**NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA | : | IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA |
| v. | : | |
| ERIC T. REID | : | |
| Appellant | : | No. 122 EDA 2026 |

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001420-2024

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: **FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2026**

Eric T. Reid appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed for his convictions of one count of conspiracy to commit murder, three counts of first-degree murder, four counts of recklessly endangering another person, and one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime.[1] Reid challenges the denial of a motion to suppress out of court identifications, the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and the imposition of consecutive life sentences. After careful review, we affirm.

---

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

[1] 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2502(a), 2705, 6106, 6108, and 907, respectively.

We obtained the following procedural and factual history from the certified record. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on August 11, 2023, five people entered the basketball courts located at 8th and Diamond Streets in the city of Philadelphia. These people fanned out, pulled firearms, and shot at the individuals who were on the basketball court. A total of 75 fired cartridge casings were later discovered by police. Three men died as a result of this shooting, one man was injured, and multiple people had to run and take cover to avoid the massacre.

Police obtained numerous surveillance videos during their investigation into the shooting. One video captured the shooting, but the perpetrators were all wearing masks. However, police were able to identify the vehicle, a Chevrolet Silverado, that the perpetrators arrived in and subsequently used to flee the area. Police later tracked the Silverado on surveillance cameras and obtained footage recorded prior to and after the shooting.

Using this footage, police were able to positively identify Reid as one of the shooters. Two Philadelphia police officers, Officer Ryan Daut and Thomas Schaffling, viewed the footage with homicide detectives and identified Reid in the videos. After they told the detectives the person in the videos was Reid, detectives showed Officers Daut and Schaffling a Justice Network ("JNet") photograph of Reid to confirm they were discussing the same person. Police further obtained Reid's cell phone and searched it, linking him to his co-defendants and this shooting.

On September 3, 2025, Reid filed a motion to suppress the identification evidence provided by Officers Daut and Schaffling. The court held a hearing on this motion on September 8, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion, finding the identification procedure used was not unnecessarily suggestive.

Reid proceeded to a jury trial, held jointly with four co-defendants. At the conclusion of trial, the jury was hung as to co-defendant Tynel Love, found co-defendant Sufyaan Kinslow not guilty, and found Reid, co-defendant Quaza Lopez, and co-defendant Tyyon Bates guilty of all charges. On October 20, 2025, the same day the jury returned its verdict, the court sentenced Reid to three consecutive life sentences plus a consecutive 24 to 48 years of incarceration.

Reid filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on December 10, 2025. Reid filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. The trial court did not order Reid to file a Rule 1925(b) statement or file a Rule 1925(a) opinion. ***See*** Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), (b).

Reid raises four questions for our review:

> I. Did the trial court err by denying [Reid's] motion to suppress the identifications of Officers Ryan Daut and Thomas Schaffling?
>
> II. Was the evidence of [Reid's] involvement in the crime insufficient as a matter of law?
>
> III. Was the jury's verdict against the weight of the evidence?
>
> IV. Did the court abuse [its] discretion when it sentenced [] Reid to three consecutive life sentences?

Appellant's Brief, at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In his first claim, Reid argues the identification procedure used by homicide detectives to identify individuals on a surveillance video was impermissibly suggestive.[2] ***See id.*** at 14-16. Reid submits the trial court erred in failing to suppress the identifications made by Officers Daut and Schaffling based upon that allegedly suggestive procedure. ***See id.***

We begin with our well-established standard and scope of review:

> Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is *de novo*. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.

***Commonwealth v. Wright***, 314 A.3d 515, 531-32 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).

The officers here made an out of court identification while viewing surveillance video provided by homicide detectives. We are mindful that:

---

[2] We note with disapproval that Reid's argument section is not "divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued[.]" Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). The arguments pertaining to each question seem to overlap and it is unclear when one argument ends and the next begins. We will address, however, the arguments we can clearly discern.

