

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF DALE CHARLES	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
STOFFEL	:	PENNSYLVANIA
	:	
	:	
APPEAL OF: JOHN H. QUINN, JR. AND	:	
ROBERT GAZZOLA	:	
	:	
	:	
	:	No. 1255 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered September 23, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Orphans' Court at
No(s): OC-2004-01421

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:

FILED: October 14, 2026

John H. Quinn, Jr. (Quinn), and Robert Gazzola (Gazzola) (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the orphans' court's order finding Quinn in civil contempt of the orphans' court's prior orders, and imposing a purge condition and sanctions for every day that Quinn remained noncompliant with the court's prior orders.¹ After careful review, we affirm.

In its opinion, the orphans' court provided the following history underlying the instant appeal:

The decedent, Dale C. Stoffel (Decedent), passed away [in conjunction with the work of his company, Wye Oak Technology, Inc. ("Wye Oak"),] on December 10, 2004[. Decedent is] survived by his wife, Barbara Stoffel (Ms. Stoffel), and their two children. On December 27, 2004, letters testamentary were granted to

¹ Appellants' argument challenges the contempt order as to Quinn, but presents no argument regarding Gazzola. Accordingly, we address the arguments pertaining to Quinn.

Quinn[, a licensed attorney,] in accordance with Decedent's will. [Relevantly, Article IV of the will created a testamentary trust (the Trust) naming Quinn as the sole trustee.]

[Quinn] filed an account of the [assets of the Estate of Dale Charles Stoffel (the Estate)] on March 28, 2006, which listed two bank accounts with a combined value of \$15,364.56; stock shares in the CLI Group and its subsidiaries totaling \$1,000,000; stock shares in Wye Oak ..., totaling \$1,000,000; personal property valued at \$1,500; and liabilities totaling \$149,262.02; resulting in the value of the Estate on March 27, 2006, totaling \$1,867,602.54. A large portion of the Estate's value was and continues to be tied to an award of approximately \$120 million granted to Wye Oak in litigation against the nation of Iraq [(Iraq Litigation)] in connection with unpaid government contracts and the death of Decedent. [Quinn] continued to serve as executor of the Estate and trustee of the [] Trust until January 29, 2025.

Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/7/26, at 2 (paragraph break added; punctuation modified).

On June 5, 2023, Ms. Stoffel filed a petition to remove Quinn as executor of Decedent's Estate and as trustee to the Trust. Ms. Stoffel further sought to disqualify Gazzola as the successor administrator, and to name herself as administratrix of Decedent's Estate. Following proceedings not relevant to this appeal, Ms. Stoffel filed an amended petition for Appellants' removal on October 3, 2024. The orphans' court held a hearing on the amended petition and, on January 29, 2025, the orphans' court entered an order removing Quinn as executor/trustee, removing Gazzola as the successor administrator, and appointing Ms. Stoffel as administratrix of the Estate. Orphans' Court Order, 1/29/25, at 1-2. In its order, the orphans' court issued the following directive:

[Quinn] is hereby ordered to assign, convey and transfer all funds, property, money and other assets of the Estate to [Ms.] Stoffel within 30 days of this Order.

Id. at 2.

Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 2025, order, and filed a timely notice of appeal of that order. The appeal is pending before this panel at Superior Court Docket Number 236 WDA 2025. Notwithstanding, on March 5, 2025, the orphans' court entered an order denying Appellants' motion for reconsideration, and ordering Quinn to "assign, convey[,] and transfer all assets, funds, property, money[,] and other assets of the Estate to [Ms. Stoffel]." Orphans' Court Order, 3/5/25.

On March 28, 2025, Appellants filed a motion to stay the removal of Quinn as the Estate's executor pending his appeal. In an order dated April 30, 2025, and filed on May 2, 2025, the orphans' court denied a stay. In addition, the orphans' court's order included the following directive:

[Quinn] is ordered to provide an account of his time as executor within ten (10) days of this order **and to turn over all records and [E]state property still in his possession within thirty (30) days of this order.**

Orphans' Court's Order, 5/2/25 (emphasis added). Appellants appealed the May 2, 2025, order denying a stay; this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory. ***See In Re: The Estate of Stoffel***, 602 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super. filed Jul. 29, 2025) (order).

