

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of : No. 1601 Disciplinary Docket No. 3
: :
PAUL JOSEPH STAUB, JR. : No. 36 DB 2010
: :
: Attorney Registration No. 87556
: :
PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT : (Allegheny County)

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 10th day of August, 2023, the Petition for Reinstatement is granted. Petitioner is ordered to pay the expenses incurred by the Board in the investigation and processing of the Petition for Reinstatement. See Pa.R.D.E. 218(f).

A True Copy Nicole Traini
As Of 08/10/2023

Attest: 
Chief Clerk
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA:

Pursuant to Rule 218(c)(5) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania submits its findings and recommendations to your Honorable Court with respect to the above captioned Petition for Reinstatement.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Board makes the following findings of fact:

A. The Initial Misconduct

1. Petitioner, Paul Joseph Staub, Jr. was born in 1976 and admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 2001. Staub currently resides in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. ODC-1; N.T. 48, 50-51.

2. From his admission in 2001 through 2006, Staub was employed in a number of associate positions at various law firms, and then was self-employed from 2006 through 2010. N.T. 51-54.

3. In 2007-2008, Staub was charged with two serious acts of misconduct. In one case, he was charged with the misappropriation of \$108,510 from an escrow account that had been created to hold the proceeds of the marital home in a divorce matter. In order to cover for this misappropriation, Staub falsified reports and misrepresented facts to the court. ODC-1.

4. During investigation of the initial matter, a second matter was identified and Staub was charged with mishandling an oil & gas investment matter in which his clients lost approximately \$115,000. ODC-1.

5. On March 29, 2010, Staub pled guilty to one count of theft by deception on the misappropriation and pled *nolo contendere* to the investment matter. ODC-1 When Judge Cashman asked him why he was pleading guilty to the misappropriation, Staub responded "because I am guilty." Reinstatement Questionnaire, Exhibit 4c, p. 5 of the criminal transcript.

6. At the hearing, Staub's defense attorney, Laura Gutnik, Esquire told the court that Staub had been having financial and marital problems at the time of the misconduct, and that Staub had done all he could to rectify his misdeeds. Reinstatement Questionnaire, Exhibit 4c, pp. 9-10 of the criminal transcript.

7. As of the date of the plea, Staub had repaid all of the funds in full in both matters. ODC-3.

8. Even before his plea, Staub had begun treatment with Dr. Robert Trivus, a psychiatrist, to address the underlying issues in his life. Reinstatement Questionnaire, Exhibit 4c, p. 10 of the criminal transcript; N.T. 70-71.

9. Staub also agreed to disbarment. On March 29, 2010, the same day he entered his pleas and was sentenced, Staub executed a verified statement of resignation pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 215. By Order dated May 24, 2010, effective June 23, 2010, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted the resignation and disbarred Staub on consent. ODC-6.

10. On March 29, 2010, Staub was sentenced for both matters to intermediate punishment of one year, with work release and concurrent probation for five years. ODC-1.

11. Following his sentencing, Staub filed bankruptcy and chose to file Chapter 13 so that he would repay his debtors over time. The bankruptcy case was closed in 2016 with the plan being satisfied in full, Staub having paid approximately \$97,000 over five and a half years. ODC-1; Reinstatement Questionnaire No. 21.

B. Post-Disbarment Employment and Personal Life

12. Subsequent to his disbarment on consent, from 2010 to July 2018, Staub was employed full-time as a paralegal by Peter Georgiades, Esquire, who operated Greystone Legal Associates. N.T. 55-56.

13. In relation to his employment as a paralegal for Mr. Georgiades and Greystone Legal Associates, Staub failed to file the notice of employment required by Pa.R.D.E. 217(j)(5). N.T. 72, 73.

14. This failure came to light in connection with a previous Petition for Reinstatement filed in 2016. Staub admitted that when he started paralegal work for Mr. Georgiades in 2010, he did not follow the requirements of Pa.R.D.E. 217 to notify the Board of his employment, but, once informed of them by Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”), now understands his obligations under that rule. N.T. 73.

15. Staub has complied with Pa.R.D.E. 217 through all subsequent employment.

16. Staub notified the Board by letter dated August 7, 2018, that he had ceased employment with Mr. Georgiades in June 2018 and asked that the letter be considered notice under Pa.R.D.E. 217(j)(5). Staub also notified the Board in that same letter that he would be commencing employment with the law firm of Echard Marquette. ODC-1.

17. Since July or August 2018, Staub has been employed full-time as a paralegal for the law firm of Echard Marquette, located in Allison Park, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The firm’s practice areas are corporate, medical malpractice, legal malpractice, and other personal injury. N.T. 56,58, 60.

18. Staub has known Matthew Marquette, Esquire since 1998, when they attended law school together and they have been friends since that time. N.T. 22, 23, 57.

19. Staub’s job duties include telephone intake, filing, scheduling meetings, legal research and drafting documents. Staub created an electronic filing system for the firm. Staub testified that as to his responsibilities, “no job was too small.” N.T. 59.

20. Staub has never held himself out as a lawyer at Echard Marquette and informs callers that he is not a lawyer. N.T. 59, 60.

21. Mr. Marquette describes Staub as “the best paralegal I ever had” and someone who, through discussion of the cases, “makes me a better lawyer.” N.T. 27-28.

22. Staub filed the appropriate notices with the Board as to his employment with Echard Marquette. N.T. 60; PE-E.

23. Staub stays current on case law through his various legal research projects and testified that he loves “being on top of things.” N.T. 59; ODC-1.

24. Staub fulfilled the Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) requirements necessary for reinstatement by completing 36 credit hours plus an additional 5 credit hours for a total of 41 hours of continuing education. ODC-1.

25. Staub is married to his second wife, with whom he shares a happy and stable relationship. He and his wife both work and live comfortably within their financial means. Staub has two children: his daughter from his first marriage is in college and his son from a prior relationship is approximately 10 years of age. Staub maintains a good relationship with his former wife, who testified on his behalf and described him as an “amazing father” to their daughter. Staub sees his son “as much as humanly possible.” He is current on child support obligations. N.T. 49, 50, 61.