> Whether an out of court identification is to be suppressed as unreliable, and therefore violative of due process, is determined from the totality of the circumstances. Suggestiveness in the identification process is a factor to be considered in determining the admissibility of such evidence, but suggestiveness alone does not warrant exclusion. Identification evidence will not be suppressed unless the facts demonstrate that the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. …

***Commonwealth v. Bishop***, 266 A.3d 56, 63 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

After the suppression hearing, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record:

> But I will just state in terms of factual findings that the reason that these two officers were questioned [was] because of their familiarity with the vehicle from the patrol alert, the officers were called in and shown video which is not unnecessarily suggestive, I will—this is a conclusion of law I'm interspersing there—that's normal police work in every case where surveillance video depicts people and the officer trying to figure out who they are. I should say homicide people trying to figure out who they are. They ask the cops in the area do you know these guys; and that's a perfectly lawful non-suggestive thing to do. There's no basis for any constitutional suppression here.
>
> Absolutely they are entitled once they say I know it's John Doe to show an actual photograph that's a known picture of John Doe to be sure it's the right John Doe that they're talking about. That's all that happened here. That's all fine.
>
> So your motion for suppression the way that you've styled it, which is a motion to suppress identification evidence, which is a constitutional motion based on unnecessarily suggestive identification, I find that there's no factual basis for any constitutional violation. So that is denied.
>
> There is, I suppose in the nature of a motion in limine to exclude the identification of the officers as violating rule 701. And I do believe that there is an independent basis for them to make an

> identification. I will find as a fact that they have extensive familiarity with the defendant based on seeing him on social media, seeing him in the area that they patrol, having seen [him] in connection with a [violation of the Uniform Firearms Act ("VUFA")] arrest that occurred in 2021.
>
> And with regard to Officer Schaffling also having seen the defendant in court on numerous court appearances and, in fact, having stood next to him and his mother outside on the street on one occasion, I guess after a court appearance.
>
> So that is an ample basis to distinguish it, because this is how I look at it: Are they in a different position than the jurors to make an identification based on appearance because of a history of familiarity with the defendant. And they have that history. They are in a different position from me or any other juror. Although I'll say that there is an extraordinary likeliness between the defendant and the one photograph that shows him standing there.
>
> ***
>
> It shows his face and looks just like him to me. But I'm not familiar with him as the officers are, so that their identification would have more believability because they know him and have a history with him … .
>
> So for all those reasons, your motion is denied.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/8/25, at 86-89.

The trial court's factual findings are supported by the record. Officers Daut and Schaffling explained the process used by homicide detectives[3] in identifying Reid from surveillance videos. Specifically, they were both asked to come to the homicide unit to view videos. ***See id.*** at 21-22; 59-60. The officers were each shown the surveillance videos; they did not view the videos

---

[3] The officers were interviewed by different detectives within the homicide unit.

together. ***See id.*** at 37; 60. Neither officer was told who the suspects were or if there were any suspects seen on the videos prior to viewing the videos. ***See id.*** at 21-22, 35-36; 69.

Upon arrival, the officers were shown the surveillance video and still shots of the people seen on the videos. ***See id.*** at 21-23; 59-61. Both officers were able to identify Reid as one of the suspects based upon prior interactions with Reid. ***See id.*** at 23; 60. Officer Daut told detectives that he was not 100% positive that the one suspect was Reid but believed it to be Reid. ***See id.*** at 23.

After the officers each identified Reid, the detectives provided the officers a JNet photograph of Reid to confirm the identification provided was the same Eric Reid that the detectives suspected. ***See id.*** at 49-50; 72-73. It is this portion of the identification procedure that Reid takes issue with, as he claims that the JNet photograph was only shown to bolster their identification of Reid from the surveillance videos. ***See*** Appellant's Brief, at 15-16.

We agree with the trial court that there is nothing inherently suggestive about this process. Officers Daut and Schaffling were not shown the JNet photograph of Reid until after they identified him from the surveillance videos. Reid has failed to convince us that this identification procedure was suggestive, let alone "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." ***Bishop***, 266 A.3d at 63 (citation omitted). Reid's first issue therefore does not entitle him to relief.

In his second claim, Reid seemingly claims the evidence was insufficient. However, Reid merely asserts "[t]he Commonwealth failed to produce competent evidence that [Reid] participated in the crime" and again argues the identification by Officers Daut and Schaffling should not have been admitted. Appellant's Brief, at 16.

