in addition to the victim’s testimony, unless the victim was under 14 years old. Id. at 517. If the victim was less than 14, his or her uncorroborated testimony alone could sustain a conviction. Id. The amendment to the statute extended

³⁸ The amendment to the statute affected four of Carmell’s fifteen convictions. Id. at 519.

³⁹ The statute required independent evidence to corroborate the victim or evidence that the victim informed another person within six months of the assault. Id.

the child victim exception to allow convictions based on the uncorroborated testimony of victims under 18 years old. Id. at 518. The Court found that amended statute violated the *ex post facto* clause because it

changed the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a conviction; under the new law, petitioner could be (and was) convicted on the victim's testimony alone, without any corroborating evidence. Under any commonsense understanding of *Calder's* fourth category, [the amended statute] plainly fits. Requiring only the victim's testimony to convict, rather than the victim's testimony plus other corroborating evidence is surely 'less testimony required to convict' in any straightforward sense of those words.

Id. at 530.

In Allshouse, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed an amendment to the Tender Years Hearsay Act ("TYHA")⁴⁰ under the fourth prong of the *ex post facto* analysis. 36 A.3d at 185. The statement at issue in Allshouse was a four year old's statement that the Defendant was responsible for the spiral fracture of her infant brother's arm. Id. at 168. At the time of the 2004 incident of child abuse, the Act only permitted child hearsay about acts perpetrated "with or on the child by another." Id. at 184. At the time of trial, the Act had been amended and the language "with or on the child by another" was removed. Id. at 183. The trial court permitted the testimony and the

⁴⁰The tender years exception permits an out-of-court statement of a child victim or witness under the age of twelve to be admissible if the evidence is "relevant and the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5985.1 (a)(1). The child must either testify at trial or be unavailable as a witness for the statement to be admissible.

§ 5985.1 (a)(2).

Supreme Court held that the application of the amended Act did not violate the *ex post facto* clause. Id. at 188. The Court stated,

the TYHA is not a sufficiency rule, as it does not address the type of evidence sufficient to support a conviction. . . the amended version of the TYHA in the instant case did not alter the evidence the Commonwealth was required to prove in order to convict Appellant. A.A.'s testimony, though potentially helpful, was not an essential element of the Commonwealth's case against Appellant.

Id.

Instantly, Section 5920 does not implicate the first three prongs of the test for an *ex post facto* violation. Therefore, it would only violate the *ex post facto* clause if it “alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender.” Like the statute at issue in Allshouse, and unlike the statute in Calder, § 5920 is not a rule of sufficiency and did not alter the proof necessary to convict the Defendant.

At trial, Dr. Barbara Ziv testified as an expert in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence, and the impact of sexual violence on victims during and after being assaulted, as permitted by the statute. Dr. Ziv’s testimony did go to any element that the Commonwealth was required to prove in order to sustain a conviction, but simply assisted the jury in understanding victim responses to sexual violence. Therefore, this Court properly allowed expert testimony pursuant to §5920 and this claim must fail.

**2. This Court did not err in admitting evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to Pa. R.E. 404 (b).
(Concise Statement Issues 6 and 8)**

Defendant's makes two claims related to the admission of prior bad acts evidence pursuant to Pa. R.E. 404 (b), each with multiple subparts. First, the Defendant claims that the Court violated his due process rights in allowing the Commonwealth to present evidence in the form of five prior bad act witnesses who each alleged that the Defendant sexually assaulted her. Next, he alleges that the witnesses' allegations were too remote and dissimilar from Ms. Constand's. Finally, he alleges that the Court's changed ruling, following a mistrial, violated his rights to due process.

Second, the Defendant assigns error to the admission of his civil deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes. First, he alleges that this evidence violated his due process rights under the state and federal constitutions. Next, he claims that the deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes was irrelevant and remote in time. He then claims that the deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes "backdoored" the admission of a sixth 404 (b) witness, constituting inadmissible prior bad act evidence. Finally, he alleges that the Quaalude evidence was highly prejudicial in that it included statements regarding the illegal act of giving "narcotics" to another person. These claims are without merit and must fail.

Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal activity generally is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in conformity with those past acts or to show criminal

propensity. Pa. R.E. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. Pa. R.E. 404(b)(2). Prior bad act evidence is admissible only if the probative value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Pa. R.E. 404 (b)(2). Notably, Pa. R.E. 404(b) is not limited to evidence of crimes that have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in court. It encompasses both prior *crimes* and prior *wrongs and acts*, the latter of which, by their nature, often lack “definitive proof.” Commonwealth v. Lockcuff, 813 A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. Super. 2002).

As to common plan, scheme or design, our Supreme Court has stated,

[t]he trial court must first examine the details and surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the signature of the same perpetrator. Relevant to such a finding will be the habits or patterns of action or conduct undertaken by the perpetrator to commit crime, as well as the time, place, and types of victims typically chosen by the perpetrator.

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted). The prior acts must bear a logical connection to the crimes charged. Hicks, 156 A.3d at 1125-1126. “Much more is demanded than the mere repetition of crimes of the same class, such as repeated burglaries or thefts. The device used must be so unusual or distinctive as to be like a signature.” Id. (citations omitted).

Remoteness is but one factor that the court should consider. The importance of the time period between the earlier act and the current act is inversely proportional to the similarity of the other crimes or acts. Tyson, 119

A.3d at 359. The more similar the crimes, the less significant the length of time that has passed. Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding common scheme exception justified admission of testimony regarding defendant's previous sexual assaults despite six-year lapse between periods of abuse, where three victims were nearly same age, victims were either daughter or step-daughter of defendant and lived with him when acts occurred; and pattern of molestation—from improper touching to oral sex to sexual intercourse—was highly similar with respect to two victims). “If the evidence reveals that the details of each criminal incident are nearly identical, the fact that the incidents are separated by a lapse of time will not likely prevent the offer of the evidence unless the time lapse is excessive.” Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359. When conducting a remoteness analysis, the sequential nature of the acts and the time between each act is determinative. Commonwealth v. Smith, 635 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quoting Frank, 577 A.2d at 617 (stating “[i]ndeed, the relevancy of this evidence rested in large part upon the fact that the evidence indicated a recurring sequence of acts by this [defendant] over a continuous span of time, as opposed to random and remote acts”)).

Evidence of a prior crime or bad act may also be admitted to show a defendant's actions were not the result of a mistake or accident, “where the manner and circumstances of two crimes are remarkably similar.” Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359 (citing Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 294–95 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

Chief Justice Saylor's concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Hicks, offers a related, compelling basis for admission. In Hicks, Chief Justice Saylor described the "doctrine of chances," or "the doctrine of objective improbability" as another "theory of logical relevance that does not depend on an impermissible inference of bad character, and which is most greatly suited to disproof of accident or mistake." Hicks, 156 A.3d at 1131 (Saylor, C.J. concurring) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 549 A.2d 121, 126 (Pa. 1988) (OAJC).

Chief Justice Saylor succinctly summarized leading commentary on the doctrine:

To determine whether the asserted theory qualifies [as a non-character-based theory of logical relevance], the trial judge must trace the entire chain of inferences underlying the theory. The theory passes muster if the inferential path between the item of evidence and a fact of consequence in the case does not require any inferences as to the defendant's personal, subjective character.

* * *

[T]he proponent does not offer the evidence of the uncharged misconduct to establish an intermediate inference as to the defendant's personal, subjective bad character. Rather, the proponent offers the evidence to establish the objective improbability of so many accidents befalling the defendant *or the defendant becoming innocently enmeshed in suspicious circumstances so frequently.*

* * *

The reasoning of the doctrine of chances theory avoids the forbidden character-based logic, and thus is permissible under current law. It is founded on a logical inference deriving not from the personal characteristics of the actor, but from the external circumstances themselves. The inference is based on informal probability reasoning—reasoning that does not require formal statistical proof, but only the jury's subjective evaluation of likelihood based on intuition and common experience. And in

many cases, the intuitive assessment is rather compelling. Could it really be true that a person has received so many stolen vehicles without realizing—at any point—that they were stolen? It is thus possible for one's mind to travel from the evidence to the conclusion without relying on forbidden character reasoning or on the assumption that prior experience would have given the defendant notice of the stolen nature of vehicles obtained from a particular source or under similar circumstances.

