NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: A.M.J., A MINOR	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: N.H., MOTHER	:	
	:	No. 1030 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2025-00088

IN RE: E.J., A MINOR	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: N.H., MOTHER	:	
	:	No. 1031 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2025-00089

IN RE: L.R.J., A MINOR	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: N.H., MOTHER	:	
	:	No. 1032 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2025-00090

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: **FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026**

N.H. (Mother) appeals from the orders granting the petitions filed by the Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (the Agency), and terminating her parental rights to her biological daughters, A.J. and L.J. (born in August 2021 and February 2024, respectively), and her biological son E.J. (born in June 2022) (collectively, Children).[1, 2] After careful review, we affirm.

In its opinion, the orphans' court described the Agency's initial involvement with the family, and the ensuing procedural history:

> The family had an open and ongoing case for services with the [Agency] since August 29, 2023. Additionally, the Agency had prior involvement with the family dating back to 2021. A referral was made on October 22, 2024, regarding substance abuse by [Mother and Father (Parents)]. [***See*** N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 6 (Service, Access, and Management (SAM) caseworker Kristie Valera (Ms. Valera) testifying that the referral alleged Mother was abusing methamphetamine, and Father was housing illicit drug users in the basement of the family residence).] In response to the referral, caseworkers were able to enter the home on October 23, 2024. Mother was present and tested positive for methamphetamine. Father was at work. The Agency also had concerns about the conditions of the home. An Emergency Protective Order was granted on the same day[,] and a Shelter Care hearing was held on October 24, 2024. [C]hildren were adjudicated dependent on November 12, 2024[, and Children were placed with Father's mother (paternal grandmother)]. ….
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> ….

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[1] The orphans' court also terminated the parental rights of Children's biological father, J.J. (Father). Father's consolidated appeals are listed before this panel at 971-973 MDA 2026.

[2] On August 19, 2026, we *sua sponte* consolidated Mother's appeals.

> Three separate Family Service Plans (hereinafter "FSP") were created in this case[, dated November 19, 2024; and May 12 and November 12, 2025]. All three plans had nearly identical goals and objectives for Mother and Father to complete. … [T]he goals and objectives for Mother were to (1) maintain a sober lifestyle, which include[d] the requirement that Mother submit to drugs screens twice [] a week and attend drug and alcohol counseling; (2) maintain safe and stable housing[,] which include[d] a requirement to maintain employment; (3) maintain safe and healthy relationships with [C]hildren, which include[d] a requirement to complete [the] Safe Care[Program[3]]; (4) understand how her actions affect the family; (5) address … mental health[concerns]; and (6) maintain a clean and safe home.
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> The goals and objectives for Father include[d] all six of the above goals[,] but also include[d] an additional goal requiring successful completion of the Domestic Violence Intervention Program.
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> … The initial [permanency review hearing (PR)] was held on January 16, 2025. No ratings were offered[,] as the first FSP was adopted at that hearing. The next PR was scheduled for July 10, 2025[,] but was continued at Mother's request because she was in [a drug] rehab[ilitation program]. The [PR] was ultimately held on August 26, 2025. At that hearing, both Mother and Father received a compliance rating of moderate and a progress rating of none. The next PR took place on March 11, 2026. Mother received a compliance and progress rating of none and none. Father received a compliance and progress rating of minimal and minimal.

Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 1-3 (record citations omitted; footnote moved to body).

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[3] The orphans' court explained that the "Safe Care [Program] is an evidence[-]based, parent-training curriculum[,] specifically designed to assist parents with [] baseline parenting skills and to enhance the well[-]being of children [from newborn] to five[years old]." Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 11 n.5.

On November 25, 2025, the Agency filed separate, substantially identical termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions, each requesting termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The matter proceeded to a hearing, which occurred on April 27-28 and May 5, 2026. Mother appeared and was represented by counsel. Children, who did not appear, were collectively represented by their guardian *ad litem*, George Mehalchick, Esquire (GAL).[4] The Agency presented the testimony of several witnesses, and Mother testified on her own behalf.

Gene Hockenbury (Mr. Hockenbury), an employee of drug-testing agency Northern Tier Research, testified as an expert toxicology witness. N.T., 4/27/26, at 16-17. Mr. Hockenbury testified that Mother submitted to six drug tests on the following dates: November 1, 2024; March 11 and April

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[4] While the certified record does not contain an order defining the scope of the GAL's appointment (or any appointment order), our review of the notes of testimony discloses that the GAL represented both the best and legal interests of Children. ***See In re P.G.F.***, 247 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. 2021) ("[T]he Adoption Act requires that all children receive counsel in contested involuntary parental termination proceedings." (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a))). At the TPR hearing, the orphans' court inquired of Parents' counsel and Children's GAL whether they believed a conflict of interest exists between Children's best and legal interests. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 49; ***see also In re Adoption of K.M.G.***, 240 A.3d 1218, 1224 (Pa. 2020) ("Given the essential nature of the GAL/[legal c]ounsel's ability to represent a child without conflict and this Court's mandate that the orphans' court make that determination prior to appointment, we conclude that appellate courts should verify that the orphans' court indicated that the attorney could represent the child's best interests and legal interests without conflict."). Children's GAL represented that no conflict exists. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 49-50. The orphans' court thereafter accepted the GAL's representation. ***See id.*** at 50 (the orphans' court entertaining the parties' arguments).