On May 8, 2025, Quinn filed a declaration in lieu of account (declaration). As described by the orphans' court,

in his declaration ..., [Quinn] claims that “in order to prepare a full and complete accounting of [his] actions as Executor as required by the court’s order dated January 29, 2025, [Quinn] must have access to records going back to December 1, 2005, which are being stored by Iron Mountain[, a storage facility].” [Quinn] continues in his declaration that: “[u]pon information and belief, the ... records appear to be contained in approximately 52 boxes, which are in storage with Iron Mountain. These boxes cannot be retrieved without advance payment of thousands of dollars. Among the aforementioned records are records or statements of the Estate bank account held at United Bank.” [Quinn] claimed that he was unable to retrieve records of the [Estate’s] bank account from United Bank directly, as he had been removed as executor, but that [Ms. Stoffel] could pay to have United Bank locate and reproduce them.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/7/26, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted; punctuation modified).

On July 2, 2025, Ms. Stoffel, on behalf of the Estate, filed a “Motion to Compel and Request for Finding of Contempt” (motion to compel). The motion to compel alleged that Quinn had failed to comply with the orphans’ court’s January 29, 2025, and May 2, 2025, orders. Motion to Compel, 7/2/25, ¶ 2. Quinn filed an answer to the motion to compel and, on July 22, 2025, the orphans’ court heard argument on the motion.

On August 1, 2025, the orphans’ court entered an order providing, in relevant part, as follows:

The Estate shall file a Petition for Contempt regarding [Quinn’s] compliance, or lack of compliance with the court’s order compelling him to turn over all files pertaining to the ... Estate[,]
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order.

Orphans’ Court Order, 8/1/25. The order required Quinn to file an answer to the contempt petition, and the orphans’ court scheduled a contempt hearing

for September 22, 2025. Finally, the orphans' court directed Quinn to provide the Estate's counsel with an inventory of the 52 boxes stored at Iron Mountain's storage facility, and to identify which boxes contain Estate materials. ***Id.***

The orphans' court described what next transpired:

[Ms. Stoffel, on behalf of the Estate,] filed [her] Petition for Contempt Sanctions [(contempt petition)] on August 21, 2025, alleging that [Quinn had] failed to provide the boxes of Estate documents stored at Iron Mountain as previously ordered. **[Quinn's] counsel provided an inventory of the fifty-two (52) boxes stored by [Quinn] and his law firm at Iron Mountain, identifying eleven (11) boxes which contained materials relevant to the Estate,** and redacted information regarding the remaining boxes that [Quinn] claimed did not contain Estate materials. Appellant[s] filed an answer ... and new matter [to the contempt petition] on September 9, 2025.

[Quinn] claimed in [his] answer that he was not in contempt, as he had turned over some records and provided a statement in lieu of account. [Quinn] also claimed that it was impossible for him to retrieve the eleven (11) boxes stored at Iron Mountain which contained Estate materials, as he could not pay the debt that he and his firm owed Iron Mountain in the amount of eighty-two thousand six hundred sixty-five dollars and forty-nine cents (\$82,665.49). [Quinn] also raised a new matter in which he alleged that [Ms. Stoffel] was acting in bad faith by pursuing a contempt action against him. Appellant[s] claimed that [Ms. Stoffel's] contempt petition was of a "harassing and wasteful nature" and only contained "vague and generic demands." [Ms. Stoffel filed a reply to Quinn's new matter.]

Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/7/26, at 6 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted; punctuation and capitalization modified).

