NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.	:	
NYAL BARTON PIPER	:	
Appellant	:	No. 1396 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-05-CR-0000138-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: **FILED: November 16, 2026**

Nyal Barton Piper appeals from the judgment of sentence of ninety months to forty years of imprisonment, followed by twelve months of re-entry supervision, imposed after he entered an open plea of *nolo contendere* to twenty counts each of cruelty to animals and aggravated cruelty to animals, and ten counts of failure to keep a dog license. We affirm.

On December 31, 2023, the Pennsylvania State Police responded to the Bedford Township residence owned by Appellant and his wife, Renee Lynn Piper ("Co-defendant") to conduct a welfare check on animals believed to be inside. Troopers observed that the couple were dirty and covered in feces, as were multiple dogs in the backyard, one of which had an open wound on its ears. After obtaining consent to search, troopers found the house in a deplorable condition. The floors were covered in feces, cages holding the

animals were stacked three high throughout the residence, and no clean food or water was provided or accessible to the animals. Volunteers from the Bedford County Humane Society ("BCHS"), as well as other local shelters, removed ninety dogs, eight cats, and a tortoise from the home.[1] Four dogs had to be euthanized at the scene, and a fifth was euthanized the following day. Many of the surviving animals required veterinary procedures, including dental extractions, treatment for severe skin infections and sores, and surgery for infected wounds. Only nine of the dogs were licensed. ***See*** N.T. Plea, 6/17/25, at 30-31.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant and Co-defendant with nearly 500 offenses. On the day scheduled for jury selection, Appellant entered an open plea of *nolo contendere* to the charges enumerated above, with the remaining charges to be *nolle prossed*.[2] The parties agreed that the forty cruelty counts corresponded to forty separate animals. ***Id***. at 22, 24. During the colloquy, the court explained that a *nolo contendere* plea meant that Appellant was "not agreeing factually as to what happened in the case with the Commonwealth's evidence," but was "conceding that if a jury were to hear all the evidence in the case, that they could convict [him] of those counts."

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[1] BCHS manager Kathy Ramsey testified at sentencing that their agency had removed ninety-four dogs. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 17.

[2] Co-defendant entered an identical plea at the same proceeding. Her separate appeal from her judgment of sentence, docketed at 1394 WDA 2025, is addressed in a separate memorandum.

Id. at 22. The court further advised Appellant that each felony count of aggravated cruelty carried a statutory maximum of seven years of imprisonment, that the sentences could be imposed consecutively, and that sentencing was open to the court's discretion. ***Id***. at 23. The court accepted the plea, ordered a pre-sentence investigation ("PSI") report, and deferred sentencing.

The court sentenced Appellant on September 26, 2025. In fashioning the sentence, the court considered the PSI report, sentencing memoranda from all parties with exhibits, the Commonwealth's photographs and videos of the residence and the animals, letters from rescuers, volunteers, and adoptive owners, and the report of the defense expert, Wayne D'Agaro, Psy.D. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of a representative of the Bedford County Humane Society, Ms. Ramsey, and Appellant presented the testimony of Dr. D'Agaro and Co-defendant's mother, Mary Ann Hazen. Appellant also exercised his right of allocution.

Ms. Ramsey recounted the rescue, the condition of the animals, the five dogs that had to be euthanized, and the burden borne by the shelter, its staff, and the community. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25***,*** at 15-22. The Commonwealth requested that the court impose consecutive sentences for each animal that Appellant harmed and that the respective terms of imprisonment fall at the top of the standard range or in the aggravated range. ***Id***. at 23-24.

Appellant presented the testimony of Dr. D'Agaro, who evaluated him and found no cognitive impairment, but identified that he suffered from severe depression and anxiety. ***Id***. at 42. He explained several subtypes of animal hoarding, including the "overwhelmed caregiver," who attempts to care for animals but becomes overwhelmed psychologically and financially, and the more culpable "exploiter" and "breeder" hoarders, who lack empathy for the animals. ***Id***. 37-38. He placed Appellant in the overwhelmed-caregiver subtype, explaining that Appellant felt particularly overwhelmed because age, diabetes, and neuropathy left him unable to provide his wife with the assistance she needed. ***Id***. at 36-38, 42-43. On cross-examination and in response to the court's questions, Dr. D'Agaro acknowledged that his opinions were based solely on his interviews and information supplied by counsel, and that he had not reviewed the photographs or videos of the home, information about the couple's retirement benefits or financial assets, or any statement from Ms. Hazen. ***Id***. at 43-46.