17 and 22, 2025; and February 24, 2026 (two tests administered). ***Id.*** at 21, 24-25, 48. According to Mr. Hockenbury, Mother tested positive on each of those dates for various substances, including methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, alcohol, and THC. ***Id.***

Kristy Vassell (Ms. Vassell) testified concerning her involvement with the family in her capacity as the supervised visitation lead at Outreach Center for Community Resources Family Reunification Program (Outreach). N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 12. Ms. Vassell testified that Parents had supervised visits with Children at the Outreach facility every other week, between November 2024 and November 2025, for a total of 28 visits. ***Id.*** at 18, 32; ***see also id.*** at 22 (Ms. Vassell testifying that "a police officer was present each time [M]other and [F]ather had visits with [C]hildren," due to Father's aggressive behavior toward Outreach staff and Mother), 34-35 (Ms. Vassell confirming that Outreach would not have deemed the presence of law enforcement necessary if Father was not at a supervised visit).

Ms. Vassell testified that supervised visits "started as one hour, and then [Mother] was granted the hour before, but that only took place for two visits, and then [Parents] joined together for the remainder [of] the two hours." ***Id.*** at 32. According to Ms. Vassell, Parents' last supervised visit with Children was in November 2025. ***Id.*** at 33. Ms. Vassell stated that "after several attempts of scheduling [additional visits between Parents and Children,

Parents advised Outreach] that they didn't want the visitation because they were seeing" Children independent of Outreach's supervised visitation. ***Id.***

Ms. Vassell testified that during visits with Children, Mother "did [] display some times of falling asleep, being very tired, picking at her skin during the visit," but that "[f]or the most part," Mother's interaction with Children during visits was appropriate. ***Id.*** at 38; ***see also id.*** at 40 (Ms. Vassell agreeing that Mother's visits with Children were largely appropriate, but "[t]here were a few [instances] where we had some issues [regarding Mother's] falling asleep, dropping items."). According to Ms. Vassell, Children "were always happy to see [Mother. Mother] interacted with [Children], for the most part, appropriately." ***Id.*** at 61; ***see also id.*** (Ms. Vassell agreeing that Children and Mother appeared to share a bond).

Outreach supervised visitation specialist Olivia Fryer (Ms. Fryer) testified that Parents' "nodding off and falling asleep" was a "recurring issue" during their supervised visits with Children. ***Id.*** at 65. Ms. Fryer opined that Parents'

> [c]onsistent dozing off …, laying on the floor and falling asleep[during visits], [] is consistent with my concerns [regarding Parents'] sobriety during visitations. I know [Parents' youngest child, L.J.,] at one point had crawled on [Father,] trying to pat him awake, and [Father] said that he was sleeping. [S]o those were my main concerns with the lack of engagement in the visits[,] due to the consistent nodding off.

Id. at 68; ***see also id.*** at 74 (Ms. Fryer describing an occasion where L.J. "was laying on [Mother], trying to wake [Mother] up, and then [Mother] said

'[L.J.], wake mommy up.' So it was recurring and I never took it as a form of play.").

Kathryn Schnurr (Ms. Schnurr) testified that during her time working with Parents, she facilitated the Safe Care Program. ***Id.*** at 81. Ms. Schnurr explained that both Mother and Father successfully completed the Safe Care Program. ***Id.*** at 83. The orphans' court summarized Ms. Schnurr's pertinent testimony as follows:

> Ms. Schnurr [] talk[ed] to Parents about available [parenting, mental health, and drug and alcohol] resources, as well as made referrals[for various programs]. [N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26,] at 91. Ms. Schnurr reviewed the FSP with [] Parents. ***Id.*** at 93. [Ms. Schnurr] testified she would remind [Parents] to [submit to drug] screen[s,] because [they] were required under the FSP. ***Id.*** Ms. Schnurr referred Mother to Healthy Moms at the Wright Center. ***Id.*** at 95. [Ms. Schnurr] also referred [Parents] to Parents as Teachers, a parenting program at Outreach. ***Id.*** at 96. [] Parents did not follow through. ***Id.***

Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 11 (capitalization modified).

Ms. Valera testified that she has acted as the family's primary Agency caseworker, through SAM, since Children were adjudicated dependent in November 2024. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 3. Concerning Mother's FSP goals, Ms. Valera testified consistently with the orphans' court's above factual recitation. ***See id.*** at 24-25. Ms. Valera testified that, following their dependency adjudications, Children were placed into kinship care with Father's mother (paternal grandmother). ***Id.*** at 5; ***see also id.*** (Ms. Valera stating

A.J. and E.J. were placed with paternal grandmother on July 22, 2025, and that L.J. was placed with paternal grandmother on November 13, 2025).[5]

The orphans' court summarized Ms. Valera's testimony concerning substance abuse service referrals made for Mother, and Mother's engagement with those services:

> Mother was referred to Just Care on October 24, 2024, December 13, 2024, and January 25, 2025. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 7.[6] On April 17, 2025, [] Just Care [staff drug-]screened Mother. N.T. (Vol. I), 5/5/26, at 79. Based upon [Mother's positive drug test results for methamphetamine, Just Care staff] declined to admit Mother into the program because, in their opinion, [Mother] needed a higher level of care. ***Id.*** … [Just Care staff] recommend[ed that] Mother go to inpatient [substance abuse] treatment. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 8. Ms. Valera testified [that] Just Care would have addressed Mother's mental health and drug and alcohol needs[,] as well as provide[d] parenting support. ***Id.*** at 31.
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> Mother was admitted to participate at Lakeside on October 27, 2025, for outpatient drug and alcohol treatment. ***Id.*** at 8. [Following a drug screen at Lakeside, Mother] tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, alcohol, and naloxone …. ***Id.*** at 9. Ms. Valera testified Mother's attendance at Lakeside in November and December 2025 was spotty. ***Id.*** Mother had too many no calls/no shows[and, as a result,] Lakeside discharged Mother via a letter dated December 12, 2025. ***Id.*** Mother then rescinded her release [of confidential information] at Lakeside[, which prevented the Agency from obtaining additional information]. ***Id.***

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[5] At the time of the TPR hearing, Children and paternal grandmother were residing in Middletown, New York. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 5. It is unclear from the record whether paternal grandmother is a pre-adoptive resource for Children.