On September 22, 2025, the orphans' court held a hearing on Ms. Stoffel's contempt petition, after which the court found Quinn in contempt of

the orphans' court's January 29, 2025, March 5, 2025, and May 2, 2025, orders, based on his failure to transfer to Ms. Stoffel all of the Estate's files and assets. Orphans' Court Order, 9/22/25. To purge his contempt, the orphans' court directed Quinn to

comply with all prior orders and turn over to [Ms. Stoffel] any and all Estate property as well as any and all records relevant to the administration of the Estate, including any documents stored with Iron Mountain and any documents regarding the administration of the Estate from the years 2022-2024, by close of business on October 1, 2025. **The court further ordered that failure to successfully turn over all Estate property and documents by October 1, 2025, shall result in further sanctions in the amount of one thousand dollars (\$1,000) for every day that [Quinn] remained noncompliant.**

[Quinn] filed a Motion to Stay Coercive Contempt Sanctions Pending Efforts at Compliance and Appeal on September 29, 2025. [Quinn] also contemporaneously filed a Notice of Appeal from the September 23, 2025, order on October 1, 2025. After considering [Quinn's] motion and the [almost] contemporaneously filed appeal, the orphans' court denied the motion by way of order dated October 2, 2025, and directed [Quinn] to comply with the September 23, 2025, order and turn over all [E]state property, including the documents stored at Iron Mountain....

Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/7/26, at 13 (footnotes omitted; punctuation modified; emphasis added).² Appellants and the orphans' court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellants present the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [orphans'] court err in holding [Quinn] in contempt when the [orphans'] court disregarded evidence demonstrating that [Quinn] previously provided the records at issue to [Ms.

² As of this time, Quinn has turned over the 11 boxes, held by Iron Mountain, to Ms. Stoffel.

Stoffel,] and the [orphans'] court perpetuated this error by denying [Quinn's] requests to call [Ms. Stoffel] as a witness or to provide an offer of proof supporting this contention?

2. Did the [orphans'] court err in holding [Quinn] in contempt for reasons other than the sole focus of the contempt hearing, which was whether [Quinn] turned over 11 Iron Mountain boxes?

Appellants' Brief at 8.

Appellants first argue that the orphans' court improperly disregarded evidence indicating that Quinn had provided copies of the records to Ms. Stoffel. ***Id.*** at 28. Appellants direct our attention to Quinn's testimony that, to the best of his knowledge, he previously provided copies of the documents stored at Iron Mountain contemporaneously to Ms. Stoffel. ***Id.*** Appellants argue Quinn could not be held in contempt for something he had already done. ***Id.***

Appellants further argue that the orphans' court erred by not allowing them to present an offer of proof regarding the basis for them seeking to compel Ms. Stoffel's testimony at the contempt hearing. ***Id.*** at 29. Appellants claim that they requested

to be permitted to provide an offer of proof consistent with Pa.R.E. [] 103(a)(2), which provides that a party may claim an error for the failure to admit evidence only if "... a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context."

Id. Appellants argue,

[a]lthough [Appellants] believe that the contempt action is part of a larger effort by [Ms. Stoffel] to avoid paying [Quinn] for valuable services rendered, this was not why [Quinn] sought to call [Ms.

Stoffel] at the contempt hearing. In fact, Appellants' motion to compel ... refutes the [orphans' court's] characterization of [Appellants'] offer of proof, in that [Appellants] provided multiple reasons that [*sic*] [Ms. Stoffel's] testimony would rebut the contempt allegations irrespective of any conspiracy.

Id. at 30 (punctuation modified). Appellants argue that this evidentiary ruling caused Quinn prejudice, as he was found in contempt and subjected to a daily sanction of \$1,000 for his noncompliance. ***Id.*** at 32.

Although Appellants contend that the orphans' court erred by precluding Ms. Stoffel's testimony, and by not allowing them to present an offer of proof, they offer no legal authorities supporting their argument.³ Further, they argue that the orphans' court erred as a matter of law in not allowing them to present an offer of proof on the record. Although we could deem the claim waived on this basis,⁴ we will nevertheless address Appellants' issue.

We first observe our standard and scope of review:

When reviewing a decree entered by the orphans' court, this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error and the court's factual findings are supported by the evidence. Because the orphans' court sits as the fact-finder, it determines

³ Rather, Appellants provide our scope and standard of review of the orphans' court's evidentiary rulings, and a citation to our Rules of Evidence regarding issue preservation.

⁴ ***See In re A.C.***, 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) ("[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived."); ***see also*** Pa.R.A.P.2119(a) ("The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part ... the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.").

the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion. However, we are not constrained to give the same deference to any resulting legal conclusions. Where the rules of law on which the court relied are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse the court's decree.