26. Staub is current on his tax obligations. N.T. 50.

C. The Initial Reinstatement Petition

27. On September 22, 2016, Staub filed a Petition for Reinstatement (“2016 Petition”).

28. A reinstatement hearing was held on March 31, 2017, and on September 5, 2017, the Hearing Committee issued a Report and recommended that Staub’s reinstatement be granted.

29. On January 9, 2018, the Board issued a Report on the 2016 Petition and concluded that although Staub's underlying misconduct was not so egregious as to preclude reinstatement, his seven year period of disbarment was not a sufficient amount of time to dissipate the negative impact of his misconduct, he failed to demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation during the time of his disbarment, and he failed to prove that he had the moral qualifications to resume the practice of law. The Board recommended that the 2016 Petition be denied.

30. On March 1, 2018, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted the recommendation of the Board and denied the 2016 Petition.

31. Staub testified that following the denial of his 2016 Petition, he had no intention to apply again, as he felt it was "too hard" and he "was not supposed to be a lawyer." N.T. 61.

D. The DUI

33. While Staub's reinstatement request was pending and approximately two months prior to the Court's denial of the Petition for Reinstatement, on or about January 6, 2018, Staub, while under the influence of alcohol, was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Allegheny County. The record references Staub's BAC level as either .214 or .252. N.T. 57; ODC-1, ODC-4, ODC-5

34. Staub's vehicle struck the rear of another vehicle that was stopped at a light, then struck a telephone pole and came to rest. The other driver, Kenneth Takacs, was bleeding and complaining of neck pain at the scene and taken to the hospital. Staub was unconscious and bleeding when taken from the car and remained unconscious as he was

taken from the scene of the accident to the hospital. Reinstatement Questionnaire, Exhibit 9c, p. 2 of the police criminal complaint.

35. Staub sustained serious injuries in the accident, including a broken orbital bone, broken nose, broken ribs, concussion, and a spiral fracture of the knee. Staub used a walker for about two and a half months and it was approximately seven or eight months from the accident until he was fully recovered. N.T. 57, 58.

36. Mr. Takacs sued Staub civilly and the matter was settled with the insurance company. N.T. 76.

37. Staub has little recollection of the events of the accident as he had been rendered unconscious. He remembers going out with friends, leaving the entertainment establishment, getting into his car, and next remembers that he woke up “having damn near killed myself.” N.T. 57; ODC-9.

38. On November 14, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Staub entered a plea of guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (BAC .16+) (an ungraded misdemeanor), in violation of Pa.C.S. § 3802(c); one count of recklessly endangering another individual (a misdemeanor of the second degree), in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; and one count of simple assault (a misdemeanor of the second degree), in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). ODC-5.

39. On November 14, 2018, Staub was sentenced to a four-day period of confinement at DUI Alternative to Jail, ordered to serve a term of five months of probation, concurrent to the DUI Alternative to Jail program, restitution in the amount of \$130.00 to the victim, attend safe driving school, undergo an alcohol evaluation and any related treatment, pay a fine of \$1,000, and pay court costs. ODC-4, ODC-5.

40. Staub completed all terms of his criminal sentence, and the case was closed eight months after the conviction. N.T. 79.

41. Staub did not report the criminal conviction to ODC within twenty days, as required by Pa.R.D.E. 214.

E. The Second Reinstatement Petition

(i) *The Pa.R.D.E. 214 Issue*

42. On January 26, 2022—approximately 12 years after disbarment and 14 years from the original misconduct—Staub filed a second Petition for Reinstatement (“2022 Petition”), accompanied by a Reinstatement Questionnaire.

43. On the Reinstatement Questionnaire, Staub voluntarily disclosed the November 14, 2018 DUI conviction.

44. On March 21, 2022, ODC filed a response to the 2022 Petition and stated its opposition to reinstatement based on Staub’s DUI conviction and his failure to timely notify ODC in accordance with Pa.R.D.E. 214.

45. Staub’s voluntary disclosure was the first notice Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) had of the DUI. ODC-8, DB-7 Request for Statement of Respondent’s Position, p. 1.

46. On May 5, 2022, ODC filed a Notice of Criminal Conviction in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and on May 9, 2022, ODC issued a DB-7 Request for Statement of Staub’s position in relation to Staub’s 2018 criminal conviction and why it had not previously been reported pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 214. ODC-8.

47. On May 16, 2022, Staub submitted a timely, counseled response to the DB-7. ODC-9. Therein, he accepted responsibility for the DUI and related offenses. Staub

also provided the following explanation regarding his failure to comply with Pa.R.D.E. 214:

[I]n November of 2018, there were so many things going on in [Staub's] life, all of the changes [Staub] was making and continuing to make, [Staub's] duty to report the DUI was the furthest thing from his mind. [Staub] was helping Matt Marquette and Trent Echard open their office; [Staub] was dating what would become [Staub's] new wife who lived in North Carolina, and [Staub] was completely unaware of the duty. As the Board is aware, [Staub] worked for three different lawyers in 2018 and none of them thought to report it or even mention to [Staub] to report it. In addition, [Staub's] criminal defense attorney did not advise him to report it, nor did his ex-wife.

48. Staub testified at the reinstatement hearing that the failure to report the conviction was "totally my fault. I'm not making an excuse." N.T. 75. However, he "had no idea that I needed to tell the Disciplinary Board that I had been convicted of a crime." Staub testified that if he had known, he would have done so, as he had nothing to hide. He further testified that his failure to report was not intentional and that he had voluntarily disclosed it in his Reinstatement Questionnaire. N.T. 73-74.

49. Staub testified that his criminal lawyer did not advise him that he needed to report the conviction to ODC, nor did the other lawyers he knew or worked for so advise him. N.T. 75.

50. This testimony is corroborated by both Matthew Marquette, Esquire and Staub's former wife Kelli Kleeb, Esquire, who is currently employed as an administrative law judge, both of whom testified that they were unaware of Pa.R.D.E. 214 and Staub's obligation to report the DUI. N.T. 26, 45.