Hicks, 156 A.3d at 1133 (Pa., 2017) (Saylor, C.J. concurring)(emphasis in original)(citations omitted).

The Chief Justice noted that caution must be used when applying the doctrine of chances, specifically,

[t]o protect against the exception swallowing the rule, Professor Imwinkelried recommends that the trial court determine whether the prosecution has satisfied three criteria. First, is the evidence of other acts roughly similar to the charged crime? Second, does the number of unusual occurrences in which the defendant has been involved exceed the frequency rate for the general population? Third, is there a real dispute between the prosecution and the defense over whether the actus reus occurred?

Id. at 1136.

Upon determining that prior bad act evidence meets an exception,

the trial court must assure that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact upon the trier of fact. To do so, the court must balance the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence with such factors as the degree of similarity established between the incidents of criminal conduct, the Commonwealth's need to present evidence under the [exception], and the ability of the trial court to caution the jury concerning the proper use of such evidence by them in their deliberations.

Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359.

“Unfair prejudice” means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Pa. R. E. 403, cmt. “Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. Although at times the jury is

presented with unpleasant facts, [t]he trial court is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts” Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1180–81 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

When ruling on the admissibility of prior act evidence, the determination is fact specific and must be made on a case by case basis. Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609, 614 (Pa. Super. 1990) (enumerating balancing test factors).

a. The testimony of five prior bad act witnesses was properly admitted. (Concise Statement Issue 6)

The Defendant’s first allegation of error is that the Court erred in permitting five 404 (b) witnesses to testify. The Court notes at the outset, to the extent that this allegation of error relies on the difference between this Court’s ruling prior to the first trial and the ruling prior to the second trial, this claim is both waived and belied by the record. At no time was this claim raised before the trial court, during the second trial, constituting waiver. In fact, Defense counsel conceded that “the Court is not bound by its prior rulings...” during argument on the 404 (b) motion. N.T. March 6, 2018 at 32.⁴¹ Thus, any error on this ground is waived. Pa. R.A.P. 302(a)

Likewise, this Court submits that the Defendant has not preserved a Due Process Claim. In his “Opposition to the Commonwealth’s Motion to Introduce Evidence of Alleged Prior Bad Acts of Defendant,” (“Opposition”) the Defendant raised a general due process argument regarding the admission of improper

⁴¹ See, Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 311 (stating “the grant of a new trial ‘wipes the slate clean’”); Commonwealth v. Mulholland, 702 A.2d 1027, 1035-36 (Pa. 1997).

evidence and cited extra-jurisdictional authority for support of that argument. Opposition at 31-33. However, at the argument on the Commonwealth's Motion, defense counsel made a due process argument in the context of preparing to defend against the testimony of the 404 (b) witnesses. N.T. Mar. 6, 2018 at 112. Furthermore, in his post argument brief, the Defendant's due process argument focused on the proffered testimony of witnesses who were not ultimately called at trial. Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Commonwealth's Motion to Introduce Evidence of 19 Alleged Prior Bad Acts of the Defendant at 17-20 ("Post-Hearing Brief"); See, Exhibits C-PBA-2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 16. He argued that evidence pertaining to those allegations were vague as to time and place, hampering his ability to prepare his defense. Post-Hearing Brief at 17. As he has not specified how his right to due process was violated, forcing the Court to guess, this Court's analysis is hampered; thus, constituting waiver. To the extent that his due process claim implicates the balance of probative value versus unfair prejudice, it will be discussed below.

The testimony of the five⁴² 404 (b) witnesses was admissible under both the common plan, scheme or design exception and the lack of accident or mistake exception, with admissibility further supported by the doctrine of chances. Therefore, this claim must fail.

First, the Defendant asserts that testimony of the permitted witnesses was too dissimilar to Ms. Constand's allegations. This claim is belied by the

⁴² The Commonwealth proffered 19 prior bad act witnesses.

record. Ms. Constand's testimony can be summarized as follows: 1) Ms. Constand was substantially younger than the married Defendant and physically fit; 2) she met him through her employment at Temple University; 3) they developed what she believed to be a genuine friendship and mentorship. Over the course of that friendship, she accepted invitations to see the defendant socially, both with other people and alone; 4) after a period of time, during which he gained her trust, he invited her to his home to discuss her upcoming career change; 5) he offered her three blue pills and urged her to take them;⁴³ 6) once she took the pills, she became incapacitated and was unable to verbally or physically stop the assault. She did not consent to sexual contact with the Defendant; 7) during intermittent bouts of consciousness, she was aware of the Defendant digitally penetrating her vagina and using her hand to masturbate himself.

The allegations of the Commonwealth's 404 (b) witnesses may be summarized as follows: 1) each woman was substantially younger than the married Defendant and physically fit; 2) the Defendant initiated the contact with each woman, primarily through her employment; 3) over the course of their time together, she came to trust him and often developed what the woman believed to be a genuine friendship or mentorship; 4) each woman accepted an invitation from the Defendant to a place in his control, where she was ultimately alone with him; 5) each woman accepted the offer of a drink or a pill, often after insistence on the part of the Defendant; 6) after ingesting the pill or

⁴³ He told her, "These are your friends. They'll help take the edge off."

drink, each woman was rendered incapacitated and unable to consent to sexual contact; 7) the Defendant sexually assaulted her while she was under the influence of the intoxicant he administered. These chilling similarities rendered the 404 (b) testimony admissible under the common plan, scheme or design and the absence of mistake exceptions.

The Defendant's actions were so distinctive as to become a signature. The striking similarities between the assaults alleged by each woman were not confined to insignificant details. In each instance, the Defendant met a substantially younger woman, gained her trust, invited her to a place where he was alone with her, provided her with a drink or drug and sexually assaulted her once she was rendered incapacitated.

Each woman was substantially younger than the married Defendant, and physically fit.

Ms. Constand was 30, the Defendant was 66. Ms. Thomas was 22, the Defendant was 46. Ms. Lasha was 17, the Defendant was 49. Ms. Baker-Kinney was 24, the Defendant was 45. Ms. Dickinson was 27, the Defendant was 45. Ms. Lublin was 23, the Defendant was 52. Each woman was physically fit. Ms. Constand was a former professional basketball player and athlete. Exhibit C-19. Ms. Thomas was an aspiring actress. Exhibit C-3A. Ms. Lasha was an aspiring model and actress. Ms. Baker-Kinney was a bartender at Harrah's Casino. Ms. Dickinson was an established professional model. Ms. Lublin was modeling to pay for her education. Exhibit C-16.

Each woman met the Defendant through her employment or career aspirations, most believing that he sincerely desired to mentor her.

Ms. Constand met the Defendant at Temple University, where she was the Director of Basketball Operations. Ms. Constand considered him a mentor. Ms. Thomas met the Defendant through her modeling agency that sent clients to the Defendant to be mentored. Ms. Lasha met the Defendant through a family connection in the hope of becoming an actress and model. Ms. Baker-Kinney met the Defendant at Harrah's Casino, where she worked and he was a regular performer. Ms. Dickinson met the Defendant when he contacted her modeling agency and asked to meet her. She believed he was interested in helping her break into an acting and singing career. Ms. Lublin met the Defendant through her modeling agency.

Each woman accepted the Defendant's invitation to a location under his control.

Ms. Constand accepted an invite to his home. Ms. Thomas travelled to Reno, Nevada for acting lessons with the Defendant. She believed she was staying at Harrah's hotel, but upon her arrival, she was taken to a home outside of Reno where no one was present except the Defendant. Ms. Lasha accepted an invitation to the Defendant's suite at the Las Vegas Hilton. Ms. Baker-Kinney accepted an invitation to a party, only to arrive with her friend to find there were no other guests. Ms. Dickinson accepted an invitation to Lake Tahoe to discuss her acting aspirations. Following dinner, she accepted an invitation to his room to continue discussing her career. Ms. Lublin accepted an invitation to the Las Vegas Hilton.