In re Estate of Pendergrass, 26 A.3d 1151, 1153 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted; some capitalization modified).

The decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the orphans' court. ***In re A.J.R.-H.***, 188 A.3d 1157, 1167 (Pa. 2018). "A reviewing court will not disturb these rulings absent an abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused if, *inter alia*, the orphans' court overrides or misapplies the law." ***Id.*** (citations omitted).

Admissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact. Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the potential prejudice.

Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted); ***see also Commonwealth v. Miner***, 753 A.2d 225, 230 (Pa. 2000) ("Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact.").

Our review discloses that Appellants' motion to compel Ms. Stoffel's testimony alleged that her efforts to remove Quinn and to hold him in contempt

is an element of an overall scheme by the lawyers involved in the Iraq [L]itigation to diminish [] Quinn at every turn so as to prevent his receipt of any payment for his and his firm's efforts in support of the Iraq [L]itigation recovery.

Motion to Compel Attendance, 9/4/25, ¶ 3. Regarding the need for Ms. Stoffel's testimony, Appellants averred that in her contempt petition, Ms. Stoffel failed to specify why the summary accounting provided by Quinn was deficient; and that she failed to articulate "a basis for her contempt allegation, **other than the fact that she has not received the Estate documents held by Iron Mountain.**" *Id.* ¶¶ 6-8 (emphasis added). According to Appellants,

[a]t a minimum, [Ms. Stoffel] must testify as to why [] Quinn's efforts have not been performed in a good faith effort to comply with [the orphans' court's] orders; what information or documents she believes [] Quinn possesses or controls; why that information is needed to administer the Estate; what other information she requires to effectively administer the Estate; and what efforts she has undertaken to obtain said information or documents short of pursuing a personal smear campaign against [] Quinn at the behest of the other Iraq [L]itigation firms.

Id. ¶ 12.

Contrary to Appellants' assertions, the orphans' court's prior orders neither required Ms. Stoffel to identify the information she believes Quinn controls, nor to undertake any efforts to obtain the documents held by Quinn. Thus, testimony regarding these matters is not relevant to the issue of

whether Quinn is in contempt of the orphans' court's orders. Rather, the orphans' court expressly directed Quinn "to turn over all records and [E]state property still in his possession" Orphans' Court Order, 5/2/25.

In its opinion, the orphans' court thoroughly addressed Appellants' claim and concluded it lacks merit:

The basis for [Appellants'] motion was [Quinn's] belief that [Ms. Stoffel's] actions to remove him as executor and bring a contempt action against him are part of "an overall scheme by the lawyers involved in the Iraq [L]itigation to diminish [] Quinn at every turn so as to prevent his receipt of any payment for his and his firm's efforts to support the Iraq [L]itigation recovery." [Appellants] also alleged in [their] motion to compel that [Ms. Stoffel] "failed to provide with any specificity the basis for her contempt allegations" and was thus acting in bad faith.

....

Appellant[s] provided no further basis or proof of [their] claims in [their] motion to compel [Ms. Stoffel's] attendance at the contempt hearing. [Appellants'] motion contains the same bald and baseless allegations of a conspiracy between [Ms. Stoffel] and the other attorneys performing work on the Estate to defraud [Quinn] and his firm of his portion of the fees from the underlying Iraq [L]itigation....

... **[T]he testimony sought from [Ms. Stoffel] about this alleged conspiracy is entirely immaterial for the purposes of the contempt hearing.** The dominant purpose of the September 22, 2025, hearing was to determine if [Quinn] was in contempt of the orphans' court's orders directing him to turn over all Estate documents and property to [Ms. Stoffel]. The attorneys' fees arising out of the Iraq Litigation, and any conspiracy to reduce [Quinn's] fees from that litigation, is of no relation to [Quinn's] failure to turn over Estate property or his failure to comply with the [orphans'] court's orders.

Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/7/2, at 19-20 (emphasis added; punctuation and capitalization modified). We agree with the orphans' court's sound reasoning,

and its conclusion that Ms. Stoffel's testimony would have no relevance to the contempt proceedings. **See id.** Appellants' first issue merits no relief.

