

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
	:	PENNSYLVANIA
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
TYRONE MCDUFFIE	:	
	:	
Appellant	:	No. 832 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008551-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

FILED JUNE 23, 2026

Tyrone McDuffie appeals from the order denying his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows. On December 6, 2021, McDuffie pled guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to one count each of third-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. That same day, the trial court imposed the negotiated, aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years of incarceration. McDuffie filed neither a post-sentence motion nor a direct appeal.

On December 1, 2022, McDuffie filed a *pro se* PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and PCRA counsel, after being granted several time

extensions, amended McDuffie's petition on February 2, 2024. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss and McDuffie filed a reply to this motion. On January 10, 2025, the PCRA court issued a Criminal Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss McDuffie's petition. McDuffie did not file a response. By order entered February 28, 2025, the PCRA court dismissed McDuffie's petition. This appeal followed. Both McDuffie and the PCRA court have complied with Appellate Rule 1925.

McDuffie raises eight issues on appeal, which we cite verbatim:

#1. **Brady v. Maryland**, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) Violation. Did the PCRA court err in denying a hearing on whether prosecutor failed to timely provide "secure version" of government witness Chambers' record?

#2. **Brady** Violation. Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor failed to provide FBI record of the government witness Chambers?

#3. **Brady** Violation. Did the PCRA court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor failed to provide PARS report of the government witness Chambers?

#4. **Brady, Napue v. Illinois**, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), **Glossip v. Oklahoma**, 604 U.S. ___(2025) Violations. Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor untimely provided a mandatory homicide activity report?

#5 **Brady, United States Giglio**, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), **Glossip, supra**, violations. Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor failed to disclose moving government witness to a prison in his home county?

#6. **Brady, Napue, Glossip**, violations. Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing whether the prosecutor failed to provide timely cell phone records which was evidence of perjurious grand jury testimony on government witness Chambers which she failed to correct?

#7. **Brady, Napue, Glossip, violations.** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor interfered with [McDuffie's] right to a fair and impartial trial under the Fourteenth Amendment by falsely asserting a defense witness had a 5th Amendment issue?

#8 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Did the PCRA Court err by failing to conduct a hearing on whether guilty plea counsel failed to prove effective assistance of counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution?

McDuffie's Brief at 12-13.

This Court's standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA is to ascertain whether "the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record." **Commonwealth v. Barndt**, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings. To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court's decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

After careful review, we conclude that the PCRA court has authored a thorough and well-reasoned opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a). In his June 16, 2024 opinion, the Honorable Glenn B. Bronson demonstrated an

understanding of the constitutional holdings of the cases cited by McDuffie, and correctly rejected McDuffie's multiple claims that the Commonwealth committed any constitutional violation. In addition, Judge Bronson correctly cited McDuffie's burden of proof regard his claims of plea counsel's ineffectiveness and explained why these claims did not warrant post-conviction relief.


We discern no legal errors or abuse of discretion in Judge Bronson's analysis of McDuffie's eight claims on appeal. In addition, Judge Bronson did not abuse his discretion in determining that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. In our view, McDuffie's claims of constitutional violations arise from his assumptions and speculations following a review of the multiple documents included in the discovery provided by the Commonwealth. Regarding McDuffie's claims of plea counsel's ineffectiveness, we conclude that his undeveloped allegations of "mistakes" do not require remand. **See Commonwealth v. Clark**, 961 A.2d 80, 94 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that, in the absence of a sufficient proffer, a petitioner's bare assertions would inappropriately convert an evidentiary hearing into a "fishing expedition" for possible exculpatory evidence).

As such, we adopt Judge Bronson's 1925(a) opinion as our own in affirming the order denying McDuffie post-conviction relief. **See** PCRA Court's Opinion, 6/16/25, at 8-16 (rejecting issues #1 through #7 because in each of McDuffie's **Brady**, **Napue**, and/or **Glossip** claims, McDuffie either

acknowledged that the Commonwealth provided the particular document prior to McDuffie's trial date and/or entry of guilty plea, the identified document contained no information helpful to the defense, or the claim was refuted by the record); and at 16-23 (concluding plea counsel was not ineffective for recommending that McDuffie plead guilty; none of the eight "mistakes" allegedly made by plea counsel would entitle McDuffie to post-conviction relief).¹

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Benjamin D. Kohler". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2026

¹ The parties are directed to attach Judge Bronson's June 16, 2025 opinion to this memorandum in any future appeal.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYRONE MCDUFFIE

CP-51-CR-0008551-2019

FILED

JUN 13 2025

Appeals/Post Trial
Office of Judicial Records

OPINION

BRONSON, J.

June 13, 2025

Defendant Tyrone McDuffie has appealed from this Court's order of February 28, 2025, dismissing his petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court's order should be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 6, 2021, defendant pled guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to one count each of third degree murder (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c)), criminal conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1)), and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1)). That same day, the Court imposed the negotiated, aggregate sentence of 25 to 50 years incarceration. Defendant did not file post-sentence motions or an appeal. Defendant was represented at his guilty plea and sentencing hearings by Samuel C. Stretton, Esquire.

On December 1, 2022, defendant filed a *pro se* petition under the PCRA, which is here at issue. On December 12, 2022, Louisa Ashmead Robinson, Esquire, was appointed to represent defendant. Defendant filed an amended petition on February 2, 2024, and on September 5, 2024, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. Defendant filed a reply to the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss ("Defense Reply") on November 8, 2024. On January 10, 2025, the Court

issued notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its intent to dismiss defendant's PCRA petition without a hearing ("907 Notice"). The Court dismissed defendant's petition on February 28, 2025.