51. At the time the DUI conviction could have been reported under Pa.R.D.E. 214, Staub had been disbarred for eight years; had recently been denied reinstatement

on his initial petition and had no intention of applying again; and was in the midst of the professional and personal matters outlined in his DB-7 response. ODC-9; N.T. 60-61.

(ii) Testimony relating to Rehabilitation, Moral Qualifications, Competency and Learning in the Law

52. At the instant reinstatement hearing, Staub's counsel referred to the "problems" that arose in 2008 and Staub immediately corrected his counsel by stating "[t]hey weren't problems. I committed a crime." Staub acknowledged what he did and testified that he would not have pled guilty if he had not committed a crime. N.T. 54.

53. Staub testified that events since his disbarment, including the DUI accident, have changed his view of how his misconduct has impacted others.

54. Staub testified:

What I didn't really realize, I think, the first time was how I affected everybody else. I've had to drag everybody down here twice now, but that's just small. You know, when you read in the newspaper about a lawyer who has stolen his client's money or done something with their trust, that affects every other lawyer, so everyone had to take time out of their day to convince themselves and their clients that they're not a crook, and when you do what you guys all do, trust is everything, and I - - let's not say shattered it for everyone, but affected it for everyone, so I had an affect (sic) on people that I didn't know I had an effect on.

N.T. 63-64.

55. Staub further testified:

I'm sorry for that, and I don't think - - you know, you're so overwhelmed by how this has affected you personally that you don't think about how it affected other people. You know, I understood it affected my daughter and I understood it affected my ex-wife and people around me, but I didn't realize that, you know, there's somebody I never met in Philadelphia that this may have, but I'm sorry for all that, and, you know, I wish I could have realized that sooner, but I realize it now.

N.T. 64.

56. Staub testified that being denied reinstatement in 2018 and being nearly killed in the 2018 accident made him re-evaluate his life and that he is much more appreciative of what he has now, and he believes his experience has changed him and made him better. N.T. 64-65.

57. Staub expressed sincere remorse and testified that he is very sorry for what he did. N.T. 65.

58. Staub testified that his path towards redemption started in 2008 after his arrest when he began receiving treatment from Dr. Trivus for his personal issues. N.T. 70-71.

59. Staub stated that Dr. Trivus showed him that “good people can make awful decisions. What is important is that good people learn from those decisions and do not repeat them.” ODC-1, Reinstatement Questionnaire No. 21.

60. Staub testified as to his employment plans if reinstated. For now, he believes he will stay at his same job with Echard Marquette. N.T. 65. Staub does not intend to work as a sole practitioner in the future and stated on his Questionnaire that it is hard to practice law alone. He believes that he has learned a lot during his disbarment and there is much he could show others about the pitfalls of practicing and the pitfalls of not reaching out for help. ODC-1, Questionnaire No. 18.

61. As to causing the accident that injured another and resulted in his conviction, Staub expressed remorse. N.T. 64, 65. He testified that he was “mostly afraid that I might have hurt somebody or killed someone.” N.T. 74.

62. Staub testified that he does not have an alcohol problem and might have a drink once or twice a week, at home with his wife. He does not drive after consuming alcohol, as he realizes he has too much to lose. N.T. 79.

63. At the reinstatement hearing, Staub presented the testimony of four witnesses, all of whom were found credible by the Hearing Committee.

64. Michael Kalich is Staub's brother-in-law and has been married to Staub's sister since 2002. Mr. Kalich is a senior vice president in independent risk management at PNC Bank. N.T. 15-16.

65. Mr. Kalich testified that over the past four years since Staub's 2016 Petition was denied, he has observed Staub evolve and mature. Mr. Kalich described Staub as a leader in the family, an outstanding father, and a loving husband. Mr. Kalich testified that Staub is very supportive of everyone in the family and performs many tasks for some of the older members of the family, in terms of household responsibilities. N.T. 17-19.

66. Mr. Kalich testified that he is aware of the reason for Staub's disbarment and that he does not have any reservation in recommending Staub's reinstatement. N.T. 15, 20.

67. Significantly, Mr. Kalich testified that, being in the risk field for a major financial institution, he recognizes the significance of testifying in favor of the reinstatement of a lawyer who misappropriated funds, and he did so without reservation. N.T. 17, 20.

68. Matthew Marquette, Esquire has practiced law in Pennsylvania for 22 years and currently practices at Echard Marquette. N.T. 22. Mr. Marquette has been personal

friends with Staub since law school in the late 1990s and has employed Staub as a paralegal since 2018. N.T. 22-23.

69. Mr. Marquette testified that Staub fulfills traditional paralegal duties at the law firm, including collecting information from clients on the phone, legal research and drafting legal documents for review. N.T. 24.

70. When Mr. Marquette hired Staub, his firm sent the required notice of employment to the Board by letter dated July 25, 2018. N.T. 24; PE-D.

71. Mr. Marquette testified that Staub is the best paralegal he has ever had, and explained that Staub is very good at legal research and is very helpful in identifying strong and weak points in a case. N.T. 27.

72. Mr. Marquette described Staub as a great credit to his practice and someone who makes Mr. Marquette a better attorney. N.T. 28.

73. Mr. Marquette is aware that Staub was convicted of DUI in 2018 and he testified that by his observation, Staub does not have an alcohol problem, and he has never seen Staub take a drink and drive. Mr. Marquette further testified that his law firm does not promote a culture of drinking. N.T. 25, 26, 31.

74. Mr. Marquette testified that Staub, in fact, had used his expertise with the DUI to help others. Mr. Marquette shared a personal story about his own son who struggled with a substance abuse problem. He testified that there were many times when Staub was the only one who could communicate with Mr. Marquette's son. N.T. 26. Mr. Marquette testified that Staub was very good with Mr. Marquette's son and helped him through a difficult time. N.T. 26.

75. Mr. Marquette testified that he is aware that Staub did not report the 2018 criminal conviction and further testified that he himself was not aware of the rule that required Staub to report the conviction to ODC. N.T. 26.

76. With respect to the original misconduct in 2007-2008, Mr. Marquette testified that Staub knows his long discipline was warranted. As a long-time friend, Mr. Marquette was not happy with what Staub had done, but he knows that Staub is not happy with himself, either. N.T. 28.