In their second issue, Appellants argue that the orphans' court erred in holding Quinn in contempt "for reasons other than his failure to turn over the 11 Iron Mountain [b]oxes." Appellants' Brief at 32. Appellants state that the contempt hearing "was solely focused on whether [Quinn] had turned over the 11 boxes[.]" **Id.** Nevertheless, Appellants argue, the orphans' court "held [Quinn] in contempt for reasons unrelated to the Iron Mountain boxes." **Id.** at 33. According to Appellants, the orphans' court based its contempt determination, in part, on Quinn's failure to provide an accounting of the Estate pursuant to the orphans' court's January 29, 2025, order. **Id.**

In support, Appellants refer to comments made by the orphans' court, following the parties' closing arguments at the contempt hearing:

[The court] find[s] it perplexing that ... [the court's] January order said [Quinn] will provide an accounting, and that still hasn't been done. And you make it out as a simple matter, that there's two simple assets of the [E]state, but we still don't have it....⁵ And at the same time, [you] say, but those records are meaningless anyway. They ... won't be helpful to this matter in any case.

⁵ The omitted portion of the orphans' court statement provides as follows:

Then [you say] it's impossible to comply with that order because all of the records are in storage and [Quinn's law] firm still owes money, so we can't get them.

N.T., 9/22/25, at 51.

Id. (citing N.T., 9/22/25, at 51-52) (footnote added). Appellants argue that this comment contradicts the orphans' court's opinion, which states that the court "did not rely on Appellants' failure to file an accounting in its finding of contempt." **Id.** at 33-34 (capitalization and punctuation modified) (quoting Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/7/26, at 16-17).

Appellants further point out that in its opinion, the orphans' court stated it did not set a purge condition relating to the filing of an accounting in its order. **Id.** at 34. Appellants dispute this statement, arguing that the orphans' court's September 23, 2025, order required, as a purge condition, that Quinn "just comply with all prior orders." **Id.** (citation omitted). Appellants assert that the orphans' court's January 29, 2025, order required him to file an accounting. **Id.** at 34 n.61.

Appellants argue that the orphans' court's

tainted view of [Quinn,] stemming from his failure to file an accounting[,] leached into its contempt finding, despite the [court's] acknowledgement that the lack of [an] accounting was not before the court as part of the contempt action. This negative view unfairly infected the [orphans'] court's assessment of [Quinn's] credibility.

Id. at 35.

Appellants also argue that the orphans' court conflated Quinn's representation that the Iron Mountain files were necessary for "an historic accounting of the Estate back to 2005, on one hand, with [Quinn's] testimony that the documents are not essential to the current administration of the

Estate, on the other.” ***Id.*** at 36. Appellants claim this “conflation” is evidenced by the orphans’ court’s opinion, which stated the following:

[Quinn] admitted, in his declaration in lieu of account, that “in order to prepare a full and complete accounting of [Quinn’s] actions as Executor ... [Quinn] must have access to records going back to December 1, 2005, which are being stored by Iron Mountain.” Thus, [Quinn] clearly was aware that these boxes of documents were necessary for the administration of the Estate and would need to be produced for the Estate accounting. Given his vast amounts of experience, the orphans’ court did not find it believable that [Quinn] would store these crucial Estate documents with a facility that would make it impossible for them to be recovered.

Id. at 36 (punctuation modified) (quoting Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/7/26, at 29-30). Appellants further quote the following portion from the orphans’ court’s opinion:

As [Quinn] had already admitted that these boxes were necessary for the administration of the Estate and to perform an accounting of the Estate, securing them from Iron Mountain was of crucial importance to the ongoing administration of the Estate.

Id. at 37 (quoting Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/7/26, at 33).

Appellants claim Quinn consistently testified that the Iron Mountain boxes are not necessary for the ongoing administration of the Estate. ***Id.*** Appellants argue, “the fact that the records are unnecessary for the current administration of the Estate is further reason why, along with the fact that [Ms. Stoffel] already possesses the records, the [orphans’ court] abused its discretion in this matter.” ***Id.*** According to Appellant, the discrepancy between Quinn’s statements and the statements by the orphans’ court demonstrate the orphans’ court was “erroneously influenced,” which, in turn,

“infected its determination of [Quinn’s] credibility and [the court’s] ultimate decision to hold him in contempt.” **Id.** at 37-38. Appellants assert that the orphans’ court’s actual basis for holding Quinn in contempt was its frustration over a lack of an accounting by Quinn. **Id.** at 38.