The Commonwealth submits this argument is woefully undeveloped and therefore waived. ***See*** Appellee's Brief, at 12. Alternatively, the Commonwealth submits the evidence was sufficient to establish Reid's identity as one of the shooters. ***See id.*** at 13-14. We agree with the Commonwealth that this claim is both waived and without merit.

First, we note Reid's entire sufficiency argument is one paragraph, does not include our standard or scope of review, and provides only one case citation. ***See*** Appellant's Brief, at 16-17. Claims that are not sufficiently developed for our review are waived. ***See Commonwealth v. McIntyre***, 333 A.3d 417, 434 (Pa. Super. 2025). Because Reid fails to provide a developed argument on his sufficiency claim, we find it waived.

However, even if we did not find the claim waived, it is meritless. Reid argues that the only evidence of his identification as one of the shooters should not be considered in the sufficiency analysis. ***See*** Appellant's Brief, at 16-17. Our standard of review required this Court to consider all evidence "whether or not the trial court's rulings thereon were correct[.]" ***Commonwealth v. Mitchell***, 902 A.2d 430, 444 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). We would

therefore be required to consider the identification testimony provided by Officers Daut and Schaffling in our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, even if it was improperly admitted, as Reid unpersuasively alleges. When considering this evidence, we find there was sufficient evidence that Reid was one of the shooters. Therefore, even if not waived, Reid is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Next, Reid asserts the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, again relying upon his claim that the officer identifications were erroneously admitted. ***See*** Appellant's Brief, at 17-18. Reid further asserts that, because police were unable to find any firearms or other physical evidence in Reid's home after the shooting, the jury should not have believed he participated in the shooting. ***See id.***

The standards applicable to a weight of the evidence claim are as follows:

> Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of the trial court's discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial court had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial court when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is, or is not, against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the trial court's conviction that the verdict was, or was not, against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
>
> A trial court abuses its discretion where the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not

> applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. By comparison, the role of the trial court is to determine whether, notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the evidence claim, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial court.

***Commonwealth v. Smith***, 351 A.3d 1245, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2026) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted).

The trial court here relied upon its sufficiency analysis when it found the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence:

> The evidence established that as a result of a beef between a group associated with the area of 4th and Diamond Streets in Philadelphia, which included [Reid], and a group associated with 8th and Diamond Streets, [Reid] and four other men came out onto a basketball court located at 8th and Diamond and opened fire on defenseless young men who were playing basketball. Three men were shot dead and a fourth was grievously injured. All of this was depicted on video surveillance.
>
> [Reid's] sole sufficiency argument is that the Commonwealth failed to prove [his] identity as one of the shooters. However, the evidence overwhelmingly refutes this claim. This evidence included video surveillance of the vacant lot where the shooters parked the murder vehicle, which showed [Reid] getting out of the vehicle shortly after the murders occurred. He is clearly seen directly under the vacant lot's surveillance camera, and had a distinctive appearance, towering over the other shooters. Two officers who knew [Reid] identified him from that video.[a] That the vehicle in question was used for the murders was demonstrated by surveillance video before and after the shootings and by a license plate reader which captured the plate number. Moreover, the video from the lot shows [Reid] removing from that vehicle and carrying codefendant Tyyon Bates, who had been accidentally shot by one of his coconspirators during the attack at the playground. In addition, Uber records showed [Reid] being dropped off one block from the vacant lot shortly before the

> murder. This evidence was more than sufficient to prove that [Reid] was one of the shooters.
>
> > [a] One made a positive ID, while the second, although identifying [Reid], stated that he was not 100% sure. Even without the testimony of the officers, it was evident to the court from the video and from [Reid's] appearance in the courtroom that one of the people clearly depicted in the video at the lot was defendant Reid.
>
> ***
>
> As stated above, the Commonwealth's evidence plainly established that [Reid] was one of the shooters. Because the evidence fully supported the verdict, the verdict did not shock the conscience of the court. [Reid's] weight claim is therefore meritless.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 12/10/25, at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We cannot find the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court detailed the evidence establishing Reid's identity as one of the shooters. The jury had the opportunity to see and hear the evidence, including the surveillance videos and the identification provided by Officers Daut and Schaffling, and Reid's cross-examination of those officers. As such, Reid's weight of the evidence claim is meritless.

