NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.	:	
MACHI RAWLS	:	
Appellant	:	No. 788 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 26, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004566-2024

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: **FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026**

Appellant Machi Rawls appeals from a judgment of sentence convicting him of two counts of robbery, two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, and one count of carrying a firearm without a license.[1] Appellant challenges the denial of his decertification motion by the trial court, which was entered by Hon. Barbara A. McDermott.[2] Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court displayed bias and prejudice, relied upon *ex parte* inadmissible evidence, and failed to consider that Appellant established that public interest would be served by a transfer. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court provided a thorough review of the facts in this matter:

> On May 11, 2024, at around 3:50 p.m., [Appellant, age 17], along with his three co-defendants, robbed two juveniles at gunpoint on

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[1] 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1); 903; and 6106(a)(1), respectively.

[2] We note that Judge McDermott passed away on August 11, 2026.

> the SEPTA "L" train near 2600 Kensington Avenue in Philadelphia. The defendants, all masked, surrounded the fourteen and fifteen-years-old juveniles and stole their sneakers, a sweatshirt, and a ski-mask hat. The juveniles reported the incident to the police, and within an hour, [Appellant] and his co-defendants were caught with the stolen property. [Appellant] had a 9mm handgun in his possession at the time of his arrest.
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> On October 22, 2024, [Appellant] appeared before [the trial court] for a decertification hearing. Prior to this hearing, [the trial court] had reviewed materials submitted by the defense. At that time, [the trial court] was informed that the Commonwealth was agreeing to remand the case to juvenile court. [The trial court] felt that it needed more information about the [Appellant] in order to accept the agreement. Defense counsel permitted the [trial court] to discuss the incident with [Appellant], during which he admitted that robbing the two juveniles was an impulsive decision. [Appellant] told the [trial court] that he had a good support system, and his prior placement taught him how to do the right thing. However, [Appellant] blamed his behavior that day on his peers, claiming that they didn't have his best interest. [The trial court] held the matter under advisement for further thought.
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> At the next case listing on November 27, 2024, [the trial court] was notified telephonically that there had been an incident between [Appellant] and a deputy sheriff at the prison and that [Appellant] would be late arriving to court. [Appellant] had appeared at the prison processing unit without wearing his mandatory identification wristband and had hidden unpermitted clothing on his person. The deputy sheriff described [Appellant] as highly combative. While waiting for [Appellant] to arrive, [the trial court] offered to have the deputy sheriff testify under oath to the specifics of the incident. Both sides declined. When [Appellant] appeared in court, he acknowledged that he was not wearing his wristband and was breaking the rules, but attempted to justify his decision as a mere misunderstanding. Rather than proceed with the decertification hearing at that moment, the [trial court] continued it for six weeks.
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> On January 7, 2025, after a hearing [the trial court] denied decertification.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 1 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

On February 26, 2025, Appellant entered a guilty plea to two counts of robbery, two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, and carrying a firearm without a license. Appellant was sentenced to eleven and one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by two years of probation. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues:

1. Did a trial judge improperly refuse to recuse herself from presiding over a decertification hearing after she had engaged in plea bargain negotiations with the parties, had multiple conversations with [Appellant], learned *ex parte* of prejudicial information regarding [Appellant]'s conduct while in custody, rejected the tendered negotiated plea bargain, and made a pre-determination regarding her ruling on the decertification motion?

2. Did the lower court improperly deny Appellant's motion to decertify his case to the Family Court, Juvenile Division, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322 because the court considered and significantly relied upon inadmissible and non-record evidence involving Appellant's statements made during his plea discussions, and vague, unsubstantiated, and non-record hearsay evidence that Appellant engaged in violence while in adult custody; in violation of Pa.R.E. 410, his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment and Article 1 Section 9, and his state and federal due process rights?

3. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in denying transfer because the evidence compellingly demonstrated that his decertification would serve the public interest where the Commonwealth did not present evidence disputing Appellant's position?

Appellant's Brief at 4-5 (some formatting altered).

First, we must address whether Appellant's guilty plea waives his right to appeal the denial of his decertification. We have previously held that "[t]he issue of certification between the juvenile and criminal divisions is jurisdictional and, therefore, not waivable." ***See Commonwealth v. Sanders***, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we find that Appellant's claims are not waived.