Defendant has now appealed the Court's dismissal of his PCRA petition, raising the following claims (verbatim) (block capitalization omitted):

1. **Brady Violation #1.** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on the issue of whether the prosecutor violated [defendant's] *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) rights by failing to timely provide mandatory discovery of the "I told you so" Chambers' secure version of his criminal arrest June 24, 2019, arrest for firearms violations?
2. **Brady Violation #2.** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on the issue of whether the prosecutor violated *Brady, supra*, by failing to timely order and provide the FBI records of the "I told you so" witness Chambers' until only one business day before jury selection?
3. **Brady Violation #3.** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor suppressed a PARS report of the firearms arrest of Colin Chambers on 6/25/2019 which was mandatory discovery?
4. **Brady, Napue v. Illinois, Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. __ (2025) Violation #4.** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor suppressed a discovery homicide activity report until November 18, 2021, of a July 28, 2021, interview, because she it had to have put her on notice that her witness Colin Chambers gave false grand jury testimony, on August 27, 2019, which she relied on to indict the [defendant] and she which she failed to correct in violation of *Napue* and *Glossip*?
5. **Brady, Napue, United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), Glossip, supra, Violation #5.** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor failed to disclose that she relocated the "I told you so witness" Chambers from a Philadelphia prison to a prison in Delaware County at Chambers' request which was a favorable benefit to him in exchange for his providing inculpatory testimony against defendant and would have been impeaching material under *Giglio*?
6. **Brady, Napue, Glossip Violation #6.** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on when and how long before the jury date the prosecutor had the cell phone records of Gulldege that showed that he could not have been a shooter and that these cell phone records put the prosecutor on notice that it was Chambers who perjured himself at the grand jury proceeding in the summer of 2019 and whether she then failed in her constitutional obligation to correct Chambers' false testimony which

interfered with defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial under the Fourteenth Amendment?

7. ***Brady, Napue, Glossip, Violation #7.*** Did the PCRA Court err in denying a hearing on whether the prosecutor failed in her Constitutional obligation to correct false testimony and advise the Court on the day of the guilty plea 12-6-2021 that Gullede could not have been a shooter and whether she should have advised the Court that she was withdrawing her request for 5th Amendment counsel for Gullede and that it was her witness, Chambers, who had perjured himself in front of the grand jury and was in need of 5th Amendment counsel and that the defendant should have known of this development as it was material to his decision to entering a guilty plea as he would not have done so if he had known that Gullede did not have a 5th Amendment issue and therefore the outcome of the trial would have been a different result and the prosecutor's creating this false 5th Amendment issue and then suppressing the outcome of it interfered with his right to a fair and impartial trial under the Fourteenth Amendment? *See Glossip Supra.*

8. **Did the PCRA Court err by failing to conduct a hearing on whether guilty plea counsel failed to provided effective assistance of counsel within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by failing to conduct a hearing on whether counsel made the following mistakes which changed the outcome of the trial because they caused the defendant to plead guilty?**
 - a. Failing to request a continuance to analyze, investigate and discuss the last minute discovery, with defendant;
 - b. Failure to subpoena and discuss Gullede's medical and cell phone records with the defendant, failure to advise [defendant] that Gullede had appeared in Court; Failure to learn whether Gullede was willing to testify after being appointed 5th Amendment counsel;
 - c. Filing an alibi notice before receiving discovery and failing to withdraw it;
 - d. Failing to discuss an affirmative defense of an 'alternative suspect' Philip McDuffie with the defendant. .
 - e. Failing to explain the difference between cell phone v. location data to the defendant.

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(B)(1) ("Statement of Errors") ¶¶ 1-8. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's claims are without merit, and the Court's order dismissing defendant's PCRA petition should be affirmed.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual basis proffered by the Commonwealth for defendant's guilty plea, to which defendant agreed in substance, established the following:

On October 9, 2018, at approximately 1:36 a.m., police officers responded to a radio call regarding a female shot in the rear driveway of the property at 5223 Westford Road in Philadelphia. N.T. 12/6/21 at 27. Upon arrival, officers located the decedent, 20-year-old Andrea Meyers, leaning into the front passenger seat of the car parked in the driveway with gunshot wounds to her chest and left arm. *Id.* Ms. Meyers was transported to Albert Einstein Medical College by medics, where she was pronounced dead at 1:58 a.m. *Id.* at 27-28.

Upon investigation, police recovered two types of fired cartridge casings from the crime scene, as well as surveillance footage from the area capturing the murder. *Id.* at 28. The footage depicted two vehicles driving by the crime scene immediately preceding the shooting and circling the block. *Id.* The video then showed two people coming from the area of those vehicles, shooting numerous times upon the car in the driveway of 5223 Westford Road, and then running back towards those vehicles before fleeing the scene. *Id.* at 28-29. At the time of the shooting, Ms. Meyers was in the car with three others, that is, Julien Johnson, Kevin Ulysses, and Duke Jules. *Id.* at 28.