Finally, Reid asserts the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to three consecutive life sentences. ***See*** Appellant's Brief, at 18. Reid seemingly claims he was not one of the shooters and therefore the application of the guidelines was clearly unreasonable. ***See id.*** at 18-19.

A challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed does not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. ***See Commonwealth v. Jennings***, 351 A.3d 1215, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2026) (*en banc*).

> An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
>
> We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, ***see*** Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, ***see*** Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, [***see***] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

***Id.*** at 1239-40 (citation omitted).

Reid filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his claim in a post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. We therefore turn to whether Reid has raised a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

> The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. [This Court has] found a substantial question exists when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process. We cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.
>
> It is settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. When we examine an appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists, our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits. A Rule 2119(f) statement

> is inadequate when it contains incantations of statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions of law.

***Commonwealth v. Radecki***, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

Reid's entire Rule 2119(f) statement provides as follows:

> The trial court abused its discretion by sentencing [Reid] to three consecutive life sentences. The trial court's sentence was clearly unreasonable, even though it was within the range of sentences allowed by the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. The applicable guidelines were clearly unreasonable because the Commonwealth failed to prove that [Reid] participated in the shooting at all, or if he did, what role he played in the crime.

Appellant's Brief, at 13.

The Commonwealth argues Reid failed to present a substantial question. ***See*** Appellee's Brief, at 16-17. We agree. Reid's claim is again predicated on his assertion that the Commonwealth failed to establish his identity. We already found this claim lacked merit and further note that this claim goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, not the sentence imposed. To the extent that Reid challenges the consecutive nature of his sentence, we find the claim fails to present a substantial question and is meritless.

> A court's exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a substantial question. Rather, the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will present a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.

***Commonwealth v. Caldwell***, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Because the imposition of consecutive sentences only raises a substantial question where it is unduly harsh when considering the nature of the offense, we must first look at the aggregate sentence. The aggregate sentence here is a life sentence. "Due to the nature of a life sentence, two consecutive life sentences are, in reality, no longer than two concurrent life sentences or, for that matter, one life sentence. All would require appellant to spend his life in prison." ***Commonwealth v. Szczesniewski***, 591 A.2d 1055, 1057 (Pa. Super. 1991).

The nature of the crimes here are three counts of first-degree murder, where Reid and four coconspirators stormed a basketball court and opened fire, leaving behind 75 fired cartridge casings. We cannot find an aggregate sentence of life is unduly harsh under the circumstances of this case.[4] We therefore find that Reid has not presented a substantial question for our review.

Even if we were to address Reid's discretionary aspects of sentencing claim, it would be meritless. Our standard of review is well-established:

> [T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to affirm the sentencing court's determination is an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court [has] offered:

---

[4] We also note that the court is required to impose a life sentence for a conviction of first-degree murder where the death penalty is not sought by the Commonwealth. ***See*** 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.

> An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.
>
> The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing court sentences flesh-and-blood defendants, and the nuances of sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should not be lightly disturbed. Even with the advent of the sentencing guidelines, the power of sentencing is a function to be performed by the sentencing court.

***Jennings***, 351 A.3d at 1241-42 (brackets and citation omitted).

The trial court explained its reason for the consecutive sentences as follows:

> [T]he imposition of consecutive sentences was completely reasonable. [Reid], after much planning with numerous coconspirators, ran onto a basketball court at a neighborhood playground with four other killers, opening fire and slaughtering three defenseless men, grievously wounding a fourth, and endangering the lives of at least four little children who ran from the bullets. [Reid] not only extinguished the lives of three men who were merely playing basketball at a city playground, but also created terror in the community. It is difficult to find criminal behavior more deserving of consecutive sentences.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 12/10/25, at 7.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Reid and his coconspirators engaged in a massacre that took the lives of three people, injured another, and risked the life of at least four children who had to run from the basketball

court. The court's imposition of consecutive sentences of life for each victim killed was not an abuse of discretion.

As Reid's final issue is waived and meritless, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2026