Once each woman was in a location under the Defendant's control, he gave her an intoxicant.

When Ms. Constand arrived at his home, he offered her wine. When she declined, he insisted that she try it. After she only tasted the wine, the Defendant went upstairs and returned with three blue pills, which she accepted. He told her "These are your friends. They'll help take the edge off." The Defendant asked Ms. Thomas to do a cold read of a script in which her character was intoxicated. He gave her a glass of wine to use as a prop and to help her get into character. Ms. Lasha had a cold on the day of her meeting with the Defendant. He offered her a blue pill he said was a decongestant and two shots of amaretto. Ms. Baker-Kinney accepted two pills from the Defendant which she believed he said were Quaaludes. Ms. Dickinson was suffering from menstrual cramps and the Defendant gave her a small, round blue pill that he said would help. The Defendant poured Ms. Lublin a shot to help her relax. She initially resisted as she was not a drinker. He insisted that it would help her improvisational skills and she accepted the drink. He then prepared her a second drink.

After consuming the intoxicant, each woman became incapacitated.

Ms. Constand testified that after taking the pills, she began to have double vision and to slur her words. She described her legs as rubbery and weak and she could not speak. She was unable to maintain consciousness. Ms. Thomas testified that she remembers only "snap shots" of what happened after she sipped the wine he gave her. Ms. Lasha testified that she began to feel woozy after taking the pill and shot that the Defendant provided her; he led

her to a back bedroom and she could no longer move. Ms. Baker-Kinney testified that after she took the pills, she became dizzy and her vision blurred and that she fell forward onto the game she was playing with the Defendant. Ms. Dickinson testified that after taking the pill the Defendant gave her, she felt lightheaded and like she could not get her words out. Ms. Lublin testified that she felt dizzy and woozy and her hearing became muffled after taking the shots the Defendant prepared for her.

Each woman was incapable of consent and sexually assaulted.⁴⁴

Ms. Constand testified that she was unable to maintain consciousness and was jolted awake by the Defendant forcefully penetrating her vagina with his fingers. Ms. Thomas testified that she woke up in bed with the Defendant forcing his penis into her mouth. Ms. Lasha testified that she was aware of the Defendant rubbing his genitals on her leg and pinching her breasts, but she was unable to stop him. Ms. Baker-Kinney testified that she awoke to the sound of her friend leaving the house and looking down to see her clothes were disheveled. The Defendant positioned himself behind her on the couch and began to fondle her as she was unable to move. Ms. Dickinson testified that she began to feel woozy, dizzy, lightheaded and could not get her words to come

⁴⁴ The Court acknowledges that the actual sexual act perpetrated against each woman was not identical. Common plan scheme or design exception “does not require that the two scenarios be identical in *every* respect.” Tyson, 119 A.3d at 360 n.3 (emphasis in original); Frank, 577 A.2d at 425-426 (upholding the admission of six prior instances of sexual assault in rape case where the sexual contact was not identical in each instance).

out. The Defendant got on top of her and she felt vaginal pain before she passed out.

The testimony was also admissible under the lack of mistake or accident exception and the related doctrine of chances, both of which require a lesser degree of similarity. Instantly, there was no dispute that a sexual encounter occurred, however, the Defendant maintained that it was consensual. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth was, therefore, relevant to show a lack of mistake, namely, that the Defendant could not have possibly believed that Ms. Constand consented to the digital penetration as well as his intent in administering an intoxicant.

Furthermore, the evidence was also admissible under a doctrine of chances theory. As outlined above, the evidence admitted was more than roughly similar to the charged conduct. The Defendant befriended younger women and administered an intoxicant in order to have sexual contact with them. The fact that at 19 other women were proffered as 404 (b) witnesses lends to the conclusion that the Defendant found himself in this situation more frequently than the general population.⁴⁵ Finally, both the Defendant and Ms. Constand agreed that digital penetration occurred. However, the Defendant maintained that it was consensual. Under those circumstances, the fact that numerous other women recounted the same or similar story, further supports the admissibility of this evidence under the doctrine of chances.

⁴⁵ The Commonwealth indicated in its Motion that it had investigated approximately 50 allegations, but chose 19 for this Court's consideration.

As to remoteness, while there was a lapse of fifteen years between the presented testimony and the instant case, the incidents were all close in time to each other. Two of the assaults were in 1982, one in 1984, one in 1986 and one in 1989. When taken together, and as a whole with all 19 proffered witnesses, the sequential nature of the acts coupled with their nearly identical similarities renders the lapse of time unimportant. Thus, this Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting this evidence under the common plan, scheme or design exception.

Upon finding that the evidence falls within the common plan, scheme or design, lack of accident or mistake and related doctrine of chances exceptions, this Court engaged in a balancing of the probative value versus the prejudice to the Defendant. First, the striking similarities between the proffered evidence and Ms. Constand's assault weighed in favor of admission of this evidence. Additionally, the Commonwealth had a substantial need for the other acts evidence. Where the parties agreed that the digital penetration occurred, the evidence of other acts was necessary to rebut the Defendant's characterization of the assault as a consensual encounter. See, Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866, 870 (Pa. 1996) (affirming admissibility of prior bad act evidence "where [Defendant] denies that the touching occurred, and since the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim in this case might reasonably lead a jury to determine that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether [Defendant] committed the crime charged, it is fair to conclude that the other crimes evidence is necessary for the prosecution of the case"); Commonwealth

v. Gordon, 652 A.2d 317, 324 (Pa. Super. 1994) (reversing trial court's exclusion of the evidence stating "the Commonwealth has demonstrated a need for the evidence, since appellee will undoubtedly assail the victim's credibility through [. . .] her failure to make a prompt complaint regarding the conduct or her apparent acquiescence in the acts by failing to resist at the time they occurred. Appellee might further attempt to show that the victim was mistaken regarding the nature of the acts"). Furthermore, Ms. Constand did not report the assault until approximately one year later, further supporting the Commonwealth's need for the evidence. Smith, 635 A.2d at 1090; Frank, 577 A.2d at 618 (stating "[t]he Commonwealth's need for the evidence was not minimal in light of the victim's failure to promptly reveal the fact that he had been sexually molested by the Appellant").

While this Court found that the testimony of all 19 witnesses was relevant and admissible, the Court sought to mitigate any prejudicial effect of such evidence by limiting the number of witnesses. See, Commonwealth v. Hicks, 91 A.3d 47, 55 (Pa. 2014) ("Hicks I") (stating that "[trial court] would have the authority to dictate how many cumulative witnesses may testify, but it cannot dictate which of those witnesses the Commonwealth may call to prove its case"). The Commonwealth was permitted to call five 404 (b) witnesses whose testimony was admissible to show both a common plan, scheme or design and the absence of mistake.

Furthermore, in addition to limiting the number of 404 (b) witnesses who were permitted to testify, at trial, this Court gave a cautionary instruction no

less than four times during trial, and again in its concluding instructions, limiting the prejudicial effect of the testimony. N.T. Apr. 11, 2018 at 45-46, 50-51; N.T. Apr. 12, 2018 at 69, 167. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. Commonwealth v. LaCava, 666 A.2d 221, 228 (Pa.1995). Limiting instructions weigh in favor of upholding admission of other bad acts evidence. Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 89 (Pa. 2004). Therefore, because the evidence of other acts was admissible under 404 (b) and this Court repeatedly cautioned the jury, the Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing five prior bad act witnesses and this claim must fail.

b. The Court did not err in admitting the Defendant's deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes. (Concise Statement Issue 8)

The Defendant's next allegation under Pa. R. E. 404 (b) is that this Court erred in admitting portions of his civil deposition testimony related to his use of Quaaludes. First, the Defendant alleges that the admission of this evidence violated his Due Process Rights. Next, the Defendant argues that the admission of the Quaalude testimony "backdoored" the admission of a sixth prior bad act witness, was not relevant and was remote in time and constituted inadmissible "bad act" evidence. Finally, he alleges that the deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes was highly prejudicial as it involved giving "narcotics" to another person.