It is well established that,

[i]n proceedings for civil contempt of court, ... the burden of proof rests with the complaining party to demonstrate that the defendant is in noncompliance with a court order. To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree which he is alleged to have violated; (2) the act constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional, and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.

Thomas v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 220, 226 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Because the order forming the basis for civil contempt must be strictly construed, any ambiguities or omissions in the order must be construed in favor of the defendant.” **Sutch v. Roxborough Mem. Hosp.**, 142 A.3d 38, 67 (Pa. Super. 2016). “A person may not be held in contempt of court for failing to obey an order that is too vague or that cannot be enforced.” **Id.** at 68.

At the contempt hearing, Ms. Stoffel presented the testimony of Quinn as on cross-examination. N.T., 9/22/25, at 4. Quinn acknowledged that on March 5, 2025, he received an order

which says to assign, convey, and transfer all assets, funds, property, money, and other assets of the [E]state to [Ms. Stoffel] as ordered....

Id. at 8. Quinn denied understanding that the order required him to turn over the documents in his control to the Estate. **Id.** at 9.

Quinn further confirmed receiving the orphans' court's May 2, 2025, order requiring him to turn over "all records and [E]state property still in [Quinn's] possession." **Id.** Quinn confirmed that the files were in the possession of Iron Mountain. **Id.** at 10. However, Quinn testified, "I don't believe they are property of the [E]state." **Id.**

Quinn acknowledged the Estate has demanded the return of its documents stored at Iron Mountain and, as of the date of the contempt hearing, these documents were still at Iron Mountain. **Id.** at 10-11. In fact, Quinn confirmed that 11 of the boxes held at Iron Mountain contain documents related to the Estate. **Id.** at 12. Quinn conceded that the topic of the Iron Mountain boxes came up at the July 22, 2025, hearing on Ms. Stoffel's motion to compel the return of the Estate's property. **Id.**

Regarding his efforts to secure the boxes from Iron Mountain, Quinn offered the following testimony:

We have sent a letter to the lawyer ... who [indicated] that he represented Iron Mountain and asked if it was possible to ... get a quote as to the cost of recovering those 11 boxes....

Id. at 13. Quinn acknowledged that prior to the hearing, this was his sole effort to secure transfer of the boxes from Iron Mountain to the Estate. **Id.**

Regarding the 11 boxes retained by Iron Mountain, Quinn testified that the documents contained in those boxes pertain to Estate activities in 2007

and earlier. **Id.** at 23. According to Quinn, he had previously filed an account for the Estate encompassing that time frame. **Id.** Quinn described his efforts to obtain the Iron Mountain documents after August 15, 2025:

I wrote a letter to the lawyer for Iron Mountain who had communicated with us that they were seeking to collect the \$82,000 for the benefit of Iron Mountain and ask[ed] them if they would advise us whether there was an amount less than \$82,000 that could be paid in order to retrieve ... only the 11 boxes. The response to that was the case was closed, and they did not provide the information.

Id. at 27-28. Quinn stated the response from the lawyer is dated September 9, 2025. **Id.** at 29.

Quinn testified that on September 16, 2025, he sent correspondence to Rosalyn Dela Cruz, a payment specialist for Iron Mountain. **Id.** at 28, 29. As of the date of the hearing, Quinn had not received a response to this correspondence.⁶ **Id.** at 30.

In its opinion, the orphans' court explained that

[Quinn] argues ... that the orphans' court erred by finding [Quinn] in contempt on the basis that he had not filed an accounting. This argument is irrelevant as the orphans' court did not rely on [Quinn's] failure to file an accounting in its finding of contempt. The orphans' court focused the contempt hearing on [Quinn's] failure to turn over the Estate's files and to produce the boxes of Estate material stored at Iron Mountain, as that is what [Ms. Stoffel] raised in her contempt petition. [Ms. Stoffel] did not seek a finding of contempt on the basis of [Quinn's] failure to file an accounting. Although the court's order of January 29, 2025,

⁶ Regarding his ability to pay Iron Mountain, Quinn confirmed his personal assets, including bank accounts, real property, stocks, and debts. N.T., 9/22/25, at 36-41. However, Quinn testified his law firm does not have the money to pay for the release of the documents at Iron Mountain. **Id.** at 45.

required [Quinn] to file an accounting, this was not the subject of the petition for contempt. This is reflected in the record.