[6] The orphans' court explained that Just Care is a program facilitated by Friendship House that "brings support to parents and families experiencing a range of challenges[,]" including substance abuse and mental health issues. Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 12 n.6.

> Mother re-engaged with Lakeside on December 29, 2025. ***Id.*** However, [Mother] was discharged unsuccessfully on January 18, 2026[, as Mother failed to appear at her intake appointment]. ***Id.***
>
> [Ms.] Valera testified she referred both [Parents] to Drug and Alcohol Treatment Services (hereinafter "DATS"). ***Id.*** at 8. Ms. Valera testified Mother had attended on June 17, 2025. ***Id.*** at 10. Mother then no call[ed]/no showed on October 9, 2025[,] and October 19, 2025. ***Id.*** Mother re-enrolled in DATS on January 26, 2026. ***Id.*** On that date, [Mother] had her intake appointment. … [Mother] kept some appointments and missed some appointments. ***Id.*** Mother rescinded her DATS release on March 31, 2026. ***Id.*** Mother was asked by DATS to [submit to a drug] screen on that date[,] and she refused. ***Id.***

Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 12-13 (record citations and capitalization modified; headings and original footnote omitted; footnote added); ***see also*** N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 11 (Ms. Valera testifying that Mother had 150 "presumed positive" drug screens based upon her failure to appear for testing).

Concerning housing, Ms. Valera testified that the family home was condemned sometime after September 25, 2025. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 12-13; ***see also id.*** at 14 (Ms. Valera stating that Scranton Police observed that the family residence "was full of trash, roaches, garbage, maggots, old food," and housed dogs that "were starved and full of bedbugs"). Ms. Valera testified that the Agency referred Mother to housing case management, but Mother failed to supply the required pay stubs. ***Id.*** at 12.

Ms. Valera testified that Mother obtained a new residence (Wayne Avenue residence) in October 2025. ***Id.*** at 14. According to Ms. Valera,

> Mother was getting her rent paid every month up until February [2026] from the Women's Resource Center[(WRC)]. [WRC] did have to stop payments due to [M]other's noncompliance [with the lease terms,] and the fact that [WRC] was made aware that [Father] was living in [Mother's residence], which is not allowed due to … [Mother] receiving the funding because of the ongoing domestic violence.

Id. at 21.

Regarding Mother's mental health FSP goal, Ms. Valera testified that the Agency referred Mother to Omni Health Services (Omni), a mental health services provider. ***Id.*** at 30. Ms. Valera testified that Omni discharged Mother due to her failure to attend sessions. ***Id.*** Ms. Valera explained that Mother re-engaged with Omni, but was again discharged, with her last session occurring in August 2025. ***Id.***

Ms. Valera testified that Children share a bond with Parents, but opined that Children could not be safely returned to Parents "due to the ongoing concerns throughout the dependency … case." ***Id.*** at 57; ***see also id.*** at 59-60 (Ms. Valera opining that termination of Parents' parental rights would not harm Children). Ms. Valera highlighted that Children each have special needs to which paternal grandmother attends:

> [E.J.] has cerebral palsy with hypoxia. [E.J.] is receiving services in Middletown, New York[, where Children reside with paternal grandmother]. [Paternal grandmother] has been getting [E.J.] all the appropriate services that are needed. [E.J.] does outpatient therapy, [physical therapy], and speech[therapy]. [A.J.] was diagnosed with autism. [A.J.] gets occupational therapy and speech [therapy] in the day care. And [L.J.] is [going to] have a[n] early intervention appointment to see if she is up to speed on her milestones.

Id. at 57 (paragraph breaks omitted); ***see also id.*** at 58 (Ms. Valera testifying that paternal grandmother "is a director of a school, so she is up to speed on all the services and needs of [C]hildren"). According to Ms. Valera, she observed paternal grandmother interact with Children, and opined that Children are "extremely bonded to" paternal grandmother. ***Id.*** at 59.

Finally, Mother testified on her own behalf. Mother explained that she resides, alone, at the Wayne Avenue residence. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 5. Mother denied that Father resides with her at the Wayne Avenue residence, and testified that she and Father have been separated, at the latest, since August 2025. ***Id.*** at 5-6.

Mother testified that the Agency "never invited [her] to participate" in formulating an FSP, but that she was aware of her obligation to submit to drug screens twice a week. ***Id.*** at 8. According to Mother, she did not attend most of her required drug screens because she did not have transportation, and the Agency only provided her with one bus pass. ***Id.*** at 9-10. ***But see id.*** at 27 (regarding her failure to attend drug screens, Mother testifying, "I understand where I went wrong. I should have found a way."). Mother additionally challenged the accuracy of several of the drug screens to which she did submit. ***Id.*** at 29-30.

Mother testified that, despite the Agency's purported lack of support in facilitating visits between Mother and Children, she and Children share a strong bond. ***Id.*** at 16. Mother testified that she "talk[s] to [Children] every

night," and visits Children at paternal grandmother's residence every weekend. ***Id.***

Mother testified that she is enrolled in mental health treatment through Friendship House, where she is engaged in counseling. ***Id.*** at 17. Mother admitted that she did not sign a release for the Agency to obtain documentation from Friendship House, and asserted her belief that "anything that [Ms. Valera] was trying to get would [be used to] try to hurt me …" ***Id.*** at 18; ***see also id.*** at 19 (Mother testifying, "I want to be able to go to treatment and not have to worry about it backfiring on me or [] somebody being [] biased towards me or pre-judged or whatever.").