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for recusal because the trial court displayed bias and prejudice towards Appellant. ***See*** Appellant's Brief at 25. Specifically, Appellant references multiple comments that the trial court made throughout the decertification hearing demanding that Appellant convince the trial judge that he has "'gotten it,' accepts responsibility for 'what [he has] done' and that he's 'earned the right to have [a spot in the juvenile facility] versus a spot in prison.'" ***See id.*** at 26 (citing N.T. Hr'g, 10/22/24, at 10, 16). Additionally, Appellant believes that the trial court was prejudiced against him, due to its reliance upon statements made by the sheriff's department "about supposed conduct occurring at the adult prison on November 27, 2024." ***See id.*** at 41-42. Appellant highlights that the trial court interrupted Appellant's counsel to insert the sheriff's department version of events. ***See id.*** Appellant claims that none of the statements were "properly entered into the record, and counsel specifically objected to it." ***Id.*** at 42.

We have previously held that:

> Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to recuse is for an abuse of discretion. The standards for recusal take into account a subjective determination of the trial court regarding its ability to preside impartially and an objective, community-based determination of the trial court that its involvement would not create the appearance of impropriety.
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> The standards for recusal are well established. It is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially. In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that decision will not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of discretion. In reviewing a denial of a disqualification motion, we recognize that our judges are honorable, fair and competent.
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> We assume that a jurist will possess interests and relationships that might conceivably influence their judgment but, in the normal course of events, the mere presence of an interest or relationship that could theoretically affect a judicial decision does not create a presumption of partiality.
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> Rather, recusal is required wherever there is ***substantial doubt*** as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially. A jurist's impartiality is called into question whenever there are factors or circumstances that may reasonably question the jurist's impartiality in the matter. Thus, in order for the integrity of the judiciary to be compromised, we have held that a judge's behavior is not required to rise to a level of actual prejudice, but the appearance of impropriety is sufficient. In this regard, the appearance of impropriety sufficient to disqualify a judge exists when a significant minority of the lay community could reasonably question the court's impartiality.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 360 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

> We have also held that:
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> > Not establishing bias or partiality . . . are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as [ ] judges, sometimes display. A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune.

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 61 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis removed).

> Here, the trial court explained:
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> > As [Appellant's] counsel was aware, after parties reach an agreement and prior to [the trial court] accepting an agreement, [the trial court] will frequently have a conversation with the juvenile to in order to better assess the juvenile's credibility and to learn if the juvenile has matured from the time between his arrest and the hearing. [Appellant] offers no evidence to substantiate the claim that [the trial court] was prejudiced by its conversations with the [Appellant], or that the conversations would impact on [the trial court]'s ability to preside impartially over the decertification hearing.
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> > [Appellant]'s allegation that [the trial court] was prejudiced after it learned of [Appellant]'s confrontation with a deputy sheriff is meritless. Upon learning of [Appellant]'s poor conduct at the prison, [the trial court] did not reject the negotiated agreement and did not rule on the decertification motion. Instead, [the trial court] continued the matter to a later date, which allowed the court to further deliberate and provided ample time for [Appellant's] counsel to challenge the sheriff's department's narrative of events following [Appellant]'s inconsistent account of the incident.
> >
> > [Appellant] offers no evidence to support his claim that [the trial court] prejudged [Appellant]'s amenability to treatment or

> predetermined the disposition of the decertification motion. [The trial court] initially mistakenly believed that the hearing had already occurred because of its previous conversations with [Appellant] and prior review of [Appellant]'s mitigation documents. When brought to [the trial court]'s attention, [the trial court] immediately realized that the hearing had not occurred and then proceeded to hear all evidence and argument in an objective manner.
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> [The trial court] duly denied [Appellant]'s motion to recuse after it determined that it was capable of impartially presiding over the decertification hearing, and that [the trial court]'s continued involvement would not create the appearance of impropriety or risk public confidence in the judiciary. [Appellant] fails to offer any evidence to the contrary.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 3-4 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse. ***See Martin***, 360 A.3d at 961. As the trial court stated, it

> initially mistakenly believed that the hearing had already occurred because of its previous conversations with [Appellant] and prior review of [Appellant]'s mitigation documents. When brought to [the trial court]'s attention, the court immediately realized that the hearing had not occurred and then proceeded to hear all evidence and argument in an objective manner.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 4 (citation omitted). We find that the trial court's expressions "of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger" are "within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as [] judges, sometimes display." ***See Kearney***, 92 A.3d at 61. For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse. ***See Martin***, 360 A.3d at 961; ***Kearney***, 92 A.3d at 61.

