NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.	:	
MACARIO URSEL CLARK	:	
Appellant	:	No. 431 MDA 2026

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 17, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000684-2025

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: **FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2026**

Macario Ursel Clark (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of one count of carrying a firearm without a license.[1] After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history underlying this appeal, as follows:

> On September 3, 2024, Sergeant Grant Cox (Officer Cox) of the West Shore Regional Police Department was parked in his patrol vehicle, observing traffic heading into Wormleysburg, when a grey Nissan Altima drove past him. As the Altima passed by, Officer Cox noticed the occupants look at him, look back, and then forward, as they continued to the vicinity of the 400 block of [North Second Street]. Officer Cox began to follow the vehicle, and when he did, the Altima made a quick right turn onto Elm

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[1] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1) (providing that "any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license … commits a felony of the third degree").

> Street. As Officer Cox turned right onto Elm Street, he observed that the Altima had parked, and all its occupants had exited the vehicle and began to walk away.
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> Officer Cox testified that he is familiar with the area; did not recognize the individuals who had exited the Altima; and found it odd that the individuals had parked so abruptly and got out of the car. He added, specifically, that the Altima was parked approximately three feet from the curb, and the front end of the car was partially in the street, with the potential to obstruct the flow of traffic.
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> Three occupants, including [] Appellant, exited the car. Appellant had been in the driver's seat. Officer Cox noted that all the occupants looked young—perhaps in their late teens. Officer Cox walked up to the Altima and looked in. He saw the extended magazine of what appeared to be a pistol that occupied the space between the front passenger seat and the center console. At that point, he asked the individuals who had been in the vehicle, and were, then, approximately 20 yards away from it, to come back—which they did. Officer Cox asked the individuals about the gun, and Appellant responded that he would "take the charge." N.T.[, 12/15/25,] at 35. At that point, Officer Cox asked for, and received, consent from Appellant to search the Altima.
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> Appellant was ultimately charged with carrying a firearm without a license. At the jury trial on December 1[5], 2025, Officer Cox was the only witness presented by the Commonwealth, along with [exhibits including] the recovered weapon and [body-worn camera] footage (from another officer) of Officer Cox's encounter with the Altima and its occupants. Appellant proffered no evidence at trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 1-3 (some punctuation modified). Additionally, "the parties stipulated that Appellant was under 21 years of age at the time of the incident … and that the firearm was operational and capable of firing a projectile." ***Id.*** at 4 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6109(b) (providing that an individual must be "21 years of age or older" to apply "for a license to carry

a firearm concealed on or about his person or in a vehicle within this Commonwealth")).

Pertinently, as the trial court explained,

> Appellant's counsel requested a jury instruction regarding the definition of possession, containing language about constructive possession, including the ability and intent to control an item. [The trial court did not give the requested instruction.] The court instructed the jury about the elements of carrying a firearm without a license. In that regard, the jury was informed that to find Appellant guilty of the charge, it must determine he carried a firearm in a vehicle, was not in his home or place of business, and did not have a valid and lawfully issued license [to carry] a firearm. …
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> During its deliberations, the jury sent a question to the court requesting clarification of the term "carry" in the context of the charge. Appellant's counsel reiterated his previous position, relying on … ***Commonwealth v. Magwood***, 538 A.2d 908 (Pa. Super. 1988), [for the proposition] that the [defendant] must be found to have been in possession of the weapon. The court agreed to inform the jury that, in order to carry a weapon, the [defendant] must be found to be in possession of the weapon. However, Appellant's counsel indicated he stood by his initial argument that the court should provide the jury with an instruction that carrying a firearm without a license requires either actual physical possession, or constructive possession, of the firearm. [Appellant's counsel requested an instruction that] while actual possession necessarily involves control, constructive possession requires the power and intent to control, and mere presence [in a vehicle in which a firearm is found] is not, in and of itself, enough to sustain a conviction.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 3-4.

In response to the jury's question regarding the term "carry," the trial court further instructed the jury as follows:

> [I]n 1988, our Superior Court said, in order to carry a weapon, essentially, the [d]efendant must be found to have been in possession of that weapon.