Mother acknowledged that she did not complete her FSP goals, but felt "like [she] made significant progress really quickly." ***Id.*** Mother stated, "I'm not blaming the [A]gency at all. I take responsibility for what I've done and what I didn't do. I just feel like there could have been a little bit more support." ***Id.*** at 20. ***But see id.*** at 20-21 (Mother testifying, "I feel like there was [] a lot of manufactured failures, [and] obstacles put in the way.").[7]

[7] Following Mother's testimony, Children's GAL advised the orphans' court that he "feel[s] the best place for [C]hildren is to be with paternal grandmother. And in that regard, I would support the [A]gency's petitions." N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 50.

At the conclusion of the TPR hearing, the orphans' court terminated Mother's parental rights to Children.[8] Mother timely filed notices of appeal and contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statements. On June 26, 2026, the orphans' court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Mother raises the following issues:

> A. Whether the [orphans' c]ourt erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of Mother's parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act?
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> B. Whether the [orphans' c]ourt erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in failing to consider and/or improperly weighing evidence regarding Mother's ongoing efforts to remedy the conditions that led to [] Children's placement?
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> C. Even if this Court determines the Agency presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of Mother's parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act, whether the [orphans' c]ourt nevertheless erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining termination of Mother's parental rights is in the best interest of … Children?
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> D. Whether the [orphans' c]ourt erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in failing to give adequate weight to the bond between Children and Mother, and the potential harm termination may cause?

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[8] On May 6, 2026, the orphans' court issued orders (docketed May 13, 2026) formally terminating Mother's parental rights. While the orders do not reference any subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, it is apparent from the orphans' court's on-the-record remarks, at the conclusion of the TPR hearing, and its subsequent Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, that the orphans' court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). ***See*** N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 55-61; Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 20-25.

> E. Whether the [orphans' c]ourt erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion in failing to consider and/or improperly admitting hearsay evidence in making its findings?

Mother's Brief at 12-13 (issues reordered).[9]

We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an abuse of discretion. ***In re M.L.R.***, 351 A.3d 731, 736 (Pa. 2026).

> [A]ppellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the orphans' court's findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the orphans' court's factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the orphans' court's ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
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> An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the

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[9] Despite acknowledging that the orphans' court terminated her parental rights pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), ***see*** Mother's Brief at 21, Mother offers no argument concerning subsection 2511(a)(1) in her brief, nor does she cite subsection 2511(a)(1) in her statement of questions involved. We could deem Mother's challenge under Section 2511(a) waived on this basis. ***See In re K.T.E.L.***, 983 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2009) (deeming waived a parent's challenges to subsections of Section 2511(a) not included in her statement of questions involved); ***In re L.J.W.***, 264 A.3d 345 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 9-10) (wherein the orphans' court determined termination was warranted pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), this Court concluding that the parent's "failure to contest subsection (a)(8) concedes that subsection and [] compels us to conclude that the [orphans'] court properly terminated her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)." (citing ***In re B.L.W.***, 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004), wherein we reiterated that "we need only agree with [the orphans' court's] decision as to any one subsection [of Section 2511(a)] in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.")); ***see also*** Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential memorandum decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value). Nevertheless, as explained herein, we address Mother's Section 2511(a) challenge pursuant to subsection (a)(8).

> facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
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> In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans' court must balance the parent's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with the child's essential needs for a parent's care, protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of N.A.S., 338 A.3d 191, 196–97 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted); ***see also Interest of S.K.L.R.***, 256 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021) (instructing that in reviewing an order terminating parental rights, "the appellate court should not search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the [orphans'] court."). "[Our Supreme] Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases involving close calls, deference to the [orphans'] court's determination is particularly crucial." ***In re Adoption of G.W.***, 342 A.3d 68, 84 (Pa. Super. 2025) (*en banc*) (citation omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis: "Courts must begin by first considering whether a parent's conduct warrants termination under [S]ection 2511(a)[,] prior to shifting its focus to whether termination best serves the

child's needs and welfare." ***Interest of M.K.L.***, 354 A.3d 42, 60 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citation omitted). If the court finds grounds exist to warrant termination under Section 2511(a), it must then assess the evidence relative to the child's needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), "giv[ing] primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." ***In re T.S.M.***, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

Notably, as explained above, this Court need only agree with the orphans' court as to "any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights." ***In re M.E.***, 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

Instantly, because the orphans' court addressed only Section 2511(a)(8) in its opinion,[10] we confine our analysis to that subsection, which provides as follows:

> **(a) General rule.--**The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
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> * * *

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[10] In its opinion, the orphans' court stated its intention to "focus its analysis on" Section 2511(a)(8), because a petitioner "need only prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the elements of any one of the [] subsections it has chosen to proceed under." Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 23. Although the orphans' court accurately described a petitioner's burden, **an orphans' court should address each subsection of Section 2511(a) upon which the court bases its termination decision**. Here, had we disagreed with the orphans' court's Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, our ability to review the sufficiency of the evidence as to the remaining subsections would have been materially impeded by the absence of the court's alternative reasoning.

> (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that

> (1) the child has been removed from the parent's care for at least 12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8) does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent's willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the child. Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue conditions have been remedied such that reunification of parent and child is **imminent** at the time of the hearing.