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court's "[reliance] on improper facts and factors in making her determination under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322 requires reversal." Appellant's Brief at 46 (formatting altered). Appellant argues that "consideration of inadmissible evidence and improper factors is an abuse of discretion." ***Id.*** at 47. Appellant contends that once the hearing started, his counsel "moved in the only evidence of record." ***Id.*** at 49. Appellant states that this did "not include any notes from previous hearings or affidavits or testimony from prison or court officials." ***Id.*** Appellant highlights that when the psychologist stated that Appellant "is low risk for future violence," the trial court interjected stating "How can he be low risk when he engaged in violence in the prison?" ***Id.***; ***see also*** N.T., 1/7/25 at 20. Appellant also claims that during the trial court's findings and conclusions, the trial court referred to what happened at the prison as one of her reasons for denying the decertification. ***Id.*** at 50. Appellant contends that "none of this 'evidence' was properly before the court" and should not be considered. ***Id.*** Appellant also argues that the comments made violate the "Rule of Evidence 410, the Fifth Amendment, and Pennsylvania case law." ***Id.*** at 34. Appellant contends that the comments made during the decertification hearing violated Pa.R.E 410 because "statements made during plea discussions were inadmissible against him at the transfer hearing." ***Id.*** Appellant claims that the discussions on October 22 and November 27 "were made during a proceeding in which the parties were seeking the court's acceptance of the tendered plea under Pa.R.Crim.P. 590." ***Id.*** at 35. Appellant admits that the "plea would not ultimately have

been entered by [the trial court], [the trial court] had to accept the agreement to enter a transfer order without a formal hearing." ***Id.*** Appellant explains that he only talked to the trial court "solely for the purpose of trying to convince her to accept the plea." ***Id.*** Appellant also contends that the "Fifth Amendment and Article 1 Section 9 of Pennsylvania's Constitution [] bar admission and consideration of the statements at the transfer hearing." ***Id.*** at 36. Appellant argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that "a defendant's right to silence operates to preclude a court at a transfer hearing from considering whether the minor expresses remorse or otherwise refuses to comment on his case." ***Id.*** (referring to ***Commonwealth v. Taylor***, 230 A.3d 1050, 1071 (Pa. 2020)**.**

The Commonwealth contends the trial court's discussion with Appellant did not violate Pa.R.E. 410 because the statements were not made "during the course of a plea negotiation or guilty plea hearing." Commonwealth's Brief at 12. Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated because Appellant was "not compelled by the court to admit guilt." ***Id.*** at 13. Furthermore, the Commonwealth contends that the "record demonstrates that [Appellant] willingly participated in discussions with the [trial court]" and was not forced into answering the trial court's questions. ***Id.***

We have previously held that:

> Decisions of whether to grant decertification will not be overturned absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the misapplication or

> overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly unreasonable judgment passed upon partiality, prejudice or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some formatting altered and citations omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 410(a)(3) states:

> In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions: . . . (3) a statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 311, 409, 414, 424, 550, or 590 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a comparable rule or procedure of another state. . .

Pa.R.E. 410(a)(3).

The trial court explained:

> [Appellant] offers no evidence to substantiate the allegation that [the trial court] improperly relied upon [Appellant]'s statements made regarding the proposed agreement. Although the parties proposed a negotiated plea agreement, by which [Appellant] would plead guilty in Family Court in exchange for a two year placement, it is always [the trial court]'s obligation to evaluate whether the agreement serves the interests of justice.
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> [Appellant]'s allegation that [the trial court] considered non-record evidence is unfounded, as the defense accepted the information conveyed to them. [The trial court] deliberately did not decide whether to accept the negotiated plea agreement after it learned of [Appellant]'s combative and disruptive behavior at the prison, instead continued the matter. At no point did [Appellant] avail himself of the opportunity to challenge the narrative provided by the Sheriff's Department.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25 at 5 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ***See Ramos***, 920 A.2d at 1257. We agree with the