77. Mr. Marquette testified that he has observed that Staub has changed for the better, and if he had not, Mr. Marquette would not have Staub anywhere near his law practice. N.T. 28-29. Mr. Marquette has observed a measure of humility with which Staub goes about his work, and he believes enough time has passed after the original misconduct to justify reinstatement. N.T. 29.

78. Mr. Marquette sees no reason why Staub should not be reinstated, as he would be a credit to the bar. N.T. 28, 33.

79. Jay Fingeret has practiced law in Pennsylvania for 51 years and has known Staub for two or three years. N.T. 34, 35.

80. For approximately two years, Mr. Fingeret worked in the same suite of offices as Echard Marquette and saw Staub on a daily basis during that time. He knew that Staub was a paralegal at the firm, and he never saw Staub hold himself out as a practicing attorney. N.T. 37.

81. Mr. Fingeret and Staub had discussions about areas of the law, and he found Staub's legal acumen to be "very great" and testified that Staub had a general overall "wonderful" knowledge of the law. N.T. 37-38.

82. Mr. Fingeret testified that he knows Staub is a disbarred lawyer but was not aware of the reason for Staub's disbarment and was not aware of Staub's 2018 criminal conviction. Regardless, Mr. Fingeret testified that Staub has visible remorse for his actions and is living with the consequences. N.T. 38, 39, 41.

83. Mr. Fingeret testified that he recommends Staub for reinstatement, as he finds him to be a person of integrity. N.T. 38.

84. Kelli Kleeb, Esquire has practiced law in Pennsylvania since 2001 and is currently employed as an administrative law judge with the Social Security Administration. N.T. 42. Ms. Kleeb is Staub's former wife and testified that she and Staub co-parent their daughter, who is in college, and they have always had open lines of communication for parenting purposes. N.T. 43.

85. Ms. Kleeb considers Staub to be a very good friend, and a reliable and amazing father. She further testified that Staub has been an honest person with her. N.T. 43, 45.

86. With respect to Staub's failure to comply with Pa.R.D.E. 214, Ms. Kleeb testified that she was not aware of the Rule either. N.T. 45.

87. Ms. Kleeb testified that the accident was an awakening for Staub, as thereafter he began to make changes mentally and physically to become a healthier person. N.T. 44, 46-47.

88. Ms. Kleeb testified that Staub should be reinstated, as it has been a very long time and he has improved himself greatly over the years. N.T. 45.

(iii) The Procedural History Below

89. On June 16, 2022, the Hearing Committee held a reinstatement hearing.

90. Following consideration of the parties' post-hearing briefs, by Report filed on October 31, 2022, the Committee concluded that the misconduct for which Staub was disbarred is not so egregious as to preclude reinstatement. However, the Committee found that Staub failed to meet his burden by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice law in the Commonwealth; and that Staub failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his resumption of the practice of law will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, nor subversive of the public interest. Based on these conclusions, the Committee recommended that the Petition for Reinstatement be denied.

91. Specifically, the Hearing Committee found that "there was no evidence of rehabilitation"; that Staub's explanation of his failure to comply with Rule 214 constituted a refusal to accept responsibility; and his lack of community service was considered a negative factor. Hearing Committee Report p. 7 ¶ 26.

92. On November 21, 2022, Staub filed a Brief on Exceptions and requested oral argument before the Board. ODC filed a Brief Opposing Exceptions on December 9, 2022. A three-member panel of the Board held oral argument on January 6, 2023. The Board adjudicated this matter at the meeting on January 19, 2023.

93. Though recognizing that the Hearing Committee is afforded weight on credibility issues, the Board concludes that the Committee's recommendation is not supported by the record evidence and applicable law.

94. For the reasons stated below, the Board recommends that Petitioner Paul Joseph Staub Jr. be reinstated.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The misconduct for which Petitioner was disbarred on consent is not so egregious as to preclude reinstatement. *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. John Keller*, 506 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1986).

2. Petitioner met his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that a sufficient period of time has passed and he is rehabilitated from the underlying misconduct. *In the Matter of Jerome Verlin*, 731 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1999).

3. Petitioner met his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3).

4. Petitioner met his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that his resumption of the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive of the public interest. Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3).

III. DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of the lawyer disciplinary system is to protect the public from unfit attorneys and to maintain the integrity of the legal system. *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. John Rodes Christie*, 639 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. 1994). When a disbarred attorney seeks reinstatement, the Board and the Court must first examine whether the magnitude of the breach of trust is so egregious as to preclude further reconsideration of

the petition for reinstatement. *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. John Keller*, 506 A.2d 872, 875 (Pa. 1986).

At the time of Staub's first reinstatement proceeding, the Board determined that this case met the *Keller* threshold standard, such that it was appropriate to consider reinstatement. We take this opportunity to confirm our previous conclusion on this key issue. The breach of trust engaged in by Staub that caused his disbarment on consent involved his theft of a significant amount of entrusted funds, falsification of documents, and false statements to opposing counsel and the court, which were designed to conceal the theft. There is no doubt that Staub's misconduct was egregious and adversely impacted the profession, the public, and the courts. Nevertheless, consistent with the decisional law, we conclude—as did the Board in 2006 and the Hearing Committee below—that Staub's misconduct was not so egregious that it should prohibit his reinstatement. Staub's misconduct is similar to that of other attorneys who have been disbarred and who have sought and been granted reinstatement. *See, In the Matter of Lawrence Greenberg*, 749 A.2d 434 (Pa. 2000) (misappropriation of two million dollars and commission of perjury in a bankruptcy not so egregious as to warrant permanent disbarment); *In the Matter of Jerome Verlin*, 731 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1999) (conviction of criminal conspiracy, perjury, false swearing and theft by deception stemming from assisting a client in impersonating a dead man at a deposition not so egregious as to warrant permanent disbarment); *In the Matter of Robert Costigan*, 664 A.2d 518 (Pa. 1995) (theft conviction was not a breach of trust of significant magnitude to forever bar the attorney seeking readmission). Accordingly, Staub has satisfied the *Keller* threshold and is not barred from seeking reinstatement.