In re E.J.C., 335 A.3d 1222, 1230-31 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

In considering Section 2511(a)(8), we have observed that "a parent's progress toward remedying the conditions [necessitating her child's placement] is insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant a finding in favor of the parent under the second prong of [Section 2511](a)(8)." ***In re Adoption of G.W.***, 342 A.3d at 87 (citing ***In re R.J.S.***, 901 A.2d 502, 512 (Pa. Super. 2006), wherein we emphasized that termination under Section 2511(a)(8) "does *not* require an evaluation of [the parent's] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children." (emphasis in original; citation omitted)). Moreover, Section 2511(a)(8) does not "require

an evaluation of the availability or efficacy of [a county agency's] services." ***Id.*** at 88 (citation omitted).

Here, in her first issue, Mother "address[es] the evidence of record as it applies to all subsections of [2511(a)] relied upon by the Agency." Mother's Brief at 21. Mother does not dispute that Children were removed from her care more than twelve months prior to the Agency's filing of its TPR petitions. Instead, Mother focuses her argument on the second element of Section 2511(a)(8), *i.e.*, that the conditions necessitating Children's removal from her care continued to exist at the time of the TPR hearing.

In support of her argument, Mother points to evidence that she attended multiple drug and alcohol treatment programs, including "Lakeside, DATS …, and later, Just Care[.]" ***Id.*** at 22. Mother further cites Ms. Schnurr's testimony that Mother "'attended Endless Mountain … for a couple of days,' which is a rehab facility." ***Id.*** at 24 (quoting N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 91-92). According to Mother, "[t]his is evidence that Mother did attempt, on multiple occasions, to seek help and assistance for her drug and alcohol issues and mental health [issues] in compliance with her FSP." ***Id.*** at 23.

Mother emphasizes that she completed the Safe Care Program; secured stable housing, for which she was current on rent and utility payments; and "maintained two separate jobs during [Children's] dependency, allowing [Mother] to afford stable and safe housing while meeting all the needs of [] Children." ***Id.*** at 23, 25, 27. Mother opines that the orphans' court "decided

to terminate [her] parental rights while ignoring Mother's positive course of action, good faith attempts [at] compliance with her FSP[s,] and remarkable progress …." ***Id.*** at 27-28.

Mother additionally faults the Agency for failing to (1) inspect her residence to assess its suitability for Children's return; (2) "go to her place of employment, to pick[ ]up her paystubs as proof of her income"; and (3) "give Mother appropriate transportation or adequate resources to be successful during [Children's] dependency." ***Id.*** at 25, 27.

In response, the Agency argues that under Section 2511(a)(8), the orphans' court

> properly focused on the length of [Children's] placement[,] Mother's failure to remedy conditions, and the needs and welfare of [] Children. Mother's attempts to blame the Agency for her struggles and lack of progress[] demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to accept any responsibility[,] and highlight the lack of [Mother's] affirmative steps to reunite with [C]hildren. Subsection [2511(a)](8) does not measure the efforts, but the progress; progress that simply was not achieved ….

Agency Brief at 19.

The Agency further argues that Mother's account of her efforts to address her substance abuse issues

> conveniently leaves out the fact that [Mother] was unsuccessfully discharged from Lakeside; left [] an inpatient rehabilitation [facility, *i.e.*, Endless Mountain,] after only six days, [] against medical advice; was unsuccessfully discharged from DATS; and was discharged from [the] Just Care program on multiple occasions.

Id. at 17-18 (punctuation modified).

Instantly, the orphans' court set forth its rationale for terminating Mother's parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8) as follows:

> [C]hildren have been in placement since October 23, 2024. At the time of the [TPR] hearing …, [C]hildren had been in foster care for 18 months.[11] … Th[e orphans'] court is satisfied the Agency has established by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to [C]hildren's placement continue to exist today. ….
>
> ….
>
> [Pursuant to the FSPs, P]arents were required to address their drug and alcohol issues, their mental health issues, and maintain safe and stable housing. … Throughout the history of the case, neither parent received a compliance rating higher than moderate. In addition, neither parent received a progress rating higher than none or minimal. At the last PR held on March 11, 2026, Mother received a compliance and progress rating of none and none. … The testimony [at the TPR hearing] established that at the time of the hearing …, [P]arents were still only allowed to have supervised visits with [C]hildren. Currently, [] paternal grandmother supervises visits between [P]arents and [C]hildren at her home in Middletown, New York. [P]arents were offered additional visits at Outreach[,] but they declined.
>
> The testimony established that neither [Mother nor Father] has adequately addressed their drug and alcohol issues. Mother only [drug-]screened six times in 18 months[, missing 150 required drug screens]. … [O]n February 24, 2026, [Mother] tested positive for methamphetamine. [At t]he most recent [drug] screen[,] on March 11, 2026[, Mother] tested positive for cocaine, THC, and alcohol. Mother is not enrolled in any drug and alcohol treatment. In August of 2025, [Mother] was admitted to inpatient [drug and alcohol] treatment at Endless Mountain[,] but signed herself out after six days[,] against medical advice.
>
> ….

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[11] We note that the 12-month period described in the first element of Section 2511(a)(8) must be measured from the date the child is removed from the parent's care to the date the termination petition is filed. ***In re S.D.T.***, ***Jr.***, 934 A.2d 703, 706-07 (Pa. Super. 2007).

> Neither [Mother nor Father] adequately addressed their mental health [issues,] despite multiple referrals. Mother testified that she is currently addressing her mental health at Friendship House[;] however[,] she declined to sign a release[of confidential information]. In addition, [Mother] engaged with Friendship House **after** the [TPR petitions were] filed.
>
> Neither [Mother nor Father] has established that they have safe and stable housing. … Mother lost her funding from the WRC for noncompliance. [Mother] must now make the rent payments on her own. [Mother] testified she [paid] two months' rent[,] but no documentation was offered. Neither [Mother nor Father] has submitted paystubs []or proof of employment.

Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 20-23 (some paragraph breaks omitted; emphasis and footnote added).

The orphans' court additionally emphasized that a court's inquiry, in considering the sufficiency of termination under Section 2511(a)(8), "is focused upon whether the at-issue conditions [necessitating placement] have been remedied such that reunification of parent and child is **imminent** at the time of the [TPR] hearing." ***Id.*** at 23 (quoting ***In re E.J.C.***, 335 A.3d at 1231 (emphasis in original)); ***see also*** N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 61 (the orphans' court finding that, "because of all the issues in the case, [P]arents are nowhere near making any progress that would allow or justify" Children's return to Parents' care).

The orphans' court's factual findings are supported by the record, and its conclusion is free of legal error. ***Interest of N.A.S.***, 338 A.3d at 196-97; ***see also In re Adoption of S.P.***, 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (in termination of parental rights cases, "we must defer to the trial judges so long as the

factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion." (citation omitted)).

Regarding the first element of Section 2511(a)(8), the record confirms that Children were removed from Mother's care on October 23, 2024, and the Agency filed its TPR petitions on November 25, 2025, approximately 13 months later. ***See*** 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); ***In re S.D.T.***, ***Jr.***, 934 A.2d at 706-07. As the orphans' court observed, at the time of the TPR hearing, Children had been separated from Mother for approximately 18 months. Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 20.

Turning to the second element, the record amply supports the orphans' court's conclusion that the conditions that led to Children's removal from Mother's care continue to exist. The primary conditions leading to Children's removal were Mother's drug use and unstable housing, both of which persisted at the time of the TPR hearing. As explained at length above, Mother (1) was repeatedly discharged from various drug and alcohol programs due to her noncompliance; (2) did not consistently attend any drug and alcohol treatment program; and (3) was not enrolled in any drug and alcohol treatment program at the time of the TPR hearing. ***See*** N.T. (Vol. I), 5/5/26, at 79; N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 8-10; Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 22; ***see also*** N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 68, 74 (Ms. Fryer testifying to Mother's apparent drug intoxication during supervised visits with Children). Throughout Children's

dependency, Mother submitted to just six drug screens, all of which revealed illicit substances in Mother's system, and Mother failed to appear for 150 drug screens. ***See*** N.T., 4/27/26, at 21, 24-25, 48; N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 11.

Concerning housing, the family home was condemned after police observed that it was "full of trash, roaches, garbage, maggots, [and] old food." N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 14. Although Mother subsequently secured the Wayne Avenue residence, her rental assistance was discontinued based on her noncompliance with lease terms and reports that Father was living at the residence. ***Id.*** at 21. As the orphans' court observed, Mother offered no documentary evidence at the hearing confirming that she was current on her rent, ***see*** Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 22, and the court appropriately exercised its discretion in judging the weight and credibility of Mother's testimony. ***See Interest of N.A.S.***, 338 A.3d at 196.

Mother's argument that the testimony at the TPR hearing evidenced her efforts to remedy the conditions necessitating Children's placement is unavailing in a Section 2511(a)(8) analysis. ***See In re Adoption of G.W.***, 342 A.3d at 87 ("[A] parent's progress toward remedying the conditions [necessitating her child's placement] is insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant a finding in favor of the parent under the second prong of Section 2511(a)(8)."). Mother's argument that the Agency failed to ensure her success in meeting her FSP goals is likewise unpersuasive, as Section

2511(a)(8) does not "require an evaluation of the availability or efficacy of [a county agency's] services." ***Id.*** at 88.

Finally, concerning Section 2511(a)(8)'s third element, which we discuss at length below,[12] we discern no abuse of the orphans' court's discretion in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights best serves the "needs and welfare" of Children.

As the record supports the orphans' court's determination that the evidence presented at the TPR hearing proved, by clear and convincing

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[12] Regarding the third, *i.e.*, "needs and welfare," element of Section 2511(a)(8), we have observed that "our current precedent interprets the needs and welfare analyses required under subsections (a)(8) and (b) to utilize the same legal standards and to be based upon the same evidence." ***In re Adoption of G.W.***, 342 A.3d at 87 n.20. The distinction, if any, between the needs and welfare analyses intended under Section 2511(a)(5), (8) and (b) is presently being considered by an *en banc* panel of this Court. ***See In re: T.J.A.K.-L., a Minor, et al.***, Nos. 780, 782-787, and 789 EDA 2026. As Mother does not challenge the needs and welfare element of Section 2511(a)(8) as analytically distinct from her Section 2511(b) argument, but instead confines her argument to whether termination serves Children's needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), we address both inquiries in our Section 2511(b) analysis below. We acknowledge that ***T.J.A.K.-L.*** may alter the applicable analytical framework. ***See In re C.R.K.***, 161 WDA 2026, 2026 WL 2805827 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 18, 2026) (unpublished memorandum at 14 n.9) (acknowledging ***T.J.A.K.-L.*** and consolidating this Court's analysis of the needs and welfare element of Section 2511(a)(5) with its Section 2511(b) inquiry, where the parent confined her argument to Section 2511(b)). Under any standard, however, for the reasons set forth below, we agree with the orphans' court that termination of Mother's parental rights best serves Children's needs and welfare.

evidence, the elements of Section 2511(a)(8), Mother's first issue merits no relief.[13]

We consider Mother's third and fourth issues together, as they each challenge the orphans' court's determination under Section 2511(b).