In his allocution, Appellant apologized for the time and expense his "animal hoarding" had caused and denied ever knowingly harming an animal but devoted much of his statement to criticizing BCHS and its supporters for their public comments about the case and for allegedly disseminating the evidentiary photographs. ***Id***. at 63-66. His counsel highlighted his twenty years of service in the United States Navy, his age, health, and remorse, and requested a mitigated-range sentence of probation. ***Id***. at 66-67.

The court then explained its sentence at length. ***Id***. at 67-96. It recounted its review of the entire record, which it had read "at least three to five times," and described the photographs as "some of the most extreme" it had seen in approximately twenty years as a prosecutor and judge. ***Id***. at 68-69. The court rejected Dr. D'Agaro's overwhelmed caregiver opinion as resting on an incomplete factual basis and found that Appellant was "more closely aligned with an exploiter hoarder." ***Id***. at 81-88.

After addressing the gravity of the offenses, the protection of the public, and Appellant's rehabilitative needs, the court imposed the following sentence. On the five counts of aggravated cruelty that corresponded to the five animals that had to be euthanized, the court imposed aggravated-range sentences of six to twenty-four months of imprisonment. On each of the remaining fifteen counts, it imposed four to twenty-four months of imprisonment, which was at the top of the standard range. All twenty felony sentences were set to run consecutively. On one count of cruelty to animals, the court imposed twelve months of re-entry supervision, consecutive to the felony sentences. On each of the remaining nineteen counts of cruelty to animals, it imposed a concurrent term of twelve months of probation. On the ten counts of failure to keep a dog license, it imposed no penalty other than costs. The aggregate sentence was

ninety months to forty years of imprisonment, followed by twelve months of re-entry supervision.[3]

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied, and a timely notice of appeal. He complied with the court's order to file a concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that its reasons for the sentence were fully set forth on the record at the sentencing hearing and referred this Court to the transcript. ***See*** Trial Court Memorandum, 1/7/26, at 1.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

> I. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion and imposed a manifestly excessive sentence, one inconsistent with sentencing principles, of [ninety] months to [forty] years['] incarceration where the Appellant was [eighty-two] years old at the time of sentencing, had a prior record score of zero, served [twenty] years in the U.S. Navy, entered an open *nolo contendere* plea, and the sentence constitutes a *de facto* life sentence?
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> II. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion and imposed a manifestly excessive sentence by relying upon a factual and psychological conclusion not supported by the record—specifically, its determination that Appellant was more consistent with an "exploiter hoarder" rather than an "overwhelmed caregiver"—and then relying on that

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[3] The court also found Appellant eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive ("RRRI") program and, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 5555, prohibited him from owning, possessing, or caring for animals for forty years. ***See*** Sentencing Order, 9/26/25, at ¶¶ 2, 7. It declined the Commonwealth's request for restitution to the rescue organizations, a ruling that is not at issue in this appeal. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 9-13. The court also rejected Appellant's argument that his sentences merged, because each count represented a separate animal. ***Id***. at 8-9.

characterization in determining the severity and structure of the sentence?

III. Whether the sentencing court placed undue weight on the nature of the offense, while failing to give meaningful practical effect to Appellant-specific mitigating circumstances, resulting in a sentence that is unreasonable and inconsistent with the individualized sentencing required by Pennsylvania law?

Appellant's brief at 7 (cleaned up).

We begin our review mindful of the following legal principles. "An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right." ***Commonwealth v. Bowens***, 265 A.3d 730, 762–63 (Pa.Super. 2021) (*en banc*) (cleaned up). Rather, as we have explained:

> [A]n appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction. We determine whether the appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the following four factors: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id. at 763 (cleaned up).

A substantial question is raised when an appellant sets forth a colorable argument that his sentence is either: "(1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." ***See Commonwealth v. Radecki***, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). In addressing whether an

appellant has presented a substantial question, "[o]ur inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits." ***Commonwealth v. Rhoades***, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). To determine whether an appellant has raised a substantial question, our review is generally confined to the appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement, although we may also consider the statement of questions presented. ***See Commonwealth v. Dodge***, 77 A.3d 1263, 1271 (Pa.Super. 2013).