Initially, this Court notes any due process argument is subsumed in this Courts analysis of the denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress his depositions as a whole, as discussed in section A (2). As to the final subpart of

this claim, regarding giving a “narcotic” to another person, the Court submits this is waived as it was not raised before the trial court. A new and different theory of relief may not be advanced for the first time on appeal. Cline, 177 A.3d at 927. As this Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the portions of the Defendant’s civil deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes, these claims must fail.

Following this Court’s ruling that five 404(b) witnesses could testify, the Commonwealth sought the admission of the Defendant’s civil deposition testimony regarding Quaaludes under 404(b). Specifically, the Commonwealth argued that this evidence was necessary to demonstrate the strength of its 404 (b) evidence showing common plan, scheme or design and absence of mistake and relatedly to show the Defendant’s motive and intent in executing his signature plan and the absence of mistake.

In his deposition testimony, the Defendant testified about his use of Quaaludes with women he wanted to have sex with. N.T., Apr. 18, 2018, Trial by Jury, commencing at 10:31 a.m. at 35-50. He testified that he gave Quaaludes to Jane Doe Number 1, that he had never given Quaaludes to a man, and that he did not take the Quaaludes himself. Id. at 35. He described Jane Doe 1 as “walking like she had too much to drink,” after knowingly taking the Quaalude he gave her. Id. at 36.

He testified that he obtained seven prescriptions for Quaaludes in the 1970s and agreed that he could have kept them for several years. Id. at 38, 40-41. He obtained the Quaaludes from his doctor, but he never personally

took them. Id. at 40. He testified that he used them “the same as a person would say ‘have a drink,’” meaning he gave them to other people. Id. at 42. He testified that he did not take them because he would get sleepy and that he knew Quaaludes were a depressant. Id. at 42. He testified that, “Quaaludes happen to be a depressant. I have had surgery and while being given pills that block the nervous system, in particular areas of muscle, the back, I found that I get sleepy when I want to stay awake.” Id. at 42-43. He testified that his doctor was aware that he did not intend to personally take the Quaaludes and that “[w]hat was happening at the time was that—Quaaludes happen to be the drug that kids, young people, were using to party with and there were times when I wanted to have them just in case.” Id. at 44. He also indicated that when he obtained the Quaaludes he intended to use them with young women that he wanted to have sex with. Id. at 47. At this point in his deposition, Ms. Constand’s counsel asked him, “Did you ever give any of those young women Quaaludes without their knowledge?” Id. at 47. The Defendant’s counsel objected and the Defendant stated, “I misunderstood. Woman, meaning Jane Doe Number 1, and not women.” Id. He testified that he never gave the drug to women without their knowledge. Id. at 48. He further testified that he had given Quaaludes to other women besides Jane Doe Number 1 who had not come forward. Id. at 49, 50.

First, the Defendant alleges that this evidence inappropriately “backdoored” the admission of another 404 (b) allegation of sexual assault. This Court is unable to determine the legal significance of “backdoored,” and

has found no appellate authority using such a term. While the woman that the Defendant testified he gave Quaaludes to was proffered as a 404 (b) witness, she did not testify at trial. The Defendant's deposition testimony detailed only his version of a consensual sexual encounter with that woman. No evidence regarding that woman's allegations that the Defendant sexually assaulted her was admitted at trial. Thus, this claim is without merit.

Next, he alleges that the evidence was irrelevant and remote. The Commonwealth established that the Defendant engaged in a signature pattern of providing an intoxicant to a woman and sexually assaulting her. Thus, the Defendant's *own words* in describing his use of drugs with a depressant effect with women he wanted to have sex with was highly probative of his intent and motive in executing that signature pattern. The import of his own words relating to the use of Quaaludes with women he had sex with rendered the fact that the testimony was about the 1970s inconsequential.

Again, upon finding this evidence relevant and admissible this Court balanced the probative value against the risk of undue prejudice. Like the prior bad act witness testimony, the Commonwealth demonstrated a need for this evidence. The evidence was relevant to show the strength of the Commonwealth's 404 (b) evidence. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 308 (Pa. 2002). For example, Ms. Baker-Kinney testified that in the early 1980s, the Defendant gave her two pills that she believed were Quaaludes. In his deposition, the Defendant testified that he obtained a number of

prescriptions for Quaaludes and agreed that he could have kept them for many years.

The Defendant was charged with three counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 3125 (a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(5). In order to sustain a conviction pursuant to § 3125 (a)(4), the Commonwealth was required to prove that,

the defendant knew of or recklessly disregarded Andrea Constand's unconsciousness. A defendant "recklessly" disregards another person's unconsciousness if he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the other person is unconscious. The risk disregarded must be the sort of risk that is grossly unreasonable for the defendant to disregard.

Pa. SSJI (Crim) 3125(B). Likewise, in order to sustain a conviction pursuant to § 3125 (a) (5), the Commonwealth was required to prove, that the Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded Ms. Constand's substantial impairment.

The Defendant's own words about his use and knowledge of drugs with a depressant effect was relevant to show his intent and motive in giving a depressant to Ms. Constand. As a result of this knowledge, he either knew she was unconscious, or recklessly disregarded the risk that she could be. Similarly, he either knew she was substantially impaired or recklessly disregarded the risk that she could be.

Additionally, any prejudicial effect of this evidence was mitigated by the Court's instructions. N.T. Apr. 25, 2018 at 35. This evidence was included in the Court's instructions to the jury outlining the limited purpose of such evidence. Thus, this claim is without merit and must fail.

C. Jury Instructions

1. **This Court properly instructed the jury. (Concise Statement Issue 9)**

The Defendant's next contention is that this Court erred in several of its instructions to the jury and by refusing to include a special interrogatory on the verdict sheet. Initially the Court notes that, once again, to the extent that the Defendant couches his claims as a violation of his constitutional right to Due Process, any such claim is waived as it was never raised before this Court. The law is clear that "issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal." Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2017)(citations omitted); Pa. R.A.P. 302(a) (stating "[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal").

Likewise, pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[n]o portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto **before the jury retires to deliberate**. All such objections shall be made beyond the hearing of the jury." Pa. R. Crim. P. 647(C) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "[u]nder Criminal Procedural Rules 603 and 647(B), the mere submission and subsequent denial of proposed points for charge that are inconsistent with or omitted from the instructions actually given will not suffice to preserve an issue, absent a specific objection or exception to the charge or the trial court's ruling respecting the points." Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 506, (Pa. Super. 2008)(quoting

Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 225 (2005)). “The relevant inquiry for [appellate courts] when reviewing a trial court's failure to give a jury instruction is whether such charge was warranted by the evidence in the case.” Baker, 963 A.2d at 506 (citations omitted).

Instantly, both the Commonwealth and the Defendant submitted proposed points for charge. Following an informal charging conference, the Court indicated at an on-the-record conference which instructions would be read. N.T., Trial by Jury Commencing at 1:30 p.m., Apr. 23, 2018 at 57-107. There was no objection to the final form of the instructions when the Court made its final ruling on the inconsistent statement charge before closing arguments. N.T. Apr, 24, 2018 at 5-8. Likewise, there were no objections either before or after the instructions were actually given. N.T. Apr. 25, 2018 at 1-6, 61. Instead, on April 26, 2018, **the day after the jury was instructed** and retired to deliberate, the Defendant filed a document purporting to preserve objections that were not previously made on the record. Defendant William H. Cosby's Objections to Jury Instructions. Pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 647(C), this Court submits that such a filing was insufficient to preserve these claims on appeal. Even if the claims are not waived, this court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury and this claim must fail.

It is well settled that,

when evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, this Court will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply isolated portions, to determine if the instructions were improper. We further note that, it is an unquestionable maxim of law in this Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the

law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014)(citations omitted).

a. The jury was properly instructed on consciousness of guilt.

The Defendant's first claim is that the Court abused its discretion by giving a consciousness of guilt instruction. As outlined above, the Court submits that this claim is waived. Additionally, while the Defendant did object at the on the record charging conference, the objection was followed by extended discussion about the specific wording of the instruction. N.T. Apr. 23, 2018, Trial by Jury Commencing at 1:30 p.m., at 59, 60-66. At the conclusion of the conference, the following exchange took place:

Ms. Bliss: And then we were going to email you our proposed language for that consciousness of guilt.