Mother argues that the testimony presented at the TPR hearing established that Mother and Children share "a very strong bond." Mother's Brief at 30; ***see also id.*** at 33 (Mother citing Ms. Vassell's agreement that Children appear "very bonded with Mother"). According to Mother, "testimony from the caseworkers and visitation supervisors directly involved with [] Children presented no evidence that there has been any abuse or neglect[] by Mother or Father to [] Children at any time during [their] dependency." ***Id.*** at 31. Mother further contends that she demonstrated the capacity to care for Children by maintaining stable housing and employment, enrolling Children in daycare, and attending counseling at Friendship House. ***Id.*** at 29-30. Finally, Mother argues that, "given [Children's] young ages, severing the

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[13] In her second issue, Mother argues the orphans' court failed to adequately consider her efforts to remedy the conditions that led to Children's placement. Mother's Brief at 35. Because Mother's argument implicates Section 2511(a)(2) and (5), we do not address it. ***See In re M.E.***, 283 A.3d at 830 (providing that this Court need only agree with the orphans' court as to "any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights." (citation omitted)); ***see also In re R.J.S.***, 901 A.2d at 512 (stating that termination under Section 2511(a)(8) "does *not* require an evaluation of [the parent's] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children." (emphasis in original; citation omitted)).

bonds between paternal grandmother and [C]hildren would not be as detrimental as" severing Children's "irreplaceable, strong, and well[-]established bonds" with Mother. ***Id.*** at 34.

Preliminarily, we observe that Mother's brief cites no legal authority in support of her third and fourth issues, in violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. ***See*** Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that "argument shall be … followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent."); ***see also In re Adoption of J.N.M.***, 177 A.3d 937, 942 (Pa. Super. 2018) (concluding a parent waived her challenge under Section 2511(a), where she failed to cite any relevant legal authority); ***In re M.Z.T.M.W.***, 163 A.3d 462, 463 (Pa. Super. 2017) (deeming a parent's Section 2511(b) issue waived, observing that "this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant's brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority." (citation omitted)). We nevertheless address the merits of Mother's third and fourth issues, and conclude they merit no relief.

When the orphans' court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must separately consider a child's needs and welfare:

> **(b) Other considerations.--**The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

> efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

"Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child's perspective, placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent." ***Interest of K.T.***, 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (citation omitted). Courts must also "discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond." ***Id.*** (citation omitted). However, "the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis." ***Id.*** at 1113.

> [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

Interest of D.R.-W, 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

"When examining the effect upon a child of severing a bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy a necessary and beneficial relationship, thereby causing a child to suffer extreme emotional consequences." ***In re Adoption of J.N.M.***, 177 A.3d 937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

> [B]y evaluating the impact of severance to determine if it will impose more than an adverse or detrimental impact, courts

> correctly refine their focus on the child's development and mental and emotional health rather than considering only the child's "feelings" or "affection" for the parent, which even badly abused and neglected children will retain.

Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110-11 (citations omitted).

Finally,

> [w]hen conducting a full subsection (b) analysis focused upon the child, **the** [**orphans'**] **court has discretion to place appropriate weight on each factor present in the record**. However, when weighing the difficult factors discussed above, courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.

Interest of M.K.L., 354 A.3d at 71 (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

Here, the orphans' court aptly summarized the testimony presented at the TPR hearing concerning the bond Children share with Parents and with paternal grandmother:

> A number of witnesses testified about the bond [P]arents share with [C]hildren. [Ms.] Vassell testified both [Mother and Father] were loving and affectionate with [C]hildren. N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 51. [C]hildren at times did not want to separate from Mother and Father. ***Id.*** at 51-52. [Ms. Vassell] testified [C]hildren were always happy to see Father and Mother[,] and were affectionate with them. ***Id.*** at 53. … Ms. Vassell testified [C]hildren appeared well bonded with [P]arents. ***Id.*** at 53-54, 61.
>
> [Ms.] Frye[r] also testified about the bond between [P]arents and [C]hildren. [Ms. Fryer] testified Mother was appropriate and affectionate with [C]hildren. ***Id.*** at 70-71. … [Ms. Fryer] testified there is a bond. ***Id.*** at 76.
>
> [Ms.] Schnurr also testified about the bond between [P]arents and [C]hildren. [Ms. Schnurr] testified Mother shared a bond with [C]hildren. ***Id.*** at 102.

> Finally, Ms. Valera testified about the bond between [C]hildren and paternal grand[mother]. Ms. Valera testified paternal grandmother is addressing the needs of [C]hildren. N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 58. Ms. Valera was able to observe [paternal] grandmother and [C]hildren interact. ***Id.*** at 59. [Ms. Valera] testified [C]hildren "are extremely bonded to [paternal] grandmother." ***Id.*** [Ms. Valera] further testified that[,] in her opinion[, C]hildren would not be harmed if [P]arents' rights are terminated.

Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 17-18 (some citations modified).

The orphans' court further found that paternal grandmother appropriately attends to Children's heightened needs:

> The testimony established that E.J has special needs. [E.J.] has been diagnosed with cerebral palsy with hypoxia. Currently, paternal grandmother takes [E.J.] to all [of] his [medical and therapeutic] appointments. A.J. attends speech and occupational therapy[,] with [paternal] grandmother [taking] her to her appointments. L.J. is going to be assessed for early intervention. All providers for [C]hildren are currently in upstate New York. Ms. Valera testified paternal grandmother is "up to speed" with all [of C]hildren's needs. N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 59. [Ms. Valera testified that] all [of C]hildren's needs are being met[, and that C]hildren are safe. ***Id.***

Id. at 23-24 (some citations modified).