> In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court used this definition of carry[:] … to possess and convey a firearm in a vehicle[,] including the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car. That was used in a case dealing with carrying a firearm, so it was to possess and convey a firearm.
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> Now, convey means simply to take or carry from one place to another, to transport. I hope that is helpful. Again, there is the aspect of possession and to possess and convey with respect to carrying. And conveying is to take or carry from one place to another. So the definition of convey goes back and uses the word carry. It's a little bit circular, but I hope that is somewhat helpful.

N.T., 12/15/25, at 89-90.[2]

The jury thereafter convicted Appellant of carrying a firearm without a license. On February 17, 2026, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years' probation.

Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

> 1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by denying [Appellant's] requested jury instruction defining possession, including constructive possession requiring the power and intent to control, where the case involved a vehicle with three occupants and the jury expressly asked for clarification of "carry"?
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> 2. Did the Commonwealth fail to present evidence distinguishing [Appellant's] power and intent to control the firearm from that of the two other occupants of the vehicle beyond proximity and an ambiguous statement[,] which rendered the evidence insufficient

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[2] Though not explicit in the record, it is apparent that ***Muscarello v. U.S.***, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), is the United States Supreme Court case the trial court referenced.

> at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] "carried" the firearm?

Appellant's Brief at 5.

In his first issue, Appellant argues the word "carry," as used in Section 6106, "has been repeatedly equated [with] the word 'possess' by Pennsylvania [c]ourts[.]" Appellant's Brief at 18 (citing ***Commonwealth v. Peters***, 218 A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa. 2019); ***Commonwealth v. Townsend***, 237 A.2d 192, 194 (Pa. 1968); ***Magwood***, 538 A.2d at 910).[3] Appellant relies on Justice McCaffery's dissenting opinion in ***Commonwealth v. Muhammad***, 335 A.3d 1047 (Pa. 2025) (plurality), which suggested that "carry" is an ambiguous term, and that it should be equated with "possess." ***Id.*** at 1071-76 (McCaffery, J., dissenting);[4] ***see also*** Appellant's Brief at 17-18. Appellant

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[3] The Commonwealth argues Appellant's brief is substantially defective, as it repeatedly cites strings of cases without distinguishing between them or elucidating them in his argument. Commonwealth's Brief at 10-11 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 126(a) ("When citing authority, a party should direct the court's attention to the specific part of the authority on which the party relies"). Our review confirms that Appellant repeatedly relies upon a string citation of ***Peters***, ***Townsend***, and ***Magwood***, without quoting language from any of the cases, and it is not clear that they stand for the propositions for which Appellant cites them. ***See*** Appellant's Brief at 17, 18, 23. The Commonwealth argues "this defect prevents the Commonwealth from directly responding to [Appellant's] purported claims and legal analyses." Commonwealth's Brief at 11. The Commonwealth asserts the defects in Appellant's brief "prohibit any meaningful review," and urges this Court to dismiss the appeal. ***Id.*** at 12. While we decline to dismiss the appeal, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant's use of string citations is unhelpful.

[4] ***But see Muhammad***, 335 A.3d at 1074 (McCaffery, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that Pennsylvania precedent, including ***Peters***, ***Townsend***, *(Footnote Continued Next Page)*

further relies on ***Magwood***, in which this Court rejected an appellant's challenge to a jury instruction that defined "carry" under Section 6106 as "essentially" equivalent with possession, and included an instruction regarding constructive possession. ***Magwood***, 538 A.2d at 909; ***see also*** Appellant's Brief at 21-22. Appellant notes that, instantly, the trial court used part of the jury instruction approved in ***Magwood***, but did not include the portion regarding constructive possession. Appellant's Brief at 21-22. Appellant maintains this was erroneous. ***Id.*** Appellant further asserts he was prejudiced by the error, arguing he could have been acquitted if the jury had been instructed regarding constructive possession. ***Id.*** at 22.

The Commonwealth counters that the trial court sufficiently and accurately instructed the jury regarding Section 6106. Commonwealth's Brief at 12-15. The Commonwealth notes that this Court, relying on the plurality opinion in ***Muhammad***, has held that

> to convict a defendant of carrying a firearm without a license, "there were only three elements the jury needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt: [First, that defendant] carried the firearm in a vehicle…. Second, that [he] was not in his place of abode … or a fixed place of business…. And, third, that [he] did not have a valid and lawfully issued license to carry a firearm."

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and ***Magwood***, "is divorced from any explicit consideration of whether 'carries' is something distinct from 'possesses.'").