During the contempt proceedings, the court never directed [Quinn] to file an accounting, and stated multiple times on the record that the dominant purpose of the contempt hearing was focused on the boxes stored at Iron Mountain. This is further reflected in the court's September 23, 2025, order, which makes no mention of filing an accounting and instead directed [Quinn] to "turn over to [Ms. Stoffel] any and all Estate property as well as any and all records relevant to the administration of the Estate, including any documents stored in the Iron Mountain storage facility and any documents regarding the administration of the Estate from the years 2022-2024." The court did not set any purge conditions related to the filing of an accounting nor did it make any mention of an accounting in its order.

As the orphans' court did not rely on [Quinn's] failure to file an accounting in its finding of contempt and did not order [Quinn] to file an accounting to purge his contempt, the orphans' court did not err or abuse its discretion.

Orphans' Court's Opinion, 5/7/26, at 16-17 (footnote omitted; punctuation modified). The record supports the orphans' court's findings.

In addition, our review discloses that the orphans' court considered Quinn's statements, regarding the lack of an accounting, only in the context of his efforts to comply with the orphans' court's orders regarding transfer of the Iron Mountain boxes. For example, the orphans' court deemed incredible Quinn's claim that it was impossible for him to obtain the boxes from Iron Mountain:

[Quinn] admitted in his declaration in lieu of account that "in order to prepare a full and complete accounting of [Quinn's] actions as Executor ... [Quinn] must have access to records going back to December 1, 2005, which are being stored by Iron Mountain." Thus, [Quinn] clearly was aware that these boxes of documents were necessary for the administration of the Estate and would

need to be produced for the Estate accounting. Given his vast amounts of experience, the orphans' court did not find it believable that [Quinn] would store these crucial Estate documents with a facility that would make it impossible to them to be recovered.

[Quinn] clearly had knowledge that these documents would need to be secured and produced during the administration of the Estate, and nonetheless allowed his firm's debt with Iron Mountain to accrue. It is also clear that [Quinn] was aware of the court's orders directing him to secure the boxes from Iron Mountain and negotiate their release without full payment of the debt. [Quinn] made no efforts to secure the boxes or contact Iron Mountain for five (5) months and then claimed that compliance was impossible as he had not received replies to messages sent six (6) days prior to the contempt hearing. [Quinn] cannot willfully disobey court orders and refuse to make efforts to comply only to claim that compliance is impossible due to his own voluntary inaction.

Id. at 29-30.


Our review confirms that the orphans' court found Quinn in contempt based solely upon his failure to transfer the 11 boxes held at Iron Mountain's facility. ***See id.*** at 21-22 (finding Quinn had notice of the orphans' court's orders requiring him to turn over the Estate's documents held at Iron Mountain, and deeming "disingenuous" Quinn's assertion that he was unaware the orders pertained to the Iron Mountain boxes), 22-23 (discrediting Quinn's claim that it was impossible for him to obtain the Iron Mountain boxes, where the record shows that Quinn's efforts "came on the eve of the contempt hearing" and months after the orders requiring their production), 24 (finding Quinn's "wrongful intent" on the grounds that he failed to make any effort to retrieve the Iron Mountain boxes for nearly five months, and delayed his attempts to retrieve the documents for "no legitimate purpose."). Thus,

Appellants' claim that the orphans' court found Quinn in contempt, "for reasons other than his failure to turn over the 11 Iron Mountain boxes," is not supported in the record and lacks merit.

Because the evidence supports the orphans' court's findings and conclusions, we affirm its order finding Quinn in contempt, imposing a purge condition, and ordering sanctions.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Benjamin D. Kohler", is written over a horizontal line.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

DATE: 10/14/2026