Here, Appellant timely appealed, preserved his sentencing challenges in a post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. The Commonwealth concedes that the first three requirements are satisfied but contends that Appellant has not raised a substantial question. ***See*** Commonwealth's brief at 4.

The Commonwealth is correct that a bald challenge to the court's exercise of its discretion to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences and that a claim that the court failed to give adequate weight to mitigating factors does not, standing alone, raise a substantial question. ***See Commonwealth v. DiSalvo***, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa.Super. 2013); ***Commonwealth v. Austin***, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013). In this vein, Appellant's third issue, which asserts that the court allowed the gravity of the offenses to overwhelm the mitigating circumstances of his lack of criminal history, military service, and rehabilitative needs, does not raise a substantial

question. ***See DiSalvo***, 70 A.3d at 903. Critically, Appellant does not contend that the court failed to consider those circumstances. He concedes that the court reviewed the mitigating evidence and challenges only the weight the court assigned to it. ***See*** Appellant's brief at 37. In so far as this claim implicates neither a misapplication of the sentencing code nor the court's fundamental misunderstanding of the sentencing process, we will not address it. ***See Bowens***, 265 A.3d at 763.

However, Appellant's two remaining claims are not as limited as the Commonwealth contends. In his first issue, he alleges that the consecutive imposition of twenty felony sentences produced an aggregate sentence that is clearly unreasonable and amounts to a *de facto* life sentence in light of his age. In his second issue, he contends that the court relied upon a characterization of him as an 'exploiter hoarder' that lacked support in the record. ***See*** Appellant's brief at 18-20.

As we explained in ***Dodge***, "a defendant may raise a substantial question where he receives consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges if the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence; however, a bald claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial question." ***Dodge***, 77 A.3d at 1270 (cleaned up). "The key to resolving the preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what

appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case." ***Commonwealth v. Mastromarino***, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa.Super. 2010).

Appellant's first issue is not a bald challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentences. Rather, he presents a plausible argument that running twenty felony sentences consecutively, as applied to an eighty-two-year-old offender with no prior record, raised the aggregate sentence to a level that is clearly unreasonable in light of his criminal conduct. ***See Dodge***, 77 A.3d at 1270; ***Mastromarino***, 2 A.3d at 587. Appellant's second issue, which asserts that the court relied upon a characterization of him that lacked support in the record, likewise presents a substantial question. ***See Commonwealth v. Downing***, 990 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa.Super. 2010) (holding that a claim that the sentencing court relied upon an improper factor raised a substantial question).

We therefore proceed to the merits.

The following principles govern our review of Appellant's challenges:

> To prevail, Appellant must demonstrate that the sentencing court abused its discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, Appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Solomon, 247 A.3d 1163, 1168 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up). Where, as here, the trial court has the benefit of a PSI report, "it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors

and considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed." ***Commonwealth v. Torres***, 303 A.3d 1058, 1065 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). "We cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court." ***Commonwealth v. Macias***, 968 A.2d at 773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009).

While it is broad, "the trial court's discretion is not unfettered." ***Commonwealth v. Coulverson***, 34 A.3d 135, 144 (Pa.Super. 2011). The sentence imposed "should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). A sentencing court must weigh the specific facts of the offense alongside the defendant's character, looking to factors such as criminal history, age, individual traits, and prospects for rehabilitation. ***See Commonwealth v. Taylor***, 277 A.3d 577, 593 (Pa.Super. 2022).

Furthermore, "the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Where, as here, each individual sentence falls within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, we may grant relief only if "the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2). In making that assessment, we consider the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of Appellant, the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe Appellant, including any PSI report, the findings upon which the sentence was based, and the sentencing guidelines. ***See*** 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d). An unreasonable sentence is one that is "irrational" or "not guided by sound judgment." ***Commonwealth v. Walls***, 926 A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. 2007). Our deference to the sentencing court reflects that it "is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it," as it "can accord the proper weight to the defendant's character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime." ***Id***. at 961 (cleaned up).

Mindful of these principles, we turn to the merits of Appellant's sentencing challenge. We first address Appellant's contention that his aggregate sentence is clearly unreasonable, considering his arguments regarding the mitigating evidence insofar as they bear on that contention. We then turn to his challenge to the court's assessment that he was more closely aligned with an "exploiter-hoarder."