The Court: No. I've already made a decision on that one. I've made a decision on that one.

Ms. Bliss: Ok. All right.

The Court: I'm going to read it as introduced by the language of the [standard] charge.

Id. at 107. The record is devoid of any objection to the Court's final consciousness of guilt instruction, thus constituting waiver. N.T. Apr. 25, 2018 at 1-6; 61. Even if this claim is not waived, the Court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on consciousness of the guilt.

The Court instructed the jury as follows:

The Commonwealth contends there was evidence tending to show

that the Defendant made offers to pay for education, therapy and travel; and that he concealed the name of the pills that he gave to Andrea Constand. The Defendant contends this is not evidence of the consciousness of guilt. If you believe this evidence, you may consider it as tending to prove the defendant's consciousness of guilt. You are not required to do so. You should consider and weigh this evidence along with all the other evidence in the case.

N.T. Apr. 25, 2018 at 36. This instruction outlined the parties' contentions about certain acts of the Defendant after he was confronted by Ms. Constand and her mother and how the jury could consider such acts. However, it did not direct the jury that such acts, in fact, constituted consciousness of guilt and instructed the jury that it was not required to consider the evidence as tending to prove consciousness of guilt. Thus, the instruction, derived from Pa. SSJI (Crim.) 3.15, was appropriate based on the evidence in the case and the Court did not abuse its discretion.

b. The Court properly denied the Defendant's request for a "grading the investigation" charge.

The Defendant's next contention is that the Court erred in denying his request for an instruction consistent with Kyles v. Whitley,⁴⁶ which he entitled "Grading the Investigation." "Defendant's Notice of Filing Proposed Jury Instructions," Apr. 26, 2018, Exhibit 1 at 22 ("Proposed Instructions"). As outlined above, the submission of written instructions is insufficient to preserve a claim of error. Even if this claim is not waived, this Court is aware of no legal authority for such an instruction. Likewise, such an instruction

⁴⁶ In Kyles v. Whitley, 541 U.S. 419 (1995), evidence was affirmatively withheld from the defense that created the possibility that the Defendant had not committed the crime, including potentially inculpatory statements of another individual.

was not supported by the evidence. Kyles v. Whitley dealt with Brady⁴⁷ violation and suppression of evidence favorable to the defense, neither of which occurred in this case. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any objection or argument regarding this instruction, fatally impairing this Court's ability to conduct further analysis.

c. This Court's 404 (b) instruction contained an accurate statement of the law.

The Defendant's third contention is that this Court's 404(b) instruction contained an inaccurate statement of the law. As noted above, he failed to preserve this claim, thus it is waived. The Defendant did not object to the court's instruction during trial, where it was given numerous times. N.T. Apr. 11, 2018⁴⁸ at 45-46, 50-51; N.T. Apr. 12, 2018 at 65-67, 69-70, 167-168. Likewise, the Defendant did not object at the charging conference when it became apparent his proposed language would not be read or when the instruction was actually read to the jury. N.T. Apr. 23, 2018, Trial by Jury Commencing at 1:30 p.m., at 58, 67-70; N.T. Apr. 25, 2018 at 1-6, 61. However, even if it is not waived, the Defendant is mistaken.

Both during the trial and in concluding instructions, the Court read Pennsylvania Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 3.08 which instructs the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts may only be used for a limited purpose, in this case to show a common plan, scheme or design or an absence of mistake,

⁴⁷ Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66 (Pa. 1986).

⁴⁸ There are two volumes of notes of testimony from this date, both indicating a commencement time of 10:37 a.m. The smaller volume contains brief argument and is only 31 pages. The cited volume is that containing testimony.

and may not be used not to infer that the Defendant is a person of bad character. The instruction, as read by this Court, contains an accurate statement of the law.

The 404 (b) instruction requested by the Defendant contained an inaccurate statement of the law and attempted to impart a duty on the jury to determine the relevance and probative value of the prior bad acts evidence. Specifically, he sought to include the following language: “[e]ach allegation of Commonwealth witnesses stands on its own merits, and you must decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether the claimed charge is relevant or probative of the charged crime in this case; that is, similar or part of a pattern.”

Proposed Instructions, Exhibit 1 at 7. This language misstates Pennsylvania law. The jury’s duty is to apply the law to the facts as they find them. Pa. SSJI (Crim) 7.05 (2016)(stating “[i]t will be your responsibility to consider the evidence, to find the facts, and, applying the law to the facts as you find them, to decide whether the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”). Questions of relevance and probative value are threshold evidentiary inquiries to be determined by the Court. Therefore, the Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for an inaccurate statement of the law.

d. The Court properly denied the Defendant’s request for a special interrogatory regarding the statute of limitations.

Finally, this court did not err in denying the Defendant’s request for a special interrogatory on whether the offense occurred within the statute of limitations. Preliminarily, the Court submits that while the Defendant made

argument regarding the interrogatory at the charging conference, he did not object when the Court issued its ruling. N.T. Apr. 23, 2018 at 67, 71. Thus, this claim is waived or, alternatively, without merit.

The Court denied the request to avoid confusing the jury and creating the potential for an inconsistent verdict. Id. at 71. Instead, the court instructed the jury as follows:

The information alleges that the crime was committed between January and February of 2004.

You are not bound by the date alleged in the information. It is not an essential element of the crime charged. You may find the defendant guilty if you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged in and around the date charged in the information even though you are not satisfied that he committed it on the particular date alleged in the information.

Now, very carefully follow this. The Defendant may not be convicted of aggravated indecent assault unless the Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution began within 12 years of the date that the offense was committed. The Defendant was arrested on December 30, 2015, which is the date the prosecution began in Commonwealth v. Williams H. Cosby, Jr. That meant that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred on or after December 30, 2003 to be within 12-year window. The Commonwealth does not need to prove, however, the specific date that the offense occurred.

N.T. Apr. 25, 2018 at 46-47.

Thus, the jury was instructed that before it could find the Defendant guilty, it had to find that the assault happened within the statute of limitations. As the charge to the jury was clear and accurate on the whole, this Court did not abuse its discretion, therefore, this claim must fail.

D. Post-Trial Issues

1. This Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant's motion for recusal. (Concise Statement Issue 3)

The Defendant's next issue is that this Court should have recused itself.⁴⁹ Again, the Defendant failed to preserve any constitutional challenge. His motion contains no allegation of constitutional error, thus, he may not raise such a claim for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2017). As fully set forth in this Court's memorandum and opinion of September 19, 2018, which this Court incorporates as if set forth in its entirety in satisfaction of Pa. R.A.P. 1925 (a), this issue is both waived and without merit.

As this Court outlined in its memorandum,

A motion for disqualification is directed to and decided by the jurist whose impartiality is questioned." League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 370 (Pa. 1995)).

It is well settled that,

[t]here is a presumption that judges of this Commonwealth are honorable, fair and competent, and, when confronted with a recusal demand, are able to determine whether they can rule in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. If the judge determines he or she can be impartial, the judge must then decide whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make. A judge's

⁴⁹ The Defendant sought this Court's recusal twice; this issue deals with his "Motion for Disclosure, Recusal, and For Reconsideration of Recusal," filed on September 11, 2018, and only insofar as it relates to Defendant's allegations of bias related to a defense pretrial witness, Bruce L. Castor, Jr.

decision to deny a recusal motion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107, 122 (Pa. Super. 2015), aff'd, 170 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2017) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Furthermore, courts have consistently held that, “[i]n this Commonwealth, a party must seek recusal of a jurist at the earliest possible moment, *i.e.*, when the party knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to recuse. If the party fails to present a motion to recuse at that time, then the party's recusal issue is time-barred and waived.” Lomas v. Kravitz, 170 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2017). “Notably, [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] has held that, in addition to actual knowledge of the facts underlying the application, facts that ‘should have been known’ are to be considered in determining timeliness.” League of Women Voters, 179 A.3d at 1087 (citation omitted). Courts conduct a waiver analysis because,

[l]itigants cannot be permitted to hedge against the possibility of losing a case on the merits by delaying the production of arguable grounds for disqualification, or, worse, by digging up such grounds only after learning of an adverse order. To hold otherwise would encourage judge-shopping, would undermine the interests in the finality of judicial decisions, and would countenance extensive and unnecessary expenditures of judicial resources, which are avoidable by mere timely advancement of the challenge. The courts of this Commonwealth cannot and do not approve of such gamesmanship. Id. at 1086; Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 489 A.2d 1291, 1300 (Pa. 1985) (citation omitted) (stating, “[o]nce the trial is completed with the entry of a verdict, a party is deemed to have waived his right to have a judge disqualified, and if he has waived that issue, he cannot be heard to complain following an unfavorable result”). Where a recusal motion is based upon purportedly after-discovered evidence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, “as in other cases involving after discovered evidence, there must be a showing that... the evidence could not have been brought to the attention of the ... court in the exercise of due diligence.” League of Women Voters, 179 A.3d at 1087 (quoting Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1301).