Commonwealth that Appellant's reliance on Pa.R.E. 410 is misguided as the statements were not made during a plea negotiation or guilty plea hearing. Rather, the statements were made during a decertification hearing. Furthermore, Appellant has not provided this Court with any case law showing that Pa.R.E. 410 applies to decertification hearings. For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ***See id.***

Lastly, Appellant argues that he "[d]emonstrated through his evidence that he was amendable to treatment and transfer would serve the public interest." Appellant's Brief at 51. Appellant highlights that he was "the only party to present evidence as the Commonwealth declined to introduce additional evidence or call any witnesses." ***Id.*** Additionally, he presented letters of support, "but also a detailed psychosocial evaluation which showed him to be low risk of future violence and amendable to rehabilitation." ***Id.*** Appellant contends that the report showed that he accepted responsibility for his actions and that he had a supportive mother who was "willing to involve herself in these treatments." ***Id.*** at 52. Appellant also claimed that he attended the Institute for the Development of African American Youth's program[3] and "fully engaged and a became a teen leader." ***Id.*** Appellant highlights that he only attended "one short stint of therapy when attending the IDAAY program." ***Id.*** Appellant also gained technical training certificates

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[3] The Institute for the Development of African American Youth's (IDAAY) Don't Fall Down in the Hood" program, includes "community service, roundtable discussions on youth and gun violence, anger management treatment, and drug and alcohol treatment." Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25, at 7-8.

and applied to attend the Community College of Philadelphia. ***Id.*** Appellant contends that the "court's analysis is weak and ignores the evidence actually presented and the requirements of Section 6355." ***Id.*** at 53. Appellant argues that the evidence actually presented "overwhelmingly favor[s] transfer to juvenile court." ***Id.*** (some formatting altered).

We have previously held that:

> Decisions of whether to grant decertification will not be overturned absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly unreasonable judgment passed upon partiality, prejudice or ill will.

Ramos, 920 A.2d at 1257 (citation omitted and some formatting altered).

A juvenile may request treatment through the juvenile system through the transfer process of decertification. ***Commonwealth v. Ruffin,*** 10 A.3d 336, 338 (Pa. Super. 2010); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322(a). "It is well established that a juvenile seeking decertification has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the transfer to juvenile court is warranted." ***Ramos***, 920 A.2d at 1258 (citations omitted). "[The trial] court shall consider the factors contained in section 6355(a)(4)(iii)" in order to determine whether the juvenile has satisfied his or her burden of "establishing that the transfer will serve the public interest[.]" 42 Pa.C.S. § 6322(a). The factors include:

> (A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;
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> (B) the impact of the offense on the community;

> (C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child;
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> (D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly committed by the child;
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> (E) the degree of the child's culpability;
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> (F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives available under this chapter and in the adult criminal justice system; and
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> (G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering the following factors:
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> > (I) age;
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> > (II) mental capacity;
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> > (III) maturity;
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> > (IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the child;
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> > (V) previous records, if any;
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> > (VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child;
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> > (VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction;
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> > (VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;
> >
> > (IX) any other relevant factors;

42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A)-(G).

Furthermore,

> Although the Juvenile Act requires that a decertification court consider all of the amenability factors, it is silent as to the weight that should be assessed to each factor. The ultimate decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial as an adult is within the sole discretion of a decertification court. A decertification court must consider all the facts set forth in § 6355 of the Juvenile Act, but it need not address, [] the applicability and importance of each

> factor and fact in reaching its final determination. . . The presumption in this Commonwealth remains that if a court has facts in its possession, it will apply them.

Ruffin, 10 A.3d at 339 (citations omitted and some formatting altered.