Mr. Johnson was later interviewed and told detectives that he had been receiving threats for approximately two days prior to the murder. *Id.* at 29. Specifically, Mr. Johnson showed detectives his phone, which revealed that he had been receiving threatening Instagram messages from an account, unknown to him, that had an Instagram username similar to his own. *Id.* The person using the account sent messages to Mr. Johnson threatening to kill him and his family, as well as messages including pictures of Mr. Johnson's address. *Id.* The last message from the

account was sent approximately four hours prior to the murder. *Id.* Detectives were able to determine that the Instagram account was created and used by Lekita McDuffie, defendant's cousin. *Id.* at 29-30.

Detectives executed a search warrant on Lekita's home and cell phone.¹ *Id.* at 30. Upon performing a phone extraction, detectives discovered numerous messages detailing the motive for the shooting, as well as evidence that Lekita had enlisted her cousins, defendant and his sister, Dolores McDuffie, to perpetrate the shooting. *Id.* Specifically, the messages found on Lekita's phone established that: 1) Lekita's home was "shot up" in what she believed was retribution for a murder that her child's father had committed; 2) the father of Lekita's child had fled to Haiti; 3) Lekita and Dolores believed that Mr. Johnson was responsible for the shooting of Lekita's home; and 4) Lekita messaged defendant right before the murder to "be on standby." *Id.* at 31.

Detectives were able to get warrants for both the phone numbers and Google accounts associated with defendant and Dolores. *Id.* at 31. With regard to defendant, the search of his Google account revealed that he had searched both the address of the murder immediately before the murder and searched a description of the incident immediately following the murder. *Id.* at 32. Cell site analysis further revealed that defendant's phone traveled with both Dolores's and Lekita's phones on the night of the murder, both to the crime scene at the time of the murder and later to the home of Dolores's and defendant's mother. *Id.* at 32. A witness, Colin Chambers, also came forward, and gave a statement to police that he had a conversation with defendant and Dolores during which they laughed about the shooting, and defendant specifically told Mr.

¹ Because Lekita has the same last name as her co-defendant, Dolores McDuffie, the Court refers to each of them by their first names to avoid confusion. *See* N.T. 12/6/21 at 29-30.

Chambers that he was one of the two shooters in Ms. Meyers's murder. *Id.* at 32-33. Defendant was ineligible to possess a firearm at the time of the shooting. *See id.* at 38.

III. DISCUSSION

An appellate court's review of a PCRA court's grant or denial of relief "is limited to determining whether the court's findings are supported by the record and the court's order is otherwise free of legal error." *Commonwealth v. Green*, 14 A.3d 114, 116 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). The reviewing court "will not disturb findings that are supported by the record." *Id.*

A. *Brady and Napue Claims*

Defendant raises seven claims premised upon the Commonwealth's alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Four of these claims also include claims premised upon the Commonwealth's alleged failure to correct false testimony in violation of *Napue v. Illinois*, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Statement of Errors ¶¶ 1-7.²

Under *Brady*, exculpatory evidence not disclosed to the defense will give rise to a due process violation and will require a new trial if the exculpatory evidence is "material" either to guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87; *see also* Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a) (specifying, as mandatory discovery, "[a]ny evidence favorable to the accused that is material either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth"). If the police possess evidence that is favorable to the defense, then the Commonwealth is deemed

² Defendant raises *Brady* claims in paragraphs 1 through 3 of his Statement of Errors. *See* Statement of Errors ¶¶ 1-3. In paragraphs 4 through 7 of his Statement of Errors, defendant raises both *Brady* and *Napue* claims. *See* Statement of Errors ¶¶ 4-7.

to be responsible for its disclosure even if it is solely in the possession of the police. See *Commonwealth v. Lambert*, 884 A.2d 848, 854 (Pa. 2005).

Therefore, to establish a *Brady* violation, defendant must demonstrate that: “(1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) which was either exculpatory evidence or impeachment evidence favorable to him; and (3) he was prejudiced by the concealment.” *Commonwealth v. Simpson*, 66 A.3d 253, 264 (Pa. 2013). In order to establish prejudice, defendant “must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding/would have been different. *Id.* A reasonable probability for these purposes is one which undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” *Id.* (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, “*Brady* evidence may not be cumulative of other evidence, cannot have been equally available to the defense, and cannot have been discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” *Id.* (internal citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court set forth the elements of a *Napue* violation as follows:

To establish a *Napue* violation, a defendant must show that the prosecution knowingly solicited false testimony or knowingly allowed it to go uncorrected when it appeared. If the defendant makes this showing, a new trial is warranted if there is any reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, __A.3d __, 2025 WL 1427968 at *21 (Pa. 2025) (internal citations and quotations omitted).³

With respect to the Court’s decision to deny defendant an evidentiary hearing, “[i]t is well settled that [t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA petition, and if

³ In the Statement of Errors, in each paragraph asserting a *Napue* violation defendant also alleges a “Glossip violation.” Statement of Errors ¶¶ 4-7. *Glossip v. Oklahoma*, 145 S.Ct. 612 (2025), is a recent decision from the United States Supreme Court, which reaffirms the above-described standard for evaluating a *Napue* claim. See *Glossip*, 145 S.Ct. at 626-627.

the PCRA court can determine from the record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.” *Commonwealth v. Maddrey*, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal quotations omitted); Pa.R.Crim.P. 908. Further, where a defendant seeks the reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a defendant’s petition without a hearing, defendant must show “he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” *Maddrey*, 205 A.3d at 328 (quoting *Commonwealth v. Hanible*, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011)).