The orphans' court ultimately determined that,

> [i]n light of both Mother and Father's repeated inability to address their ongoing drug and alcohol, mental health, [and] housing … issues, th[e orphans'] court finds the testimony overwhelmingly establishes the needs and welfare of [C]hildren would not be best served by returning [C]hildren to [Mother]. ….
>
> ….
>
> Th[e orphans'] court finds the testimony established [C]hildren share a bond with both Mother and Father …. The testimony also establishes [C]hildren are bonded with paternal

> grandmother. Th[e orphans'] court is satisfied[,] based on the totality of the circumstances[, that C]hildren will not suffer irreparable harm if the parent-child relationship is severed. [C]hildren are safe and being well cared for in paternal grandmother's home. [C]hildren have been in [placement] for more than 18 months. In that period of time, despite numerous referrals and assistance, [P]arents have made no or minimal progress.

Id. at 24-25.

We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the orphans' court, as it is amply supported by the record and free of legal error. ***Interest of N.A.S.***, 338 A.3d at 196–97; ***see also Interest of M.K.L.***, 354 A.3d at 71 (noting that the orphans' court "has discretion to place appropriate weight on each [Section 2511(b)] factor present in the record").

Contrary to Mother's assertion, the orphans' court readily acknowledged that Children share a bond with Mother. Orphans' Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 17-18. The orphans' court nevertheless found, after weighing Mother's and Children's bond against the other evidence presented at the TPR hearing, that Children would not suffer irreparable harm if the parent-child relationship were severed. ***Id.*** at 24-25. While significant, the existence of a parent-child bond does not, standing alone, preclude the termination of parental rights. ***See Interest of K.T.***, 296 A.3d at 1113 ("[T]he parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis.").

The record further supports the orphans' court's finding that Children also share a strong bond with paternal grandmother, with whom Children have resided for the majority of their placements. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 59

(Ms. Valera opining that Children are "extremely bonded to" paternal grandmother). In addition to attending to Children's daily needs, the testimony at the TPR hearing established that paternal grandmother has secured and maintained appropriate services for Children's respective special needs. ***Id.*** at 57-58.

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of the orphans' court's discretion in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights best serves Children's needs and welfare. Accordingly, Mother's third and fourth issues entitle her to no relief.

In her fifth and final issue, Mother argues that the orphans' court erred "in failing to consider and/or improperly admitting hearsay evidence in making its findings." Mother's Brief at 40. Mother argues that the orphans' court "looked at the totality of the circumstances when making its decision[,] which included hearsay statements." ***Id.*** at 42 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Initially, we determine whether Mother has preserved this issue for appellate review. In her brief, the only purported hearsay evidence Mother cites is "visitation notes and a report, to undermine [P]arents' credibility, and show how [] there were 'issues … or concerns that occurred during those visits." ***Id.*** at 42-43 (quoting N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 18). Mother does not cite a specific exhibit or testimony. ***See In re Child M.***, 681 A.2d 793, 799 (Pa. Super. 1996) (in a termination of parental rights case, stating that "[w]e

cannot address appellant's sweeping charge that the lower court incorrectly admitted too much 'hearsay' because we lack references to specific instances of alleged lower court error ….").

Mother further fails to direct this Court to the place in the record where she preserved her evidentiary claim with a timely objection. ***See Interest of S.K.L.R.***, 256 A.3d at 1124 (finding waiver of a challenge to the admissibility of evidence, where the petitioner/county agency failed to object and state a specific ground for the objection.). While Mother claims that "visitation notes and a report" were admitted by the orphans' court "over Attorney Objection," Mother's Brief at 42, our review discloses that Mother lodged no objection.

On the second day of the TPR hearing, during Ms. Vassell's testimony, the Agency proffered Outreach's visitation notes (Exhibit 6). N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 14. *Father* objected, arguing that "[t]here's double hearsay contained in Exhibit 6." ***Id.*** at 15. The orphans' court asked Father for an example of the objectionable evidence, which Father was unable to provide. ***Id.*** Counsel for the Agency then advised, "I've notified counsel[for Parents], there are going to be several Outreach workers that testify today." ***Id.*** With no further argument from Father (or Mother), the orphans' court admitted Exhibit 6 as a business record, with the following, limiting qualification:

> [W]hile the whole document may come in[as a business record], and I'm probably going to consider large swaths of it[,] considering the proffer by the Agency that multiple Outreach workers will be testifying, if there is a specific piece of double hearsay in there, I can assure you I will not rely on it in making my final decision.

Id. at 17. Neither Mother nor Father objected to the orphans' court's qualified admission of Exhibit 6, and our review discloses Mother did not object to the admissibility of Exhibit 6 at any time during the remainder of the TPR hearing.

Because Mother wholly fails to identify any objectionable hearsay testimony, and because she neither lodged an objection, nor joined in Father's objection to Exhibit 6, Mother's fifth issue is waived. ***See Interest of S.K.L.R.***, 256 A.3d at 1124; ***In re Child M.***, 681 A.2d at 799; ***see also Commonwealth v. Cannady***, 590 A.2d 356, 362 (Pa. Super. 1991) (deeming a defendant's evidentiary challenge waived, where he did not lodge a timely objection, "nor did he join in [his] co-defendant['s] objection").[14]


Based on the foregoing, Mother's challenges to the orphans' court's termination of her parental rights to Children entitle her to no relief.

Orders affirmed.

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[14] Even if Mother had properly identified objectionable evidence and preserved her challenge with a timely objection, our review would be impeded by Mother's failure to ensure that Exhibit 6 was included in the certified record transmitted to this Court. ***See Commonwealth v. Bongiorno***, 905 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2006) (*en banc*) ("Our law is unequivocal that the responsibility rests upon the appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing court to perform its duty.").

Judgment Entered.



Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2026