Memorandum and Order at 1-3.

Furthermore,

basing the Motion on the Court's duty to disclose does not overcome the failure to file the Motion at the earliest possible date. See League of Women Voters, 179 A.3d at 1088 (quoting Reilly, 489 A.2d at 1301) ("[S]imply because a judge does not raise *sua sponte* the issue of his impartiality, however, does not entitle a party to question a judge's partiality after the case has ended without substantiation in the record that the complaining party did not receive a full, fair, and impartial trial").

Id. at 5. This Court cannot disclose that which does not exist. This Court simply has no bias against Mr. Castor, thus no disclosure was necessary.

Instantly, the Defendant waived this issue by failing to timely raise it. The Defendant filed an unsupported motion on the eve of sentencing based on this Court's purported bias against a defense witness. The basis for the motion was a Radar Online tabloid article; Attorney Green⁵⁰ concluded that Mr. Castor was the most likely source of the article. Motion For Disclosure, Recusal and Reconsideration of Recusal para. 9A. The Motion does nothing more than assert that this Court *should* have a bias against Mr. Castor based on Mr. Castor's actions in a decades old political race. The Court has no such bias.

The source of this alleged information, Mr. Castor himself, testified before this Court in a pretrial matter on February 2 and 3, 2016, nearly *three years* before the motion was filed. At the February 2016 hearing, Mr. Castor was called as a Defense witness. During that hearing, there was an exchange between then defense counsel and Mr. Castor indicating that they had numerous conversations regarding Mr. Castor's testimony. N.T. Feb. 2, 2016

⁵⁰ Attorney Green represented the Defendant for sentencing.

at 111. Clearly, because Attorney Green concluded that Mr. Castor was the basis for the article on which he based the motion, the basis for the motion was known by a defense witness in 2016 and could have been discovered by the defense with an exercise of due diligence. The Defendant failed to raise the alleged issue at this earliest possible moment.

Even if the Defendant was not aware of the grounds asserted in his motion at the time of Mr. Castor's testimony, the article on which he relied in his Motion was published on March 28, 2018, prior to his retrial and contains quotations from his spokesperson. Thus, he knew, or should have known, the grounds for his motion in March 2018. However, he failed to file a motion until September 13, 2018, nearly seven months later. Thus, this Court submits the claim is waived.

Again, even if it is not waived, the claim is entirely devoid of merit. "The party who asserts that a trial judge must be disqualified must produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially." Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107, 122 (Pa. Super. 2015), aff'd, 170 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2017) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Defendant has not asserted anything in the record to show that this Court exhibited any bias toward him, or any witness testifying on his behalf. As such, this claim must fail.

**2. The Defendant was properly designated a sexually violent predator pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. §9799.58.
(Concise Statement Issues 10, 11)**

The Defendant's final issues relate to this Court's finding the Defendant to be a sexually violent predator. First, he challenges the application of the Sexually Violent Predator provisions of Act 29⁵¹. Second, he challenges the information relied upon by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board ("SOAB"). The Court properly applied the SVP provisions of Act 29, and the SOAB did not rely on improper information. Thus, these claims must fail.

The Defendant contends that the application of the SVP provisions in Act 29 violate the *ex post facto* clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. As discussed above,

[a] law violates the *ex post facto* clause of the United States Constitution if it (1) makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender.

Allshouse, 36 A.3d at 184 (citing Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798))) (some citations omitted). "Critical to relief under the *Ex Post Facto* Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when

⁵¹ 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9799.58.

the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 119 (Pa., 2017) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981)).

It is well settled that, “[a] legislative pronouncement enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a heavy burden.” Commonwealth v. Olivo, 127 A.3d 769, 777 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). Further,

[a]ll doubts are to be resolved in favor of sustaining the constitutionality of the legislation. [N]othing but a clear violation of the Constitution—a clear usurpation of power prohibited—will justify the judicial department in pronouncing an act of the legislative department unconstitutional and void. In other words, we are obliged to exercise every reasonable attempt to vindicate the constitutionality of a statute and uphold its provisions[.] The right of the judiciary to declare a statute void, and to arrest its execution, is one which, in the opinion of all courts, is coupled with responsibilities so grave that it is never to be exercised except in very clear cases. Moreover, one of the most firmly established principles of our law is that the challenging party must prove the act “clearly, palpably and plainly” violates the constitution. Finally, we note that: The power of judicial review must not be used as a means by which the courts might substitute its judgment as to public policy for that of the legislature. The role of the judiciary is not to question the wisdom of the action of [the] legislative body, but only to see that it passes constitutional muster.

Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 266–67 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Rules of Statutory Construction provide, in pertinent part,

(a)The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.

(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921.

When determining legislative intent, the following presumptions, among others, may be used:

- (1) That the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.
- (2) That the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.
- (3) That the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth.

1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1922.

Where legislation has a stated non-punitive purpose, courts conduct an analysis pursuant to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), to determine if the law is punitive in effect despite its stated non-punitive purpose. The Mendoza-Martinez Court identified the following considerations:

- (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
- (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment;
- (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
- (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence;
- (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
- (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and
- (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962, 973, 574 Pa. 487, 505 (Pa. 2003)

(Williams II) (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144). “[O]nly the “clearest

proof” may establish that a law is punitive in effect. Furthermore, in determining whether a statute is civil or punitive, we must examine the law’s entire statutory scheme.” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1208. (citations omitted).

In his “Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Declaration of Unconstitutionality” (“Memorandum”), the Defendant contends that under the Mendoza-Martinez analysis, Act 29, Subchapter I is punitive in effect, despite the legislature’s stated non-punitive intent, such that the application of Act 29 to the Defendant would violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Memorandum at 8. He made no additional arguments at oral argument on the Motion. N.T. Sept. 24, 2018 at 6-8. Specifically, he asserts that quarterly in-person verification for sexually violent predators, notification of changes in certain information, monthly counseling of sexually violent predators constitute affirmative restraints. Memorandum at 9-10.

Additionally, he argues that the ability to petition for removal from the registry is meaningless, as he is 81 years old. Id. at 10. Further, he alleges that an SVP designation would interfere with his relationship with his grandchildren. Id. at 11. Next, he alleges that the active notification requirements for SVPs⁵² and passive internet notifications constitute shaming which has historically been regarded as punishment. Id. at 14. Likewise, he contends that quarterly in person reporting and monthly counseling of SVPs further the traditional aims of punishment. Id. at 15. Finally, he argues that Act 29 remains excessive in relation to its stated non-punitive purpose. Id. at 17. As will be

⁵² 42 Pa. C.S.A. §9799.62

discussed below, the Defendant failed to carry his burden to show by the “clearest proof” that Act 29 is punitive in effect.

In Pennsylvania, there have been several sex offender registration laws. Megan’s Law I⁵³, the first Sex Offender Registration scheme, was enacted in 1995. *Id.* at 1196 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003)(Williams II). Under Megan’s Law I, the procedure for adjudicating certain offenders as sexually violent predators included a pre-sentence assessment by the board, followed by a hearing. *Id.* At the hearing, the offender was required to rebut the presumption that he or she was a sexually violent predator by clear and convincing evidence. *Id.* A sexually violent predator was subjected to an enhanced maximum sentence of life imprisonment and more extensive registration and community notification requirements than non-sexually violent predators. *Id.* The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the SVP provisions of Megan’s Law I as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 608 (Pa. 1999) (Williams I).