1. *Brady claim regarding the Philadelphia arrest record of Commonwealth witness Colin Chambers*

Defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his *Brady* claim that the Commonwealth failed to timely provide to defendant the “secure version” of the criminal arrest report regarding Commonwealth witness Colin Chambers. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 1; Amended Petition at pp. 30-33, 74-76. Mr. Chambers gave a statement to the Commonwealth and testified before an indicting grand jury that defendant had told him that defendant was one of the two people who shot and killed Ms. Meyers. *See* Amended Petition at pp. 16-17, Exhibits P-1 (Videotaped Interview of Chambers) & P-11 (8/27/19 Grand Jury Notes of Testimony); *see also* N.T. 12/6/21 at 32-33. Defendant argues that, because Mr. Chambers’s secure Philadelphia criminal extract revealed that Mr. Chambers had been arrested on June 24, 2019, for a firearms offense, and therefore, had an open firearms charge when he gave his videotaped statement and when he testified before the grand jury, the defense was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s untimely disclosure of Mr. Chambers’s criminal extract since “the absence of the arrest deprived

[defendant] of impeaching evidence that went to Chambers' bias and interest in providing inculpatory evidence against [defendant]."⁴ Amended Petition at p. 31.

This claim is without merit. While defendant avers that the disclosure of Mr. Chambers's criminal record was not "timely," he acknowledges that the Commonwealth provided Mr. Chambers's secure Philadelphia criminal extract three days prior to defendant's trial date and the entry of his guilty plea, that is, on December 3, 2021. *See* Amended Petition at p. 30. It is well-established that no *Brady* violation can result from evidence that was disclosed prior to trial. *See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ly*, 980 A.2d 61, 82 (Pa. 2009) (no *Brady* violations possible from statements disclosed prior to trial). The Commonwealth did not conceal evidence, and therefore, no relief is due. *See Simpson*, 66 A.3d at 264.

2. *Brady claim regarding the FBI criminal record of Chambers*

Defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his *Brady* claim that the Commonwealth failed to timely provide to defendant Mr. Chambers's FBI criminal record. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 2; Amended Petition at pp. 33-35, 74-76. Like the Philadelphia arrest record that is the basis of defendant's first *Brady* claim discussed above, this claim is based on the impeachment value of Mr. Chambers 2019 firearms arrest, which was revealed in Mr. Chambers's FBI criminal record as well as the Philadelphia arrest record. Amended Petition at pp. 33-35, 74-76.

Defendant's claim fails for the same reason as his first claim. Like the Philadelphia arrest record, defendant acknowledges that he received the FBI record three days prior to his trial date and the entry of his guilty plea. Because the evidence was turned over to the defense prior to the trial date, no relief is due.

⁴ Mr. Chambers's firearms charge was *nolle prossed* on October 13, 2021, and later expunged from his record. *See* Amended Petition at p. 30.

3. *Brady claim regarding the PARS report for the June 24, 2019 arrest of Chambers*

Defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his *Brady* claim that the Commonwealth failed to provide to defendant the Preliminary Arraignment Reporting System (“PARS”) report regarding Mr. Chambers’s June 24, 2019 arrest.⁵ *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 3; *see also* Amended Petition at pp. 35-36, 74-76, Exhibit P-5 (June 2019 PARS Report). This claim is without merit.

Although it is true that the Commonwealth did not provide defendant with the PARS report prior to his guilty plea, there is nothing in the report that was at all helpful to the defense. While the report showed that Mr. Chambers had been arrested on June 24, 2019 for a firearms offense, and therefore, had an open firearms charge against him when he made statements to the Commonwealth inculcating defendant, that arrest had already been disclosed to defendant prior to trial through Mr. Chambers’ Philadelphia criminal record report and his FBI criminal record report. *See* Sections (III)(A)(1) & (2), *supra*. The alleged facts underlying the charge were contained in the PARS report, but those alleged facts were not relevant. Only the pendency of the open charge would be relevant to prove possible bias on the part of Mr. Chambers to ingratiate himself to the Commonwealth. *See Commonwealth v. Evans*, 512 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1986) (possible bias of a prosecution witness due to outstanding criminal charges must be made known to the jury). The hearsay allegations about the facts of the case in the PARS report regarding an arrest that had not resulted in a conviction were inadmissible and unhelpful to defendant.

⁵ In the third paragraph of defendant’s Statement of Errors, he erroneously refers to the “firearms arrest of Colin Chambers on 6/25/2019.” Statement of Errors ¶ 3. Mr. Chambers was arrested on June 24, 2019.

Because the information useful to defendant in the PARS report was duplicative of what was already provided to defendant, no *Brady* violation was committed. *See Simpson*, 66 A.3d at 264. No relief is due.

4. *Brady and Napue claims regarding homicide activity report dated November 18, 2021*

Defendant makes two claims regarding the Commonwealth's homicide activity report dated November 18, 2021. First, defendant claims the Court erred in dismissing his *Brady* claim that the Commonwealth suppressed the activity report, which memorialized a July 2021 interview of witness Colin Chambers. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 4; Amended Petition at pp. 36-41, 76-81. Second, defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his claim under *Napue* that the Commonwealth unlawfully used at defendant's guilty plea hearing and at the grand jury a prior statement to police Mr. Chambers had made, even though the July 2021 interview in the activity report proved that Mr. Chambers's prior statement was untrue. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 4; Amended Petition at pp. 36-41, 76-81. Both claims are without merit.