Appellant contends that his sentence is, in practical effect, a life sentence for an eighty-two-year-old Navy veteran with no prior record, who would not complete the minimum term until approximately age ninety. He emphasizes that the court acknowledged that protection of the public was not a critical consideration and that the future-risk concern could be addressed by

barring him from owning animals. He further maintains that the court allowed the gravity of the offenses to overwhelm the mitigating evidence, and that the imposition of the same sentence on him and his much younger wife demonstrates that his sentence was not individualized. ***See*** Appellant's brief at 21-28, 35-40.

Our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion. At the outset, the court had the benefit of a PSI report, which was expressly reviewed along with the sentencing memoranda, Dr. D'Agaro's report and testimony, and Appellant's written statement. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 2-5, 67-68, 79, 85-86. We therefore presume that the court was aware of and weighed the mitigating circumstances Appellant highlights, including his age, health, lack of a criminal record, and military and government service. ***See Torres***, 303 A.3d at 1065. Indeed, Appellant acknowledges that his argument "does not depend upon claiming that the court failed to review mitigation." Appellant's brief at 37. His disagreement is with the weight the court assigned to it.

The record further confirms that the court applied each of the considerations required by § 9721(b). Regarding the gravity of the offenses, the court detailed the deplorable and inhumane conditions depicted in the photographs and videos, which included the carcass of a dog in a kennel with living dogs that was so decomposed that the court could not tell "where the dog carcass ends and the floor begins." N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 68-71.

It found that the accumulation of filth reflected neglect over a long period of time, and it reviewed the accounts of rescuers and adoptive owners describing dogs rescued from Appellant's home that could not walk, play, or pass through a doorway after lives spent confined in crates. ***Id***. at 69-76. The court also considered the substantial impact on the community, including the shelter staff, volunteers, and organizations that absorbed the rescue and rehabilitation of nearly one hundred animals. ***Id***. at 71-76, 92-93. It concluded that this was "an extreme case" of animal abuse. ***Id***. at 90.

The court did not ignore the remaining § 9721(b) considerations. It recognized that protection of the public was not "a critical consideration" and that the primary future risk was that Appellant might again possess animals. ***Id***. at 91. As to rehabilitative needs, it expressly commented that the Appellant "[is] advanced in age" and that he has medical needs, but found those needs to be normal for his age and better met in a state correctional setting than by county resources. ***Id***. The court also reflected upon what it found to be Appellant's lack of genuine remorse and appreciation for the harm he caused, and it remarked that it did not impose the sentence "with any type of celebration" or "take joy in the fact of incarcerating anyone in [his] age." ***Id***. at 91-92. The court thus weighed each of the statutory considerations and explained why the gravity of the offenses warranted a significant term of incarceration notwithstanding Appellant's age and the limited risk Appellant posed to the public.

Appellant's reliance on the court's observation that public protection was not a critical concern is misplaced. Section 9721(b) directs the court to fashion a sentence consistent with protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the victim and the community, and the defendant's rehabilitative needs. The court's candid recognition that one factor weighed less heavily here demonstrates that it considered all three, not that it failed to individualize the sentence.

The court also explained the reasons for the structure of the sentence. Each of the twenty felony counts represented a different animal subjected to the conditions described above, as Appellant agreed when entering the plea. ***See*** N.T. Plea, 6/17/25, at 22, 24-25. With an offense gravity score of eight and a prior record score of zero, the standard-range minimum sentence on each count of aggravated cruelty to animals was one to four months of incarceration, plus or minus three months. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 6. The court imposed sentences at the top of the standard range on fifteen counts. "[W]here a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code." ***Commonwealth v. Moury***, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa.Super 2010). On the remaining five counts, it imposed aggravated range sentences, explaining that those counts corresponded to the five animals that had to be euthanized. The guidelines for the torture variant of aggravated cruelty to animals, to

which Appellant pled, do not account for that aggravating circumstance.[4] ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 95-96. Appellant does not challenge that rationale. Moreover, a defendant is not entitled to a "volume discount" for multiple crimes by having all sentences run concurrently. ***See Commonwealth v. Brown***, 249 A.3d 1206, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2021). In light of the number of animals involved, the prolonged and severe nature of their suffering, and the deaths of five of them, an aggregate minimum of ninety months does not appear excessive on its face.