Megan’s Law II was signed into law on May 10, 2000. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1186 (quoting Williams II). Under Megan’s Law II, “sexually violent predators [were] no longer subjected to an automatic increased maximum term of imprisonment for the predicate offense. Instead, they [were] required to undergo lifetime registration, notification and counseling procedures; failure to comply with such procedures [was] penalized by a term of probation or

⁵³ 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9791-9799.

imprisonment.” Id. The registration, notification and counseling provisions of Megan’s Law II were found to “constitute non-punitive, regulatory measures supporting a legitimate governmental purpose” that did not constitute additional criminal punishment. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 986. Megan’s Law II was amended by Act 152 of 2004, becoming Megan’s Law III. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1186 (quoting Williams II). Megan’s Law III made numerous substantive changes to the law:

- 1) established a two-year limitation for asbestos actions;
- 2) amended the Crimes Code to create various criminal offenses for individuals subject to sexual offender registration requirements who fail to comply;
- 3) amended the provisions of the Sentencing Code which govern “Registration of Sexual Offenders”;
- 4) added the offenses of luring and institutional sexual assault to the list of enumerated offenses which require a 10-year period of registration and established local police notification procedures for out-of state sexual offenders who move to Pennsylvania;
- 5) directed the creation of a searchable computerized database of all registered sexual offenders (“database”);
- 6) amended the duties of the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”);
- 7) allowed a sentencing court to exempt a lifetime sex offender registrant, or a sexually violent predator registrant, from inclusion in the database after 20 years if certain conditions are met;
- 8) established mandatory registration and community notification procedures for sexually violent predators;
- 9) established community notification requirements for a “common interest community”—such as a condominium or cooperative—of the presence of a registered sexually violent predator;
- 10) conferred immunity on unit owners’ associations of a common interest community for good faith distribution of information obtained from the database;
- 11) directed the Pennsylvania State Police to publish a list of approved registration sites to collect and transmit fingerprints and photographs of all sex offenders who register at those sites; and
- 12) mandated the Pennsylvania Attorney General to conduct annual performance audits of state or local agencies who

participate in the administration of Megan's Law, and, also, required registered sex offenders to submit to fingerprinting and being photographed when registering at approved registration sites.

Id. at 1197–98 (quoting Williams II (citing 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4915; 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 5524.1, 9792, 9795.1 (a)(1), 9795.4, 9795.5, 9796, 9798, 9798.1, 9799, 9799.1, 9799.8)). Megan's Law III was ultimately struck down as violative of the single subject rule and replaced by the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). Id.

In 2012, the legislature enacted SORNA in an attempt to comply with the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Public Law 109-248, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1204. SORNA created, *inter alia*, a tier based registration scheme, established a statewide registry of sexual offenders to be available on the internet, required additional in person reporting "within three business days of any changes to their registration information including a change of name, residence, employment, student status, telephone number, ownership of a motor vehicle, temporary lodging, e-mail address, and information related to professional licensing," was retroactive and applied to all offenders who were required to register under any prior version Megan's Law and had not finished their period of registration and to anyone sentenced after its effective date. Id. at 1206-1208.

Two cases prompted the legislature to make changes to SORNA. First, our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), followed by the Superior Court's holding in Commonwealth v. Butler,

173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017)⁵⁴. In Muniz, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault and scheduled to be sentenced on May 8, 2007, at which time Megan's Law III was in effect and would have required a ten year period of registration as a sex offender. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1193. However, he absconded and was not sentenced until 2014. Id. The effective date of SORNA was December 20, 2012. Under SORNA, the defendant faced lifetime registration. Id. At sentencing, the court found that Muniz would be subject to the requirements of SORNA. Id. The Superior Court held that SORNA's registration requirement was not punishment and, therefore, as applied to Muniz, did not run afoul of the federal or state ex post facto clauses. Id. at 1194. Our Supreme Court granted review to determine if SORNA, as applied retroactively to the defendant therein, was violative of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id. at 1194.

In Muniz, the Supreme Court conducted an analysis and found that the Mendoza-Martinez factors weighed in favor of a finding that SORNA's registration provisions constituted punishment. Id. at 1218. Specifically, they found the following factors weighed in favor of finding SORNA to be punitive in effect: 1) whether the statute involves an affirmative disability or restraint⁵⁵; 2)

⁵⁴ Our Supreme Court granted allocatur in Butler on July 28, 2018. Commonwealth v. Butler, 25 WAP 2018.

⁵⁵ Under SORNA, Muniz was a Tier III offender, which required quarterly, in person appearances with additional in person appearances for changes in registration information. §§ 9799.15 (e)(3), (g). The Court found these in person reporting requirement to weigh in favor of the law being punitive. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1211.

whether the sanction historically regarded as punishment⁵⁶; 3) whether the statute promotes traditional aims of punishment⁵⁷; and 4) whether the statute is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.⁵⁸ Id. at 1210-1218. The Muniz court did not give weight to “whether the statute comes into play only on a finding of scienter;” “whether the behavior to which the statute applies is already a crime;” and found that “whether there is an alternative purpose to which the statute may rationally be connected” weighed in favor of finding it non-punitive. Thus, the application of SORNA to Muniz violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, but the Court equally divided on the issue of whether the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart. Notably, the Muniz court did not find SORNA facially unconstitutional.

In Butler, the Defendant pled guilty to statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors. 173 A.3d at 1213. Following a SOAB evaluation, the trial court found that the Commonwealth proved by clear and convincing evidence that Butler was an SVP and designated him as such. Id. Defendant was notified of the lifetime registration requirement pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

⁵⁶ The court found that SORNA’s publication provisions to be comparable to shaming punishments and SORNA’s mandatory conditions akin to probation. Id. at 1213.

⁵⁷ Unlike Megan’s Law II, not all crimes under SORNA carried lengthy sentences of incarceration and there were numerous non-sexual registrable offenses, thus registration for those offenses clearly deterrent in effect. Id. at 1215. Increased registration, mandatory reporting requirements and dissemination of more private information made SORNA retributive. Id. at 1216.

⁵⁸ Muniz Court found the statute to be excessive and over inclusive in relation to assigned non-punitive purpose. Id. at 1218.

9799.15 (a)(6). Id. Without the designation, Butler would only have been required to register for 15 years. Id. at 1215 (referencing 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§9799.14 (b)(8), 9199.15(a)(1)). In Butler, the Superior Court found that because Muniz held SORNA to be punitive and because an SVP designation increased Butler’s minimum registration requirement, a challenge to the SVP designation implicates the legality of a sentence. Id. at 1215. The Superior Court addressed the legality of Butler’s sentence *sua sponte*. The court stated:

[O]ur Supreme Court’s holding that registration requirements under SORNA constitute a form of criminal punishment is dispositive of the issue presented in this case. In other words, since our Supreme Court has held that SORNA registration requirements are punitive or a criminal penalty to which individuals are exposed, then under Apprendi and Alleyne, a factual finding, such as whether a defendant has a “mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him or her] likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses [.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12, that increases the length of registration must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the chosen fact-finder. Section 9799.24(e)(3) identifies the trial court as the finder of fact in all instances and specifies clear and convincing evidence as the burden of proof required to designate a convicted defendant as an SVP. Such a statutory scheme in the criminal context cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that section 9799.24(e)(3) is unconstitutional and Appellant’s judgment of sentence, to the extent it required him to register as an SVP for life, was illegal.

Id. at 1217-1218.

In response to Muniz and Butler, the legislature enacted Feb. 21 P.L. 25, No. 10; HB 631 of 2017 (“Act 10”) on February 21, 2018 and reenacted by Act 2018, June 12, P.L. 140, No. 20; HB 1952 of 2018 (“Act 29”) on June 12, 2018.