Commonwealth v. Mumford, 353 A.3d 247, 259-60 (Pa. Super. 2026) (quoting ***Muhammad***, 335 A.3d at 1053 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (OAJC)); ***see also*** Commonwealth's Brief at 13-14.

"In reviewing a jury charge, we determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case." ***Commonwealth v. Jones***, 323 A.3d 13, 21 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted); ***see also Commonwealth v. Davis***, 326 A.3d 988, 994 (Pa. Super. 2024) ("Only where there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.").

> A trial court has broad discretion in formulating and delivering instructions to a jury. When reviewing the exercise of that discretion, an appellate court must evaluate the trial court's instruction as a whole to determine if it was fair or prejudicial. A trial court may use such language as it chooses, so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. We will not rigidly inspect a jury charge, finding reversible error for every technical inaccuracy, but rather evaluate whether the charge sufficiently and accurately apprises a lay jury of the law it must consider in rendering its decision. Error cannot be predicated on isolated excerpts of the charge, but it is the general effect of the charge that controls.

Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 634-35 (Pa. 2022) (footnotes and quotation marks omitted). "The trial court is not required to give every charge that is requested by the parties[,] and its refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal unless the appellant was prejudiced by that refusal." ***Jones***, 323 A.3d at 21 (citation omitted).

In ***Magwood***, the appellant argued his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court's jury instruction regarding

"carrying" under Section 6106. ***Magwood***, 538 A.2d at 908-09. Though the ***Magwood*** Court did not set forth the facts underlying the appellant's conviction, it noted that "the Commonwealth based its case on a joint constructive possession theory." ***Id.*** at 909. The ***Magwood*** Court determined the appellant's ineffectiveness claim lacked arguable merit, reasoning as follows:

> The trial court, in defining the term "carrying" as used in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106, correctly noted that, "In order to carry a weapon, essentially, the defendant must be found to have been in possession of that weapon." The court then defined possession as follows:
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> > Mere presence in an automobile in which a weapon is found does not establish possession of that weapon. Rather, the Commonwealth must establish both the defendant's power of control over the weapon and his intention to exercise that control, which intention presupposes knowledge of the weapon's presence.
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> This definition adequately and accurately reflects the law regarding the definition of joint constructive possession. ***See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boatwright***, 453 A.2d 1058, 1059 (Pa. Super. 1982) (to prove joint constructive possession, Commonwealth must present evidence to show that defendant had both power to control firearm and intent to exercise that control; mere presence at scene where firearm was found is insufficient) (citing ***Townsend***, 237 A.2d 192 (regarding mere presence)); ***Commonwealth v. Luddy***, 422 A.2d 601 (Pa. Super. 1980) (regarding power to control and intent to exercise control)).

Magwood, 538 A.2d at 909-10 (record citations omitted; citations modified).

In ***Muhammad***, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with, *inter alia*, carrying a firearm without a license under Section 6106, and persons not

to possess firearms under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). As our Supreme Court explained,

> a conviction under Section 6105(a) requires proof of a prior conviction for an offense enumerated in subsection (b). At Muhammad's jury trial, to prevent the jury from learning of Muhammad's prior conviction and preclude the attendant prejudice to him which might arise from this disclosure, the trial court, with the agreement of the parties, did not instruct the jury that he had been charged with persons not to possess firearms. Instead, the court instructed the jurors [that] Muhammad was charged with "[p]ossessing a [f]irearm," which is not a crime under Pennsylvania law. In addition, the verdict slip provided to the jury included the following question: "Did the Defendant Rasheed Muhammad on December 18, 2018 **possess and have under his control a firearm**, to wit a Smith & Wesson 38 Caliber Special?" Beneath this question were spaces for the jury to check either "yes" or "no." In the event the jury answered "yes" to this interrogatory, the court intended to inform them there was a stipulation Muhammad had a criminal history barring him from possessing a gun under Section 6105, instruct them on this offense, and have them determine whether or not he was guilty of persons not to possess firearms. As it happens, however, the jury checked the "no" space.

Muhammad, 335 A.3d at 1049-50 (OAJC) (record citations omitted; emphasis added). However, the jury convicted Muhammad of carrying a firearm without license. ***Id.*** at 1050. On appeal, he argued the jury's response to the special interrogatory rendered the evidence insufficient to support his conviction for carrying a firearm without a license. This Court rejected that argument, noting that "consistency in a verdict is not required," and determined the evidence was sufficient to support Muhammad's Section 6106 conviction. ***Commonwealth v. Muhammad***, 289 A.3d 1078, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2023).