With regard to defendant's *Brady* claim, defendant acknowledges that the activity sheet at issue was provided to him on November 18, 2021, several weeks prior to his trial date and the entry of his guilty plea on December 6, 2021. Accordingly, because the Commonwealth did not conceal evidence, his *Brady* claim is without merit. *See Simpson*, 66 A.3d at 264.

Defendant's *Napue* claim is also meritless. In Mr. Chambers's initial statement to detectives on June 25, 2019, he stated that defendant and Kenyatta Gullede had told him that they were the two people who shot and killed Ms. Meyers. *See* Amended Petition at pp. 16-17, Exhibits P-1 (Videotaped Interview of Chambers). On July 28, 2021, in a follow-up interview with the Commonwealth memorialized in the homicide activity report at issue, Mr. Chambers stated that "when speaking with [defendant], Delores McDuffie and Kenyatta Gullede about

decedent's murder . . . he was [led] to believe that Kenyatta Gullede was present for it." *See* Amended Petition at pp. 37-38, Exhibit P-16 (November 2021 Homicide Activity Report). In his July 2021 interview, Mr. Chambers also mentioned, for the first time, that Mr. Gullede had a sling on his arm sometime around the decedent's murder. *See* Amended Petition at p. 39, Exhibit P-16 (November 2021 Homicide Activity Report). Defendant argues that these two changes were material, *i.e.*, that Gullede was merely present and that Gullede had his arm in a sling. Accordingly, defendant contends that by using the prior police statement, the Commonwealth relied on knowingly false testimony in violation of *Napue*. *See* Amended Petition at 39-41; Statement of Errors ¶ 4.

The record refutes defendant's *Napue* claim. The Commonwealth did not present any evidence regarding Mr. Gullede at defendant's guilty plea hearing. In fact, Mr. Gullede was not mentioned at all during that hearing. N.T. 12/6/2021 at 3-69. As a result, any discrepancies regarding Mr. Gullede could not give rise to a *Napue* violation in connection with defendant's guilty plea.

As for the grand jury, it is true that Mr. Chambers testified to the grand jury that he was told that Mr. Gullede was present for the shooting. *See* Amended Petition, Exhibit P-11 (Grand Jury Notes of Testimony) at 56-57. However, this was not inconsistent with what Mr. Chambers said in either of his statements. Whether Mr. Chambers was told that Mr. Gullede was a shooter (first statement) or "present" at the time (second statement), he was still "present" for the shooting as Mr. Chambers told the grand jury. Moreover, the omission in the grand jury of any reference to Mr. Gullede having a sling on his arm could not have been perjurious since Mr. Chambers was never asked in the grand jury about any sling.

Because the Commonwealth did not knowingly present false testimony at either the grand jury or guilty plea hearing, no relief is due. *See Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269-272; *Johnson*, 2025 WL 1427968 at *21.

5. *Brady and Napue claims regarding relocation of Chambers*

Defendant makes two claims regarding the Commonwealth's relocation of witness Colin Chambers from a Philadelphia County prison to a Delaware County prison. First, defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his *Brady* claim that the Commonwealth failed to disclose that it had relocated Mr. Chambers as a favorable benefit in exchange for his testimony against defendant. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 5; Amended Petition at pp. 41-44, 82-85. Second, defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his claim that the Commonwealth violated *Napue* by failing to disclose it had relocated Mr. Chambers. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 5; Amended Petition at pp. 41-44, 82-85. Both claims are without merit.

With regard to defendant's *Brady* claim, defendant argues that since Delaware County was Mr. Chambers's "home county," defendant's relocation from Philadelphia to Delaware County on August 11, 2021, was a benefit to Mr. Chambers that required disclosure. *See* Amended Petition at p. 83. Defendant further argues that any safety concerns Mr. Chambers had about being in Philadelphia were unwarranted, because defendant has never threatened Mr. Chambers. *See* Amended Petition at p. 43. These arguments are unavailing.

Defendant has proffered no evidence to show that Mr. Chambers received a benefit by being relocated, that Delaware County was Mr. Chambers's "home county," or that Mr. Chambers's security concerns were unwarranted. The record establishes that Mr. Chambers was transferred after he expressed safety concerns during his July 28, 2021 interview with the Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth disclosed that measures had been taken to protect

Mr. Chambers in a homicide activity report that was provided to defendant on November 18, 2021. *See* Amended Petition, Exhibit P-16 (November 2021 Homicide Activity Report). Accordingly, because the Commonwealth did not suppress evidence of Mr. Chambers's relocation, nor did evidence of the relocation constitute *Brady* material, defendant's claim is without merit. *See Simpson*, 66 A.3d at 264.

With regard to defendant's *Napue* claim, defendant offers no argument and alleges no facts to support a *Napue* claim based on Mr. Chambers's relocation. No relief is due.

6. *Brady and Napue claims regarding cellphone records of Kenyatta Gullede*

Defendant makes two claims regarding Kenyatta Gullede's cellphone records. First, defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his *Brady* claim that the Commonwealth did not timely provide Mr. Gullede's cellphone records to defendant. Statement of Errors ¶ 6; Amended Petition at pp. 44, 86-87. Second, defendant claims that the Court erred in dismissing his *Napue* claim where the records, which indicated that Mr. Gullede was at Jefferson-Torresdale hospital at the time of the murder, proved the Commonwealth knew, or should have known, that Commonwealth witness Colin Chambers was lying with regard to his statement that he believed Mr. Gullede was one of the two shooters who killed Ms. Meyers. Statement of Errors ¶ 6; Amended Petition at pp. 44, 86-87. Both claims are without merit.