The trial court explained:

> After carefully considering and weighing all the required factors, including [Appellant]'s psychological evaluation, psycho-social summary, medical records, letters of support, and the preliminary hearing notes, [the trial court] determined that decertification would not serve the public interest.
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> Previous attempts by the juvenile system to rehabilitate [Appellant] failed. [Appellant] was arrested and adjudicated delinquent in August of 2022 for possession of a firearm by a minor ("VUFA 6110.1"), carrying a firearm on the public street in Philadelphia ("VUFA 6108"), possession of instrument of a crime with intent ("PIC"), firearms not to carried without a license ("VUFA 6106"), conspiracy-VUFA 6106, as well as intentional possession of a controlled substance. [Appellant] was subsequently held at the JJSC from August 29, 2022 until December 8, 2022, when he was released on probation with GPS monitoring, to be supervised by the Violence Prevention Probation (VPP) Unit, which provides specialized supervision for juveniles with firearms-related offenses. [Appellant] returned to the JJSC just three months later following a violation of probation after testing positive for marijuana, and was held from March 3, 2023, until April 5, 2023.
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> [Appellant] consistently neglected his academic commitments throughout his probation. He struggled with completing his work and incurred a poor attendance record. When he did attend school, [Appellant] often arrived late or left early without permission. According to [Appellant]'s Individualized Education Program, while [Appellant] was on probation, [Appellant] was not on track to be promoted to the next grade in school as a result of his persistent disregard for his schooling.
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> The programming offered through the juvenile system failed to rehabilitate [Appellant], and [Appellant] offered [the trial court] no reason to believe that he would now be amendable to treatment. While on probation, he was given the benefit of participating in programming through the Institute for the

Development of African American Youth's (IDAAY) Don't Fall Down in the Hood" program, including community service, roundtable discussions on youth and gun violence, anger management treatment, and drug and alcohol treatment.

Despite the programming, and despite the specialized supervision for firearm-related offenses, [Appellant] quickly returned to criminal activity. In fact, after being on probation for approximately one year and five months, just four months later, [Appellant] chose to engage in a violent crime, with others, on a public subway train.

[Appellant] completed his probation in January of 2024 and was arrested on May 11, 2024, after he coordinated with three others to mask-up, surround two juveniles, and rob them while riding public transportation. [Appellant]'s actions traumatized the two juvenile victims, fourteen-and fifteen-year old cousins, who were riding the SEPTA train to meet their friends that day. He threatened the lives of every person riding the SEPTA train, any of whom could have been shot and killed if the gun was used, if the juveniles tried to defend themselves, or if anyone on the trained intervened in the incident. [Appellant] was given the opportunity to understand how dangerous guns are and the harmful impacts of gun violence on individuals and the community. Yet, [Appellant] completely ignored all the programming and immediately obtained a gun following the completion of his probation.

The duration of supervision by the juvenile system would have been insufficient for rehabilitating [Appellant]. When [Appellant] appeared before [the trial court] for his decertification hearing he was already eighteen years old. [The trial court] was convinced that [Appellant] would need more than three years of treatment in the juvenile system to rehabilitate him given the total failure of previous efforts by the juvenile system and the escalation in [Appellant]'s behavior. While [the trial court] was considering decertification, which [Appellant] knew, he chose to defy authority and break the rules by not wearing his wristband at the prison and bringing unpermitted clothing to court.

[The trial court] had no reason to believe [Appellant] would benefit from the special features and programs of the juvenile system. [Appellant] endangered the lives of the victims and community members and threatened public safety by committing his crimes on a SEPTA train in the middle of the afternoon. Prior

> attempts by the juvenile system to rehabilitate [Appellant] failed, and there was inadequate time for treatment to rehabilitate [Appellant]. Accordingly, [the trial court] determined that transferring [Appellant] to the juvenile system would not serve the public interest and duly denied decertification.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/25 at 6-9 (some formatting altered).

Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's decertification. ***Ramos,*** 920 A.2d at 1257. The record reflects that the trial court properly considered the statutory factors and demonstrated understanding of the expert evidence presented by the parties. The trial court highlighted that the previous attempts to rehabilitate the Appellant failed, which is a factor that courts may consider. ***See*** 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A)-(G). Specifically, the trial court highlighted that Appellant attended the IDAAY program during probation and four months later returned to criminal activity. Appellant argues that the factors "overwhelmingly favor transfer to juvenile court", however the weight to be assigned to each of the statutory factors is reserved for the decertification's court's discretion. ***Ruffin***, 10 A.3d at 339. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to transfer this case to juvenile court. ***Ramos,*** 920 A.2d at 1257; ***Ruffin***, 10 A.3d at 339.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/19/2026