A reinstatement proceeding is a “searching inquiry into a lawyer’s present professional and moral fitness to resume the practice of law. The object of concern is not solely the transgressions which gave rise to the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment, but rather, the nature and extent of the rehabilitative efforts he has made since the time the sanction was imposed and the degree of success achieved in the rehabilitative process.” *Philadelphia News, Inc. v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania*, 363 A.2d 779, 780-781 (Pa. 1976).

We therefore consider whether Staub has established by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice law in Pennsylvania and that his readmission would not have a detrimental impact on the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice nor be subversive of the public interest, pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3). To meet this burden, Staub must demonstrate that a sufficient amount of time has passed since his misconduct, during which he engaged in rehabilitative efforts such that the detrimental impact of his serious misconduct on the public trust has been dissipated. *Verlin*, 731 A.2d at 602.

A. Elements Of Rehabilitation

The question of what constitutes rehabilitation sufficient to meet a petitioner’s burden of proof depends on the facts and circumstances of each matter, requiring the Board to view the record as a whole and closely examine the petitioner’s period of removal

from legal practice. The decisional law provides many examples of rehabilitation to guide our analysis.

(i) Accepting Responsibility; Remorse; Making Victims Whole

From the time of the original plea, Staub has accepted responsibility for his misconduct. He pled to the original criminal charges and quickly paid back in full the considerable funds involved in the original misconduct. He voluntarily agreed to disbarment. He engaged professional help in addressing the underlying personal issues. He satisfied his bankruptcy plan and repaid his creditors. Staub even corrected his own attorney at the 2022 reinstatement hearing when that attorney referred to the underlying conduct as “problems,” stating clearly that he had committed a crime.

Staub similarly accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for driving while intoxicated. Staub’s insurance company settled with the other driver for any damages or injury. Staub completed all terms of sentence, and testified that the experience of nearly killing himself led to a complete change in the way he looked at his life and the need to make positive changes. He also used his own negative experience to positively counsel his colleague’s son, who was experiencing personal issues. The uncontroverted evidence is that Staub does not have a drinking problem and has never since engaged in driving after drinking.

At the hearing below, Staub testified at length as to his remorse and acceptance of responsibility, and his testimony was corroborated by the unrebutted testimony of all four of the other witnesses, all of whom knew him well and saw him frequently in both his professional and personal life.

The Board has determined that actions similar to those engaged in by the instant Petitioner have established acceptance of responsibility in support of rehabilitation. See, *In the Matter of Herbert Karl Sudfeld, Jr.*, No. 50 DB 2016 (D. Bd. Rpt. 5/6/2022) (S. Ct. Order 8/11/2022) (suspended attorney's earliest expression of contrition was when he cooperated with ODC in jointly seeking temporary suspension and when he later consented to a four year suspension on consent); *In the Matter of Charles M. Naselsky*, No. 169 DB 2012 (D. Bd. Rpt. 3/24/2022) (S. Ct. Order 5/4/2022) (disbarred attorney demonstrated acceptance of responsibility by resigning from the bar, and by expressing guilt and responsibility at his sentencing hearing and apologizing to the sentencing court); *In the Matter of Lisa Reo Jenkins*, No. 81 DB 2006 (D. Bd. Rpt. 11/4/2015) (S. Ct. Order 12/10/2015) (disbarred attorney accepted responsibility when she did not minimize or justify her misconduct and expressed full appreciation for the impropriety of her actions).

The record is also replete with Staub's credible expressions of remorse and regret for his actions. The Court has found that genuine expressions of remorse are evidence of rehabilitation. See, *Verlin*, 731 A.2d at 603 (in evaluating a disbarred attorney's efforts at rehabilitation, the Court stated that "[p]erhaps, most importantly, the Disciplinary Board found that Verlin testified credibly as to his remorse for his actions, which he described as a breach of trust to himself, the profession and his family.").

(ii) Seeking Professional Help

The criminal record from 2010 reflects that Staub sought treatment from a psychiatrist, Dr. Trivus, and in his Questionnaire filed in this second reinstatement proceeding, Staub credits Dr. Trivus with making a profound difference in his life. Staub describes his treatment with Dr. Trivus as his "path to redemption" as Staub learned that

“good people can make awful decisions” and that what is important is that “people learn from those decisions and do not repeat them.” In previous reinstatement matters, the Board has determined that seeking professional help is a positive factor in the analysis of a petitioner’s rehabilitation. *In the Matter of Joshua Lawrence Gayl*, No. 79 DB 2016 (D. Bd. Rpt. 9/19/2022 (S. Ct. Order 10/25/2022) (Board weighed in disbarred attorney’s favor that he entered treatment prior to entering his guilty plea in order to understand and address the behavior that led to his underlying acts of misconduct); *In the Matter of Robert Eric Hall*, No. 171 DB 2006 (D. Bd. Rpt. 2/19/2015) (S. Ct. Order 3/17/2015) (Board found as positive evidence of rehabilitation that disbarred attorney immediately sought professional treatment for substance abuse following a DUI-related motor vehicle accident that he caused, which resulted in the death of a West Point cadet).

(iii) Continuing to Work in the Law in a Competent Manner

The record demonstrates that in 2010, Staub commenced employment as a paralegal for Peter Giorgiades, Esquire, for whom he worked until approximately the spring of 2018, when Mr. Giorgiades ceased practicing law. Staub candidly acknowledged that he failed to notify the Board of his paralegal employment as he was required to do pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 217. There is no evidence that Staub engaged in the unauthorized practice of law or intended to conceal his employment from the Board during the time period that he was employed by Mr. Giorgiades. After learning of Pa.R.D.E. 217’s reporting requirement in 2016, Staub then complied, notifying ODC upon concluding employment with Mr. Giorgiades and beginning his employment with Echard Marquette.