With regard to defendant's *Brady* claim, because defendant acknowledges that Mr. Gullede's cellphone records were provided to him on December 3, 2021, that is, three days prior to defendant's trial date and entry of his guilty plea, his *Brady* claim is without merit. Amended Petition at p. 44; *Simpson*, 66 A.3d at 264.

As for defendant's *Napue* claim, defendant proffers no evidence to show how the cellphone records at issue led to perjurious testimony that affected the outcome of his case. The

Commonwealth did not present any evidence regarding the presence of Mr. Gullledge at the crime scene during defendant's guilty plea colloquy. Moreover, the cellphone records did not prove that Mr. Chambers committed perjury at the grand jury. Evidence tending to show that Mr. Gullledge was not present at the shooting did not prove that Chambers lied in his grand jury testimony, when he said that he *had been told by defendant* that Mr. Gullledge was present for the shooting.

Accordingly, defendant's *Napue* claim is without merit. No relief is due.

7. *Gullledge Fifth Amendment counsel*

Defendant argues that that the Court erred in dismissing his *Brady* and *Napue* claims that the Commonwealth interfered with the defense by falsely representing to the Court at a status listing on December 2, 2021, that Mr. Gullledge needed Fifth Amendment counsel. Statement of Errors ¶ 7; Amended Petition at pp. 44-50, 87-95. Specifically, defendant argues that, since Mr. Gullledge's medical and cellphone records placed him at the hospital at the time of the shooting, the Commonwealth knowingly made a false representation that Mr. Gullledge needed Fifth Amendment counsel. *See* Amended Petition at pp. 44-50, 87-95. Defendant further argues that the Commonwealth should have advised the Court that Mr. Gullledge no longer needed Fifth Amendment counsel on the day of defendant's guilty plea hearing. *Id.*; Statement of Errors ¶ 7.

Both defendant's *Brady* and *Napue* claims are meritless. Defendant does not aver that any exculpatory evidence was not disclosed to the defense, nor that the Commonwealth knowingly presented perjurious testimony that affected the outcome of the case. Therefore, defendant alleges no facts that would support either a *Brady* or *Napue* claim. *See Simpson*, 66 A.3d at 264; *Napue*, 360 U.S. at 269-272. Moreover, because Fifth Amendment counsel that was appointed by the Court for Mr. Gullledge advised Mr. Gullledge that he could testify, *see*

Amended Petition, Exhibit P-3 (Affidavit of Kenyatta Gullledge), defendant could not have been prejudiced by the Commonwealth's alleged misconduct. No relief is due.

B. *Ineffective assistance of guilty plea counsel*

Defendant asserts that the Court erred by dismissing his claim that guilty plea counsel, Samuel C. Stretton, Esquire, was ineffective for recommending that defendant plead guilty. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 8. In support of his claim, defendant lists eight mistakes of Mr. Stretton that allegedly establish that he was ineffective. *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 8(A)-(E).⁶ For the reasons set forth below, none of Mr. Stretton's alleged mistakes entitle defendant to relief, and therefore, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

Under Pennsylvania law, counsel is presumed to be effective and the burden to prove otherwise lies with the petitioner. *Commonwealth v. Basemore*, 744 A.2d 717, 728 (Pa. 2000), n.10 (citing *Commonwealth v. Copenhefer*, 719 A.2d 242, 250 (Pa. 1998)). To obtain collateral relief based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below accepted standards of advocacy and that as a result thereof, the petitioner was prejudiced. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In Pennsylvania, the *Strickland* standard is interpreted as requiring proof that: (1) the claim underlying the ineffectiveness claim had arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked any reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the petitioner prejudice. *Commonwealth v. Miller*, 987 A.2d 638, 648 (Pa. 2009); *Commonwealth v. Pierce*, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). To satisfy the third prong of the test, the petitioner must prove that, but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. *Commonwealth v. Sneed*, 899 A.2d 1067, 1084 (Pa. 2006) (citing *Strickland*, 466

⁶ Although defendant only lists five paragraphs of "mistakes" made by guilty plea counsel, paragraph ¶ 8(B) alleges three separate mistakes.

U.S. at 694). If the PCRA court determines that any one of the three prongs cannot be met, then the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing as such a hearing would serve no purpose.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008).

With regard to guilty plea counsel specifically, our Superior Court has set forth the standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel as follows:

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the plea-bargaining process are eligible for PCRA Review. Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . under which the defendant must show that counsel's deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary or unintelligent plea. This standard is equivalent to the "manifest injustice" standard applicable to all post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea.

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012-1013 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

1. Failure to request a continuance

Defendant claims that guilty plea counsel, Samuel C. Stretton, Esquire, was ineffective for failing to request a continuance. Statement of Errors ¶ 8(A); Defense Reply at pp. 23-25. Specifically, defendant argues that Mr. Stretton should have requested a continuance in order to "review, synthesize, and discuss [last-minute] discovery" with defendant that was provided by the Commonwealth shortly before trial. Defense Reply at pp. 23-25.

This claim is without merit. Because the Court would not have granted a request for a continuance, defendant could not have been prejudiced by counsel's failure to make one. *See*

Miller, 987 A.2d at 648. Moreover, defendant has averred nothing that would establish that the absence of a continuance rendered his plea involuntary or unknowing. *See Kelley*, 136 A.3d at 1012-1013. Accordingly, no relief is due.