We are likewise unpersuaded by Appellant's contention that his age renders the sentence a *de facto* life sentence that is excessive as a matter of course. Age is one of the characteristics a sentencing court must consider, and the court did so here. ***See Taylor***, 277 A.3d at 593. It observed that Appellant was about twenty years older than his wife but noted that Dr. D'Agaro found him cognitively intact and fully ambulatory for his age, and

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[4] The aggravated cruelty statute provides in pertinent part:

> A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly does any of the following:
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> (1) Tortures an animal.
>
> (2) Violates section 5532 (relating to neglect of an animal) or 5533 (relating to cruelty to an animal) causing serious bodily injury to the animal or the death of the animal.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5534(a). Appellant pled to the torture variant set forth in subsection (a)(1), which does not require that the animal die.

that he had continued to drive his wife throughout the state for her legal work after his retirement. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 79, 85-86. It also considered that his medical needs, while greater than his wife's, were typical for his age and would be met in a state facility. ***Id***. at 91. Appellant cites no authority, and we are aware of none, requiring a sentencing court to structure a sentence so that it concludes within a defendant's life expectancy, and we decline to hold that the court was obligated to discount the gravity of his offenses because of his age. ***See Macias***, 968 A.2d at 778.

Appellant also argues that the court abused its discretion by rejecting Dr. D'Agaro's unrebutted opinion that he was an overwhelmed caregiver and instead concluding that he was more consistent with an exploiter hoarder, then relying on that characterization in determining the severity and structure of the sentence. Appellant concedes that the court was free to reject Dr. D'Agaro's conclusions and to assign them little or no weight. ***See*** Appellant's brief at 32. He maintains, however, that the court crossed a line by adopting an alternative characterization that no witness supported. Relying on ***Commonwealth v. Downing***, 990 A.2d 788 (Pa.Super. 2010), and ***Commonwealth v. P.L.S.***, 894 A.2d 120 (Pa.Super. 2006), he asserts that the court's characterization lacked evidentiary support because nothing in the record established that he acted from indifference or selfish motivation. ***See*** Appellant's brief at 29-35.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the court's assessment of Appellant's culpability. The court did not purport to render a psychological diagnosis. To the contrary, it acknowledged, "I'm not a doctor, so I can't diagnose [Appellant and Co-defendant] as the exploiter hoarders," and it concluded from the evidence presented only that they were "closer to" and "more closely aligned with" that subtype than with the overwhelmed-caregiver subtype. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 84, 88. The court used Dr. D'Agaro's own framework in reaching that conclusion. By way of background, Dr. D'Agaro described the overwhelmed caregiver as someone with a strong attachment to the animals who wants to provide proper care, but lacks the financial resources or emotional capacity to do so, and he distinguished the exploiter and breeder subtypes by their lack of empathy for the animals. ***Id***. at 36-38, 79-80. Having accepted that framework, the court permissibly assessed which description better fit the evidence before it.

Appellant's argument that the court could reject Dr. D'Agaro's opinion but could not make contrary findings would, in effect, require the court to accept an expert's factual premises even after finding them contradicted by the record. The law imposes no such requirement.

Finally, we note that the court's assessment of Appellant's responsibility did not dictate the structure of the sentence in the manner Appellant suggests. The court imposed aggravated-range sentences only on the five counts corresponding to the animals that died, for reasons unrelated to the hoarding

subtype, and it imposed standard-range sentences on the remaining fifteen felony counts. ***See*** N.T. Sentencing, 9/26/25, at 95-96. Assessing a defendant's culpability and character is a core function of the sentencing court, and the court properly considered them here. ***See*** 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); ***Taylor***, 277 A.3d at 593.

In sum, the court considered the circumstances of the offenses, Appellant's character, his lack of a prior record, his age and health, his rehabilitative needs, and his role in the offenses, and it placed on the record its reasons for the sentence imposed. Appellant has failed to show that the court's weighing of any of these factors was manifestly unreasonable or based on partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. See Solomon, 247 A.3d at 1168. Rather, he merely asks us to substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing court and reweigh the sentencing factors, which we cannot do. ***See Macias***, 968 A.2d at 778. Since Appellant has failed to establish that the court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence, we have no cause to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

DATE: 11/16/2026