The Acts are substantially the same. The legislative findings and declaration of policy state:

(a) Legislative findings--It is hereby determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding:

(1) If the public is provided adequate notice and information about sexually violent predators and offenders as well as those sexually violent predators and offenders who do not have a fixed place of habitation or abode, the community can develop constructive plans to prepare itself for the release of sexually violent predators and offenders. This allows communities to meet with law enforcement to prepare and obtain information about the rights and responsibilities of the community and to provide education and counseling to their children.

(2) These sexually violent predators and offenders pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitments, and protection of the public from this type of offender is a paramount governmental interest.

(3) The penal and mental health components of our justice system are largely hidden from public view, and lack of information from either may result in failure of both systems to meet this paramount concern of public safety.

(4) Overly restrictive confidentiality and liability laws governing the release of information about sexually violent predators and offenders have reduced the willingness to release information that could be appropriately released under the public disclosure laws and have increased risks to public safety.

(5) Persons found to have committed a sexual offense have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public safety and in the effective operation of government.

(6) Release of information about sexually violent predators and offenders to public agencies and the general public will further the governmental interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal and mental health systems so long as the information released is rationally related to the furtherance of those goals.

(b) Declaration of policy.--It is hereby declared to be the intention of the General Assembly to:

- (1) Protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this Commonwealth by providing for registration, community notification and access to information regarding sexually violent predators and offenders who are about to be released from custody and will live in or near their neighborhood.
- (2) Require the exchange of relevant information about sexually violent predators and offenders among public agencies and officials and to authorize the release of necessary and relevant information about sexually violent predators and offenders to members of the general public, including information available through the publicly accessible Internet website of the Pennsylvania State Police, as a means of assuring public protection and shall not be construed as punitive.
- (3) Address the Superior Court's opinion in the case of Commonwealth v. Wilgus, 975 A.2d 1183 (2009), by requiring sexually violent predators and offenders without a fixed place of habitation or abode to register under this subchapter.
- (4) Address the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, No. 47 MAP 2016 (Pa. 2016), and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Butler (2017 WL 4914155).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.51.

By enacting Acts 10 and 29, the legislature specifically stated that it intended to address Muniz and Butler and to enact a non-punitive registration scheme. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9799.11; 9799.51 (b)(2),(4). Act 10 divided sexual offender registration statutes into two chapters, Subchapter H-Registration of Sexual Offenders⁵⁹ and Subchapter I-Continued Registration of Sexual Offenders⁶⁰. Subchapter H applies to offenses committed after December 20,

⁵⁹ 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.

⁶⁰ 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75.

2012. Subchapter I applies to offenses committed on or after April 1996 but before December 20, 2012. The Defendant's offenses fall under Chapter I.

As the stated purpose of this legislation is non-punitive, the analysis turns to the Mendoza-Martinez factors. The legislature made several changes to the law as a whole to remedy the balance outlined in Muniz. As to the first factor, whether the statute involves an affirmative disability or restraint, Subchapter H reduced the number of times some registrants are required to report in person by providing for telephonic verification after three years for offenders classified as Tier II and Tier III offenders. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9799.25 (a.1), (a.2). Subchapter I has reduced in person reporting requirements for all offenders. §§ 9799.56 (a)(2), 9799.60 (a)-(b.2). Likewise, all offenders, including SVPs, may petition for removal from the registry after 25 years. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9799.15 (a.2); § 9799.59. As to the second factor, whether the sanction historically regarded as punishment, reduced in person reporting requirements and the ability to petition for removal from the registry make Act 29's registration provisions less like probation. As to the third factor, whether the statute promotes traditional aims of punishment, again, reduced in person reporting requirements and fewer registrable offenses, along with the removal of tiered registration⁶¹ under Subchapter I, render this factor non-punitive. Finally, as to the fourth factor, whether the statute is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned, the removal of the majority of non-sexual offenses were removed from the statute. § 9799.14; § 9799.55, addition of the

⁶¹ Under Subchapter I, there are no longer tiered registration requirements, only 10 year or lifetime. § 9799.55.

ability to petition for removal after 25 years and the reduced in person reporting remedied the Muniz Court's concern relating this factor.

On the whole, these changes render the statute non-punitive. As the statute is non-punitive, the retroactive application to the Defendant does not violate the ex post facto clause. Likewise, because Act 29 is non-punitive, it does not increase an offender's punishment and, therefore, does not implicate the concerns of Apprendi and Alleyne, making the Defendant's SVP designation pursuant to § 9799.58 constitutional.

Additionally, this Court notes that unlike the defendants in Butler and Muniz, the Defendant would have been subject to a lifetime registration requirement, with or without an SVP designation, and quarterly in person verification and monthly counseling as an SVP under Megan's Law II which was in effect at the time of the assault in January 2004. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9795.1 (b)(2), 9796 (a), 9799.4. Thus, this Court submits that even assuming, *arguendo*, that Act 29 is still punitive, it did not increase the period of the Defendant's registration and did not subject him to "greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed." Therefore, there can be no ex post facto violation and this Court properly designated the Defendant a sexually violent predator pursuant to Act 29.

The Defendant's final issue is that this Court erred in designating him a sexually violent predator under SORNA where the SOAB evaluator relied on unsubstantiated, uncorroborated evidence in reaching her conclusion that the Defendant is a sexually violent predator. As raised, this issue is factually

inaccurate, potentially constituting waiver. First, Defendant alleges that he was found to be a sexually violent predator under SORNA, when, in fact, as discussed above, he was found to be a sexually violent predator under Act 29. While Defendant correctly challenged Act 29 in his first SVP related issue, the Court cannot be made to guess what he seeks to challenge in his final issue.

Likewise, again this Court notes, to the extent that he raises a constitutional challenge, the Defendant does not specify what constitutional provision is applicable, thus hampering this Court's review and constituting waiver of that ground. Cline, 177 A.3d at 927 (stating "issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal")(citations omitted). At the SVP hearing in this matter, counsel initially made a confrontation clause objection, but indicated "so, first, there's a statutory hearsay objection that probably obviates you having to reach the confrontation clause." N.T. Sept. 24, 2018 at 49. Even if this claim is not waived, the expert's testimony was limited to consideration of the witnesses who testified at trial and the claim fails on its merits.

At the SVP hearing in this matter, after defense counsel's objection, the following exchanges took place,

The Court: [I'm] capable of reading the statute and finding out what are the factors that you're permitted to consider, but I will probably not find in there certainly the uncharged conduct and then the reports that are supplied to you by the District Attorney's Office. So if that is in your testimony—and again, . . . obviously she's an expert and she's going to consult a lot of material. If you are able to tell me that you did not consider these additional

statements other than what were at the very least the trial testimony of five witnesses, you need to do so . . . if you are able to make that distinguishment, I would request that you do so.

Mr. Ryan: So let me, Doctor, just make sure we all know where we are. First and foremost, what I'm going to be doing is asking you questions based upon, as I understand it, your consideration of the sworn testimony of six female individuals who testified at either trial and, of course, the sworn testimony of Andrea Constand

Dr. Dudley: Yes.

Mr. Ryan: Okay, so understanding that, based on the testimony you've provided thus far, is anything changed?

Dr. Dudley: No.

N.T. Sept. 24, 2018 at 57-59.

The Court: Did you in your reliance upon your opinion, in reliance upon this testimony form your opinions, can you excise, meaning not consider the proffered testimony [of other potential 404b witnesses] as opposed to only the trial testimony of those six individuals?

Dr. Dudley: Yes.

Id. at 97.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated, "[t]he Court specifically instructed her to, when she was on the stand, to not consider it and her testimony should not consider it. So she either heard me or she didn't . . . I didn't hear it and I've got to take the testimony that she did not include it."


N.T. Sept. 24, 2018 at 63.

Thus, it is clear that the opinion Dr. Dudley rendered at the hearing on this matter did not include evidence that was not admitted in either of the trials in the instant matter. As such, the Court did not consider this information when determining if the Commonwealth met its burden of proving the Defendant to be a sexually violent predator. Therefore, this claim must fail.

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.

BY THE COURT:



STEVEN T. O'NEILL J.

Copies mailed on 5/14/9 to the following:
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Secretary

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing document upon the person(s) via PACFile and United States Postal Service, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 121:

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Date: August 11, 2020