2. Failure to subpoena Kenyatta Gulledge's medical records

Defendant claims that Mr. Stretton was ineffective for failing to subpoena Kenyatta Gulledge's medical records. Statement of Errors ¶ 8(B);⁷ *see* Amended Petition at pp. 53, 97. This claim is without merit.

It is clear from the record that Mr. Stretton knew through his own investigation that Mr. Gulledge's medical records would prove that Mr. Gulledge was in the hospital at the time of the murder. *See* N.T. 12/2/21 at 13-15. Because defendant alleges no facts that could show how the absence of the medical records could render his plea to be involuntary or unknowing, no relief is due. *See Kelley*, 136 A.3d at 1012-1013.

3. Failure to discuss Gulledge's cellphone records with defendant

Defendant claims that Mr. Stretton was ineffective for failing to discuss Mr. Gulledge's cellphone records with defendant. Statement of Errors ¶ 8(B); *see* Amended Petition at pp. 56, 97. Specifically, defendant argues that Mr. Stretton should have advised defendant that cellphone records proved that Mr. Gulledge was in the hospital at the time of the shooting, and therefore also proved that Commonwealth witness Colin Chambers was lying. *See* Amended Petition at p. 56.

⁷ In his Statement of Errors, defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for "[failing] to subpoena and discuss Gulledge's medical and cell phone records with the defendant." Statement of Errors ¶ 8(B). Based on the claims raised in defendant's Amended Petition, the Court infers that defendant is making two separate claims, that is, that counsel was ineffective for: 1) failing to subpoena Mr. Gulledge's medical records, and 2) failing to discuss Mr. Gulledge's cellphone records with defendant. *See* Amended Petition at pp. 53, 56. To the extent that defendant is attempting to raise any other claims, those claims are waived. *See Commonwealth v. Cannon*, 954 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Pa. Super. 2008), *app. denied*, 964 A.2d 893 (Pa. 2009) (where a defendant makes a vague and generalized objection on appeal that leaves the trial court to guess at his or her claims, those claims are deemed to have been waived). Defendant's claim regarding Mr. Gulledge's cellphone records is discussed in Section II(B)(3), *infra*.

This claim is without merit. The cellphone records that provided evidence that Mr. Gulledge was in the hospital at the time of the murder merely corroborated information that was previously acquired by Mr. Stretton's own private investigator. *See* N.T. 12/2/21 at 11-15. Moreover, evidence that Mr. Gulledge was not at the crime scene at the time of the murder in no way proved that defendant did not confess to Mr. Chambers, nor did it undermine other unrelated compelling evidence establishing defendant's guilt. Accordingly, Mr. Stretton's alleged failure to discuss Mr. Gulledge's cellphone records with defendant did not render his guilty plea involuntary or unknowing. *See Kelley*, 136 A.3d at 1012-1013. No relief is due.

4. Failure to learn whether Gulledge was willing to testify after being appointed 5th Amendment counsel

Defendant claims that Mr. Stretton was ineffective for failing to learn whether Kenyatta Gulledge was willing to testify after being appointed Fifth Amendment counsel and failing to discuss the possibility of Mr. Gulledge testifying with defendant.⁸ Statement of Errors ¶ 8(B); *see* Amended Petition at pp. 58, 98. Defendant argues that “[c]ounsel had a duty to learn what Gulledge had decided to do either from the [Fifth] Amendment attorney, or by asking Gulledge, or by asking the trial court to ask Gulledge, and not just assume that he was not cooperating.” Amended Petition at p. 58.

This claim is without merit. Defendant has proffered no evidence to prove that Mr. Stretton did not know whether Mr. Gulledge would testify at defendant's trial. Moreover, even if Mr. Gulledge would have testified that he was not at the scene of the murder, that would not

⁸ In his Statement of Errors, defendant also states that guilty plea counsel was ineffective for “[failing] to advise [defendant] that Gulledge had appeared in Court.” *See* Statement of Errors ¶ 8(B). This assertion was not listed as one of the enumerated “mistakes” of trial counsel set forth in the Amended Petition as the basis for defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. *See* Amended Petition pp. 51-58 (setting out 11 “mistakes” of trial counsel). Accordingly, that claim is waived. *See* Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); *Commonwealth v. Stevenson*, 894 A.2d 759, 766 (Pa. Super. 2006), *appeal denied*, 917 A.2d 846 (Pa. 2007) (same).

refute Colin Chambers's testimony that defendant admitted to Mr. Chambers that defendant committed the murder, nor the other compelling evidence establishing defendant's guilt. Additionally, even if defendant was unaware that Mr. Gulledge was available to testify, that would not render his guilty plea to be involuntary or unknowing. Accordingly, defendant was not prejudiced by Mr. Stretton's purported failure to learn whether Mr. Gulledge would testify, and no relief is due. *See Kelley*, 136 A.3d at 1012-1013.

5. Filing an alibi notice before receiving discovery and failing to withdraw it

Defendant claims that Mr. Stretton was ineffective for filing an alibi notice before receiving discovery and failing to withdraw the notice upon learning that defendant's alibi was false. Statement of Errors ¶ 8(B); Amended Petition at pp. 54-56, 97. This claim is without merit.