Staub was offered employment by Mr. Marquette as a paralegal at Mr. Marquette’s law firm and has worked there full-time to the present. Staub and Mr. Marquette have

been friends since they attended law school in the late 1990s. Both Mr. Marquette and Staub understand that Staub is not permitted to practice law and both ensure that those with whom Staub interacts are aware that he is not a lawyer. As a paralegal for the firm, Staub testified that no job is too small for him to perform, and described his responsibilities as including telephone intake, filing, scheduling meetings, legal research and drafting documents. During his time at Echard Marquette, Staub set up an electronic filing system. The record supports a finding that the law firm values Staub's services and skill set, as Mr. Marquette described him as the best paralegal he has ever had, and specifically noted Staub's ability to identify the weak and strong points of a case.

Staub's employment as a paralegal for the past 12 or 13 years has given him the opportunity to use his legal training within the requirements of Pa.R.D.E. 217 and gives assurance to the Board that Staub is competent and learned in the law. He bolstered these efforts to remain competent by completing the required 36 CLE credits and an additional 5 credits for a total of 41 credits of continuing education. If reinstated, Staub hopes to remain employed with Echard Marquette. Staub has no plans to resume a solo practice of law, as he expressed his feeling that it is hard to practice alone. He further expressed that after many years of disbarment, he feels there is much he could show others about the pitfalls of practicing and the pitfalls of not reaching out for help.

Both Staub and the experienced lawyers who worked closely with him testified that he was sad and humbled by having to take a subordinate paralegal role, but he persisted in serving the clients of the law firm which he did with great proficiency. Continuing to engage at a high level in a humbling role is a factor counted in favor of rehabilitation. See, *In the Matter of Dawn A. Segal*, No. 195 DB 2018 (D. Bd. Rpt. 4/13/2021) (S. Ct. Order

5/3/2021) (Segal performed paralegal work while suspended from the practice of law and the Board credited as evidence of rehabilitation her testimony that she felt lucky and grateful that a firm employed her in such capacity, and that being a paralegal had humbled her and she learned many things about supporting lawyers).

The Court and the Board have found that continuous, steady employment as a paralegal is evidence of rehabilitation. And, the Board has found that evidence of the high quality of a petitioner's paralegal work and knowledge of the law bolsters the conclusion that a petitioner is rehabilitated. See, *Verlin*, 731 A.2d at 602 (disbarred attorney worked as a paralegal at his son's law office); *Gayl* at No. 79 DB 2016 (disbarred attorney held steady employment as a law clerk and the record showed that his legal skills were highly regarded); *In the Matter of Robert Turnbull Hall*, No. 49 DB 2011 (D. Bd. Rpt. 6/8/2020) (S. Ct. Order 7/6/2020) (suspended lawyer maintained employment as a law clerk for the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law where his legal skills were highly regarded); *In the Matter of Madeline E. Schwartz*, No. 77 DB 2010 (D. Bd. Rpt. 6/10/2019) (S. Ct. Order 7/22/2019) (suspended lawyer maintained consistent employment as a paralegal for several law firms where her legal talents were recognized); *In the Matter of Robert P. Maizel*, No. 26 DB 2014 (D. Bd. Rpt. 10/15/2018) (S. Ct. Order 11/16/2018) (suspended lawyer demonstrated rehabilitation through the credible testimony of his employer for whom he performed paralegal work, who attested to the suspended lawyer's excellent legal skills and understanding of the law).¹

¹ Though not directly applicable to the instant matter, we note that the Board has found that a petitioner's continuous, nonlegal employment is evidence of rehabilitation. See, *In the Matter of Sandra Couch Collins*, No. 141 DB 1996 & 37 DB 1998 (D. Bd. Rpt. 3/14/2022) (S. Ct. Order 5/4/2022) (disbarred lawyer had an employment history of low-income jobs, sometimes holding several jobs at one time, in order to support herself and financially assist her daughter during a 25 year period of disbarment); *In the Matter of James Francis Donohue*, No. 112 DB 2013 (D. Bd. Rpt. 6/10/2020) (S. Ct. Order 7/6/2020) (suspended attorney maintained steady employment working two warehouse jobs to support his family).

Relatedly, Staub's completion of the CLE requirements demonstrates competency and learning in the law and is evidence of his rehabilitation from the underlying acts of misconduct. See, *In the Matter of Robert Toland, II*, No. 104 DB 2009 (D. Bd. Rpt. 11/1/2019) (S. Ct. Order 12/3/2019) (suspended attorney demonstrated competency through completion of CLE credits and paralegal work).

(iv) Getting One's Own Life in Order

The un rebutted evidence is that Staub has pursued steady employment, entered into a happy and financially and emotionally supportive new marriage, maintained excellent relations with his ex-wife and daughter, sees his young son as often as possible, is current on his taxes and child support payments, and lives within his means. The car accident served as a "wake-up call" to him and his focus on his own health and well-being is better than ever. Here, the un rebutted testimony establishes that Staub does not have a drinking problem; there is not a culture of drinking at the law firm; Staub does not currently ever drink and drive; he completed the full treatment program, paid all fines, and paid damages to the other party. He has shown clear remorse for the DUI accident ("I was mostly afraid that I might have hurt or killed someone"). The Board has credited efforts to improve mental and physical health as evidence of rehabilitation. See, *In the Matter of Cory Adam Leshner*, No. 159 DB 2013 (D. Bd. Rpt. 11/10/2020) (S. Ct. Order 12/16/2020) (disbarred lawyer tended to his physical and spiritual well-being during an 18 month prison term). In other evidence of positive rehabilitation, Staub focused on his finances during disbarment; he resolved his bankruptcy in compliance with the plan and is current with his tax obligations and child support obligations. See, *In the Matter of John*

Anthony Costalas, No. 217 DB 2015 (D. Bd. Rpt. 4/28/2022) (S. Ct. Order 6/10/2022) (suspended attorney current with tax filings and addressed outstanding debt).