Our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal and, in a plurality opinion, affirmed Muhammad's judgment of sentence. ***See generally Muhammad***, 335 A.3d 1047. While it disapproved of the use of special interrogatories in criminal trials, the OAJC determined that

> the jury's "no" answer to th[e special interrogatory's] compound question did not constitute a specific finding [that] Muhammad did not possess the firearm. Rather, the jury's negative response reflects their determination he did not both possess **and control** the gun in question.
>
> The crime of carrying a firearm without a license, however, does not require a finding of possession and control of the weapon. By its plain terms, Section 6106 applies to "any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle[.]" 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a)(1). Even assuming "carries" means "possesses" for purposes of Section 6106, there is certainly nothing in the statute requiring that in addition to carrying the firearm in a vehicle, the defendant must also control the gun as well. ***See Commonwealth v. Wright***, 609 Pa. 22, 14 A.3d 798, 814 (2011) ("[A]s a matter of statutory interpretation, although one is admonished to listen attentively to what a statute says[,] one must also listen attentively to what it does not say."), quoting ***Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.***, 567 Pa. 514, 788 A.2d 955, 962 (2001). On the contrary, as the trial court correctly recognized in instructing the jury on this charge, to convict Muhammad of carrying a firearm without a license there were only three elements the jury needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt: "First, that [Muhammad] carried the firearm in a vehicle…. Second, that [he] was not in his place of abode … or a fixed place of business…. And, third, that [he] did not have a valid and lawfully issued license to carry a firearm." Notably, this instruction, which tracks the statutory language of Section 6106(a), omits any mention of "control." Likewise, Muhammad himself simply argues "[Section] 6106 requires possession of a firearm." He does not insist there is an additional, unstated element of control.
>
> In sum, we find no actual inconsistency between the jury's answer to the special interrogatory and Muhammad's conviction for carrying a firearm without a license. The interrogatory posed a conjunctive question asking whether Muhammad "possess[ed]

> and ha[d] under his control" a firearm. That made-up question, pertaining to a made-up crime, does not reflect the elements of the very real crime of carrying a firearm without a license. In fact, as discussed, the words "possess" and "control" do not even appear in Section 6106(a), let alone as a conjunctive phrase. We thus detect no inconsistency here. The jury could have reasonably concluded Muhammad failed to "possess and have under his control" the firearm given that it was stashed away in the center console and hidden from view, while simultaneously (and properly) finding that he "carrie[d it] in any vehicle[.]" 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106(a)(1).

Muhammad, 335 A.3d at 1053-54 (OAJC) (footnotes and record citations omitted; emphasis in original).

The OAJC responded to Justice McCaffery's dissenting opinion as follows:

> While acknowledging "there is reason to question whether 'carries' is synonymous with 'possession,'" the dissent nonetheless charges us with "attempt[ing] to *sub silentio* overrule five decades of precedent equating 'carries' with 'possession.'" Dissenting Opinion at 1066; ***see also id.*** at 1071 ("I thus turn to the [OAJC's] implicit overruling of fifty years of precedent that defines Section 6106 as a possessory offense."). However, as the dissent concedes, the precedent it cites "is divorced from any explicit consideration of whether 'carries' is something distinct from 'possesses.'" ***Id.*** at 1074. In any event, we are not overruling any of these cases, "implicitly" or otherwise. On the contrary, as expressly noted above, we assume for purposes of our analysis that "carries" and "possesses" are synonymous in this context. Our disposition turns not on whether there is a distinction between "carries" and "possesses," but rather on the incontrovertible fact that Section 6106 does not require "control" of the firearm.

Id. at 1053 n.7; ***see also id.*** at 1053 n.6 (observing that, unlike Section 6106, "other provisions of the Uniform Firearms Act explicitly use the word 'possess.'" (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a), 6110.1(a), 6110.2(a)).

Instantly, the trial court opined that it sufficiently and accurately instructed the jury, reasoning as follows:

> Appellant asserts that the court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction regarding the definition of possession, to include language about constructive possession (including the ability and intent to control an item). However, the court, in fact, did address possession in the clarification it provided to the jury's question about the meaning of the term "carry."

Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 7. The trial court noted ***Muhammad***'s identification of the "three elements" necessary to support a conviction under Section 6106, and asserted its instant jury instructions "track[ed] the statutory language" of Section 6106. ***Id.*** at 8 (quoting ***Muhammad***, 335 A.3d at 1053).

Our review discloses that the trial court "sufficiently and accurately apprise[d]" the jury of the applicable law. ***Drummond***, 285 A.3d at 635. While ***Magwood*** suggests that a further instruction regarding constructive possession would also have been an acceptable, accurate instruction, ***see Magwood***, 538 A.2d at 909-10,[5] our evaluation of the "general effect" of the instant jury instructions "as a whole" reveals no abuse of the trial court's "broad discretion" in its refusal to give the requested instruction. ***Drummond***, 285 A.3d at 634-35.

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[5] ***See also, e.g., Mumford***, 353 A.3d at 259-60 (holding the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's Section 6106 conviction because, *inter alia*, the jury could have reasonably inferred the defendant constructively possessed the firearm in a vehicle).

The trial court further opined that, even if the instruction was erroneous, the error did not prejudice Appellant. Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 10-12. Rather, the trial court suggested that an instruction regarding constructive possession "would have underscored Appellant's possession … of the weapon and further supported his guilt on the charge of carrying a firearm without a license." ***Id.*** at 11. We agree.[6] ***See Jones***, 323 A.3d at 21. Appellant baldly asserts that the lack of a constructive possession instruction "likely contributed to the jury's [guilty] verdict," but fails to explain how this is the case. Appellant's Brief at 22. We emphasize the evidence established that, when Officer Cox questioned the vehicle's occupants about the gun, Appellant immediately claimed responsibility for it, saying, "I'll take the charge." N.T., 12/15/25, at 35; ***see also id.*** at 40-41 (same); Exhibit 3 (body-worn camera footage depicting Appellant saying, "I'll take the charge").

For these reasons, Appellant's first issue merits no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his Section 6106 conviction. Appellant's Brief at 23-24. Appellant maintains the Commonwealth presented no evidence "to refute that any of the other passengers in the vehicle carried the gun." ***Id.*** at 24. Appellant

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[6] We observe that in ***Magwood***, the defendant argued the trial court should *not* have instructed the jury regarding constructive possession, and maintained he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to object to the instruction. ***See Magwood***, 538 A.2d at 908-09.

asserts this "resulted in competing inferences as to who carried the gun," and therefore rendered the jury's verdict "a product of conjecture." ***Id.***

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

> presents a pure question of law and, as such, our standard of review is *de novo*, and our scope of review is plenary. As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
>
> The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence establishing a defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant's crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's convictions will be upheld.

Mumford, 353 A.3d at 256 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

In its opinion, the trial court rejected Appellant's sufficiency challenge. Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 11. As the trial court observed, the evidence showed that

> Appellant was one of three occupants of the Altima, and the operable weapon was recovered in the space between the passenger seat and the center console—in close proximity to Appellant as the car's driver. At some point, after noticing Officer Cox, Appellant abruptly parked the Altima, and all three occupants began to walk away. Appellant was under 21 years of age at the time, and when asked about the weapon by police, Appellant immediately stated, "I'll take the charge."

Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/26, at 9. Noting Appellant's reliance on the concept of constructive possession, the trial court further concluded the evidence was sufficient to show Appellant's constructive possession of the gun. ***Id.*** at 10-11 (stating "it is apparent [that] Appellant, as the driver of the vehicle, had easy access to the weapon and, at the very least, would have shared joint constructive possession of the gun with the individual who occupied the passenger seat.").

We agree with the trial court's analysis and conclusion. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant carried the firearm in a vehicle without a license. ***See*** 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a); ***Mumford***, 353 A.3d at 259-60. With respect to Appellant's reliance on constructive possession, we observe that Appellant neglects to mention the well-settled principle that "[t]o find constructive possession, the power and intent to control the [item] does not need to be exclusive to the [defendant,] … and may be found in one or more actors where the item … is in an area of joint control and equal access." ***Id.*** at 258 (quoting ***Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon***, 256 A.3d 432, 437-38 (Pa. Super. 2021)). The evidence therefore did not have to refute the possibility that the vehicle's

other occupants also carried/possessed the gun. Accordingly, Appellant's second issue merits no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.



Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2026