Alibi is a defense which "places the defendant at the relevant time in a different place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party." *Commonwealth v. Ali*, 10 A.3d 282, 316 (Pa. 2010) (quoting *Commonwealth v. Johnson*, 966 A.2d 523, 538 & n. 5 (Pa. 2009)). The right to present alibi testimony is not absolute. *Commonwealth v. Poindexter*, 646 A.2d 1211, 1218-19 (Pa. Super. 1994). Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 567, a defendant is required to file a notice of alibi with the clerk of court no later than the time required for filing the omnibus pretrial motion. Such notice is required to "contain specific information as to the place or places where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense," as well as the names and addresses of any witnesses whom the defendant intends to call in support of the claim. *See Pa.R.Crim.P. 567(a); Poindexter* 646 A.2d at 1218-19. The purpose of the alibi notice is to insure "both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to

the determination of guilt or innocence.” *Commonwealth v. Lyons*, 833 A.2d 245, 257 (Pa. Super. 2003 (internal citations omitted)).

Should the defendant fail to file such a notice, or should any witness be omitted from the notice of alibi, the trial court is given discretion to exclude the testimony of the proffered witness other than the defendant, grant a continuance to enable the Commonwealth to investigate the witness, or may make such other order as the interests of justice require. *See Pa.R.Crim.P. 567(b); Poindexter* 642 A.2d at 1219 (citing *Commonwealth v. Anthony*, 546 A.2d 1122 (Pa. Super. 1988)). One such remedy available to the Court is to permit the alibi testimony and instruct the jury that the defendant did not provide the proper alibi notice, permitting the Commonwealth to explain why it was unprepared to rebut this testimony. *See Commonwealth v. Servich*, 602 A.2d 1338, 1343 (Pa. Super. 1992).

Here, Mr. Stretton filed an alibi notice at the direction of defendant on November 5, 2020, indicating that at the time of Ms. Meyers’s murder, defendant was at the home of his then-girlfriend, Cierra Johnson. *See Amended Petition* at p. 54, Exhibit P-32 (Notice of Alibi). Cellphone records later established that this alibi was demonstrably false, since defendant’s cell phone was not at Ms. Johnson’s address during the time of the murder, but rather, at the crime scene. *See Amended Petition* at pp. 54-55; *see also N.T. 12/6/21* at 32.

The fact that defendant provided a false alibi to guilty plea counsel, which led counsel to file a notice of alibi under Pa.R.Crim.P. 567 in order to preserve defendant’s right to present evidence of the alibi to the jury, does not prove that counsel was ineffective. Counsel was required to timely file the notice and was unaware at the time of filing that defendant had given him a false alibi.

Moreover, counsel's failure to withdraw the alibi notice after learning that the alibi was fabricated by defendant could not have prejudiced defendant. In order to show prejudice, defendant would have to have demonstrated that had the alibi notice been withdrawn, defendant would have proceeded to trial, testified, and presented a defense inconsistent with the alibi notice. *See Commonwealth v. Shaw*, 247 A.3d 1008, 1018 (Pa. 2021). Defendant proffered no evidence to support such a showing. Accordingly, no relief is due.

6. Failing to discuss "other suspect" defense with defendant

Defendant claims that Mr. Stretton was ineffective for failing to investigate and discuss with defendant an "other suspect" defense. Statement of Errors ¶ 8(D); Amended Petition at pp. 56, 97. Specifically, defendant alleges that since Commonwealth witness Colin Chambers told police that he believed Phillip McDuffie, a relative of defendant, was also at the crime scene, Mr. Stretton should have discussed with defendant the possibility of raising Phillip McDuffie as an "alternative suspect" at trial. *See* Amended Petition at p. 56.

This claim is meritless. Video and ballistic evidence established that there were two shooters. Therefore, whether Phillip McDuffie was a suspect did not exculpate defendant, or otherwise render defendant's plea involuntary or unknowing. Accordingly, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's alleged failure to discuss this defense with him, and no relief is due. *See Kelley*, 136 A.3d at 1012-1013.

7. Failing to explain to defendant the difference between cellphone and location data

Defendant claims that Mr. Stretton was ineffective for "failing to explain the difference between cellphone vs. location data to [defendant]." Statement of Errors ¶ 8(E); Amended Petition at pp. 57, 98. Specifically, defendant alleges that "[defendant] did not know the difference between location data and cellphone registering off a tower data and [Mr. Stretton] did


not explain it to him.” Amended Petition at p. 57. Defendant further argues that, while Mr. Stretton told defendant that defendant’s phone was “in the area of the murder” at the time Ms. Meyers was killed, defendant “did not know that the tower was three-tenths of a mile away and that his cell phone could have gone as far as six-tenths of a mile if it had been on the other side of the tower.” *Id.*

This claim is without merit. Mr. Stretton’s representation to defendant, that is, that defendant’s phone was “in the area” of the crime scene at the time Ms. Meyers was killed, was an accurate representation. Moreover, any misunderstanding defendant had regarding the cellphone evidence, which did, in fact, prove that defendant was in the vicinity of the crime scene at the time of the murder, did not render defendant’s guilty plea to be involuntary or unknowing. Accordingly, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s purported failure to explain the different types of cell phone data, and no relief is due. *See Kelley*, 136 A.3d at 1012-1013.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court’s order dismissing defendant’s PCRA petition should be affirmed.

BY THE COURT:



GLENN B. BRONSON, J.

Commonwealth v. Tyrone McDuffie
Type of Order: Opinion

CP-51-CR-0008551-2019

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the person(s), and in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P.114:

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
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Dated: June 13, 2025



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Law Clerk to Hon. Glenn B. Bronson