The record is uncontroverted that Staub is a good father to his daughter and a good husband and family man. There was also testimony that Staub has been as good a father as possible to the son he shares with a woman he dated prior to his recent marriage. During his disbarment, he has been a leader in his extended family and assisted elderly members of his family. In previous reinstatement matters, the Board has found that evidence of a petitioner's focus on caring for family and supporting others constitutes rehabilitation. See, *In the Matter of Joseph A. Gembala, III*, No. 21 DB 2012 (D. Bd. Rpt. 5/10/2022) (S. Ct. Order 6/21/2022) (suspended lawyer devoted substantial hours to caring for his elderly parents, which enabled them to remain in their homes prior to their deaths); *In the Matter of Anthony M. Crane*, No. 85 DB 2013 (D. Bd. Rpt. 3/30/2022) (S. Ct. Order 5/11/2022) (suspended attorney provided support and care for his wife and three children, one of whom suffered from severe autism and one of whom had a learning disability); *Segal* at No. 195 DB 2018 (suspended attorney cared for a dying friend and tried to be a presence of kindness and support to the people around her); *In the Matter of Harry Vincent Cardoni*, No. 210 DB 2010 (D. Bd. Rpt. 2/25/2020) (S. Ct. Order 3/12/2020) (suspended attorney assisted elderly family members); *In the Matter of Wayne D. Bozeman*, No. 183 DB 2009 (D. Bd. Rpt. 2/28/2018) (S. Ct. Order 3/19/2018) (suspended attorney made efforts to help others, including while he was in prison for his underlying misconduct and helped a diabetic inmate).

The Hearing Committee essentially found that Staub's focus on himself and his family were inconsistent with remorse and acceptance of the harm he caused to others.

But the law is to the contrary: evidence of a petitioner's focus on seeking professional help, improving himself, pursuing a profession, and caring for his family are considered favorable factors in the rehabilitative process. Here, the evidence is uncontroverted that Staub has made significant and positive adjustments in his personal, financial, and professional life, all of which are positive factors in determining that Staub has met his burden of establishing sufficient rehabilitation to re-enter the practice of law.

(v) Compliance with Rules

Staub did violate Pa.R.D.E. 217 when he failed to report his initial employment after disbarment. However, Staub never violated the substantive practice requirements of the rule; the uncontested evidence from Staub and multiple experienced lawyers who practiced closely with him is that he never held himself out as a lawyer during his period of disbarment and never engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Once the reporting aspect of the Rule was brought to his attention, he followed it without exception in his later employment. In light of this record, the initial reporting violation more than a decade ago does not preclude reinstatement here.

Staub also failed to comply with Pa.R.D.E. 214's requirement to report his DUI conviction within 20 days. The uncontradicted record reflects that Staub voluntarily disclosed the conviction to ODC and was completely forthright about it in his Reinstatement Questionnaire and throughout this proceeding.

Staub testified that he did not report the conviction contemporaneously because he was unaware of Pa.R.D.E. 214, nor were any of the experienced lawyers with whom he worked. This testimony was corroborated by the uncontroverted and credible testimony of the two lawyers who testified as to the fact that they were unaware of the

reporting requirement. Staub also explained all that was going on his life at that time, which made it even more unlikely that he would become aware of the need to report. Any suggestion or inference that Staub was attempting to hide the information from ODC is belied by the uncontroverted fact that he voluntarily reported the DUI to ODC on his Reinstatement Questionnaire. Rather, it is far more likely that Staub's explanation is true: he did not comply with Rule 214 because he was unaware of the requirement to do so.

In sum, we find that Staub disclosed the conviction to ODC on his 2022 Petition, and credibly and satisfactorily explained why he failed to timely report his conviction under Pa.R.D.E. 214. On this record, we conclude that Staub's failure to comply with Pa.R.D.E. 214 is not an impediment to his reinstatement.

The case law supports the Board's conclusion that these rule violations do not preclude reinstatement. In a previous reinstatement matter, the Court reinstated a petitioner who committed rule violations for which he was disciplined during the period of suspension. In *In the Matter of Scott Philip Sigman*, No. 43 DB 2012 (D. Bd. Rpt. 7/26/2016) (S. Ct. Order 8/17/2016), the Supreme Court adopted the Board's recommendation and reinstated Sigman after a thirty month period of suspension. During his suspension, Sigman was employed as a paralegal by another attorney and was aware that he was required to comply with Pa.R.D.E. 217. Sigman's conduct was even more egregious than that at issue here because, unlike Staub, Sigman actually appeared at the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office for a meeting on a client's criminal case without advising the assistant district attorney that he was a suspended attorney and prohibited from appearing for a client. At his reinstatement hearing, Sigman accepted responsibility for his actions. The Board considered the misconduct and concluded that

the circumstances were not sufficiently weighty to overcome the significant evidence of Sigman's qualifications and fitness to resume practice.

Similarly, in *In the Matter of Robert William Stein*, No. 90 DB 2012 (D. Bd. Rpt. 10/19/2018) (S. Ct. Order 1/4/2019), the Supreme Court reinstated Stein following a five year period of suspension on consent. The Board found that during his suspension, Stein violated Pa.R.D.E. 217 by entering his appearance in three different matters in landlord-tenant disputes and by preparing leases and signing documents. At his reinstatement hearing, Stein admitted that his acts violated Pa.R.D.E. 217's restrictions on the activities of formerly admitted attorneys, and acknowledged he should have sought counsel to handle the matters, investigated further and read the Enforcement Rules, but did not do so, for which he was sorry. The Board concluded that Stein's actions, while violative of the rules, did not rise to the level to prevent his reinstatement, as Stein expressed understanding of his wrongdoing and apologized.

Here, like the petitioners in *Sigman* and *Stein*, Staub accepted responsibility, provided credible explanations, and apologized for his non-compliance. Staub also presented uncontested evidence of subsequent compliance.

For all of these reasons, the Board concludes that Staub's failure to comply with Pa.R.D.E. 214 and 217 do not serve as impediments to his reinstatement request.

(vi) Community Service

The Hearing Committee repeatedly "observed" that Staub had not performed any community service. However, while community service can be considered as a factor in determining reinstatement, it is not a necessary requirement for reinstatement. See, *In the Matter of John Louis D'Intino*, No. 48 DB 2009 (D. Bd. Rpt. 1/4/2019) (S. Ct. Order

3/13/2019) (disbarred attorney reinstated from disbarment after eight years even though he did not present evidence of community service; attorney met his burden by demonstrating successful recovery from substance use, holding continuous employment in nonlegal jobs, accepting responsibility for the underlying misconduct, and expressing genuine remorse as well as evidence of good character); In *the Matter of John Anthony Lord*, Nos. 149 DB 1995 & 48 DB 1998 (D. Bd. Rpt. 4/21/2006) (S. Ct. Order 7/31/2006) (disbarred attorney reinstated from disbarment after seven years without showing evidence of community service; attorney met burden of proof by demonstrating successful recovery from alcoholism, expressing sincere remorse, presenting good character evidence, and working consistently during disbarment).

(vii) Character Witness Testimony

A strong factor in support of reinstatement here is the testimony of the four character witnesses, whose testimony was uncontradicted. Though the Hearing Committee found all to be credible, their testimony was almost entirely disregarded by the Committee when it found no evidence of rehabilitation in this record. These witnesses include Mr. Marquette, Staub's employer and boss, and someone who has known him since law school and sees him almost every day. Mr. Marquette, who has practiced law in Pennsylvania for more than 20 years, testified that he would not have Staub in his firm if he did not think he was good at what he does. Mr. Marquette testified that Staub is the best paralegal he has ever had, with an ability to identify strong and weak points in cases. He believes that Staub has made him a better lawyer. Mr. Marquette spoke of Staub's remorse for his past actions. He believes that Staub has changed for the better over the years and that he has observed humility in him. Mr. Marquette confirmed that Staub made

a life-changing mistake with the drunk driving incident and that Staub does not drink alcohol to excess.

Jay Fingeret, a highly experienced practitioner who has practiced law for more than five decades in Pennsylvania, shared space with Staub's firm, saw Staub frequently and discussed cases with him. He testified that based on regular interactions and conversations over two or three years, Staub has a very good legal mind, has remorse for his past actions and is living with the consequence of his misdeeds. Though unfamiliar with the details of the original misconduct, Fingeret considers Staub to be a person of integrity, which supports his reinstatement.

Mr. Kalich, Staub's brother-in-law and a senior risk manager at PNC, frankly stated that he understands, as a risk professional, that he is putting his reputation on the line to testify in favor of the reinstatement of an individual who pled to such serious crimes in the past. However, he did so without reservation, speaking also to the fine family man that Staub is, both to his immediate family and to elderly relatives.

Finally, Staub's former wife, Ms. Kleeb, has been practicing law in Pennsylvania for more than 20 years and is currently an administrative law judge in the Social Security Administration. She testified that she and Staub share a warm relationship and that she considers him a very good friend and a reliable and amazing father. With full knowledge of the original conduct that led to Staub's disbarment, she considers him now to be an honest person. She testified that Staub has turned his life around and that the 2018 accident served as an awakening for Staub, leading him to make changes both mentally and physically to become a healthier person.

(viii) Sufficient Time

At present, approximately 13 years have passed since Staub was disbarred and almost 15 years have passed since the original misconduct that gave rise to the disbarment. In previous matters, the Court has reinstated disbarred attorneys who met their heavy burden to show rehabilitation and fitness to practice after a disbarment period similar in length to that of the instant Petitioner. See, *In the Matter of William Jay Gregg*, (disbarred attorney reinstated on second attempt after the Board found that the passage of 12 years combined with a clear demonstration of rehabilitation during that time frame established Gregg's fitness to resume practice); *In the Matter of Philip G. Gentile*, No. 54 DB 2007 (D. Bd. Rpt. 2/20/2018) (S. Ct. Order 3/16/2018) (disbarred attorney reinstated after the passage of ten years and satisfactory efforts at rehabilitation); *In the Matter of Jay Ira Bomze*, No. 149 DB 2002 (D. Bd. Rpt. 11/21/2017) (S. Ct. Order 12/26/2017) (disbarred attorney reinstated after the passage of 15 years and the demonstration of rehabilitation during those years).

Even if Staub's DUI conviction were considered an independent basis for discipline, it has been approximately four years since that event. The decisional law demonstrates that where there is a conviction of DUI and related offenses arising out of a discrete underlying event, the discipline imposed is generally in the range of a private reprimand to a short suspension, often times coupled with a period of probation. In *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Stephen Daniel Brinton*, No. 88 DB 2020 (S. Ct. Order 7/27/2020), the Court granted a Joint Petition in Support of Discipline on Consent for a three year suspension, with six months served and the remainder of the suspension stayed with probation for two years and six months. Therein, Brinton entered a plea to

DUI and two counts of recklessly endangering another person based on an automobile accident resulting in injuries to another person. In *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Mark Eric Elvin*, No. 8 DB 2018 (D. Bd. Order 1/30/2018), the Board imposed a public reprimand on Elvin for his conviction of one count of accidents involving death or personal injury, endangering another person, and DUI, general impairment. The facts of the matter indicated that Elvin, while intoxicated, lost control of his vehicle, crossed into oncoming traffic, and struck a motorcycle head on, causing injury to the operator and passenger of the motorcycle. In the matter of *Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous*, No. 142 DB 2016 (D. Bd. Order 10/18/2016), the Board ordered a private reprimand and two years of probation for an attorney who was convicted of DUI-highest rate of alcohol and two counts of disorderly conduct following an incident of erratic driving and subsequent combative behavior towards the police.

Upon this record, we conclude that Staub has met his reinstatement burden by clear and convincing evidence. Staub is fit to resume the practice of law in the Commonwealth, as he is morally qualified, competent, and learned in the law. Because Staub has amply demonstrated his qualifications, we further conclude that his reinstatement will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, nor subversive of the public interest.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unanimously recommends that the Petitioner, Paul Joseph Staub, Jr., be reinstated to the practice of law.

The Board further recommends that, pursuant to Rule 218(f), Pa.R.D.E., Petitioner be directed to pay all of the necessary expenses incurred in the investigation and processing of the Petition for Reinstatement.

Respectfully submitted,

THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

By: */s/ Laura E. Ellsworth*
Laura E. Ellsworth, Member

Date: 05/12/2023